

Personality and
Problems of Adjustment

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PERSONALITY AND PROBLEMS OF ADJUSTMENT

BY

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"It is much easier to measure nonsignificant factors than to be content with developing a first approximation of the significant."

—ELTON MAYO

Preface

The second edition represents a very considerable amount of completely new material, as well as extensive reorganization and rewriting of material from the first edition. The basic aim of this book is to describe, analyze, and interpret the development and functioning of the personality against a background of physiological, societal, and cultural factors. The new edition has twenty-three chapters. The first eleven of these make up Part I, "The Foundations of Personality." The balance, Part II, "Selected Problems of Personal Adjustment," comprises the other chapters.

The theoretical orientation, as in the previous edition, is that of social interaction. In developing this standpoint the author has drawn upon the contribution to social psychology of William James, John Dewey, Charles H. Cooley, George H. Mead, and W. I. Thomas; on contemporary anthropologists with their emphasis upon cultural variability and on the close interplay of culture and personality; and finally, on the dynamic psychology of the Freudians, with their stress on unconscious motivation and the various mechanisms of personal adjustment. The new edition, even more than the first, illustrates the growing rapprochement of the work in social psychology, cultural anthropology, and psychoanalysis.

Although all the chapters have been re-worked in an effort to improve their organization and style, the chief changes in Part I are as follows: There is a restatement of modern learning theory as it bears on the rise and operation of the personality. The chapter on theories of personality has been reorganized to permit the introduction of new material dealing especially with the work of such neo-Freudians as Karen Horney, Abram Kardiner, Erich Fromm, and others. The former chapter on methods of studying personality has been altered. The brief treatment of experimental and statistical methods has been eliminated because such a discussion is tangential to the main purpose of this book. Moreover, it is to be hoped that most of the students who use this book will have at least a nodding acquaintance with experimental method and statistics. The deleted section has been replaced by entirely new material on projective techniques for the study of personality. In addition, a critique of various forms of therapy, including the non-directive types, is included.

The principal changes in Part II are, first, a completely new chapter dealing with the psychological problems of later maturity and old age, a whole area of interest that has grown apace since the first edition of this

book appeared. Additional material from psychosomatic medicine has been included. The discussions of psycho-sexual development and adjustment, especially as related to problems of adolescence, marriage, and the unmarried but older woman, have drawn upon the recent work of Alfred Kinsey, E. W. Burgess, and H. E. Jones, among others. The treatment of juvenile delinquency and crime has been reduced to one chapter, but considerable new matter from Sheldon and Eleanor Glueck and others has been included. The earlier two chapters on the neurotic and psychotic manifestations of personality have been reorganized into one.

The new edition, like the former one, has a glossary of technical terms. The outline for writing a case history or personal life story has been revised. A listing of selected motion pictures bearing on various aspects of personality is an entirely new feature. The names and addresses of the principal distributors of such films is also included.

The book is primarily designed for students who have had at least an introductory course in psychology. Their understanding of the work, however, will be more complete and satisfactory if the students have also had the introductory courses in anthropology and sociology, respectively. It should be noted that the interrelation of culture and personality has been emphasized throughout the entire book in a much more thoroughgoing way than in the previous edition.

I wish to take this opportunity to thank various people who have helped in the preparation of the second edition. Dr. June McCormick Collins not only helped in particular with the chapter on later maturity and old age, but also collected material for a number of the other chapters. Peter Jacobsohn aided considerably by combing some of the recent literature in periodicals and books. He also collected the material from which the list of films was compiled. Miss Vera Mara typed most of the manuscript. My colleague, R. F. Winch, offered many sound suggestions regarding the content and treatment of parts of the new edition, but he is in no way responsible for the particular interpretations which I have given. Finally, I want to thank the many people who have used the first edition and who offered a great many suggestions for the present one. I trust that I have not disappointed them.

K. Y.

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PART I

THE FOUNDATIONS
OF PERSONALITY

CHAPTER 1

Personality, Society, and Culture

The subject of personality may be effectively introduced by noting its relationship to the society and culture in which it develops and functions. In fact the most striking recent advances in social psychology have come from the realization of the important part which culture plays in "making" the personality. Obviously other factors, constitutional and situational, influence the development and functioning of the individual. Yet an understanding of the place of culture in the formation of one's ideas, attitudes, values, and habits is crucial to the construction of a sound theory of personality. It is one of the basic postulates of this book that culture is a main determinant of personality.

The play of society and its culture upon the individual is, however, largely non-deliberative or unconscious. The man-in-the-street seldom has any notion of the way in which social-cultural forces affect him and his fellows. The ordinary man thinks of personality as an "indefinable something"—something which makes one person popular and another disliked. To say, "Mary has a wonderful personality," implies that Mary has qualities which make her successful in certain social enterprises. In contrast, to remark, "John is a difficult personality," indicates that John is not easy to get along with, that those who know him have to be careful in their dealing with him lest they offend him. And, then to say of still a third, "Sarah has no personality," means that she makes little or no impression on others. The inference here is that some individuals lack the mystic thing called personality.

The serious and informed student of personality cannot ignore the popular beliefs of the man-in-the-street, since how people react to each other is qualified by their preconceptions. But we would have no science of personality if we left matters at this point. To develop a systematic understanding of the structure and function of personality we must go beyond these naïve views. One of the purposes of this book is to advance a fuller and more objective understanding of the fundamentals of personality, how it develops, and how it functions in society and culture.

THE INDIVIDUAL IN SOCIETY AND CULTURE

Any given response or behavior may be stated as the function of the interplay of the person and his environment. In this book our emphasis will

be upon the individual's relation to other people, that is, to his *social* environment. The key concept for this relationship is *interaction* in which the response of A is the stimulus or cue to B whose own reaction to A's response is, in turn, a stimulus to A. Thus is set up a pattern of interstimulation and response which G. H. Mead called "the social act."¹

Three Basic Variables. For our purposes the important variables are personality, society, and culture. The first is the central concept; the others provide the stage on which personality operates. Of the two latter, *society* may be defined generically as a configuration or more or less structured interaction between or among individuals. It is an association of people, large or small in number, who have a common set of habits, attitudes, and ideas sufficient to hold them together. Groups may be classified as primary or secondary. The former are marked by close face-to-face relations and the satisfaction of a wide range of needs of the individual. Such a group is the family, small neighborhood, or the village. The secondary group is characterized by specialized interests and often indirect or mechanical rather than close inter-personal means of communication. Sometimes groups are set off from one another in terms of avoidance or hostility and we classify them in terms of in-group versus out-group relations. In addition, some societies or groups have a territorial location as the family or the city; others, like a scientific association or a corporation, do not.

Culture consists of the customs and traditions of man, his ways of thinking and acting which have largely come down from the past and which he shares with his fellows. Culture arises and is kept going by basic and recurrent needs of mankind. Although it is transmitted from generation to generation, it is subject to change through invention or borrowing from others. It is characterized also by certain central or core features and a considerable range of variability. In psychological terms it represents expectations, definitions of situations, and responses thereto which are largely learned at the hands of one's fellows.

Without common ideas, attitudes, traits, and habits which grow out of interaction, society would fall apart. Common thoughts and actions develop first of all around the basic needs for food, drink, clothes, shelter, reproduction, child care, and the requirements of societal organization and control. So, too, thoughts and habits emerge which express esthetic and play interests; others explain and symbolize man's place in the universe and his relations to the supernatural. These common and more or less standardized patterns the members of the group pass on to other individuals, to children born into the group, or to new members who get into the particular association in one way or another. This transmission of ways of thinking and doing runs through all society from the family and other primary groupings to the most loosely knit secondary types. This continu-

¹ G. H. Mead, *Mind, Self, and Society* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1934).

ity of ideas, attitudes, and habits or culture from one generation to the next is one of the outstanding features of man's life in society.

Personality may be defined as the more or less organized body of ideas, attitudes, traits, values, and responses (habits) which an individual has built into rôles and statuses for dealing with others and with himself. The source of these rôles and statuses, with their supporting ideas, attitudes, traits and habits, is his differential participation in various groups and their culture patterns. Some of his characteristics as a personality will have much in common with those of his fellows. Others will be quite distinctive and idiosyncratic. The relative weight of the common, conforming features and the individualistic, unique ones will depend, as we shall note, on the interplay of constitutional factors with personal-social and cultural learning. (See below.)

On the basis of these foundations we shall have ample opportunity to see that the person's view of himself as well as his view of others is intimately bound up with what he has learned from his parents, playmates, fellow-workers, and so on through the whole gamut of his membership in groups of varying sizes and functions.

Furthermore any sound and full consideration of personality must take into account both the *external* or stimulus-response aspects of personality and the *internal* or motivational and valuational features. It is true that the internal factors can only be studied by observing gross bodily reactions or by studying gestures and language. But from such external expressions we draw certain inferences about the internal elements and these inferences aid us in understanding what impels people to action and what meaning they give their experiences.

Some Important Determinants of Personality. Personality development and function within the social-cultural matrix rests upon the biological foundation of the individual. This means that one's potentialities for development and function have their first roots in components which depend on heredity. As we shall see in Chapter 2 the old debate about heredity versus environment is meaningless. This does not mean, however, that genetic factors such as body build, neuro-muscular organization, differences in endocrine balance, and other organic features are not important in strength and direction of drives or needs, in learning capacity, and in aiding in determining the goals or rewards which serve to reduce the imbalance or tension that sets up behavior in the first place.

In addition to these organically founded factors, sex and age are also rooted in the constitution of the individual. True, the culture will largely determine their place in particular situations but together they represent two important bases for differentiation of social function and hence of some aspects of personal adjustment.

The societal impress upon personality is first of all evident in the different membership rôles and statuses which the individual has or acquires.

In fact, Linton considers the factor of status so important that in addition to accepting Kardiner's theory of some kind of modal or culturally determined basic personality type, he posits a "status personality" which is "superimposed" upon the basic pattern. The status elements "differ from the basic personality type in being heavily weighted on the side of specific overt responses."²

Rôle and associated status, in fact, are the keys to the development of the social self which, in turn, is the core of the personality. Ample attention to these factors will be given later. Rôle and status and their accompanying ideas, attitudes, and habits have their roots largely in the culture of a given time and place. While the culture is carried to a new-born and growing infant and child through parents, teachers, preachers, and others, nevertheless it has a certain externality and patterning of its own.

In addition to constitutional and social-cultural determinants, we must not overlook the impress of given situations themselves on personal qualities and actions. No matter how fully culture may define some situations there are others where this is not so. Some of these arise within the family, on the playground, in critical circumstances, such as combat, flood, or fire, or where other physical forces come into unexpected play. That is, we refer to situations where the culture has not provided a specific or permissive definition of what to do. These forms of learned responses we call *personal-social* to distinguish them from cultural.³ Personal-social training is particularly important in the earliest and formative years of life and hence must be considered an important determinant of the individual's life organization.

Forms of Control and of Deviation. Individuals in all societies find themselves under some kind of duress or power obliging them to conform to the expected standards of their society or group. These controls may take the form of external punishment, symbolic or physical, or internal values and attitudes which we express by the sense of guilt and shame. The concept of moral self or conscience (the super-ego of Freud) refers to this particular function of the individual. People everywhere are norm-oriented in much of what they think and do. Nevertheless most individuals under some circumstances do deviate from the norms of their society. Some of these divergences are of minor significance to the group or society, others are considered so severe as to threaten its stability. Among the latter are homicide, treason to the group, taking the property of others

² Ralph Linton, *The Cultural Background of Personality* (New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1945), p. 130. For Kardiner's theory of basic personality types, see his *The Individual and His Society* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1939). Kardiner's theory is reviewed in Chap. 11.

³ Personal-social is not a very satisfactory term but over the years since it was first introduced into social psychology, I have not come up with a better one. The reason for using *personal* is to stress the non cultural and unique aspect of the learning while *social* indicates that the source and operation are always within the framework of the social act.

—as property is variously defined—and showing verbal and overt actions the society would consider mentally aberrant or abnormal. We shall describe and analyze some of these with regard to particular personality problems, but it is well to recognize at the outset that societies are marked not only by conformity to norms but by deviance from the same as well. This brings us once more to the important matter of the relation of general and universal to specific and unique elements in the personality, as these, in turn, relate to cultural variability and differences in personality structure and function. We shall discuss this in the next and final section of this chapter.

CULTURAL VARIABILITY AND PERSONAL VARIABILITY

In treating the social-cultural factors which come into play in developing and maintaining the personality, there has been a definite shift from an earlier, ethnocentric standpoint to one which analyzes the structure and the function of personality in terms of the varying cultures and sub-cultures to which the individual is exposed. Persons brought up under nonliterate cultures or those outside our own Euro-American societies show a wide range of ideas, attitudes, habits, and values—many of which we in Western societies do not have nor fully understand. For example, earlier studies of individual and group differences in intelligence were oriented to Europeans and Americans and chiefly those of the middle class. It is only within relatively recent decades that alleged racial and individual differences have been shown to be, at least in considerable part, due to variations in culture and to the opportunity to take on and use one's culture. Today we know that until such factors are held constant, we must not accept as scientifically proved a lot of findings about differences in so-called "innate" intelligence.

So, too, earlier studies of motivation, learning, and the growth of vocabularies—to note three important examples—confined themselves almost entirely to individuals and groups of upper- and middle-class status in our own society. We still know very little about these matters in other societies. Also, only relatively recently have studies of juvenile delinquency, criminal conduct, and neurotic and psychotic behavior been approached from the standpoint of sub-cultures within a given larger society, or from an analysis of data from societies whose total culture differs sharply from the Euro-American.

Certain Changes in Standpoint. During the two decades from 1920 to 1940, when these new considerations were influencing psychology, parallel changes were going on in the relations of cultural anthropology to sociology. The vast amount of descriptive material on non-European, especially nonliterate, peoples which had been accumulated by anthropologists began to arouse the attention of other social scientists. The latter began to realize the need to re-examine their generalizations about

the universality of the structure and function of the group life and institutions of their own cultural systems which hitherto they had assumed to be true everywhere. For instance, scholars realized that the generalizations about competition under capitalist economics and about the place of conflict in our politics might not be as universally binding for all times and places as had been previously assumed.

Then, too, anthropologists, feeling the influence of psychology, began to give increasing attention to the study of individuals as individuals in a given tribe or society whereas earlier they had been satisfied with generalizations made from reports of a few informants plus their own observations of day-by-day life of tribal members. This new approach meant that the anthropologist had to pay attention to motives, learning, and actions which differed from as well as conformed to the group norms of a particular society under study.

On their side, psychologists began to realize that a wide variety of psychological structures and functions which they had long taken for granted as universal probably reflected the particular culture patterns of the societies of Europe and the Americas. They saw that this applied not only to motivation but to such matters as perception and forms of thinking as well. The recognition of these new horizons of human activity certainly made a contribution, if not to the mechanics of learning, at least to a better understanding of the cultural sources of the ideas, attitudes, values, and habits which a given individual acquires in his particular society or group.

Out of this academic cross-fertilization, then, arose a field of special interest known variously as "culture and personality" or as "personality in culture" or slight modifications of such phrasing. College and university courses began to be offered under such titles and a flood of articles and a number of books began to appear relating to this area of academic and practical interest.⁴ Most of the initial treatment of this topic attempted to recast materials already known in anthropology and psychology into a new frame of reference which took into account the impact of culture upon the personality. This meant studying the manner in which the personality operates within a social-cultural context, being affected by it and affecting it, in turn.

Gradually, however, anthropologists and others have been able to design their field studies in such a way as to gather first-hand information on a wide variety of activities of individuals who live under different

⁴ The practical concern with this topic became clear during the Second World War when American and Allied Forces found it necessary to deal with non-European peoples, both literate and nonliterate. Of course, some recognition of this whole matter had been taken by colonial administrators previously, but it took the impact of a far-flung technological war to bring Americans face to face with the need to understand the subtle relationship of culture and personality if they were to handle successfully their contacts with individuals and groups outside their particular cultural framework.

cultural systems than our own. Differences in child training, such as feeding, weaning, toilet training, and the interplay of indulgence and discipline have been explored. Various psychological theories, but particularly the behavioristic and psychoanalytic, have been invoked in an effort to tie the wealth of these data together. But it must be said in all frankness that carefully controlled scientific studies are just now emerging. Adequate methods of making cross-cultural investigations bearing especially on the topic of personality are difficult to make. The most promising developments, moreover, are those coming from individuals trained in both anthropology and psychology or from teams of workers, representing various pertinent disciplines, who undertake research together in a given locality.

This whole field has become so large in scope that it deserves special treatment, and this book is not the place to attempt a critical review of the more pertinent literature on culture in relation to personality. However, in the chapters which follow various cross-cultural comparisons will be made where they are pertinent.

Culture and the Individual. It would be foolish and quite inaccurate to fail to realize that culture influences individual make-up: traits, attitudes, values, and habits. Certainly men differ among themselves in terms of group membership be it in this tribe or that nation.

Common sense long supported this idea before more scientific studies were undertaken. Observation of peoples of widely differing cultures and personality organization shows that while we may postulate a norm or modal type for a given society there are also many individual variations around this norm or type. Moreover, these variations rest on biological factors, differentials in kind and rate of learning, and a number of other things.

For our purposes here, we state the relatively widespread generalization that the culture patterns of a given society or group within a given larger society influence the development and functions of personality. But even slight acquaintance with the extensive literature bearing on this matter shows that the particular manner in which these interact is variously interpreted. As we shall see later, these involve problems as to the relative importance of the training of the early months and years compared to that of later periods. So, too, matters of individual variation as related to constitutional differences, the weight of personal-social as compared to cultural learning, and finally of the effects of differential exposure to culture will be explored.

CHAPTER 2

Constitutional Foundations of Personality

People have long believed that a person's physical make-up had some bearing on human adjustment. One of the most widespread of such views is that "blood counts." That is, an individual's conduct is believed, in part at least, to be determined by biological heredity. Sometimes when a husband and wife get into a wrangle over the behavior of their children, one or the other or both may come forth with such expressions as, "Well, Mary gets that trait from your side of the family," or "Sonny is just like the Joneses." Another common belief is that such things as height, weight, color of skin, hair, and eyes, facial form, and voice are important elements in personality. For the man-on-the-street the concept of personality is often more or less limited to concern with such matters affecting physical appearance.

These views reflect a mixture of some sound observation and popular mythology, and, like other beliefs, serve to influence attitudes and actions of individuals toward one another. Since we want to make use of more objective facts and views regarding personality, we must examine more seriously the place of constitutional elements in the development and functioning of personality. No matter how much importance we attach to the social-cultural environment in governing behavior, we must never forget that the individual is first of all an organic system, a member of an animal species. The biological factors are important for at least two reasons: (1) only through organic structures does behavior take place; and (2) while the individual always expresses himself largely through personal-social and cultural learning, the constitution sets certain significant limitations to such learning.

We want to see then, what physical factors come into play with various adjustive functions of the individual. Among others we shall comment first on some basic assumptions and facts regarding the nature of the adaptive processes, particularly the persistent and dynamic relations of the organism to its environment. In passing we must note briefly the organization of bodily activity in terms of sustaining and coordinating systems as a background to more particular attention to the functions of the neurological and endocrine systems in adjustment. The chapter will close with a review of certain important facts from studies of fetal devel-

opment and the new-born child as they bear on subsequent personality development.

THE DYNAMICS OF ADAPTATION

The adjustment of the organism to its environment may be viewed as a constantly changing or dynamic relationship between energy systems within itself and forces or energy changes outside. At the physiochemical level, life consists of a continuous series of internal changes leading to adaptation to the external world. These relationships take place through the living cells or protoplasm, organized in certain forms or structures and performing particular functions. As Hill, the English physiologist puts it, "The living cell is not so much a thing as a process; a chain of chemical events organized in a peculiar way."¹ And as Sharp, the cytologist, further remarks, "It [the cell] is . . . a dynamic system in a constantly changing state of molecular flux, its constitution at a given time being dependent upon antecedent states and upon environmental conditions."²

Organism and Environment. These quotations may serve as "the text," to use a ministerial term, for our examination of certain fundamental principles of organic adjustment, including that of man. The relations just noted imply logically two sets of factors or variables—the relation of the organism to its environment and to its previous condition or antecedent states. At the common-sense level of analysis the difference between individual and environment seem clear enough. The individual is an organized and functioning unit within something we call the skin and the environment is everything not within the skin. At a simple level of descriptive analysis this seems satisfactory but on further examination the relations do not seem so clear. For example, at lunch, the food on your plate may be labeled part of the environment along with the utensils for eating. But when you put the food into your mouth, chew, and swallow it, is it still a part of the environment or not? When the gastric and other juices reduce at least parts of the food to chemical substances that are absorbed into the blood stream, does it then for the first time become a part of you as an organism? And if so what of the residue of food which is later expelled through the lower bowel? Is this to be considered a part of the individual while within his body or as a part of the environment?

This little example shows how difficult it sometimes is to draw sharp distinctions between things or events which are in constant interplay. Those theorists who stress the study of the organism as a whole in relation to its circumstances or surroundings often view the inter-relations of

¹ A. V. Hill, "The physical environment of the living cell," *Lectures on Certain Aspects of Biochemistry* (symposium with Dale, Drummond, et al.) (London, University of London Press, 1926), pp. 256-257.

² From *An Introduction to Cytology*, 3rd ed. by L. W. Sharp. Copyright 1934. McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc.

organism to environment in terms of a larger field or totality. This is essentially the view of the *Gestalt* psychologists (see Chapter 4) and of some biologists.³ Other theorists and students of behavior operate by defining as clearly as they can just what they mean by the terms they use in detailed studies and try, for the most part, to avoid getting into elaborate philosophical discussions as to just what is meant by organism, in general, and environment, in general.

It is wise to note, however, that physiologists do distinguish, for purposes of analysis, between what they call the *external* and the *internal* environment. The relation of the organism to the outside environment, is as Sharp noted, also influenced by the prior condition of the organism itself, and this involves an understanding of the inner interplay of cells and parts of the organism. It was in the course of studying the relation of changes within the body as, in turn, related to adaptation of the body to the outside world that Claude Bernard (1813-1878) the great French physiologist, called attention to the importance of what he termed the *milieu intérieur* or internal environment. He wrote:

"For the animal there are really two environments: an external environment in which the organism is placed, and an internal environment in which the cells live. Life goes on, not in the external environment, air, fresh water, or salt water, as the case may be, but in the liquid internal environment composed of the organic circulating liquid which surrounds and bathes every cell. This medium is composed of the lymph and the plasma, the liquid portion of the blood, which in the higher animals penetrate the tissues and make up the totality of the interstitial liquids. These are the instrument of all the local nutritive processes, the source and confluence of the exchanges of the cells. A complex organism must be considered as a union of simple beings, its cells, which live in the liquid internal environment.

"The constancy of the internal environment is the condition of free and independent life. The mechanism which makes possible this constancy assures in the internal environment the maintenance of all the conditions necessary to the life of the cells. . . .

"The constancy of the environment presupposes such a perfection of the organism that at every moment external variations are compensated and equilibrated."⁴

Principle of Homeostasis. Biologists have always been concerned with how the organism copes with its external environment. Most of the active body cells give off directly certain chemical substances which aid in maintaining a balance between the inside and the outside aspects of the total adaptive operation. For example, histamine influences the supply

³ See, for example, Andras Angyal, *Foundations for a Science of Personality* (New York, Commonwealth Fund, 1941).

⁴ Quoted by L. J. Henderson in "The physico-chemical changes in blood during the respiratory cycle" in *Lectures on Certain Aspects of Biochemistry* (London, University of London Press, 1926), pp. 177-178. By permission.

of oxygen to the cells, and without adequate oxygen, of course, cells could not perform their usual or normal functions. This interplay of internal changes in relation to adjustment to the outside environment is so universal that various attempts have been made to state the matter in more general terms. This is the basis, in fact, of Cannon's principle of homeostasis. This means that the organism acts at all times to retain a condition of balance and a steady state between itself and the environment. This may be thought of as a general process which brings about a constant interplay between states of equilibrium and disequilibrium. According to Cannon the internal environment is kept in a steady state by the activities of two closely intermeshed mechanisms of adaptation. Certain internal mechanisms, autonomic and physiological, act to maintain a constant fluid environment for the living cells without which they could not function. Certain other mechanisms—largely the cerebro-spinal system—are directed outward and serve to bring the organism into contact with the external environment in such a way as to secure optimum satisfactions of tissue needs—the latter being broadly defined for present purposes.⁵ Some aspects of their operation will be discussed later. At this point, however, it is well to note that this principle of balance means that there must be a certain stability of the organism itself if it is to be able to modify itself in the presence of stimulations from the external environment. To quote Cannon,

"Here, then, is a striking phenomenon. Organisms composed of material which is characterized by the utmost inconstancy and unsteadiness, have somehow learned the methods of maintaining constancy and keeping steady in the presence of conditions which might reasonably be expected to prove profoundly disturbing."⁶

To cite an instance: Men have been exposed to dry air in the temperature range of 239–257 degrees Fahrenheit without any increase in their body temperature above the norm. Arctic animals at temperatures as low as 31 degrees below zero Fahrenheit do not show any marked fall in body temperatures. Then, too, people living at very high altitudes show remarkable adaptability to the reduced pressure of the air. Similar adaptation is possible within the organism, as evidenced in the dissipation of heat produced by hard muscular effort when continued beyond a very few minutes. The lactic acid which is produced in connection with strenuous muscular exercise would neutralize the alkali in the blood if other chemical changes did not operate to counteract this possible effect.

There is, in truth, neat organic integration or cooperation between the two sets of mechanism. For example, Richter and collaborators found

⁵ See W. B. Cannon, *The Wisdom of the Body* (New York, W. W. Norton & Company, 1932).

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 22. By permission

that both male and female rats will resort to nest-building if their body temperature is made to fall below a certain critical level. They also discovered that the removal of various endocrine glands, especially adrenals, thyroid, and parathyroid, induced the same type of reaction.⁷

The processes necessary to maintain a constant internal environment are found in all animal species. Richter, in fact, says this "constitutes one of the most universal of all drives . . . the real motive power, the energy behind" ⁸ what we ordinarily call drives in a narrower sense. (See Chapter 3.)

This principle of homeostasis in the physiology of the individual, animal or man, has its counterpart in certain theories—not yet completely demonstrated empirically—in psychology and the social sciences. Cannon himself suggested some analogies between "biological and social homeostasis," ⁹ and certain psychologists and others have used the concept as a tool in the descriptive analysis of the relations of the individual to his social and cultural environment, and even of groups and institutions in relation to each other. While there is always some danger that such a happy analogy may be mistaken for causative relationships whose nature and mechanisms are not fully known, the idea of an interplay of conditions of balance and imbalance in inter-personal and inter-group affairs is widespread.¹⁰ Certainly in the discussions of personality and human adjustment which follow in this book, the concepts of equilibrium and disequilibrium and of fixity and flexibility as related thereto will be widely applied.

Before going on to discuss the organization of behavior, a comment must be made about the nature of the external environment. It may be broadly defined as the thing or situation to which the individual responds. At the physical level the stimulation may be defined in terms of light and sound waves, chemicals, varying degrees of mechanical pressure, and the like. In addition to the physical environment which can be detected by our ordinary sense modalities, seeing, hearing, tasting, smelling, and so forth, there are physical stimuli such as radio-active substances, disease germs, and viruses which affect the organism. The existence and effects of these elements of an unseen external environment are known to us largely by the aid of instruments invented by man, such as the micro-

⁷ C. P. Richter, "The internal environment and behavior: V. Internal Secretions," *American Journal of Psychiatry*, 1941, 97: 878-893.

⁸ C. P. Richter, "Biology of drives," *Psychosomatic Medicine*, 1941, 3: 105-110. Quotation from p. 110.

⁹ Cannon, *op. cit.*, pp. 287-306.

¹⁰ In the political field where struggle for power is evident, the equilibrium-disequilibrium theory has had considerable vogue. See, for example, H. D. Lasswell, *World Politics and Personal Insecurity* (New York, Mc Graw-Hill Book Company, Inc. 1935), Chap. 1. So too the concepts of equilibrium have been widely applied by economists in describing and analyzing operations of the market.

scope and telescope which serve to extend men's sensory capacities and thus enable him to come into contact with this otherwise unknown environment. At the psychological level the stimuli may be defined as sensations which get their meaning from a combination of the sensory factors and the interpretation which is derived from past experience. And as we shall see, at the social-cultural level we are concerned with other persons as well as material objects.

In the discussions which follow reference will be made to both the internal and the external environments, but for the most part the context will make clear which of the two is meant and at which level of description. Where it does not an appropriate qualifying adjective will be employed.

The Sustaining and Coördinating Systems. The essential attributes of protoplasm with which we are concerned are (1) differential receptivity to stimuli from outside or from other parts of the organism, (2) ability to respond or react to these stimuli, and (3) plasticity or modifiability of the protoplasmic organization. This capacity for the modification of tissue makes possible alterations in subsequent contacts with the external environment.

To get an over-all view of the organism living in an external environment, let us merely note the main structures and functions which make up the body. These may be viewed as sustaining and coördinating systems that have a long phylogenetic or racial history. These are: (1) The digestive system, which is concerned with the translation of foods and liquids into forms of energy usable by the organism. (2) The respiratory system, which controls the intake of oxygen and the expulsion of carbon dioxide. (3) The circulatory system, which transmits oxygen to the cells and carries waste matter from them. (4) The eliminative system, which carries waste matter from the bowels, kidneys, and skin to various organs of expulsion. (5) The reproductive or sexual organs, which function in the procreation process. (6) The nervous system, which has to do with the selective reception, transmission, modification, and conduction of impulses to responding organs. (7) The endocrine system, which has to do with the production of powerful and highly important chemicals necessary to aid the nervous system and to help maintain life through various relations to other systems and organs. (8) The muscular system, which furnishes the reactive organs, in form of both striped and unstriped muscles. And (9) the skeleton or bony structure, which provides the frame on which the other organs hang.

All these systems are continuously or intermittently active with reference either to the world outside or to the maintenance of the constancy of the internal environment. Our chief concern, however, is with the neural and endocrine systems which are so basic to the adaptation of the

individual to his material and social-cultural world. In the next section we shall review briefly some of the important facts about the structure and functions of the nervous system. In the section following we shall take up the endocrine system.

THE NERVOUS SYSTEM

The nervous system, made up of nerve cells and their connecting fibers, is the principal coordinating agency for all the other bodily organs. It is principally concerned (1) with the coordination of the sustaining systems, (2) with learning or habit formation, and (3) with making possible reflective thought and planned adaptation.

The central nervous system is composed of the spinal cord and the brain. The latter is divided into three major sections: the hindbrain or brain stem, the midbrain, and the forebrain. The most important portion of the forebrain consists of the cerebrum. From the brain and spinal cord various major nerves reach out over the entire body. Besides the brain and spinal cord there is the autonomic division, consisting of a double chain of nerve ganglia and nerve fibers extending on both sides of the backbone from the base of the brain to the end of the vertebral column. Other masses of neural tissue scattered throughout the body are connected with the autonomic system.

There are two great motor systems in the central nervous system: the somatic or skeletal, and the visceral or autonomic. Both of these systems have connections with the brain and spinal cord and with the peripheral nervous system—that outside the brain and spinal cord. As the names imply, the somatic system controls the movements of the skeletal or striped muscles, and the autonomic controls the contraction of the visceral, unstriped muscles, and the secretion of glands.

The skeletal muscles are innervated through a single source of nerve supply (the final common path) which is always excitatory in character. If this neural stimulation ceases, the muscle becomes limp and without tone. The visceral effectors, on the contrary, are usually innervated by two nerves, one from each of two divisions of the autonomic. One of these is excitatory, the other inhibitory. (See below.)

Behavior is controlled through the coordination of three fundamental types of nerves and related structures: (1) the receptors and the sensory nerves connected with the receptor organs, (2) the connecting, adjustor, central, or associative neurons, and (3) the efferent or motor nerves which end in muscles or glands.

The Receptors. Psychologists have often classified the receiving organs into four kinds on the basis of their particular features and functions. Table 1 presents the essential facts as these four classes of receptors with notations regarding their physical stimuli.

Table 1

A CLASSIFICATION OF RECEPTORS AND THEIR APPROPRIATE PHYSICAL AND CHEMICAL STIMULI

		STIMULI	RECEPTOR ORGANS
1. <i>Exteroceptors</i>	{ Stimulated by energy changes in environment, such as	{ Light Sound Heat and cold Pressure Chemicals Chemicals	Visual (in eye) Auditory (in ear) Temperature (in skin) Pressure (in skin) Smell (in nose) Taste (in tongue)
2. <i>Interoceptors</i>	{ Stimulated by organic changes in internal organs, such as	{ Emptiness or fullness of internal organs, chemicals	Systemic (in viscera), for example, linings of the alimentary canal
3. <i>Proprioceptors</i>	{ Stimulated by changes in position and movement in body, such as	{ Movement or postural changes	Kinesthetic (in muscles) Static or vestibular (in semi-circular canals)
4. <i>Nociceptors</i>	{ Stimulated by any energy changes which tend to immediate injury of tissue, such as	{ Any of above stimuli which injure tissue	Pain senses (in skin and in nearly all important organs of the body)

Although this classification is by no means adequate, the important fact is that the receptors are the selective and discriminative means by which the organism comes into contact with, and helps to adjust itself to, its environment. Yet the individual is by no means always aware of all the stimuli which influence him. Some of the most important effects are perhaps those which reach one below the level (limen) of consciousness.

The Central or Adjustor Processes. The neural processes which lie within the spinal cord and the brain make up the links between the sensory or afferent nerves which receive the stimuli from the receptors and the motor or efferent nerves which carry the stimulation to the appropriate muscles, tendons, and glands. This central system consists of the cerebrospinal organization and the autonomic system related thereto. We know that the cerebrospinal portion of the total nervous system is fundamental to the whole process of learning, involving coördination and elaboration of stimuli-response relations. It is the superiority of this system which sets man off from all his animal relatives, even his close kin the apes. Yet actually we know very little about the exact manner in which the cerebral, cerebellar, and related areas of the brain act to coördinate, modify, and transmit the impulses from receptors to effectors. Because

so much controversy has gone on about this, we must examine some aspects of the topic briefly.

In the study of personality, as in other aspects of psychology, there are only two really objective sources of information. One is to observe the response or action of the individual, that is, his behavior. The other is to study the stimulus or inciting situation which induces the response. What goes on between the stimulation and the response is a matter largely of internal changes within the individual which cannot be directly observed by others nor ordinarily reported by the responding individual. This activity has to be assumed or inferred.

In making inferences we posit or postulate what are called *intervening variables*. That is, we give names or concepts to these assumed processes or activities. These are verbal tools, logical fictions if you will, which are useful in stating more systematically the most probable cause and effect relations of stimulation and the responses of the organism. This is a universal practice in science. For example, no one has ever seen a neutron or metron, yet in modern physics these concepts are extremely important aids in describing and interpreting events observed in experimentation.

In an earlier psychology some of these important intervening variables were described in such terms as sensation, perception, memory, judgment, conceptualization, and reasoning. Today behaviorists prefer terms like differentiation, generalization, and anticipatory response to label some of the important internal happenings. They eschew the older terms as carrying an unfortunate aura of mentalism if not outright mysticism. So, too, such an expression as *internalization of stimulus-response connections* is supposed to enable us to avoid using such a term as mind or mental process when referring to what we assume to be going on inside the central nervous system between the stimulation and the reaction. Other psychologists, equally anxious to avoid the charge of mentalism, built up a system of intervening variables in terms of neurology, using such concepts as nerve cells, axons, and dendrites linked together by synapses in certain ways.

In addition to such terms there was needed some way of describing the inter-relation of receiving organs and processes, the central or adjusting organs and processes, and the responding organs and processes. This was provided by the concept of the reflex arc, and despite many criticisms of being too simple a model for the complexities of neuro-motor organization, it is still widely used. Some critics of the reflex arc concept have assumed that the inner, cortical system reacts as a totality or whole. Others have postulated various "cell assemblies" which "fire" or react in certain temporal and patterned phases or sequences.¹¹ As ingenious as some of these theories are, we remain in the dark as to the precise ways

¹¹ See, for example, the stimulating book by D. O. Hebb, *The Organization of Behavior: A Neuropsychological Theory* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1949).

in which the central nervous system operates to facilitate adaptation. We know, of course, that the cerebral cortex is the seat of learning and that this implies some kind of residue effects upon its neural structures. We have some evidence that certain areas of the cerebrum function with regard to certain sense modalities, especially seeing and hearing, and that others are more particularly concerned with the associative or connective functions. We know that disease of brain tissue can and does alter personality. We know that lack of oxygen in the brain will greatly affect neural and hence behavior functions. We know that cutting out some sections of the cerebrum will alter the reactions of individuals. Nevertheless, as to the exact nature of what occurs we know very little. We can only postulate or infer, and many good scholars believe that to state the intervening variables in anatomical or physiological terms is no more enlightening than to use the terms of an older psychology. To neurologize the psychological system may result in a disguised mysticism as misleading as any other.

The Effectors. Action itself is finally brought about when the neural energy is transmitted to muscles and glands. The muscles are of two sorts, the unstriped and the striped. The former make up in large part the tissues of the organs of digestion, respiration, elimination, sex, and glandular action. The latter make up the skeletal muscles, that is, the muscles of the arms and legs, of the torso, face, and other peripheral parts of the body. The effector neurons are carried from the somatic and visceral systems to the entire body in various large nerve bundles.

In considering the sensory-muscular-glandular system, however, we must always bear in mind that the whole process of adaptation takes place in an organized fashion. The mechanics of bodily sensitivity and activity is a highly coördinated matter involving tremendously complex neural processes, both learned and unlearned.

The Autonomic System. As already noted, the autonomic system may best be considered as the motor-visceral section of our total nervous organization which controls the responses of the viscera and glands. Its functions are not entirely independent of those of the somatic system. In fact, it is essential to somatic reactions at various levels. For example, it controls the supply of blood and the elimination of waste, and many spinal reflexes are correlated with its action. So, too, it interacts with the functions of the midbrain, as witnessed by postural changes which set up tensions in the viscera. It has relations to the learning of skilled acts which depend fundamentally upon the cortex, for, as we shall see, feeling-emotional toning is closely bound up with much of our learning. Thus, while the reactions of the autonomic system are largely those of internal changes and not peripheral movement, the two systems coöperate together in bodily adjustment.

It should also be noted that stimuli from any group of receptors may

activate responses over the autonomic as well as the somatic system. Thus external stimuli as well as internal will set up visceral reactions. Painful and emotional stimuli are particularly likely to produce drastic changes in the viscera; but it must not be forgotten that these responses are very frequently initiated by external stimulation.

There are two major divisions of the peripheral portion of the autonomic system: the sympathetic, and the cranial-sacral or parasympathetic. Each of these divisions consists of a series of related neural processes, leading to and from the visceral organs, but connected to the cerebrospinal system.

The *sympathetic* division is made up of ganglia and autonomic fibers associated with the spinal nerves found in the thoracic and lumbar regions. These nerves control the sweat glands, the hair of the body, and the peripheral blood vessels. Others are connected with the heart, the lungs, and the digestive tract and other visceral organs. Some sympathetic fibers also run to the organs of sex and elimination. The sympathetic system operates chiefly by speeding up the heart action, constricting the blood vessels, inhibiting the digestive processes by constriction of the smooth muscles, and stopping the flow of digestive glands. This system plays a distinctive rôle in the emotions of fear and anger. An unpleasant body "tone" tends to be associated with its operation.

The *parasympathetic* division is made up of fibers and associated ganglia connected with the cranial and sacral segments of the spinal nerves. The fibers of the cranial segment lead to the eyes and salivary glands, through the vagus nerve to the heart, bronchial tubes, stomach, liver, pancreas, kidneys, and small intestines, and to certain mucous membranes of the cranium itself. The fibers of the sacral section connect with the organs of defecation, urination, and sex.

The parasympathetic division operates in antagonism to the sympathetic. When this division is in operation, the sympathetic is inhibited. When the sympathetic comes into play, there is a blocking of the cranial-sacral division. For instance, in fear, the sympathetic may serve to release the sphincter muscles controlling defecation and urination, just as it acts, in an opposite manner, to inhibit the digestive processes. The cranial-sacral division is related in function to hunger, sex, and bodily elimination; the sympathetic to the fundamental emotions of fear and rage. The former set may be considered positive and pleasant in functions, the latter negative or protective and unpleasant. Figure 1 gives a schematic view of the distribution of the autonomic system in relation both to the central nervous system and to the various internal organs which it controls.

It must not be forgotten that the autonomic and cerebrospinal nervous systems function together. For example, a stimulation of the ear by a loud sound leads over a central neural connection to produce movement of the head, arms, legs, and trunk, but at the same time it sets in operation the

sympathetic division of the autonomic system and sets in motion those bodily changes which are evidenced in crying, blanching of face, inhibition of the digestive processes, and alteration in heart action and in respiration.




FIG. 1. Schematic relation of the central and autonomic nervous systems, as illustrated by the efferent innervation of some of the viscera by the latter. The thoracolumbar autonomic nerves are shown on the left, the craniosacral on the right. Note that each organ receives a double innervation and that the action of the two nerves is opposite in each instance. (Reprinted from A. J. Carlson and V. Johnson, *The Machinery of the Body*, University of Chicago Press, 1937, p. 377. By permission.)

In summary, then, the major actions which take place in the body are mediated through the nervous system. Secondly, as we shall see, the fundamental drives or tendencies to behavior rest in the vegetative, that is, the sustaining, system, in which the autonomic plays a large part. However remote our behavior may seem from this substratum, in the last

analysis no description or interpretation of social behavior is complete which ignores this fact. Though there is much evidence that the autonomic functions may be conditioned, modified, and partially controlled by the action of the cerebrospinal system, it is not altogether certain that the central system is clearly dominant over the functioning of the autonomic system. In other words, social as well as biological evidence supports our fundamental thesis that emotions, feelings, and basic drives are the cornerstones of behavior on which the superstructure of human personality is constructed. Man is always a feeling and emotional being. Only secondarily is he an intellectual, rational, and deliberative individual.

HEREDITY AND CONSTITUTION

The constitutional factors which we have been discussing derive, in the first instance, from heredity the mechanisms of which come into play in the reproduction of the species. Though the fundamental determiners of all basic structures come from the germ plasm, the factor of growth or maturation has a place in the development of the organism. Moreover in the higher animal species and particularly in man, modification is also possible through learning.

Heredity is not some magical force or power or "thing" that decides an individual's biological fate. It is a term used to state the fact that particular aspects of organized cellular life are transmitted from parents to offspring. The most obvious illustrations that like begets like are such physical features as the color of skin, eyes, and hair. But actually all the basic features of structure and function have their roots in heredity. It provides the basic range of potentials of subsequent growth and learning.

Maturation or growth refers to the biochemical and physical modifications of body tissue which occur as the individual gets older but which take place by virtue of internal conditions and not from the impact of external stimulation. The patterns of growth are probably laid down in heredity but the ordering of parts of the body with relation to each other depends on an interplay of intrinsic and external factors.

As noted above, *environment* is of two types: the internal or the liquid milieu of the cells of the body, and the external. The latter includes those events, forces, stimuli,—both physical and social-cultural—or situations outside the organism which influence its development and modify its activities.

The interplay of heredity, maturation, and environment—internal and external—is close. Heredity determines the way an individual will react under various environmental conditions. Thus, it is not skin color or any other trait which is inherited directly "but the response to the environment,"¹² involved in the development of these characteristics. So, too,

¹² L. C. Dunn and Th. Dobzhansky, *Heredity, Race, and Society* (New York, Penguin Books, 1946), p. 17.

while the endocrines play a large part in the growth of the various organs of the body, they, in their turn, come into operation only because the elements which start them in operation have a genetic source in the germ plasm. In the same way, the capacity to learn, that is, to modify the reactions to the external environment also rests on genetic factors.

It is not necessary, for our purposes, to go into extensive details regarding the mechanics of biological inheritance. But certain facts must be reviewed in order to avoid some misunderstandings about the nature and function of heredity in human affairs.

Body and Sex Cells. In the higher animal forms, including man, there are two sets of cells, the somatic or body cells, and the reproductive or sexual cells. The former are highly organized and specialized in structure and function. The latter are relatively unspecialized and come into play in the mating process which results in a new individual. The basic unit is the cell, made up of nucleus and surrounding cytoplasm. The nucleus is the activator and coördinator of the cell's energies.

Within each nucleus are a large number of biochemical units, among the most important of which are the *chromosomes*. These, in turn, are made up of smaller units called *genes*. There are literally thousands of genes within the cells, both somatic and sexual. Chemically they are probably large molecules. In the sexual cells they function as the basic physical units of heredity, both with respect to the development of the given individual and with regard to the transmission through successive generations of the inherited foundations of the given species.

The assortment of chromosomes, one half of each from mother or father, means that, with certain exceptions, we have equal hereditary effects from our respective parents. The genes lie within these paired chromosomes and are themselves paired, one coming from the female and one from the male parent.

In the sexual cells, maturation and division take place in such a way that but one of each of the chromosome pairs, and thus but one representative of each gene, gets into the subsequent germ cell. In the maturation of the germ cells the pairs are divided haphazardly so that on the theory of chance a parent can transmit only half of his genic constitution to his offspring. This has important bearing for inheritance of both sound and defective genes. As the generations follow one another there is always a sloughing off of half the genes of each parent, in order to maintain the constancy of number in the next generation, and, moreover, since the sloughing takes place by chance, the probabilities of loss can be reasonably calculated. This has important implications for human heredity since it means a probable loss of certain genetic elements from one generation to another.

Mechanisms of Heredity. Most of the data on heredity comes from observations and experiments on plants and animals and we must draw upon these data to understand the important processes of genetics, or the

science of heredity and variation. As for human inheritance there is an astounding lack of sound facts. Human breeding is slow in comparison to that in lower species and, moreover, mankind has, so far, been opposed to deliberate control of human breeding along experimental lines. Despite these limitations modern statistical methods have enabled geneticists and students of human behavior to draw some important and highly probable inferences from research into the pedigrees of human families. Some reference to these will be made later.

We all begin our existence as a single fertilized egg cell. During the germinal and embryonic stages which last for about the first five or six weeks of life, the original fertilized cell divides and re-divides thousands of times. The genes act as incitors to alter the non-genic cytoplasm and to produce various chemical and physical changes which result in increasing differentiation in structure and function. The effects are cumulative and further differentiation takes place by the specific interplay between the genes and the differentiated cell contents.

Stern puts the matter thus:

"The detailed differentiation and organization of the embryo depend on the action of the genes in all cells, the interaction among the cells, among whole embryonic regions, and among the parts of the embryo and its surroundings. It may well be that the thousands of genes present in each nucleus are active in every cell but in qualitatively or quantitatively different fashion."¹³

This brief statement on the processes of differentiation enables us to see the relationship between genes and the traits or "characters" of the developing or mature individual. A trait or character may be defined as any observable feature or aspect of the individual. These would include not only obvious items such as skin, eye, and hair color, or type of body build, but a biochemical property, such as a hormone, mental characteristics, emotional reactivity, or any cellular process. These traits or characters make up the somatic organization of cells and are collectively named the *phenotype*. For the genetic constitution or "the genic content of the nuclei of a given individual," as Stern calls it, we use the concept, *genotype*. The genotype of a given individual is a constant; it is fixed at the time of his existence as a fertilized egg. The phenotype results from the activity of the genotype with relation to the non-genic cytoplasm, the developing cells and their organization, and with the environment. In short, "The phenotype is the potentially variable product of genotype and environment."¹⁴

This distinction is important because it is so easy to think of the genes as carrying within them the tiny replicas or miniatures of various traits or

¹³ Curt Stern, *Principles of Human Genetics*, W. H. Freeman and Co., 1949, pp 35-36. By permission. This book is a handy reference on the major problems of human heredity.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 52.

characters. The traits or characters of the adult are no more present in the genes than is a motor car present in the metallic ores necessary to make it.

In short, we must never forget that biological characters are not the products of single genes but of combinations and recombinations of them and of their interplay with the environment. H. J. Muller thus cautions us: "So complicated is the manner in which the products of the different genes react to each other that no final product and no characteristic of the adult body is due to any specific gene, but in the production of every organ, tissue, or characteristic, numerous genes take part."¹⁵

When we turn to students of genetics for more specific evidence of the manner in which the genes operate to determine the direction of the development of traits or features, we discover that, for the most part, they trace the genetic effects through careful observations of the phenotypes in successive generations. After all, no one has as yet seen and traced the exact biochemical processes by which the genes operate although we do know something about their physical arrangement in the chromosome threads, especially in the fruit fly which has been a most convenient experimental subject in genetics. But from the outset of scientific study of biological inheritance at the hands of Abbé Gregor J. Mendel (1822-1884) experimenters dealt with the features of the phenotypes and from them drew their inferences and deductions regarding genic action itself. From his research Mendel concluded that there were certain recurrences of events which could be called scientific laws of inheritance.

One of these, that of *dominance*, rests upon the fact that, in crossing or mating, certain biological traits, or characters, appear to be dominant over others, called *recessive*. Thus, when animals of white and black color, respectively, are mated, the offspring will tend to be black or dark in color. Yet the recessive traits may re-appear in subsequent generations, as when the individuals of the first mating are crossed among themselves. The appearance of the dominant and recessive traits in this second group of offspring tends to follow rather definite arithmetical proportions: one quarter will be pure dominant; one quarter, pure recessive; and one half, though possessing the overt, phenotypic, evidences of the dominant trait, will be found, if interbred again in subsequent generations, to carry the latent recessive feature as well.

Another law, that of *independent segregation* or assortment, indicates that a biological trait is often transmitted in more or less unitary fashion without respect to other traits. Thus Mendel found that the color of certain seeds was entirely independent of their shape. Moreover, each trait is passed on in certain rather definite arithmetical proportions. Yet in some instances traits may blend or show intermediateness. For example, in a mixture of tall and short parents height may be found to be intermediate between the extremes of the parents.

¹⁵ H. J. Muller, "The method of evolution," *Scientific Monthly*, 1929, 29:485.

It is becoming increasingly clear that in the higher species especially, many traits or features are the results of additive or multiplicative combinations of genic elements. Among human beings such things as size, weight, amounts of endocrine secretion, pigmentation of skin, and probably the hereditary factors behind intellectual ability are, genetically considered, due to multifactorial influences.¹⁶

On the other hand there is some probability that the inheritance of what medical men call a *syndrome* or group of characters may depend, at least in part, on the activity of a single gene that serves to link the characters together. Thus, in the Lawrence-Moon-Biedl syndrome mental deficiency, obesity, the possession of extra fingers or toes, and a subnormal development of the sexual organs go together. The inference is strong that some one gene may serve to tie these effects together, though the precise way is not clear. Sometimes a single primary genic activity has manifold developmental consequences.

Mutations. In the process of breeding new generations, changes sometimes occur in the genes themselves which result in altering the characters of the individual. These are called *mutations*. Weinstein remarks, "A mutation, being an alteration of a gene, may alter any or all of the characters that the gene affects; it may modify them in any direction and to any extent."¹⁷ In their long-continued experiments in breeding fruit flies, geneticists have produced hundreds of mutations. The appearance of mutants, as these deviants are called, is apparently dependent on chemical and perhaps mechanical shake-up following fertilization and evidently takes place in the course of the interplay of organic or intrinsic factors and those of the environment as order and unity emerge. Many of these mutations are recessive in character. Some are slight and their effects do not persist; other effects are large and may and do persist. It seems most likely that mutation played a large part in the evolution of plant and animal species. Moreover, in the course of their studies, geneticists have learned how to produce mutations experimentally. Thus, by shooting X-rays into the fertilized cells at certain stages of their growth, all sorts of mutations have been produced.

The development of nuclear physics and the consequent use of the atomic bomb in war has made the facts about the possible effects of radioactivity on human reproduction more than an academic question. There has arisen a lot of myth and legend about the effects of the atom bomb on the population of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan, but specific and objective facts about the influence on future generations there are not at hand. It may well be that the long-range effects may be most serious. Certainly

¹⁶ Olive D. Maguinness, *Environment and Heredity* (New York, Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1940).

¹⁷ A. Weinstein, "Heredity and development," in J. Steiglitz, ed., *Chemistry in Medicine* (New York, The Chemical Foundation, 1928), p. 3. By permission.

experimental work on both plants and animals has uncovered striking possibilities of using radioactivity to modify genetic operations.

Other Effects and Development. Other organic changes have been induced by other methods and at various stages of growth. These effects, however, are largely those of altering the environment in which the organism develops. Changes in the chemical elements introduced into the organism may cause modifications. For example, one experimenter fed very young tadpoles pieces of thyroid gland, and they quickly changed into frogs. Some of the mature frogs were no larger than ordinary flies. In contrast, other tadpoles, which were fed thymus tissue, grew to be large, dark-colored tadpoles, but did not develop into mature frogs at all.¹⁸

These and similar experimental findings should make us extremely cautious regarding any easy mechanistic interpretation of heredity. From the very inception of the new organism there is an interplay of intrinsic factors and external forces. But we must not imagine that the cells and their genes are capable of indefinite and unlimited alteration or that an organism once set out on a course of development in a certain direction can be completely modified later. There are definite constancies as well as variabilities, and it is one of the tasks of scientific research to discover their existence and relative effects on development. The facts of dominant-recessive relations and of independent segregation clearly demonstrate such limitations. So, too, not only do we find unity and order arising in the maturing organism, but every fundamental change sets the stage for the subsequent alterations. Once an organ has been developed and begun its functions its essential differentiation sets it apart from other organs and tissues. In other words, though in the earliest stages the simplest cells are practically interchangeable as to form and function, later this interchangeability tends to disappear. Hence, as Child has shown, the strictly original genetic factors decline in importance, and the modifications of the constitution constantly predetermine the subsequent modifications.¹⁹

Another important factor to be taken into account in considering the growth of the individual is what Child terms "the standardization of developmental environment for each species." Fertilization and embryonic development take place under more or less uniform conditions for each species. As we move up the evolutionary scale from simple to higher forms, these standard conditions appear to be "progressively more exactly determined." Among the mammals including man, the embryonic and fetal development within the maternal body represents the end product of this evolutionary pattern of standardized environment. While variable condi-

¹⁸ J. F. Gudernatsch, "Feeding experiments with tadpoles, II," *American Journal of Anatomy*, 1914, 15:431-480.

¹⁹ C. M. Child, "The individual and the environment from a physiological viewpoint," *The Child, the Clinic, and the Court* (a symposium) (New York, New Republic Publishing Co., 1925).

tions after birth may profoundly alter the specific features, the basic phenotypic structures and functions are developed within relatively fixed limits.

With this comment we are back to the topic of fixity and flexibility of the organism. Not only is a steady state of the internal environment of the organism necessary for flexible adaptation to the outside, but uniform and constant operations are of first importance to the sustaining and coordinating systems mentioned above. In his sustaining systems man remains closely akin to his animal ancestors, and these systems furnish definite biological limitations to his flexibility and hence his learning.

Human Heredity. Solid facts about human heredity are scarce. While important data are at hand regarding the transmission of such physical features as skin color, height, and longevity, our knowledge of the place of heredity in regard to mental and personality characteristics is scanty indeed. All too often it has been impossible to separate out the effects of society and culture from those which might more strictly be considered biological or hereditary. However, studies in family pedigrees and especially studies of physical and mental characteristics of twins, foster children, and of children brought up under isolating or handicapping conditions have thrown some light on this murky topic.

Twins are of two types: fraternal and identical. The former are regarded as the product of two ova or eggs and of two spermatozoa. From the standpoint of heredity, they are no more alike than ordinary siblings, though the fact that they develop together *in utero* at the same time may make for certain uniformities or differences not found in the usual singleton offspring. Identical twins are believed to result from one fertilized ovum which in the early developmental stage splits into two homologous halves, each of which becomes a separate individual. As a result, the latter twins should possess many more traits in common than do fraternal twins. Investigations tend to bear out this hypothesis. Newman, Freeman, and Holzinger have reported that the measurement of physical features, such as head length, head breadth, cephalic index, and finger ridges, of fraternal twins showed correlations of between .46 and .69, while the correlations for measurements of the identicals range from .91 to .95.²⁰

²⁰ See H. H. Newman, F. N. Freeman, and K. J. Holzinger, *Twins: A Study of Heredity and Environment* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1934).

A coefficient of correlation is a statistical index of the closeness of the association of two traits or features. Thus, if one twin of a pair were placed in one group, and the other twin in another, and the measurement of any given trait in one group had a perfect correspondence or identity with those of the twins in the second group, the coefficient of correlation would be called positive, expressed as 1.00, or complete agreement between the measurements of each series. If, however, for every measurement of one twin, another twin in the other group showed just the opposite, then the correlation between the two groups would be completely negative, expressed as -1.00. If the members of the pairs show no correspondence either positive or negative, the correlation is zero, expressed as .00.

Comparisons of intellectual performance are much more difficult to evaluate than are those dealing with physical features. All too often the factor of learning is hard to control. Nevertheless studies have shown some rather consistent differences which may well have genetic foundations. For example, a number of educational and intelligence tests administered to samples of children show a declining correlation between siblings as we examine the results on identical twins, where the coefficients range around .90, to fraternal twins, where it is about .70, to ordinary brothers and sisters, where it hovers around .50. Furthermore, the correlations between tests of children and those of their parents or cousins are usually about .30 or even lower, while the coefficients between test performance of grandparents and those of children are below .20, and between unrelated children of a zero order. That is, the last cases show no significant relations at all.

Additional data are on hand from reports on identical twins known to have been reared apart. Newman collected materials on twenty pairs of such twins. In matters of temperament and conduct some pairs showed differences while others were reported to be remarkably alike. Some cases even showed a noticeable similarity in their diseases and illnesses. Mental differences as measured by intelligence and achievement tests clearly revealed the effects of education. If the divergences in amount of schooling was marked, the twin with the greater amount of education invariably scored higher on intelligence and scholastic tests. Some of these differences were of the order of fifteen to twenty points on various standard tests. The most striking variations were found in four pairs of twins. In other cases the deviations in intelligence were not excessive.

Newman also compared his twenty pairs of identicals reared apart with fifty pairs brought up together. In measurable physical characteristics those in the first group did not differ any more than those in the second, except in body weight. This factor obviously reflected variations in diet, health, and amount of physical exercise. In mental performance the differences were more evident. The average difference in I.Q.²¹ of the twins reared together was 5.3 points; for those brought up apart, it was 8.3 points. This latter deviation, however, is mostly accounted for by the four pairs of twins, noted above, where there was such sharp variation in education.²²

Various studies of children reared in foster homes show much the same

²¹ An intelligence quotient, or I.Q., in abbreviated form, is an index of intellectual ability as measured by the Binet-Simon mental tests and others. An I.Q. of 100 is said to be normal; as one falls farther and farther below that, he is considered increasingly subnormal; as persons get indexes above that figure, they are considered to be increasingly supernormal. The bulk of urban American school children of white parents have I.Q.'s ranging between 90 and 110, which may be considered a convenient standard of normality in intelligence.

²² See H. H. Newman, *Multiple Human Births: Twins, Triplets, Quadruplets, and Quintuplets* (New York, Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1940). Also Newman, Freeman, and Holzinger, *op. cit.*

variability. Research has shown that the I.Q.s of children are influenced by the level of intellectual ability of the foster parents. Siblings of equivalent capacity at the outset, adopted into different homes, some of high quality, others of low, later showed noticeable average differences. Those of high-level foster homes had an average I.Q. of 95; those of low-quality homes, 86. Moreover, the younger the age at which children are adopted, the more, apparently, will they be influenced in the direction of the level of the home life as measured by intelligence quotients.

Other investigations of children whose cultural divergences are even more distinct confirm this same sort of finding. Sherman and Key in their analysis of the intelligence test performance of children brought up in isolated mountain communities in the South in comparison with children of the same general white stock who had been exposed to modern culture, including better education, demonstrated that opportunity and cultural stimulation play a definite part in determining intellectual levels. A wide variety of studies of children of different social strata and of different racial stocks show that cultural influences have a decided effect in fixing the intellectual attainment possible to children of normal physical make-up.²³ A consideration of the part genetic factors may play in social-emotional and temperamental traits is equally difficult.

There has been a long controversy in psychiatry and clinical psychology about the place which heredity may have in predisposing individuals to certain kinds of more serious mental breakdowns, particularly manic-depressive psychoses and schizophrenia. While it is extremely difficult to disentangle the many factors which determine such breakdowns, certain statistical techniques have been applied to large samples of related and non-related individuals to discover if schizophrenia occurs more frequently in family groups than in the general population. In one such study by Kallmann comparisons were made in terms of consanguinity, including, among others, identical twins, fraternal twins, ordinary siblings, half-siblings, step-siblings, and the relations of these individuals again to parents. An attempt was made to take into account variations in environment. The author reports that the distribution of his cases shows "that the chance of developing schizophrenia in comparable environments increases in proportion to the degree of blood relationship to a schizophrenic index case." It seems that the predisposition of this mental disorder, that is "the ability to respond to certain stimuli with a schizophrenic type of reaction . . . depends on the presence of a specific genetic factor which is probably recessive and autosomal [having to do with chromosomes which are not sex-linked]." ²⁴

²³ See Mandel Sherman and Cora B. Key, "The intelligence of isolated mountain children," *Child Development*, 1932, 3:279-290. For a review of a number of these studies, see Anne Anastasi and J. P. Foley, *Differential Psychology*, rev. ed. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1949), Chap. 23.

²⁴ F. J. Kallmann, "The genetic theory of schizophrenia," *American Journal of Psychiatry*, 1946, 103:309-322. Quotation from page 322, by permission.

Other studies of schizophrenia and also of manic-depressive psychoses have tried to show that there is a genetic basis for such disorders.²⁵ But if heredity does play a part in the incidence of such disorders the genetic elements are probably of a multifactorial kind. Actually such studies do not and cannot separate out the factors of heredity as a "thing" from environment as another "thing." To try to do so would mean the return to a former viewpoint that regarded heredity and environment as two sets of forces, different and opposed to each other. This viewpoint is no longer in good favor. It must not be forgotten that heredity determines the organism's response to the environment and that the two sets of forces are constantly working interdependently. What these statistical studies try to show is that with environmental factors being held relatively constant, the higher occurrence of such maladjustments in some family strains than in others is highly presumptive evidence that genetic factors are operating to lay down a type of constitution predisposed to such mental disorders.

There is some additional suggestive evidence from psychosomatic medicine of the possible place of genetic factors in relation to personality maladjustments. Psychosomatic disorders are those which involve both mental and physical symptoms such as one finds in the inter-relations of anxiety and peptic ulcers. The growing recognition of the close linkage of mental and bodily symptoms has led to the development of a whole field of study and therapy.

Many of the conditions of this kind are clearly linked up with the functions of the autonomic nervous system. This is true of certain heart disorders, of high blood pressure, mucous colitis and others, and many students of these difficulties have long believed that there may well be some inherited constitutional predisposition for the same. Assuming that differences in autonomic functioning as found among identical twins, siblings, and unrelated individuals might be considered as indicators of such genetic foundations, Jost and Sontag undertook a rather extensive research. Their sample consisted of identical twins, of siblings, and of unrelated children, from the ages of six to twelve years. Physiological reactions were carefully recorded for vaso-motor persistence, salivary output, heart reactions, standing palmar conductance, reclining volar skin conductance, respiration rate, and pulse pressure. The authors recorded the results for each of these seven measures and also for a combined measure of *autonomic balance*. They summarize their findings as follows:

"... The group contained many pairs of siblings and six pairs of monozygotic twins. Comparison of the measures of siblings with those of twins shows them to be less alike than those of the twins. Similar comparisons show the un-

²⁵ See, for example, the suggestive results on relationship of certain mental disorders in families to life expectancies in Torsten Sjogren, "A genetic-psychiatric investigation of a Swedish rural population," *Proceedings of the Eighth International Congress of Genetics* (Lund, Berlingska Boktryckeriet, 1949), pp. 429-445. In schizophrenia and severe mental deficiency, especially, the average expectation of life was estimated to be about three-quarters of that for normal persons of the same age.

related less alike than the siblings and the unrelated less alike than the twins. Most of the differences are statistically significant. Correlations of the scores of pairs of twins, pairs of siblings and matched unrelated children show the correlations for the twins highest, siblings next, and unrelated least. These results suggest that what one might call "autonomic constitution" may be at least partially an inherited characteristic. These findings should help to explain the genetic predisposition to many of the psychosomatic diseases."²⁰

This study does not prove, of course, that psychosomatic troubles arise directly from inherited factors. It does, however, provide strong presumptions in favor of the view that the tendency toward certain psychosomatic disorders rests on heredity and is not entirely derived from difficulties in learning to handle a given environment. (See Chapter 23 on mental disorders, including attention to psychosomatic factors.)

In closing this section we must recall that present behavior rests upon constitutional foundations the sources of which, in turn, are heredity, maturation or growth, and the acquirements and changes brought about through learning. In studying personality, if we assume that physical traits have a hereditary foundation there is equally good reason to assume that the structure and function of the neurological, endocrinological, and other bodily systems also vary, in part at least, because of inherited determinants.

THE ENDOCRINE SYSTEM

The internal environment, which we discussed earlier consists of blood, lymph, and various other chemical substances. Some of the most important of these latter are derived from certain glands. There are two types of gland, the duct and the ductless. The former are illustrated by those of the digestive and eliminative systems that carry their respective products from one part of the body to another or to the outside by means of ducts. The ductless glands are those which pour their chemical products directly into the circulatory system.

The Endocrine Glands and Their Functions. The substances from the ductless glands are hormones. The word *hormone* comes from the Greek word *hormon* meaning rousing or setting in motion. A hormone may be defined as a specific chemical product produced in one part of the body—usually in a specialized gland—and transmitted by the blood or lymph to other parts of the body, the structure or functions of which are thereby altered or modified. Endocrine substances influence growth and metabolism, play a part in drives and in emotions, affect sexual functioning in profound ways, and doubtless influence mood and temperament.

The recent and important advances of endocrinology—the science of

²⁰ Hudson Jost and I. W. Sontag, "The genetic factor in autonomic nervous system function," *Psychosomatic Medicine*, 1944. Quoted with permission from page 140, by permission. This paper is reported in part, in Clyde K. S. and H. A. Munn, *Personality in Nature, Society, and Culture* (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1948), pp. 53-59.

hormone actions) have been so striking and in so many instances so revolutionary and significant for human health and disease that an enormous amount of popular and pseudo-scientific literature has been written about the miracles effected by even slight amounts of hormones. Much of this is misleading.

Chemical regulation of bodily functions seems to precede neural control, both in the species and in the individual. The sustaining systems of digestion, elimination, and reproduction are all profoundly affected by chemical control, as are the early stages of growth. In this control, which operates through the internal chemical environment of the cells, the endocrines have an important place.

There have been three traditional methods of securing information as to the particular effects of hormones upon structure and function: (1) by the injection of the extracts of various ductless glands into the bodies of experimental animals and into man, or by the transplantation of glandular tissue; (2) by the surgical removal of certain glands and the observation of the growth and behavior changes in the animals following this operation; and (3) by the clinical study of human beings in whom ductless glands are known to be underactive or overactive. In some instances no active chemical substance has as yet been derived from the particular ductless gland. In these cases, evidences of effects are much less reliable than where the nature of the hormone has been chemically determined.

It would carry us too far afield to attempt even a short account of the nature and functions of the various ductless glands. A summary of the essential facts, for our purposes, is to be found in Table 2.²⁷ Later in discussing certain symptoms of personality maladjustment reference will be made to the place of hormones in the etiology of the same.

Not only do particular glands have more or less specific effects upon growth and various bodily functions, but the major glands are often closely intermeshed as to function. For example, the anterior pituitary by means of its still undetermined hormones controls the thyroid and hence influences oxidation and other chemical reactions of the tissues. It influences the adrenal cortex and hence affects carbohydrate and other metabolism. It controls the gonadal functions in large part; and directly influences the secretion of milk by the mammary glands. It also seems to affect general bodily growth and, somewhat more specifically, to influence the metabolism of proteins, carbohydrates, and fat. On the other hand, so far as is known, it has little or no control over the parathyroids, the islets of Langerhans, and the medulla of the adrenals. The interplay between the thyroid and the pituitary is especially close. Removal of the former may induce enlargement of the pituitary and evidently increase its secretions.

²⁷ In addition to the facts listed in Table 2, other hormones are probably produced in the mucous membrane of the upper section of the intestine, in the kidneys, and in the spleen.

Table 2

THE ENDOCRINE GLANDS AND THEIR CHIEF FUNCTIONS

Gland	Location	Functions and Effects
Pituitary or hypophysis	Four small lobes, near base of skull— <i>anterior, middle, pars tuberalis, posterior</i>	Often called the Master Gland. Produces several distinct hormones. Stimulates growth, including that of nervous system; affects sexual function—especially female periodicity, lactation, bodily metabolism, and temperature. Pituitary also affects thyroid, adrenals, and sex glands.
Thyroid	In neck, astride the windpipe	Hormone called thyroxine influences bodily growth, basal metabolism, action of kidneys, sweat glands, brain, and other endocrines.
Parathyroids	Four in number, close to thyroid	Affects calcium metabolism; also nervous tensions.
Adrenals	Really two distinct structures, cortex and medulla, near kidneys	The <i>cortex</i> produces hormones which affect metabolism and resistance to various stresses. The <i>medulla</i> produces adrenin, which coöperates with autonomic system to alter respiration, heart action, release of blood sugar from the liver, and in general helps energize body to meet physical emergencies. Particularly important in emotional expressions of fear, anger, and sexual activity.
Sex glands ovaries (female) testes (male); also placenta	Interstitial tissue in sex glands themselves	Stimulates growth, especially secondary sexual characteristics; affects sexual activity, especially female periodicity, and lactation.
Islets of Langerhans	In the pancreas	Influences metabolism and use of blood sugar.
Thymus	Two lobes near apex of chest	No specific endocrine known, but apparently gland promotes early growth.
Pineal	Pea-sized cone suspended from upper brain	No specific substance known, but believed to influence growth.

The destruction of the pituitary, on the other hand, acts to depress thyroid activity.²⁸

FETAL DEVELOPMENT

The beginnings of behavior lie in the development of the body and its various organs during the period from conception to birth. For purposes of

²⁸ See R. C. Hoskins, *Endocrinology: The Glands and Their Functions* (New York, W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1941). See also A. T. Cameron, *Recent Advances in Endocrinology*, 6th ed. (Philadelphia, Blakiston Company, 1947), pp. 431-433.

observation and comparison the development of the human being *in utero* is conventionally divided into three periods: (1) the germinal stage, the first week or two following conception; (2) the embryonic period, from the second or third week to the fifth or sixth week; and (3) the fetal, from about the sixth week to birth. While our major concern is with the development of behavior during the fetal period, a brief view of the trends of physical growth of the human being will not be amiss, as a background to the later discussion.

The development of the body and its various organs does not take place at uniform rates or amount. This is true both of the prenatal period and of the postnatal until the stage when physical growth is more or less complete. Beginning in the later embryonic period and continuing through the fetal period, the development of the head precedes that of the neck, the neck growth comes before that of the chest, the chest before that of the pelvis. So, too, arm development takes place ahead of leg growth; also upper-arm development precedes that of the lower-arm, and that of the latter takes place prior to the growth of the hand. The same holds true for the lower limbs. Some of the changes in form and proportion of the human body which occur during fetal and postnatal life are shown in Figure 2.




FIG. 2. The body form and proportions at different ages. (From R. E. Scammon, "Developmental anatomy," in Morris, *Human Anatomy*, 9th ed., Philadelphia, The Blakiston Company, 1933. By permission.)

It is evident that the other parts and bodily systems follow a somewhat similar trend but that following birth their course of growth diverges considerably. Figure 3 shows this for four groups of organs: (1) lymphoid type, including thymus, lymph nodes, and intestinal lymphoid masses;

(2) the nervous system; (3) the body as a whole; and (4) the genital or sexual organs.




FIG. 3. The four main types of growth followed by various parts and organs of the body in postnatal life. (Richard E. Scammon, Fig. 3, p. 24 of *Child Care and Training*, 7th ed., rev., by Marion L. Faegre and John E. Anderson. Copyright, 1947. By permission.)

The Rise of Individual Behavior Patterns. While it is evident that structural organization and internal physiological functions arise together on the foundation of hereditary factors and on forces which play upon it in the course of development in a more or less standardized environment, overt movement itself or *behavior*, in psychological terms, emerges in certain more or less distinctive stages.

The onset of behavior in animals has long been the subject of intensive study. And the manner in which it proceeds has been the subject of some differences of emphasis and interpretation. Some workers have contended that motor responses begin as more or less simple and specific reflexes and by combination and coördination become organized or integrated into larger functioning patterns. Others have taken the view that, at the outset, the reactions of the fetal and young organism tend to be undifferentiated, uncoördinated, and of a mass-reaction variety, and that only gradually do individuation and specialized functioning arise. The more cautious students avoid taking an extreme position on either side of this question, but hold that while it may be possible to state a

broad general principle regarding the rise and development of response systems, we need to reckon with such matters as the age or period when the inception of behavior occurs, with the intensity of the stimuli used to induce movement, and with the internal or external source of stimulation. It may well be that behavioral development involves a trend from specificity to generality as well as a process of individuation from total responses to more specialized ones.²⁹ Certainly various studies on lower animals show that the development of movements proceed from a somewhat general to a more specific kind.³⁰

When we turn to the fetal development of human beings, we have no comparable experimental data. Laboratory experimentation with mothers and babies is out of the question. We must depend on the introspections of pregnant women, on reports of attending physicians, and of clinical observations of prematurely born babies or of babies removed surgically from their mothers.

The Fetal Development of Sensory and Motor Processes. All but the very simplest motor responses depend for their initiation upon sensory stimulation. It is during the prenatal period that all the essential sensory-motor organizations are established. These involve all four classes of receptors: exteroceptors, interoceptors, proprioceptors, and nociceptors. (See Table 1, p. 17.) This is not to say that all the stimulus-response mechanisms connected with sensation are brought into operation before birth, but the developing organism "gets ready"—as it were—for appropriate stimulation later. That is, some sensory-motor connections seem to be made during the fetal period.

The sources of information about fetal sensory-motor activities derive from observations made on mothers during normal pregnancies and upon the studies of human fetuses which have been removed by operation. Research made on lower mammalian forms indicates that certain sensory-motor patterns come into operation before birth. This is particularly true of the pressure and tactile senses. In the lower forms as well as in human fetuses the responses to touch and pressure at first seem to be a-rhythmic and uncoördinated, but sometimes it is difficult to be sure of these interpretations. As to human fetuses, many of the more specific responses

²⁹ See Leonard Carmichael, "The onset and early development of behavior," and K. C. Pratt, "The neonate," in L. Carmichael, ed., *Manual of Child Psychology* (New York, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1946), Chaps. 2 and 4.

³⁰ See G. E. Coghill, *Anatomy of Behavior* (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1929); see also his "Early embryonic somatic movements in birds and in mammals other than man," *Monograph, Society for Research in Child Development*, 1940, 5:1-48. Another important study is J. D. Coronios, "The development of behavior in the fetal cat," *Genetic Psychology Monograph*, 1933, 14:283-386.

Although generalizations from experimental work on lower animals seems to the naïve person to have little bearing on human behavior, the student should appreciate the well-recognized principle of biology that the operation of animal protoplasm is everywhere essentially the same and that developmental changes follow somewhat the same patterns, at least in the higher animals.

associated later with postural controls, locomotor actions, sucking, sexual and abdominal functions are initially set up from tactile and pressure stimulation during the fetal period. Also internal physiological changes may initiate similar reactions. So, too, responsiveness to auditory stimulation, to warm or cold stimuli, and probably rudimentary smell reactions have been reported. There is at least one well-described case of what was probably prenatal hearing which occurred about a month prior to delivery. However, as the authors cautiously advise "the possibility of reception through tactile organs in the skin cannot be excluded."³¹

There is plenty of evidence from the study of operatively removed human fetuses that the auditory and visual senses are well developed prior to birth. For example, the iris reflex has been observed in prematurely born babies. So, too, the muscular apparatus of the eye and eyelid are developed prior to birth. In the later stages of fetal growth the nociceptors or pain senses also begin their operation.

Pregnant women have reported that between the fourteenth and seventeenth weeks the fetal heartbeat is detectable. Heart action has been recorded as have fetal electroencephalograms during the later weeks of pregnancy.³² The records of the latter resemble those from the precentral region of the brain in the new-born. So, too, rhythmic contractions of the fetal thorax and movements of the chest, fundamental to true breathing later, have been observed. By the fourth month muscular reactions of the fetus become much more specific and more vigorous. By the fifth month the spinal cord and medulla areas are operating to facilitate coordinated movements, and by the seventh month such complex motor reactions as abdominal reflexes, knee jerk, plantar reflexes, and corneal responses are evident. During the last six or eight weeks the higher brain centers are apparently beginning to play their part in controlling basic action patterns. There is a close correlation between neurological development and emerging specificity and integration of responses.

Observers even report fetal crying, and from his studies of prematurely delivered infants, Minkowski, whose studies have been so important in this field, states that crying occurs as early as the sixth month after conception.³³ The vocal expressions, of course, are no more significant than any other muscular responses. It is only important to note that the mechanism for such behavior is developed previous to birth.

Likewise the systemic or organic senses appear in the later months of fetal life. Movements of the digestive organs have been observed, and some investigators believe that peristaltic reactions begin before birth.

³¹ H. S. Forbes and H. B. Forbes, "Fetal sense reaction: hearing," *Journal of Comparative Psychology*, 1927, 7:353-355. Quotation from p. 355

³² See D. B. Lindsley, "Heart and brain potentials of human fetuses in utero," *American Journal of Psychology*, 1942, 55:412-416.

³³ Minkowski's work has been published largely in German and French. Carmichael, *Manual of Child Psychology*, has a full review of the most important of his findings.

If this proves to be correct, we may say that the foundation of the hunger drive is laid down in this period. This is suggested by the fact that premature babies show, as a rule, less well-developed hunger patterns than do normal-time infants. In fact, many of the general bodily movements already noted seem related to this hunger drive.

According to Minkowski, facial reactions begin in the early weeks of the fetal period, and there is no reason to doubt that during the subsequent weeks the facial muscles get considerable practice. Some of those who have observed fetuses are convinced that states of fatigue are entirely possible. It may even be that the quiescent periods in prenatal life represent what has been called "fetal sleep."

The evidence of prenatal constitutional preparation for adaptation to the material and social world after birth is most extensive. We have, at best, summarized only the broad foundation of what is known in much detail about fetal development. In the next and final section of this chapter, we shall examine some of the important facts about the behavior of the new-born, whose technical name is the *neonate*.

THE NEONATE

The period of the neonate may be considered as the time from normal, full-term birth to the end of the first postnatal month.³⁴ Upon the basis of the growth and training of the receptor-central-effector patterns begun in the embryonic and fetal stages of prenatal life, the newly born continues his development. As we have noted in the previous section the baby comes into the world *ready* to carry on certain adaptive functions. But there are many others which he must acquire soon after birth if he is to survive.

Shift in Adjustment at Birth. Birth constitutes a severe crisis for the human organism. Not only are there the dangers of sheer physical injury during the birth period, but birth marks a change from a vegetative existence in an internal, liquid environment to active adjustment to the external world. During the period from the fertilization of the egg to parturition the developing baby is a host dependent on the mother. It is only through her that it gets its oxygen and food, and eliminates its waste matter. In fact, the first two great changes which occur with birth are those involving, first, the respiratory and circulatory systems, and second, those involving alimentation and elimination. Pulmonary respiration, which begins at birth, is associated with decreases in heart rhythm, increase in blood pressure, and other changes. So, too, with birth sustenance must be obtained through the alimentary track which involves intake of food and liquids, their digestion, and the expulsion of indigestible parts and other waste. The shift from prenatal to postnatal feeding is

³⁴ The basic data on the behavior of the new-born are reviewed in Karl C. Pratt, *op. cit.* Most of the factual material cited in this section is taken from this source.

usually marked by some loss in weight, probably associated with quantity and quality of milk production, loss of body water, and certain necessary re-orientation in relation to the mechanics of feeding. These latter include the direction of the oral responses to the mother's breast (or substitute in the form of a bottle-nipple), stimulation of sucking, and thence to swallowing. While the receptor-effector connections for these sequences are already present at birth, there is evidence that the nicety of sequential reactions—taking the nipple, sucking, salivation, swallowing, and the further digestive activities—are improved with learning or practice. It is clear that the demands for oxygen, for food, and for elimination of waste are associated with some of the most basic and powerful drives. (See Chapter 3.)

The neonate also shows some rudimentary sexual responses. There is mammary secretion from both sexes, known in superstition as "witch's milk." Male babies show periodic erection of the penis; and some observers report activity of male testes. Female babies have an enlargement of the uterus, secretion from its mucous membrane, and growing follicles. This so-called "genital crisis" is largely transitory and has only a remote chronological relation to puberty changes which occur years later. However, we must not overlook the fact that the stimulation of the sexual zones becomes, in time, differentiated as the basis of important emotional reactions.

For our purposes it is not necessary to make any extended survey of the many studies made on neonates in an effort to determine the repertoire of their sensory-motor patterns. But a few of the most significant findings may be mentioned.

Sensory-Motor Reactions in the Neonate. The new-born baby reacts to light and the responses depend on both duration and intensity of the stimulation. If the stimulation is intense and of short duration, lid responses appear and alterations in breathing and circulation take place. So, too, some studies have reported that the new-born will fixate a point of light and follow the light if it is moved. If the stimulus is of sufficient duration, the pupillary reflex may occur. As to hearing, the neonate is not deaf, yet we are by no means sure that it can make discriminatory responses to changes in pitch. But its reactions to auditory stimulation are affected by intensity and duration. Thus, if short and intense, auditory stimuli may be associated with lid reflexes and the respiratory-circulatory changes, and with certain gross muscular responses.

The study of both taste and smell in the young infant is very difficult. There is some evidence of discrimination to sugar, salt, and bitter substances. But it is rather doubtful if new-born infants react to olfactory stimulation. In the case of those stimuli sufficient to arouse responses, such as ammonia or acetic acid, it is hard to tell whether the baby is reacting to painful stimuli or to odors. Responses to temperature changes

are more evident. On the whole mild changes lead to approach, strong ones to withdrawal, and the nature and kind of reaction will vary with the part of the body stimulated. Intense thermal stimuli will affect respiration, circulation, and sucking.

The operation of the pressure or contact senses are in evidence though it is often hard to distinguish between effects of thermal, painful, gustatory, and other stimuli. For instance, cutaneous reflexes may be confused by failure to distinguish them from those derived from deep pressure. A number of studies state that there is no response to light tickling but that something called an *itch reaction* may be detected. So, too, there soon appear a rather wide but vaguely defined set of avoidance or withdrawal responses to contact or pressure stimulations which are sometimes called *defense movements*.

Reactions to painful stimuli are clearly evident but at first are not always clearly distinguishable as to source. Gross bodily withdrawal, facial grimacing, and crying are three of the most evident of the early responses.

The operation of the static and kinesthetic receptors as related to postural or positional changes in the body and limbs is clearly evident. Under varied conditions including holding, suspension, jarring, and rotation, the child will turn over, raise its head, arch its back, and make opposing balancing movements and clasping reactions.

The general motility of the new-born infant probably derives largely from changes in internal conditions. While the respiratory-circulatory systems contribute to these changes, apparently the alimentary and excretory systems play the largest part. For example, nursing may be followed by regurgitation and this by hiccuping.

The patterning of many motor responses become associated with the major adaptive operations of the neonate. This is first of all evident in feeding and here the mouth parts and motions—lips, tongue, sucking, and swallowing—all come in for much practice. Moreover, since the need or drive for sustenance is so intimately dependent for its satisfaction on social assistance or coöperation in the person of the mother or nurse, this entire repertoire of activities becomes, almost from the outset, associated with a social situation. This important point will be elaborated later.

Likewise protective or defense responses are soon built up. Some of these may involve approach to the mother or other person, others involve avoidance or withdrawal. So, too, grasping and other essential reaction patterns associated with hand-eye movements begin to appear fairly early. And although locomotion does not take place till months later, the pattern of walking has been noted in the alternate stepping movements of the neonate when held lightly with feet just touching a floor or table. Also the beginning of creeping movements have been observed in the neonate. Associated with arm, hand, leg, and foot reactions

are many increasingly specific reactions which need not be noted in detail. But by the end of the neonate period many important reaction patterns are in evidence, including facial and vocal ones.

Since we shall discuss the emotions in the next chapter, only a word need be said about them here. It is pretty well recognized that the young infant does not show any highly specific set of emotions, as was once believed. Rather, his fundamental emotional reactivity may be described as one of startle or upset which may be considered the roots of later fear, rage, and other more particular emotional states. In fact, the undifferentiated nature of emotional reactions on the part of young babies is often cited as additional support for the "mass reaction" theory about our earliest responses.

Reference has already been made to the possibility of practice effects both during the fetal stages as well as those of the neonate stage. This raises a question as to whether the conditioned response may be established in the first weeks of life. The evidence is not completely conclusive, but one study reports conditioned sucking and certain reactions to auditory stimulation by the fourth or fifth day.³⁵ Other researches, but not all, have confirmed the fact that conditioning is possible during the first few weeks of life. But as Pratt has said, "The responses are difficult to establish, highly unstable, and cannot be set up in all infants."³⁶

The neonate, then, is an important period in the life of the individual. It is the time when the bridge is built from one's vegetative and relatively passive fetal life to that of an ever changing and an increasingly demanding adaptation to the material and social-cultural world. True, as remarked above, the baby is born with a lot of ready-made equipment to help him in his adjustment. But he is by no means fully prepared to move into adult adaptations. Further physical maturation must occur and the more discriminative and selective mechanisms must be learned. It is in relation to this learning that the care of other persons—mother, nurse, and other adults—is necessary. These other persons make up a *social-cultural* environment. Moreover, they begin from the day of birth onward to influence and to direct his learning or adjustment along lines laid down by the culture which they possess. *The child has no human nature nor culture at birth.* He has certain rudimentary patterns of stimuli and response and an amazingly flexible neural system. Upon them the social world may build a wide variety of habits, attitudes, traits, and ideas which will carry him through life.

³⁵ D. P. Marquis, "Can conditioned responses be established in the new-born infant?" *Pedagogical Seminary and Journal of Genetic Psychology*, 1931, 39:479-492.

³⁶ Pratt, *op. cit.*, p. 240.

CHAPTER 3

Motivation and Affective Processes

Behavior is best understood when we view it in terms of a dynamic or constantly changing relationship of the individual to his environment. As we saw in Chapter 2, this relationship may be stated as alterations between equilibrium and disequilibrium; at the physiological level, the balance is called *homeostasis*. Considerations of variation in conditions of disequilibrium and equilibrium are important for the larger, molar aspects of activity. That is to say at some points in time and in certain situations, the individual is in a condition of imbalance. Such imbalance, characterized by a state of tension, may be called *poor adjustment*, *threat to survival* or just plain *trouble* or *difficulty*. Such imbalance ordinarily leads to effort or expenditure of energy on the part of the individual to get into a more favorable or satisfactory relation to his environment. This may and usually does involve movement or activity of muscles, glands, and other organs concerned with adaptation. In such a situation we say the individual is motivated, that is, *moved to action*, or pushed, pulled, or impelled to certain responses which will remove the tension or difficulty and restore balance. In any case, this gives us our first clue to the meaning of motivation. The word comes from the same Latin root as the words *motion*, *move*, and *motor*. It should be clear, then, that in its broadest sense motivation is a fundamental aspect of all behavior.

If we look further at the way in which the individual responds under conditions of imbalance, we note that such action is directed toward finding some object, situation, or stimulus in the environment that will serve to restore the condition of balance. For example, the hungry man seeks, or directs his actions toward, food. We say, then, that food is the goal. Clearly motivation, in its broad features, is not only derived from a condition of disequilibrium in the organism but is also *goal-oriented*. But there are still other phases, for example, responses leading to the goal, such as the eating of food by the hungry person. And finally, there is a state of satisfaction which follows the responses toward the goal itself.

Many students of both animal and human behavior have described the course from state of disequilibrium to goal-satisfaction and return to

equilibrium again as a *cycle of activity*. Some cycles are short in time and limited in extent. Thus the stimulation of the hand and its reflex withdrawal from a hot stove are quickly completed. In contrast, a man lost in the woods may use up a lot of time and energy finding his way to camp or home. And at still another level of means and ends, it may take a man years to attain a certain career goal and its corresponding status. In brief, cycles of activity range from short to long and, as we shall see, some are definitely subsidiary to others. Moreover, a great deal of man's behavior is not motivated by sheer physical imbalance. Men also seek fame, fortune, or "the bubble reputation even in the cannon's mouth."¹ In our discussion of personality we shall see how frequently praise, honor, prestige, and power over-ride the more physical motivations.

Common-sense experience as well as carefully controlled scientific studies have shown that the course from state of disequilibrium to attainment of goal and its satisfaction is often marked by environmental situations and conditions within the individual that serve to stop, block, or otherwise hinder him from moving easily to the wanted goal. A person whose hand has come into contact with a hot stove may also find that this contact is followed by a further accident of some object falling across his forearm so that he cannot quickly withdraw his hand. We say such blockage produces frustration. This frustration, in turn, may set up more struggle or withdrawal and escape. Various aspects of the handling of frustrations will be discussed later.

While this overall view will serve as an introduction, students of human behavior are not satisfied to leave the matter in such general terms. They go further and try to work out the details regarding various aspects of motivated conduct. In particular they are concerned with the distinctions between motivated activity which rests on direct bodily needs and that is learned or derived from the society and its culture. It is the purpose of this chapter to examine some of these details.

SOME BASIC FEATURES OF MOTIVATION

During the past few decades many experiments have been made on motivation and many theories have been propounded regarding it. Sometimes the theories have been advanced independently of the empirical research. Moreover, in presenting theories and findings, various concepts and principles of explanation have been put forward. It would carry us too far afield to attempt even a short review of these materials. Yet, because various terms have come into common use and because we lack even reasonable agreement as to their meaning, let us examine briefly the use of certain of the more common concepts as related to motivation.

Needs, Appetites and Aversions, and Drives. From a strictly scientific view it is pretty clear that the pulls and pushes to behavior can only be

¹ Shakespeare, *As You Like It*, II, ii.

inferred from observation of certain sequences in the stimulus-response relations of organism to its environment. Motivations such as tissue needs, tensions, appetites and aversions, instincts and drives are really *intervening variables*. They are not directly seen, heard, or otherwise detected. They are assumed or inferred as a means of helping us to construct a reasonable and sound systematic statement of what occurs between a state of disequilibrium—detected by overt activity—and a subsequent, later state of equilibrium.²

One of the first psychologists to stress the place of biologically derived motivations was William McDougall, who in his *Social Psychology* (1908) took sharp issue with the traditional psychology of the time for neglecting the place of motivation.³ In developing his own particular formulation he used the term *instinct*. As used in animal biology, instinct refers to types or patterns of behavior or responses whose source is unlearned, that is, dependent on structures and functions determined by heredity and prenatal maturation. Unfortunately the term had certain popular and literary uses which were not scientific. For example, it was used to refer to any deep-seated, more or less automatic reaction whether learned or not. This might range from a simple reflex to a set of complex habits and interests definitely derived from one's culture. The respective rôles and statuses of men and women, the existence of warfare, profit-seeking, leadership, creative and inventive activities, and many other kinds of social behavior were indiscriminately ascribed to instincts and accompanying traits. Moreover, McDougall's rather rigid schema of instincts, coupled with his own confusion about the derivation through learning of much motivation, further undermined the usefulness of the concept for psychology. As a result, then, of such careless usage of the term, it has been rather completely dropped from the technical vocabulary of psychology and other terms have come into use.

Despite the vagaries regarding instinct, it became increasingly clear to students of both animal and human behavior that account must be taken of the prior conditions which set up motivated behavior. That is, some particular physiological condition must be determined to mark in time the inception of a given cycle of motivated activity. Such terms as appetites and aversions, needs or tensions, and drives began to be used. *Appetite* is characterized objectively by a state of agitation, tension, or readiness of the organism prior to the appearance of the appropriate stimulus object which will relieve the agitation or tension. Some call this

² States of homeostasis or its opposite are, of course, themselves inferences from observations of stimulus-response relations.

³ William McDougall, *An Introduction to Social Psychology*, 1st edition (Boston, John W. Luce & Co., 1908). This book went through many editions and had a tremendous influence on social psychology between 1910 and 1930. For a critical analysis of the concept of instinct, see L. L. Bernard, *Instinct: A Study in Social Psychology* (New York, Henry Holt & Company, Inc., 1925).

a *positive valence* of the organism. In contrast *aversion* is a state of agitation or tension which continues so long as a disturbing stimulus object or situation is present, but which disappears when the said disturbing stimulus ceases to act. Aversion is not the mere negative appetite; it is an "active avoidance."⁴

Although the concepts *appetite* and *aversion* serve to indicate some broad differences in certain kinds of bodily conditions which set up motivated activity, the concept of *need* has come into use to refer to the more specific elements of appetites and aversions.⁵ *Need* refers to a particular condition of disequilibrium in the organism that serves to bring about a push or a pull toward or away from an object or situation. The push or pull proper, that is, the more direct effort at satisfying the need or relieving the tension is referred to as *drive* or *motive*.

In common with rather widespread practice, we shall use the concept *drive* to refer to those impulsions which rest more or less directly on biological needs closely related to survival. These latter include, among others, needs for oxygen, liquids, foods, evacuation, avoidance of pain; and reproduction. The term *motive*, in contrast, will be used to refer to those pushes and pulls which are socially learned. That is, *motives are acquired drives which arise in man as a result of his membership in society and as a participant in its culture*. But, as we shall see, social-cultural influences act on organic needs and drives as well as induce more or less completely new needs and motives.

Motivated behavior, both original or primary, derived or secondary may depend either on changes in the organism or on the situation or environment. The former are often referred to as the internal bases of motivation, the latter as the external. At the level of primary drives, the most obvious of the internally determined are those of hunger and sex. At the level of acquired motives, we find mental sets, values, attitudes, ambitions, and no end of internally derived pushes to action. The externally determined drives are illustrated in the pain avoidance responses and those environmental conditions, such as humidity, temperature, and altitude which affect the operation of respiratory and other regulatory mechanisms of the body. Since motives are learned they obviously are much affected by external conditions. Among other things, rôle and status have important functions in establishing and continuing many of our motives.

In some discussions of motivation the concepts of *incentive* and *interest* have a place. The former is defined as an external object or condi-

⁴ See P. T. Young, *Motivation of Behavior* (New York, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1936), p. 272.

⁵ Some writers have made appetites and aversions practically synonymous with drives, others have used them as parallel terms, e.g., F. L. Ruch, *Psychology and Life*, 3rd ed. (Scott, Foresman and Company, 1945). There seems no sound logical or psychological reason why Ruch discusses hunger as a drive but sex under the rubrics of appetites and aversions.

tion which is perceived or reacted to as potentially satisfying to a drive or motive. With respect to primary drives food acts as an incentive to hunger, and at the level of motives there are no end of illustrations—for instance, promised rewards to children for good conduct, to pupils for hard work in school, and to employees for high production in industry. Interest refers to some more or less persistent concern with a value or good which serves as a motive to action. The objects or goals of our interests may frequently be considered as ranging along a preference line from things that concern us greatly to those of less or no concern.

There are still other terms which are often used with respect to various aspects of motivation. *Wants* and *urges* are more or less synonymous with needs. The term *impulse* has sometimes been used as a synonym for instinct in a technical sense. Sometimes it is used as a broad term to cover all aspects of internally determined push of the organism toward some goal or object of satisfaction. The term *craving* refers to a particularly strong urge or impulse, as when we say the confirmed alcoholic craves whiskey.

Some Important Aspects of Motivation. The wide variety of concepts just noted reflect, in turn, the rather broad and varied meanings associated with studies of motivated behavior. First, such behavior may mean that the animal or person has been deprived for a given period of time of something essential to survival. The experimentalist in animal psychology says that an animal which has been long denied food has a hunger drive. This is an inference drawn from the known fact of deprivation. Second, the reactions of the animal or person may be used to indicate a drive or motive. The animal is said to be thirsty when it drinks or hungry when it eats. Here the inference is drawn from observed actions of the animal. The same, of course, applies to behavioristic studies of human motivation. In the third instance, in human beings, conscious experience may result in the individual's stating in words or other symbols that he needs or wants something. When one speaks of being hungry it means that he is expressing in language his sensation of hunger. In other cases, of course, expression of wants may derive from unconscious or non-deliberative states of the person. Many of our anxieties are of this kind. In such instances, if called upon to state or explain his motives the individual is likely to resort to rationalization. (See Chapter 5.)

As a phase of total behavior, drives and motives are inciting, guiding, continuing, and otherwise facilitating functions. In other cases, motives serve to inhibit or block certain responses. The classic examples of drives as incitors to activity are the hunger and sex drives. On the other hand, a hunger drive might be so strong as to inhibit another drive such as sex or a motive such as desire for companionship. Drives and motives serve to guide and select the ways in which the organism moves from inception to culmination of a cycle of activity. If one means to an end can-

not be followed alternative ones may be sought out. Drives and motives act to keep the organism going till the goal or reward is reached. In this sense they have a perseverative function. In connection with the incitement, selection, and persistence functions, drives and motives are characterized or accompanied by increased expenditure of energy. In the presence of blockage or frustration, they are often accompanied by emotions and feelings. (See below.)

We usually find a certain hierarchy of drives and motives. That is, there is an order of urgency and/or preference among them. The nature and extent of variations in urgency of drives among animals have been studied by discovering the amount of effort and punishment a given animal will tolerate in striving for food, mate, or other goals. In human beings motivational preferences largely reflect his social-cultural conditioning.

Drives and motives may vary as to duration, strength, degree of specificity, and degree of awareness. Duration has to do with the length of time a given drive or motive operates. This, in turn, depends on availability of a satisfying goal or reward and on the relation of short-run to long-run motivations. Strength or intensity, of course, is bound up with urgency or preference as these are related to bodily and socially derived needs.

In the matter of specificity there is, first of all, the factor of stimulus. Some drives or motives are aroused by one specific stimulus; others require a number of stimuli. Second, as to means of reaching goal, there may be only one way or alternate means of attainment. And, third, as to end result, one goal or reward may satisfy, or there may be various alternatives.

As to degree of awareness of motivation, there is a continuum from highly conscious to unconscious motives. As we shall have much occasion to see, many of the most important motives are really hidden from consciousness, being derived or having their source in the deeper reaches of the personality. However, a person determined to get ahead financially and socially may figure out and direct much of his daily motivation in deliberate fashion. Others, less self-conscious, may drift along following their more or less deeply conditioned patterns of motivation.

ORIGINAL NEEDS, DRIVES, AND GOALS

It is somewhat bootless to attempt to name and classify the wide variety of original incitors to activity since they range from fundamental reflexes of rather specific sort to more or less patterned sets of reflexes concerned with survival, such as needs for sustenance. However, to offer the reader some anchorage in facts, we list and classify in Table 3 what are generally regarded as the more important needs associated with organic conditions, the related drives, and tension-releasing goals. In addition

we note some of the more important social-cultural controls which man has applied to these basic impulsations to behavior.

The cycles of activity involved from need through drive to tension-reducing goal operate at various levels of behavioral complexity and

Table 3

CLASSIFICATION OF ORIGINAL NEEDS, DRIVES, AND GOALS, AND ALSO CERTAIN CONTROLS OF THESE DERIVED FROM SOCIETY AND CULTURE

<i>Constitutional Foundation of Need</i>	<i>Drive</i>	<i>Goal (Release of tensions)</i>	<i>Social Controls</i>
Oxygen—carbon dioxide imbalance	Respiration	Recurrent intake of oxygen and expulsion of carbon dioxide	Internal: Yogi exercises; athletic and musical training; External: Iron lung
Deviation from body temperature of 98.6° F.	Reactions to temperature needs	Regulation of body temperature	Internal: Medication External: Clothes; shelter
Lack of water	Thirst	Intake of water	Limited
Lack of carbohydrates, proteins, fats, minerals, salts, and vitamins	Hunger	Intake of food	Varied food habits
Accumulation of metabolic end-products in bladder and lower bowel, producing tension	Evacuation	Defecation; urination	Internal: Time and place regulation; modesty External: Sanitation
Expenditure of energy leading to fatigue	Reduction of activity	Rest; sleep	Internal: Time and amount regulation External: Place and conditions
Tensions in sexual organs, from sex cells and hormones	Sexual	Mating	Internal: Guilt and shame; values of restraint External: Varied mores and laws
Tissue injury, either from internal conditions or external contact	Pain-avoidance	Withdrawal or other relief from stimulus	Internal: Limited, but some training to withstand pain External: Medication
Bodily states: cumulation of energy, including emotional states	Expressive and emotive	Random motor activities of arms, legs, and so on	Wide variety of controls and permissive outlets

through varying time sequences. Moreover, the survival function of some of these cycles is more immediately evident than are others. Those related to respiration and temperature regulation are short and obviously recurrent. Those having to do with thirst, hunger, evacuation, fatigue, and sex are of longer time span but nonetheless also repetitive. Pain avoidance, on the other hand, is "accidental," that is, episodic rather than periodic. But when the pain avoidance cycle is set in motion the need-drive intensity is usually strong and persistent till the tension-relieving goal is attained. Many of these avoidance reactions are of a purely reflex nature such as eyelid, tear secretion, and other protective reflexes which begin operation at birth or within a few days thereafter. The expressive and emotional needs show certain rhythms, probably related to accumulation of energy and freedom from fatigue or release from concern with such immediate demands as those of food and drink.

Nature sets certain limits on the success or failure of these primary need-drive-goal cycles. Survival without oxygen is a matter of minutes. The effects of disturbances of temperature regulation would vary. Man may survive a considerable fluctuation in bodily heat over a considerable length of time, but certainly the upper limit of a fever is something on the order of 105° F. Deprivation of liquid may extend over a period of days, and of food over weeks before serious threats to survival become evident. The biological limits to evacuation also vary, but would usually be a matter of days. While there is doubtless a certain cyclic recurrences of the sexual drive in man, the deprivation of full sexual expression may extend over many years, if not a lifetime. The extent to which an individual may endure pain, depends, of course, on the severity of the stimulus and other conditions.

As we shall see, man, through his cultural training, has learned to modify, offset, and otherwise control some of these primary cycles. We note only a few obvious examples here: The oxygen tent has made possible the prolongation of life to practically its normally expected duration. Medicines make possible the reduction and elimination of many threats to survival from, for example, undue fever or the pangs of childbirth. Housing, through heating and air-conditioning, serves to offset the pain-producing effects of arctic or torrid temperatures, as the case may be. Hunger and thirst drives are modified by culture in terms of both kind and amounts necessary to survival. And the cultural influences on sexuality are varied in kind as well as differentially prolonged as to time.

The impact of learning, even upon the most basic of the sustaining systems, such as respiration and temperature regulation, bring us face to face with the fact that for the study of personality, the student of motivation deals chiefly with the learned modifications of the original biogenic drives. In addition to these changes he must take into account

new or acquired motives which derive from man's membership in society with its culture.

MOTIVES: ACQUIRED DRIVES

All the basic drives and mechanisms developed to aid in survival, which we have just examined, man has in common with the higher animals. Yet there are sharp differences between man and even the highest of the anthropoids, the apes. The latter have social life which may be considered the prototypes of the family, the play group, and the in-group versus out-group opposition, but they do not have true language and tool-making capacities which are the *sine qua non* of culture. There is considerable social learning among the animals, largely of an imitative or conditioned response sort. But they do not possess traditions, customs, and firmly established expectations of thought and action which we call culture.

Thus, while the new-born monkey or ape is introduced into a form of group life, it is of a rudimentary kind compared to the world in which a new-born human infant finds himself. The latter is surrounded by his mother, father, siblings, and others. These individuals direct his activities from birth on along the lines which their particular culture has trained them. And this cultural training affects the child's motivations as well as practically all other of his activities. How often he eats and what he eats will be more or less controlled by his mother or other attendant. The nature and amount of additional bodily care and affection will likewise canalize or direct his motivated behavior. The cycles connected with evacuation, sleep, and random expressive movements are all subject to control and direction by those around him. Later he will acquire speech which will aid him greatly in expressing his needs and motives. He will develop longer and longer range purposes or goals toward which acquired needs and motives will be directed. In time, the individual acquires motives—wishes, wants, desires, interests, values—which are indeed remote from his strictly bodily needs and drives.

Learning and Motivation. While we shall examine some aspects of learning theory as it relates to personality development in Chapter 4, brief note must be made here of some of the factors which underlie the derivation of new motives.

The new-born infant is obviously dominated by his physical needs. In this he is not unlike the new-born of closely related species of animals. He knows no social rules of feeding or evacuation schedules. He is indifferent to the niceties of social etiquette. Operating at a reflex level of adjustment, his organic demands for sustenance, physical safety and sleep, are imperious and recurrent. However, because he is dependent upon other members of his species for survival, and since they are more

powerful and know more than he does, his original needs and drives sooner or later will be modified to suit others. In training the infant and child in the accepted and expected ways of his family and society, the basic principle of learning is that known as the *law of effect* backed up by a system of rewards and punishments. This principle of learning holds that of the possible varied responses to the same stimulus or situation those which are linked with adequate reward or satisfaction will tend to be repeated when the same need-drive-goal cycle is set in motion. And, in contrast, those responses which are linked with punishment, such as distress, discomfort, and deprivation, will tend not to be repeated.

Yet the process of modifying and expanding drives into motives is not a simple one. It must never be forgotten that the powerful physical drives of hunger, thirst, sex, and others rest upon inherited structure-function patterns that antedate culture by millions of years. Man can do much to limit, alter, and extend his biological drives but he cannot eliminate them and survive. The task, then, for parents and others who *are* society for the infant and child is to set before the latter such rewards or goals as will block out or offset the old and substitute the new in such a way as to make the training effective. It is here that the social elements come into play. The comfort, fondling, and attention which the child gets in connection with being put upon a regular schedule of feeding, evacuation, and the like are further supported by the fact that failure to conform leads to deprivations: physical punishment, denial of affection, and others.

One of the important features of such learning is the extension of time between appearance of need and drive and its gratification through reward. Second, new stimuli are introduced as cues or incitors of motivated behavior. In our middle-class society the child learns to be hungry on a three-meal-a-day routine, not every two to two-and-one-half hours as nature "intended." So, too, he acquires control of his bowel and bladder reactions so as not to soil his clothes or bed. If he is successful in these habits, he is a "nice boy" or "mother's darling." If he is not successful he is "dirty," "nasty," or "naughty." Third, he learns new motives. For example, the very comfort, attention, and reward which he gets from mother, father, and others become, in time, powerful impelling forces in themselves. When alone he becomes anxious and uncomfortable, when with others he is relaxed, happy, and perhaps the center of attention. As we shall see later most of our adult motives and interests rest on original biologically rooted needs and drives, but the degree and kind of modification and extension varies with individuals and with the culture of whole societies and sub-groups within societies.

Within the social matrix of the family and other groups the development of motives may be viewed or studied as taking place at two levels. There are motives resting more or less directly on the original or primary

drives. These we call the *first-order* derivations. The *second-order* derivations arise, in time and with further learning, from membership in a variety of groups with all the ramifications this implies in the development of needs for affection, emotional security, sociality, mastery or power, and creativeness and recreation, far-removed from biogenic drives. The mention of group membership with regard to the second-order motives does not mean that social, that is, group effects do not play a part in the first-order derivation. They do, and, in fact, most of the needs, motives and interests, of the adult may be traced back to what happened during the development course of the first-order derivations.

First-order Derivation of Motives. For purposes of description we may divide the first-level derivations of drives into those which bear on individual survival and which rest on the sustaining systems of the body, and those which have to do with the continuity of the species, or reproduction.

Assuming that the respiratory and temperature needs of the new-born infant are adequately met, the most urgent needs of the baby are thirst and hunger. It is in connection with satisfaction of these needs that we classify man as a social species.

His needs for liquids and foods can only be satisfied at the mother's or other woman's breast or by some substitute breast, such as a nursing bottle. The infant is not, even at first, an isolated, or separate individual who later acquires his social characteristics. He is from birth on a social being. He was conceived in a social situation of mating. For months he was dependent on a physical host, the mother, during the period of gestation. And he is absolutely dependent on other members of the species for survival from the time of his delivery on.

Clearly one of the most important of infant activities is social and cultural orientation from the beginning. The periods and kinds of feeding as well as the nature and amount of attendant or accessory habits of fondling neatly illustrate the fact that other individuals—designated by the abstraction, society—teach the child habits or cues and responses which are culturally derived. Some of the detailed features of this will be discussed in Chapter 12. At this point we only note the chief steps in the development of motives which center around man's sustenance needs.

The timing and related aspects of nursing vary widely among different societies and among classes in our Euro-American culture system. The timing ranges from those situations wherein the infant is put at once upon a more or less rigid schedule of feeding to those under which he is fed whenever he cries or otherwise signals that he is hungry. Where the former practice holds, as it often does in middle-class American families, we note one of the first instances of social-cultural training of a biologically based need-drive-goal cycle. The hunger needs in the infant occur about every two or two-and-a-half hours; but infants are often put on a three-

or four-hour feeding routine. While the baby usually adapts himself to this schedule, it runs counter to what might be called "nature's norm."

In connection with nursing, of course, the child may be handled in various ways, from a great deal of fondling to more or less mechanical and unemotional manipulation. These variations will, also, in time pay off in different kinds of habits and values with regard to the mother and later to other women.

So, too, there are sharp variations in the manner and time of weaning the infant. In some societies the baby is given certain forms of solid food almost from birth on, in others not until months later. In some cases the weaning takes place gradually and by easy stages, in others it marks a sudden and often sharp break in the routine. In any case as the child shifts to solid food, he acquires the food habits and preferences of his family, class, and larger community or society. Along with these he learns to handle implements of feeding: spoons, knives, and forks in our society, chop sticks in China, or his fingers in certain Near-Eastern societies. Various conventions may surround the food-taking period. Eating itself becomes but the part of a veritable social ritual, including with middle-class families, for example, regular hours and an extensive set of equipment considered proper for mealtime. And in the "best" circles, the entertainment aspect of a formal dinner is more important than the biological satisfaction of hunger. In fact it is considered bad manners to show too much concern with one's food. The beautiful accoutrements of the room and table, the brilliant conversation, and the clothes and adornments of the guests are the center of attention. In such cases the hunger and thirst needs have become imbedded in a vast mass of habits and values which have nothing to do with the satisfaction of the primary requirements of sustenance.

There are other and more extensive ramifications of the patterns of behavior related to hunger and thirst drives. Sooner or later, the child learns about the larger economic institutions in which his own habits of eating and drinking are but the consumer phase of an elaborate system of motives and habits. If he is a farm child, he learns about crops and dairy products as a source of the meals he eats. If an urban child, he learns about the grocery store where mother gets food in exchange for money, which, in turn, father brings home from some place for doing something called "work." Still later, in the home and in school the child may learn about the whole network of institutions of production, distribution, and consumption. The motivations which he, as a growing member of his society, will acquire with reference to these larger and more extended aspects of sustenance represent what we call second-order derivation of motives. They become associated with motivations related to work, status-seeking devices to insure economic security, and a whole gamut of values as bread-winner and citizen. (See below.)

What is true of the modification and extension of the original needs and drives related to hunger and thirst is true, in principle, of the needs and drives having to do with evacuation, avoidance of pain and discomfort, and others concerned with individual survival. The training habits of defecation and urination vary greatly among different societies and between classes and other sub-groups within societies. In some instances the whole process of training is a slow and gradual one beginning about the second year and more or less dependent on imitation and advice of parents and other household members rather than on direct reward or punishment. In middle-class American families such training is often begun in the second half of the first year—if not earlier—and is frequently accomplished with much emotional and other stress on the part of both parent and child. The heavy emphasis on cleanliness is supported by rewards for acquiring the "dry habit" and strong punishment for infractions. The almost compulsive nature of much of this training probably has some distinctive effects on the personality traits of those exposed to it. (See Chapter 12.)

Closely associated with bodily cleanliness and care is a matter of wearing clothes and all the many habits associated with this practice. Learning to put various garments on and off, learning to button up, to tie shoe laces, and many other skills become associated with growing up, becoming a "little man" or a "little lady" as middle-class parlance has it. The parents, the teachers, and others praise the neat and tidy child—in his care of his clothes, in his school work, and in other learned reactions whose sources are the early stress on cleanliness.

Temperature regulation is, of course, not subject to much direct modification. In cases of extreme deviation, as in fever or chills, medication and external care may be used to restore normal temperature. But such serious deviations aside, man has, through clothing and housing, provided himself with various means of aiding the regulation of bodily temperature.

Just as one takes temperature regulation more or less for granted until something goes wrong with this particular sustaining system, so respiration does not come in for very much if any modification at the hands of society. So long as a supply of oxygen is at hand and so long as the organism can take it in and expel carbon dioxide all goes well. Certainly man has not found a substitute for oxygen or for the need to get rid of accumulated carbon dioxide. Yet there are situations where some special attention is given to training in respiration. In our Euro-American society, singers are given special breathing exercises. So, too, athletes are denied tobacco on the ground that it interferes with "their wind." And in certain cultures, as in India, unique habits of breathing are used in certain cults when seeking contact with supernatural forces.

In like manner natural reactions to fatigue are not greatly altered,

except under special circumstances. Men can be trained to remain awake for long periods of time under conditions of work or crisis. So, too, individuals may be conditioned to sleep in various kinds of beds and at various hours of the day or night and for differing periods of time. While sleep is a natural reaction to fatigue, children are trained to go to bed at certain times and for given periods, and again all sorts of extraneous elements enter into their training. Taking dolls to bed with them, being told bedtime stories, and other rewards are built up in American middle-class families as a means of training children to the expected sleep habits. In lower-class families regularity of sleep may not be considered important for young children who are permitted to sleep when they feel sleepy just as they eat when they are hungry or when there is something to eat.

In the human species, the original drives connected with reproductive functions do not come into full operation until some years after birth—the puberty period. However, two facts must be borne in mind in dealing with human sexuality. While procreation is not possible until the pubertal changes have taken place, sexual expression is evident from birth on. Secondly, the fact that full sexual maturation does not occur until puberty means that for a period of from 12 to 15 years the individual may be variously conditioned with regard to the sexual drives and their satisfaction. There is no doubt that the functions associated with reproduction have not only afforded man with some of his greatest pleasures but also some of his most serious fears and distress. Since later we shall discuss more fully the place of sexuality in personality development and adjustment, we shall only mention some of the most important features of the process of modifying the original drive into adult motivation.

Sexual responsiveness in infancy depends largely on external stimulation, chiefly of the genitalia, but partially also from stimulation of secondary erogenous zones: thighs, armpits, mouth, and other areas. Stroking or tickling of these parts of the body set up pleasurable reactions on the part of the infant. As he grows older and comes to explore his own body surfaces with his hands, the young child often manipulates his genitalia with evident pleasant effects. These are more or less natural reactions, but how the mother, nurse, or other adult will react to the child in such situations depends, of course, upon *their* cultural training. If sexuality is regarded as something to be avoided, as something sinful and dangerous to one's welfare, and, as a consequence, surrounded with heavy taboos, the child's playing with his sex organs will meet with severe punishment. This may be both physical and verbal, as slapping hands, saying an act is "nasty" or "bad," or threatening to cut off the genitalia, or the hand that touches them. This is essentially the pattern of control exercised in Euro-American, Christian societies, especially in the middle and upper classes. On the other hand, there are societies where no such heavy taboo is placed upon expressions of sexuality, where the child is encouraged and even

taught masturbation and early initiation into sexual congress itself.

Sexuality is closely associated with the affectional relation between child and parent, just as later it has its place in the love relations of adults. In our own Christian society, the repression of overt sexuality is overlaid with a high stress on sublimated, non-sexual, aspects of love. While the growing child is conditioned not to express his sexuality openly, he is highly rewarded by mild fondling, emotional warmth, and comfort from his mother and others in the family circle. As a result there early emerges a double image or idea about sexuality. Physical expression of this deep need and drive is inhibited by fear of punishment. In time, one internalizes, the punishment patterns laid down by the mother, father, and others. This is the foundation of the whole belief that overt sexuality is sinful, nasty, and bad. The internalization of social taboos becomes the controlling mechanism—the conscience. One's indulgence in tabooed forms of sexuality leads not only to punishment by others, but to self-punishment through the sense of guilt and shame.

Although overt sexuality is required for purposes of reproduction, these functions are institutionalized within the family. Moreover, in the true Christian tradition, sexual intercourse should be only for purposes of reproduction and not for pleasure. Perhaps this particular taboo today is more honored in the breach than otherwise. Yet, there remains in Euro-American culture a large component of tradition and custom centered around restraint of sexuality which have many implications in personality development and function.

Second-order Derivations of Motives. The first-order derivations of motives depend more or less directly on the original, biological drives as they are modified and canalized within the family group, especially at the hands of the mother and other close adult associates. What we call second-order derivations represent, in part at least, modifications and extensions of these initial modifications. These are illustrated in many of the familiar listings of motives found in the literature of psychology.

There have been many other attempts to list motives, and at various points in future chapters, we shall make note of these. For our purposes at this point, however, we shall discuss what seem to be the major motives as they relate to affectional needs, physical security, group membership, power and mastery functions as related to certain rôles and statuses, and recreational and creative motives. In discussing these the frame of reference will be largely that of inter-personal and group relationships as these influence the particular motive or motives.

1. The affectional needs of the individual rests on the close mother-child relations which are associated biologically with nursing. Linked to this bio-social need is bodily warmth provided by the mother to the child in their close contact, the provision of clothes, bathing, and other bodily care.

The nature and extent of such affectional patterns, of course, will vary from society to society as the respective cultures put different values on the place of love and affection in inter-personal relations. In some instances considerable early affection is followed by parental rejection as with the Balinese. Sometimes there is essentially a maternal rejection from the outset as with the Marquesans.⁶ Among the latter the mother does not nurse the infant, lest in so doing she lose the beauty of her breasts. The child is fed a kind of mash, and comes, rather early, to depend on the father and the older children in the family for affection and comfort. In middle-class America, we find a combination of affection and more or less rigid training in nursing, evacuation, and cleanliness.

From the initial contact with the mother and the affectionate patterns developed within this social context, there follows a displacement or extension of affectional relations to the father and to the brothers and sisters of one's own family. Whether these relations are warm and emotionally satisfying or cool and distant, depends in part on the nature of the original contacts with the mother. So, too, in time these reactions to other family members give the base on which one's relations to individuals outside the family will be built. Identification with playmates, colleagues, and members of a wide variety of groupings has its source in the first affectional relations of mother and child, and child with other family members.

2. At the adult level, second-order motivations having to do with physical security center in such activities as finding and keeping a business or a job which will support one and one's dependents. One's views and values about the economic institutions of his society become woven into the entire patterning of his need for economic security. The values of having a good job and of the competition for better and better monetary rewards represent such motivations in Euro-American societies. (See Chapter 19.)

3. We have already emphasized the fact that the individual could not survive without membership in a society or group. But aside from the direct benefits which the individual gets from being a member of a group—food and physical security as a child in the family, leadership rôle and status in school or an army group, and so on—the individual also develops a sense of belonging, a need for sociality for its own sake. The origin of such a motive probably rests on the affectional patterns built up in the family. In time, they become more or less autonomous. The ramifications of the need to belong are wide. Ostracism from a group wherein one once had rôle and status is one of the most telling forms of social punishment which an individual may suffer. The isolated person may substitute daydreams and wishes for actual participation in a group, but, for the most part, he is regarded by others and consequently by himself as at odds with the

⁶ Gregory Bateson and Margaret Mead, *The Balinese Character* (New York, New York Academy of Sciences, 1942), and A. Kardiner, *The Individual and His Society* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1939).

world. In the rise of the self, sense of belonging is of central importance. (See Chapter 7.)

4. Motives centering around power and mastery are clearly evident in most advanced societies. They are, moreover, closely tied up with rôles and statuses which grow out of age and sex differences and especially with those associated with the class structure of any society. Though these motives take varied forms, depending on the culture, they are found almost everywhere. Those few and isolated tribes or small societies wherein power and mastery, in some form or another, are absent or of very mild sort must not serve to mislead the student as to the important place which striving for mastery has in the great bulk of human societies.

Age differentials become linked to forms of control. Our familiar classification of age groups into infancy-childhood, adolescence or youth, maturity, and old-age indicates a certain gradation of status and power. Rôles and statuses associated with sex differences are clearly shown everywhere. In our own society, though women have made considerable advancement toward forms of equality with men in many matters, the fact remains that our culture is still rather definitely under masculine domination.

Class differences greatly affect the nature and intensity of motivations with respect to power and mastery. The very existence of a class system implies superiority-subordination relations between members of the groups in the hierarchy. The child of the top class will be differently oriented about controlling others than a child from the bottom class. While within each stratum there will be variations in power, the class system tends to fix the inter-personal patterns between members of one class and those of another.

The nature and extent of the class system, moreover, sets limits on the competitive and coöperative relations among individuals. In our American open class system, as it is called, there is much inter-personal competition to improve one's status by upward mobility in the status hierarchy. In more highly fixed class structures—as under a caste system—such mobility is almost impossible.

5. Practically all societies reveal certain additional motives which set off recreational and creative activities. Play activities serve to relax the individual and compensate, in part, for tensions and stresses associated with securing a living, struggling for power and mastery, and the like. Men everywhere show some kinds of play life, but the values and forms of recreation vary greatly from society to society. Man not only plays, he invents and creates. Some writers have even posited an innate curiosity drive, others a "creative instinct." Psychologically, creativeness rests largely on the fantasy life of the individual. In expressing overtly his day-dreams and inner wishes man may invent a new tool or machine, paint a picture, write a sonnet, compose a new tune, or otherwise create something which he did not have before. Again the culture of the time and place

will set the direction and determine the nature of much, if not all, of the creative impulses. In a society such as was found in certain periods of ancient China, creativeness was limited to the fine arts and even this was within rather set rules. In an age which puts high rewards on mechanical production, the invention of new tools and machines is emphasized and the fine arts may be somewhat neglected.

6. Closely related to recreation and creative motivations are those motivations associated with the institutions of religion and philosophy. Everywhere man reveals motives which center around his views regarding the nature of the universe and regarding its supernatural aspects—that is, those features which man does not comprehend. The variations in religious experience are great, but underneath there is a certain common core of concern with the ultimate nature of man's destiny. This concern probably derives from lack of understanding of the cosmos, from fear and anxiety about life, and from some deep desires to project oneself into a somewhat larger and perhaps more satisfactory world beyond the mundane one which everyone knows. But whatever the psychological source, culture again canalizes these fantasies into motivations and consequent activities into religious institutions. Again their universality shows that they must represent some very deep-laid needs of mankind everywhere.

These six groups of motives are, at best, descriptive categories of large or molar type. Actually within each of these and outside them there are hundreds of particular motives. Interests, values, mental sets whole systems of belief—such as myths and legends—and any number of other terms may, on occasion, be used to classify motives. It should not be forgotten that classification is not explanation. To get at the details of causation of behavior we need careful descriptions and analyses of every step from need to goal and reward. Yet in dealing with manifestations of personality in a social setting, that is, in a group, such detailed analyses are almost impossible at this stage of psychology and social science.

SOME LIMITATIONS ON DERIVED MOTIVES

There are certain limits beyond which human learning cannot go in the matter of motivation. It must not be forgotten that man is tied to his animal heritage and under severe crises may revert to primary drives and responses. Under conditions of extreme deprivation of food, men have been known to turn cannibals. Certainly where there is prolonged shortage of food, as under conditions of famine, concern with the niceties of affection and group membership give way to much more biological demands for food. This has been shown both experimentally and from actual situations under conditions of famine or deliberate starvation, as in prison camps.

Evidences of Limitations. Certain experiments made during the Second World War have given us some important information regarding the biological limitations to learned behavior including motivation. A study

of physical and psychological changes under conditions of near-starvation was made at the University of Minnesota. A group of 32 conscientious objectors volunteered to act as subjects for a period of one year. For purposes of comparison measurements of physical and psychological traits were made periodically. Also, there were interviews and a day-by-day observation of the men. For the first three months the subjects lived under "normal nutritional conditions." Then for six months they were "systematically semi-starved." During the final three months they were gradually rehabilitated.

The motivation for the experiment was excellent. As conscientious objectors the subjects were already oriented to high level of personal sacrifice for a cause. They realized that the experiment itself would throw light on many problems which have to be faced in trying to help people who are forced by circumstances, such as famine or war, to live on starvation diets. Finally, as conscientious objectors, the men were living in protected and relatively stress-free conditions.

The chief and obvious physical effect was a 25 per cent loss of weight, on the average. Also there was a 30 per cent reduction in physical strength, and a decrease of 1° F. in the norm of body temperature.

The psychological effects were various. As to motivation there developed an almost complete concern with food. The men day-dreamed of food; they collected cookbooks and recipes; they thought and talked of little else than food. In contrast the "sexual urge gradually decreased." So, too, "the tendency for spontaneous activity which is universal in healthy adults was notably lacking." Emotionally the men were dull and apathetic sharpened by occasional outbursts of aggressive and irritable reactions to others. Strangers and the well-fed staff members were the chief targets for these hostile responses.

Sociability sharply declined, though there was a strong in-group sense among the subjects of the experiment. As the six-month period wore on, there was steady lessening of sociable relations. Even talk became an effort. There was a loss of interest in or tolerance for humor.

As to intellectual capacity, as measured by various tests, it was unimpaired. However, there was little or no motivation to take up intellectual tasks, and the men were easily distracted and fatigued when they did try any mental exercise.

Still other behavior changes were observed during the three months of rehabilitation feeding. "One of the men aptly characterized the difference between starvation and rehabilitation as the difference between old age and adolescence." Both physical and psychological improvement came gradually. Habits, such as licking their plates, clung to them long after their diets had been much improved. "The energy level increased before the controls on emotional responses were re-established. For the first few weeks of rehabilitation, the irritability of the rehabilitating men was much

greater, and its expression was more boisterous." But as the men regained weight and strength the former patterns of motivation and habit reappeared. Here, as in the course of the whole experiment, individual differences were clearly apparent. Moreover, it was evident that "starving persons retain very many of their normal characteristics."⁷ Yet it is also clear that excessive deprivation of food will lead to loss of many of the learned motives and traits of man. Under more prolonged conditions of undernourishment, still other changes must occur.

So, too, man's inhibitions as to sexuality may break down under certain conditions and the more primary sex expression of sexuality appear. This is illustrated in sexual crimes and in certain forms of mob violence. Certainly if Freudian psychology has taught us anything it is that underneath the veneer or polish of civilization men and women, and children too, are often brutal, cruel, and definitely biological in their deeper, but culturally repressed, relations to their fellows.

If this be so, then those concerned with cultural training, that is, education—both formal and informal—should bear these facts in mind. It is useless to gloss over man's deep-seated hostilities or to contend, as some do, that these are really culturally induced, and hence could, through different training, be eliminated. While we need not posit or assume a simple instinct of pugnacity, certainly by the very nature of inter-personal and inter-group interactions, some people are going to be frustrated and denied their full satisfaction or goal-reward. This will tend to produce forms of response one of the most powerful of which is hostility. While we may be able to sublimate aggressiveness, it is most unlikely that its rise can be prevented or that some expression of it can be completely blocked. We shall return to this topic in other connections.

FEELINGS AND EMOTIONS

Everybody knows that some situations tend to call out reactions which we call pleasant or unpleasant, or, if the situation is regarded as more critical, responses called emotional. On the basis of such experiences both common-sense and scientific distinctions have been made between *affective*, or feeling-emotional states, and the *intellectual* ones wherein there is no obvious emotional disturbance.

If affective states are mildly pleasant, unpleasant, or indifferent we call them feelings. Other affective states, also usually marked by sense of pleasure or displeasure, may be more intense and frequently more specific. For these latter we have been taught to attach certain names: anger, fear, disgust, joy, and the like. These we term the emotions. Affective processes.

⁷ The data are taken from Harold S. Guetzkow and Paul H. Bowman, *Men and Hunger, A Psychological Manual for Relief Workers* (Elgin, Ill., Brethren Publishing House, 1946). The quotations are from pp. 23, 24, 45. By permission. For the full report, see Ancel Keys, et al., *The Biology of Human Starvation*, 2 vols., (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1949).

either the milder feelings or the more intense emotions, may be viewed behavioristically as representing tendencies within the individual to approach or avoid the *conditions* which set up disturbances in adjustment. Moreover, these conditions may be either inside or outside the individual or both.

Emotion, then, may be defined as a stirred-up state or acute disturbance of the individual which is related to certain perceived stimuli. Emotion involves three factors: consciousness or perception of a situation, internal visceral changes, and various motor or behavioral outlets. The perceptual factor is often an awareness of the interference of one's course from need to goal. This may involve a sense of anxiety, exultation, depression, and the like, on the one hand, and an increase or decrease in the intensity of the motivating need. The visceral and motor elements include such things as modifications in heart beat, sweating, flushing or blanching of the skin, and restlessness or other motor reactions.

A report of war veterans about the symptoms associated with fear in battle illustrates the matter: Of 300 combat veterans of the Spanish Civil War, 7 out of 10 reported "pounding of heart and rapid pulse," more than 4 out of 10 said they had "strong feelings of muscular tenseness," and "sinking feeling in the stomach," a third experienced "dryness of mouth and throat," about a quarter of them reported "trembling" and "sweating of palms of hands." There were lesser numbers (on the order of 14 to 17 per cent) who said they experienced "cold sweat," "loss of appetite," "prickling sensation of scalp and back," and "feeling sick or faint." Only a very few reported involuntary urination, defecation, vomiting, or outright fainting.⁸

In everyday life we experience a wide variety of affective states. There is, in fact, a kind of continuum ranging from those periodic emotional-feeling states marked by strong mental and bodily stress to the more continuing or persistent affective states that underlie most of our daily activities.⁹

With regard to emotional reaction to sudden loud sound or flash of light, however, there does seem to be a more or less persistent pattern of surprise or startle. It probably has its roots in the elementary excitement which is characteristic of the first emotional-feeling responses of the infant. Be that as it may, the startle reaction is marked by sudden movement of the head, blinking of eyes, and "a characteristic facial expression." The

⁸ From John Dollard and Donald Horton, "Fear in battle," *The Infantry Journal*, 1944, 7:19. The total percentages equal more than 100 since the informants usually checked more than one symptom. For confirmation of these findings, see S. A. Stouffer, *Studies in Social Psychology in World War II*, Vol. 2, *The American Soldier: Combat and its Aftermath* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1949), pp. 200-204.

⁹ See Nancy Bayles, "A study of fear by means of the psychogalvanic technique," *Psychological Monographs*, 1925, No. 176, 35. (Published as *University of Iowa Studies in Psychology*, No. XI:1-38.)

shoulders are raised and drawn forward, the upper arms turned inward, the elbows bent, the forearms turned downward, and the fingers flexed. There is a forward movement of the trunk, "contraction of the abdomen, and bending of the knees." Not all these movements take place every time the individual is so intensely stimulated but some elements of this pattern always occur. It is seen in infants and "does not change in its form throughout life."¹⁰

The situation which arouses affective states as well as the manner in which the individual reacts to or handles them depends, in part at least, on learning. Therefore let us turn now to examine the development of emotional behavior.

Development of Emotional Behavior. The emotional behavior of the infant and young child has, like many of the youngster's other reactions, the characteristic of somewhat undifferentiated, "mass" activity. At the outset, according to Bridges, there seems to be only a general excitement or agitation. But within three months this breaks down into "delight" or pleasurable and "distress" or displeasurable reactions. By six months we find quite a gamut of differentiated affective responses: In the unpleasant grouping are anger, fear, disgust, and distress; in the pleasant, elation and affection as well as delight. As the child matures and is exposed to more social learning still other more specific emotions appear. Bridges has shown these for the first two years in Figure 4.

This differentiation in type of reaction is accompanied by growing specificity of stimuli or situations toward which the responses are directed and by a reduction in the intensity of emotional expression. In other words discriminatory responses or perception comes into play, and the undifferentiated reactions come more and more under cortical controls. Moreover, in the course of building up this perceptual distinction, the child is taught names for these emotions, largely in terms of the stimuli. A particular combination of bodily state, perception, and motor expression or reaction gets labeled fear, or love, or anger, or any other of the list of names linked to the arousing situation. As Fred Brown has aptly put it: "*The situations giving rise to such surcharged reactions determine to a very great extent what the emotion shall be called. . . .*"¹¹ For example love describes sexual attraction, anger and fear, strong reactions at frustration, and so on.

The importance of knowing the stimulating circumstances in naming or identifying emotions was neatly shown in a study by Sherman.¹² Young infants were stimulated to emotional reactions through hunger, by drop-

¹⁰ W. A. Hunt in E. G. Boring et al., eds., *Foundations of Psychology* (New York, John Wiley & Sons Inc., 1948), pp. 38, 90. By permission. A fuller account is in Carney Landis and W. A. Hunt, *The Startle Pattern* (New York, Farrar & Rinehart, 1950).

¹¹ Fred Brown, "The nature of emotion and its relation to anti-social behavior," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1934, 28, 473. Italics in the original.

¹² Mandel Sherman, "The differentiation of emotional responses in infants. I and II," *Journal of Comparative Psychology*, 1927, 26, 284-335, 351.

ping, by making a loud noise, by pricking with a pin, and by other means. Students in medicine and psychology were asked to name the emotional response. Sometimes the emotion was elicited by the experimenter operating behind a screen, and as soon as the screen was removed the judges were asked to identify the emotion observed. In some cases the emotions of the babies were shown in motion pictures but the judges did not know what stimuli had been used.




FIG. 4. Approximate ages of differentiation of various emotions during the first two years of life. (Adapted from Katherine M. B. Bridges, "Emotional development in early infancy," *Child Development*, 1932, 3:340. By permission.)

The results are striking. For instance, the 42 medical students who saw and heard the reactions to dropping, but without knowing that the baby had been dropped, gave the following judgments as the nature of the reaction: 26 per cent said it was colic, and the same that the child had just been awakened from sleep; 16 per cent said it was anger and 14 per cent, hunger; the other judgments were scattered among pain, fear, "organic brain emotion," and being too tightly bandaged. Dropping, accord-

ing to the Watsons' thesis,¹³ is supposed to be an innate fear reaction, yet slightly less than 5 per cent of the medical students judged this to be the "cause" of the emotion.

In the second part of the study 32 graduate students in psychology saw the films which showed the emotional reactions but did not indicate what the stimulation had been. Their judgments were of the same order of variation and confusion as those of the medical students. For the emotional reaction to dropping: 42 per cent of them put down anger, 19 per cent, hunger, and only 15 per cent, fear. Other judgments included pain, grief, consternation, nausea, and rage. Yet when these same students knew what the stimulus was in each case their agreement as to how to label the particular emotion, while not perfect, was much higher.

While maturation as well as learning plays a part in the appearance and differentiation of emotional expression, social-cultural reinforcement is particularly important. Three commonly studied emotional expressions of the infant and young child are smiling, laughing, and crying. Smiling appears in the first weeks of life but is strongly reinforced by parents and others who respond with smiles and other rewards. Once built up, such a reaction becomes generalized to a large number of situations with particular kinds of pleasant rewards. Usually laughing appears later, at about 20 weeks, but by the end of the first year, it too has become a more or less stable part of the child's emotional-expressive repertoire. Crying begins at birth but it is subject to reinforcement and direction as to situations which set it off.

These and other expressive reactions related to emotions must be understood within the framework of the society and its culture in which they develop. We have here an excellent illustration of scientific ethnocentrism. We think of the smile as a spontaneous expression of amusement. But in Japan the smile is a highly conventionalized facial expression. For instance, it is a social duty to smile, even when grief-stricken, as a mask of happiness lest one be accused of inflicting one's sorrow on his friends. So, too, in parts of native Africa laughter is used to express wonderment, embarrassment, surprise, and even distress. It may not be a sign of amusement at all. Even in our society we weep or cry for joy and hysterical laughter may represent anything but a pleasant affect. In some societies hired mourners do the crying and make other show of emotions at the funeral of family dear ones. It would be considered against the social code to do the weeping oneself.¹⁴

These cross-cultural comparisons should make us cautious of some of the generalizations made about the meaning of expressive behavior, facial

¹³ J. B. Watson and R. R. Watson, "Studies in infant psychology," *Scientific Monthly*, 1921, 13:493-515.

¹⁴ Illustrations of culturally defined emotions will be found in Weston LaBarre, "The cultural basis of emotions and gestures," *Journal of Personality*, 1947, 16:49-68.

and otherwise, as indicative of certain emotions. In commenting on this topic, Hunt remarks: "The results of . . . investigations have been both confusing and controversial. No clear and univocal expressive patterns have been found for the different emotions."¹⁵ And Hunt goes on, wisely, to point out that with regard to facial expressions they fall within our culture and hence "people use them as a means of social communication."¹⁶ Bearing this in mind, we must be cautious about the findings of studies where judgments of emotions were made from photographs. Usually the first judgment is of a full face. Then the lower half of one picture is matched to the upper half of another, and a second judgment made. Many of the results show that the judges are more influenced "by expressions of the mouth than by expressions of the upper half of the face."¹⁷ Be this as it may, it does not follow that the basis of such judgment is not acquired through cultural learning. There is no biological reason for assuming that the mouth is more important as a cue to emotions than the eyes. In fact in some studies of deliberately posed photographs the eyes seemed to be more expressive of certain emotions than the mouth. Clearly the feelings and emotions are subject to modification, not only in their intensity and mass-activity features as one develops and acquires discrimination, but with respect to the behavioral norms and expectations which a given society and its culture set up for the individual.

Frustration, Aggression, and Anxiety. That the emotions and drives are closely linked is most evident when we examine the relationship of frustration to the processes of adjustment. The various activities necessary to get from need to satisfaction may be long or short, simple or complex, as the individual moves smoothly and easily or with difficulty and effort from drive to reward. The simplest and quickest course from need to reward is illustrated in any strictly reflex movement. A longer but relatively short span of time is that between an infant's cry for food and the mother's hasty presentation of her breast. But as socialization goes forward and as the demands of adaptation become more extensive, the child is faced with an increased number of blockings or thwartings which stand between his need and the attainment of the goal and reward. Frustration, in one form or another, is a universal price we pay for becoming a participating member in society.

There are various ways to meet frustrations. The most elemental is that of direct and violent physical attack upon the stimulus or situation which blocks our would-be activity. Then, too, one may find substitute ways of getting around a barrier as evidenced in conditioning where substitute stimuli or substitute rewards are acquired. The child denied affection or

¹⁵ Hunt, *op. cit.*, p. 97. By permission.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 98.

¹⁷ N. L. Munn, *Psychology: The Fundamentals of Human Adjustment* (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1946), p. 290. There is a good review of a number of such studies in Munn.

candy dreams of being a highly loved child of others than his own parents or fancies himself surrounded by rock-candy mountains. Again one may meet frustrations by escape or retreat from the situation which thwarts one. And there are others. At this point we want only to point out that aggressive reactions to frustration are marked by intense anger and often fear. Moreover, hostility aroused by recurrent blocking may serve in time to make aggressiveness itself into a motive for action. At the outset this new but acquired hostility drive may be directed to some specific situation, say a dominating, severe father. Later it may become generalized to any authoritarian figure: teacher, employer, policeman, and the like.

Frustration may and often does set up fear. Biologically fear is an important cue to the development of defenses against actual dangers. In this sense it has a survival value. Yet in time fears may become internalized in the form of anxieties which may or may not have their roots in actual dangers or threats. If at the adult level we think of fear as a reaction to a threatening situation outside, we may view anxiety as a response to an anticipated danger or the symbol of that danger. When the anticipated danger is founded in an actual situation, it may serve a highly important function of directing action toward adequate adjustment. When the anxiety is not grounded in reality, we call it neurotic anxiety. Much of the difficulties of personality adjustment are bound up with unrealistic hostilities and anxieties, and we must recognize them as motivating elements in many situations. At various points later we shall comment in detail on the place of aggression as a motive.

Mood and Temperament. Individuals are characterized by certain periodic fluctuations in the nature of their more protracted though weaker emotional-feeling tone. We say the individual is gay at one time, and depressed at another. These variations of general tone we call moods. They may be daily in periodicity or of longer cycle. In turn, certain patterns of moods may come to dominate the total personality for years, sometimes for a lifetime. This we call temperament, which G. W. Allport defines as "the characteristic phenomena of an individual's emotional nature, including his susceptibility to emotional stimulation, his customary strength and speed of response, the quality of his prevailing mood, and all the peculiarities of fluctuation and intensity in mood. . . ." ¹⁴ Furthermore, Allport holds that the temperament is rooted in innate constitutional features. While we agree with this in general, it must not mislead us into overlooking the importance of social-cultural learning in the development and functioning of emotions, feelings, mood, and temperament. The study of temperament is so closely linked up with the whole theory of personality types that we shall take it up in some detail in Chapter 9.

In conclusion, then, we may say that the emotions and associated feel-

¹⁴ G. W. Allport, *Personality: A Psychological Interpretation* (New York, Henry Holt & Company, Inc., 1937), p. 54. By permission.

ings of pleasantness and unpleasantness have a remarkably wide range of effects upon the ideas, attitudes, and habits of the individual. Love and its emergent specific emotions of sympathy, pity, and parental, filial, and sexual affection serve to facilitate social interaction as well as all sorts of learning processes. So, too, anger reactions become definitely associated with frustration of impulse toward a goal in the struggle for power or prestige. These are often considered the core emotional state in aggression. Fear, too, may arise as a result of the blocking of an on-going activity. Certainly fear is the great inhibitor of action and is linked to avoidance and submission. But its effects are not altogether deleterious for the individual. It may serve useful functions in developing caution in hazardous situations and has its place—at least at sublimated levels—in fostering coöperation and mutual aid and thus in assisting love reactions in binding groups of individuals together.

CHAPTER 4

Some Aspects of Social-Cultural Learning

If behavior may be stated as a function of the personality in relation to its physical and social-cultural environment, it becomes necessary not only to discover the way in which behavior is set going by drives or needs but also to know how various activities are built up, changed, or eliminated. In other words, the study of personality must take into account learning as well as motivation. For example, we want to know how the infant and young child is inducted into his society and its culture. This involves identifying his original drives and especially discovering how they are modified and extended to new motives in the course of growing up. We must examine, too, the way in which the individual learns both mental and motor skills to aid him in solving the many problems which he faced in his physical and social-cultural world. Moreover we want to find out the way in which he acquires his traits, attitudes, and values. These matters are the subject of the present chapter. In the following chapter the basic forms of inter-personal interaction, which are learned, will be examined as a basis for our discussion of socialization.

THE NATURE OF LEARNING

Learning has to do with certain changes in the stimulus-response systems of the individual. It consists in doing things differently than we did them before. Yet not all changes in the individual's reactions take place because of learning. For one thing, the process of maturation, as noted in Chapter 2, is due to modifications of the tissues and organs of the body which are not dependent on what we call learning. Other adaptive reactions not properly due to learning include, for example, the effects of fatigue upon work output, and sensory adaptation, such as becoming used to the odors of a tannery, and the effects of narcotics and other drugs on the sensory processes. True, fatigue or drugs may influence the conditions under which one learns. For instance, a student who keeps awake by using benzedrine is not improving his skill although keeping awake may enable him to study longer hours than would otherwise be possible.

Learning may be defined as a change in response system brought about by deliberate or unconscious linkage or association of new stimuli and old or new responses. The test of learning is not that a given response will

occur but rather that having once taken place, it will be more likely to occur again than some other response. That is to say the binding or linking of the new stimulus and response may be stated in terms of degrees of probability.

Some Basic Considerations. While most psychologists give the topic of learning a central place in their science, there is by no means agreement as to any fully adequate theory of learning. The empirical facts are reasonably well established for a wide range of learning situations. Yet efforts to put these into systematic and sound theoretical form have led to a diversity rather than unity of standpoint and interpretation. Among the most striking divergences are those between the associationists—either functionalists or behaviorists—and those who follow the Gestalt and Field theories.

Perhaps the most important single and broad principle of learning is that which Thorndike termed *The Law of Effect*. His essential point is that when a satisfying connection has been made between a given stimulus or situation and a given response, such a connection is strengthened, but that when a connection is attempted under conditions of annoyance, pain, or punishment the connection is weakened or fails to be made at all.¹ The law of effect was further bolstered, according to Thorndike, by repetition and practice, in which recency also had a part. But, as we shall note below, the elements of motivation and reward have since been added by certain behaviorists as a means of enlarging the basic principle of effect.

Another important principle of modern learning theory was introduced by Pavlov, the Russian physiologist, and others which we may call the principle of *substitution*. Still other important features of learning which bear directly on social-cultural learning involve a recognition of the importance of the configuration, field, or total situation in which learning takes place. Then, too, we must reckon with the fact that much learning occurs in a non-deliberative or unconscious way. We want to examine some of the ways in which what we acquire is organized and acts to facilitate or block other learning as well as to take note of the persistence* or non-persistence of learned drives, cues, and responses. These, in turn, provide the foundation of traits, attitudes, and values, so important as clues to personal adjustment.

In terms of organic receptivity, modifiability, and reactivity, the processes of learning involve three factors or variables: (1) the stimulus and its reception by the individual, (2) the physical changes, largely neural, which take place within the organism as a result of this reception, and (3) the response through the muscles and glands. The basic factor in learning is the association or linkage between stimulus or cue and response,

¹ See Edward L. Thorndike, *Educational Psychology*, Vol. II, *The Psychology of Learning* (New York, Bureau of Publications, Teachers College—Columbia University, 1913).

as mediated through the central nervous system. It is particularly important to note that learning involves both changes in the stimulus-response systems *and* the internal modifications which serve to re-order and integrate the neural system in such a way as to influence subsequent activities. The behaviorists sometimes seem to neglect the latter set of factors just as the Gestaltists often give little attention to the mechanics of the former.

It is extremely difficult to get at the precise nature of the neural and other organic changes which take place in the course of learning. While there is some experimental and clinical evidence about neurological changes as a result of learning, it is mostly of a general rather than a specific character.

Since much of the formal data on learning has come from the experimental laboratory, it is often difficult to make a suitable bridge between its findings and the day-by-day learning of the individual in his contacts with his parents and others in the home, with his playmates, with his fellows at school, at work, or elsewhere. If we are to be objective and consistent, however, we must assume that the fundamental mechanisms of learning are the same everywhere. While there is a great gap between the laboratory and the study of personality as an adaptive organism living in a society with a culture, we must make an effort to show how the mechanisms of learning operate in the latter as they do in the former. If we are to be scientific, there cannot be one learning theory for the laboratory and another for everyday affairs.

General Conditions Influencing Learning. All sorts of internal and external factors operate to affect the linkages fundamental to learning. There is, of course, the general bodily state at the time the learning takes place. These conditions rest, in part, upon the functioning of the sustaining systems. The general neuromuscular readiness of the organism is important. There must be a "set" favorable to learning. Then, too, such matters as drowsiness, fatigue, the possible existence of diseased tissues, or the presence of toxins or infections will doubtless affect learning, but just what particular functions such factors perform we do not entirely know. Certainly, endocrine balance must be an influence, but again its specific significance is still largely unknown. So, too, matters such as age and inaturation are to be recognized. Young persons learn more readily than oldsters, although it has been shown that adults may continue to acquire new matter long after most of them give up trying to do so. (See Chapter 20.) Likewise, the work done in the measurement of intelligence has demonstrated that differences in intellectual capacity—many of which are doubtless constitutionally predetermined—play a distinctive part in facilitating or limiting the possibilities of learning. In fact, intelligence is usually measured by devices of learning, direct or indirect—that is, through new learning or by testing materials already acquired, such as manual skill, memory, association, and verbal concepts. Another very important internal

factor is, of course, motivation or intention, to be discussed below. External physical conditions also influence the learning, including such items as noise, ventilation, temperature, humidity, amount of oxygen in the air, and time of day. The importance of particular social circumstances will be discussed subsequently.

Chief Forms of Learning. The individual acquires new solutions to problems in various ways. Let us note some of these briefly.

One of the most commonly used methods of learning is called *trial-and-error*. We learn manual and verbal skills of all sorts by applying the old proverb, "If at first you don't succeed, try and try again." A great deal of experimental work has been done using this method.

The theory behind such learning is that it takes place in piecemeal fashion, termed the part-whole method. We acquire first one item and then another as we proceed to the final solution or skill. The novice at golf works on his stance, on the proper grip, or his swing—one item at a time—hoping that in due course he will get all these elements necessary to success in striking a golf ball merged into an efficient total. Actually, of course, so far as neuromuscular mechanisms are concerned, we do not yet know just *how* this coordination takes place. But we do know that integration does occur in much if not in all learning.

The *conditioned response method* developed by Bechterev and Pavlov in Russia has become widely used in experimental work.² Conditioning means the linkage of one operating reflex arc with another. The stimulus originally inadequate to elicit a particular response attains this capacity by pairing with the "natural" or adequate stimulus for the response. Most students are familiar with the story of Pavlov's dog which was trained to salivate at the hearing of a bell or buzzer. Like trial-and-error learning, conditioning has long been known to man. It is used in child training, in the domestication of animals, and in many everyday situations calling for problem solving.

Common sense, clinical observation, and formal experimentation have shown that most learning goes on within a larger setting or situation. There are matters in the focus of attention and matters on the periphery. The *Gestalt* method has been widely applied in the laboratory, especially in the analysis of perception.

Thus, in a simple experiment, animals were placed before two open boxes illuminated by light of some determined but different brightness—say the difference between 2 and 4. The animals were trained to go to the box of a certain brightness, say 4, and to the left. Then the brightness was changed, but the same ratio was retained, 4 and 8. The animals now responded to the higher brightness, 8, and not to 4. The inference is that

² Some psychologists would make conditioning the principle of all learning. For a critical assessment of this and other methods, see E. B. Hilgard, *Theories of Learning* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1948).

they were reacting to a particular set of relationships of the stimuli rather than to a specific item, a box lighted to the brightness of 4. Certainly, as we shall have ample opportunity to note, the child's learning in the presence of friendly pupils and a sympathetic teacher may be quite different than his learning in a home marked by conflict and hostility.

Closely related to the *Gestalt* type of learning is the well-recognized quality of "belongingness" to use Thorndike's term.³ In much learning, items do not appear in a series to be added but often operate or relate to each other in a larger totality.

Some learning takes place rather suddenly without much evidence of any preliminary trials. Here, no doubt, the important cues to the correct solution, operate below the limen of consciousness. There are no random or try-and-try-again movements necessary to reach the end or goal. This is called learning by *insight*. In such instances practice or repetition is not entirely necessary. Just as some conditioned responses are acquired with one association, notably in those instances which involve strong emotional conditioning, so, too, some learning arises quickly through insight.

Much human learning also takes place with the aid of verbal and other symbols. Through manipulation of words or mathematical or other symbols, an individual may acquire a whole host of skills which he can use in solving his day-by-day problems. Most of the learning involved in mastering mathematics and in acquiring the names of classes of objects and their relations and qualities is of this kind.

As in trial-and-error learning, in symbolic operations the individual attempts one solution and then another until he hits on the correct response or answer. But in the more advanced forms of reasoning, success can only be achieved by the discovery of some central principle or operation which can be used to solve the problem. These principles are logically what we call "laws" in science. Some aspects of logical thinking will be discussed in Chapter 8.

FUNDAMENTAL ELEMENTS AND CONDITIONS IN LEARNING

A wide variety of conditions, internal and external, enter into the processes of learning. These include, among others, such things as the interplay of motivation and reward as related to the law of effect, the place of inhibition and punishment, the effects of practice and non-practice, and the development of discrimination, generalization, and anticipatory responses. Other considerations include the importance of configurations, completion or closure, and the fact that much of our everyday learning takes place incidentally and often outside the focus of deliberate or conscious attention.

The Interplay of Drive, Cue, Response, and Reward. One of the gaps

³ E. L. Thorndike, *The Fundamentals of Learning* (New York, Teachers College, Columbia University, 1932).

in earlier learning theories has been the failure to recognize the importance of motivation and reward as a part of the total learning process. True the repeated linkage or contiguity of old and new stimulus-response connections, as Pavlov and others demonstrated, may result in certain patterns persisting through time. But most of our fundamental acquirements as members of various social groups are qualified by the nature and intensity of the drives, basic or acquired, which set adjustment in motion in the first instance. We owe a debt to Clark L. Hull, not only for extending the study of conditioning to include a place for motivation and reward but for having attempted to state the processes of learning in systematic terms.⁴

Hull posits four factors in learning: drive, cue, response, and reward. The *drive* is defined as any strong stimulus, original or acquired, that impels the individual to action. Accordingly any stimulus, if strong enough, may become a drive or motive. Hull and his followers, like most psychologists, make logical distinctions between primary or native drives and secondary drives or motives. The latter, as we pointed out in Chapter 3, derive from the conditions and demands of men in society but have their first roots, at least, in man's biologically oriented needs.

The *cue* is the stimulus or indicator which determines when and where the individual will react and the kind of response he will make. A simple illustration of a cue is the sound of a class bell which denotes the end of a lecture period or a train schedule which sets in motion action designed to get one to his train on time. Cues differ, of course, in kind and intensity. As to kind they range over the whole sensory-perceptual apparatus: visual, auditory, tactile, gustatory, olfactory, and proprioceptive. Cues, in fact, constitute an important aspect of perception. As to strength or intensity, they also vary widely. Ordinarily we think that bright lights, loud sounds, strong odors and the like serve as more effective cues than would stimuli of less intense sort. Yet, by learning, one can come to detect, that is, develop a cue-readiness for stimuli of low intensity. The hunted criminal or the soldier on a dangerous reconnaissance mission becomes highly adept at detecting the slightest footfall or other noise of low intensity. Then, too, for the most part, cues become organized into patterns of stimuli which have a summation effect on the responses. In many social situations there are multiple cues which set off particular reactions.

Since both drive and cue have their source in a stimulus, they have much in common. The cue value of a stimulus, however, lies in its distinctiveness while that of the drive is in its strength. Nevertheless under certain circumstances cues may serve as drives. The original hunger and sex

⁴ See Clark L. Hull, *Principles of Behavior* (New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1943). A more readable and popular presentation of Hull's system will be found in Neal E. Miller and John Dollard, *Social Learning and Imitation* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1941). See also Hilgard, *op. cit.*

drives, for example, are relatively periodic in appearance. Through learning they may be set in motion by specific acquired cues, as by an appetizing advertisement for liquid refreshment, or the appearance of an attractive member of the opposite sex. As Martial, the Roman writer, put it: "Man is the only animal that drinks without being thirsty and makes love at all seasons."

The drive, original or acquired, impels the organism to respond to certain cues. At the reflex level, of course, the cues are largely innately determined and the response follows at once. Only if the *response* occurs can it be rewarded and learned. One of the important procedures in social learning is to arrange the situations, be they in the home, on the playground, in the school, or at work, in such a way that the learner will make the first correct response. This may involve not only physical conditions but adequate and fully understood directions or instructions. One of the difficulties in training young children arises because the cues are not made clear to the child and hence the responses may not be adequate or correct. Later the individual internalizes many of his cues and the anticipatory responses associated therewith. But at the outset of learning the infant and child must learn his cues and responses from those around him—mother, father, and others. Moreover, as we shall see, these cues and appropriate reactions thereto are largely, though not entirely, derived from the culture. (See Chapters 5, 12, and 13.)

In terms of physical organization there is probably some sort of hierarchy in the order of drives, cues, and responses. For example, with the infant the periodic recurrence of hunger with its attendant response of crying becomes quickly linked to the social cue of the mother's breast and the subsequent reward through sucking and swallowing of milk. The completion of this cycle may be followed by another involving the drive for sleep. We may designate these original and biologically oriented patterns as an "innate hierarchy."¹

Responses made to cues which, in turn, are related to drives will become fixed or learned if they are rewarded. The *reward*, then, is the culmination of the activity set in motion by the drive, and the connection of cue to response is facilitated or strengthened by the reward. In other words, the reward acts as a *reinforcement*, and it is this which is the essential feature of the Law of Effect. Stated in behavioristic terms, the reward produces a reduction in the drive or tension which put in operation the whole cycle of activity in the first instance. It is in this sense that learning is often referred to as a process of tension reduction. Any event which serves to strengthen the stimulus- or cue response linkage may be termed a reward. At the level of original drive-reward cycles, food is such a reward. This may be called a primary reward. But through learning a wide range of acquired or secondary rewards may be built up. The range of secondary

¹ See Miller and Dollard, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

rewards is extensive but varies from society to society. Those which give an individual status, however, seem rather universal, as do those associated with praise, relief from anxiety, and the induction of a sense of belonging. As dominant as secondary rewards become, there is both experimental and everyday evidence that the acquired reward value of an object or event declines or weakens unless it is periodically supported by reinforcement of more basic sort.

The acquiring of new and socially more appropriate responses is influenced by frequency of connection of drive, cue, response, and reward. This Thorndike referred to as *The Law of Exercise*. In common-sense terms it means practice. The ease with which a response can be acquired depends upon the probability or likelihood that the cues present in the situation can be made to bring out that response. For example, the original drive, cue, and response with regard to evacuation is altered by the fact that the mother introduces new cues, modified responses, and new rewards by putting the child on a certain time schedule. Hence a response such as fondling, vocal attention, or other which at the outset was weak, that is, relatively ineffective, may with practice become a dominant one. The essential feature of this kind of learning is just this alteration of old combinations of cue and response or the introduction of new cues for old responses.

In social learning there are two particularly important aids in the learning of new cue-response connections. One of these is imitation; the other is the use of words as cues.

It would be a mistake to assume that repetition or practice is always necessary to learning correct cue-response combinations. The child who burns his hand on a hot stove learns the correct response of avoidance after one trial. What we have in this situation is the sight of the stove and the visual cue, which become sufficient to direct the response in the correct way, that is, withdrawal or avoidance of the hot object. As Miller and Dollard put it, "The important fact about conditioning, or associative learning, is that the correct response is dominant in the hierarchy of responses to the unconditioned stimulus."⁶

The behaviorists tend to interpret learning through reasoning or insight as cases of associative learning. But the mechanisms involved in such learning are admittedly obscure and the *Gestalt* psychologists are extremely critical of the behaviorists for trying to fit such learning into their schemes of associative learning or conditioning.

Elimination of Responses. Any consideration of the place of learning in society should also take into account the fact that some responses may be eliminated. A very common form of elimination is illustrated in what is called *experimental extinction*. When a given response is not rewarded, its connection with a given cue tends to weaken. Human beings quickly

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

learn to give up activities which go unrewarded and seek out those which are. In the training of young children it is sometimes wiser to permit absence of reward to produce extinction than to try a frontal approach by punishment or by the introduction of substitute habits. Common sense as well as experimental work shows that stronger habits are more resistant to extinction than weaker ones. And if the drive behind a learned act is strong, or if strong emotions have accompanied the original conditioning, extinction is less likely to take place.

In many cases, the effects of extinction are not lasting. There may be a period when the decrement in performance is quite marked to be followed later by what is called *spontaneous recovery*, which occurs without the introduction of any new practice.

The social implications of extinction and recovery are broad. For many situations the extension of learning or adjustment may be limited unless certain original or biological rewards are occasionally reintroduced. While one may thrive for a time on status-giving honors, one must also have food and shelter, hence the badges of public approval handed out to workers for increased production, as in Soviet Russia, have limited appeal if such rewards are not also backed up by more substantial rewards, such as, improved food and housing. Also extinction acts to stimulate a person to try out new habits, and if these are adequately reinforced, the older habit may be completely eliminated. Then, too, spontaneous recovery may serve to revive old patterns of response if new habits have not been built up.

Experimental extinction represents a particular kind of inhibition. But there are other forms as well. Pavlov noted a simple case of this when he found that his appearance in the laboratory where his students were experimenting on dogs served, in many instances, to block or prevent the animal's secretion of saliva. This situation has been examined experimentally through establishing a new response connection after a first conditioned pattern has been acquired. The second may serve to inhibit the first. This has been termed a *conditioned inhibition*. Yet a third conditioned reaction may be established which, in turn, will block out the second or conditioned inhibition and restore the first conditioning once more. This has been called the *inhibition of the inhibition*.

Examples of conditioned inhibition are evident in everyday life. The unexpected appearance of a parent in the classroom where his own child is reciting satisfactorily may set up in the child counter-responses which blot out for the time being his successful performance. Another example is found in cases where an effort is made to counteract the learned fear of a child by giving him some strong reward, such as candy, affection, and the like. The inhibition of an inhibition is illustrated in John Anderson's account of an attempt to cure a child of a strong fear of dogs—a conditioned response. Inhibition of this conditioned fear response was apparently successfully effected through the example of other chil-

dren and the parents. Then during one night, eleven months after the initial fear conditioning, the child awoke out of a nightmare, screaming to her parents, "I don't like . . . dogs." This dream image was so emotionally laden that it served for some time to inhibit the new habit of not being afraid of dogs. Thus the dream not only served to re-establish the specific conditioned fear, but the fear was generalized to all dogs.⁷

The function of inhibitory mechanisms is highly important for social training. They provide a means for relearning. They operate to make possible the development of strong avoidant reactions to stimuli of danger or of negative value to the family or other group. So, too, the inhibition of the inhibition is witnessed when under grave situations people are said to "lose their heads" or to "go to pieces." Such loss of habitual control may become all-important in a crisis. It is evident in the mass reactions of enraged mobs whose members commit cruel and immoral acts which they would never dream of doing under more ordinary circumstances. Here strong drives inhibit the ethical acquirements of the individual. The same mechanism is at work in the manic or paranoid personality who under real or imagined wrongs at the hands of others runs amuck among his friends.

Another aspect of the process of elimination concerns the possible use of punishment. There is a popular belief that punishment will help blot out undesirable responses. Punishment involves not merely non-reward but some additional frustration, threat, or painful action directed to the learner. While much of the experimental literature on learning tends to reject the view that punishment will wipe out responses, there is certainly evidence that it acts to modify or inhibit responses under certain conditions. Without attempting to go into technical details, the general view is that non-reinforcement or other forms of extinction are more important in eliminating responses than the blocking (suppression or repression) of the response by punishment. This, however, seems in line with much clinical observation that aggressive tendencies are not eliminated by the application of parental or other social punishments. Certainly the Freudian theory of repression, which is another name for inhibition, tends to bear this out, as we shall note in the next chapter. True, would-be responses are prevented, but the reaction-trend remains in the form of thwarted feelings. So, too, punishment, acting as a frustrating agent, frequently arouses strong emotions which often suppress or inhibit other responses than the one punished. As Hilgard wisely remarks, "The lack of specificity of its target is a weakness of punishment."⁸

There is some evidence, however, that punishment may have a place

⁷ J. F. Anderson, "The dream as a re-conditioning process," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1927, 22:21-25.

⁸ Hilgard, *op. cit.*, p. 141

in inhibition and in helping to redirect learning. Punishment may serve to reduce the strength of a given response. This is particularly so if the punishment is given occasionally but not every time the undesirable reaction occurs. Also if punishment has inhibited a given overt action for a given period of time, this period may be used to strengthen some other habit or act by reinforcement. Then, too, it is important that the punishment be associated with discriminative cues for the response. On the basis of this last-named point, it would seem clear that delayed punishment is not likely to be very effective. If a parent is in a mood to punish a child, it would seem wiser to do so at the time an infraction occurs than for the mother to make the child wait several hours till "daddy comes home" and have him "tend" to the child.

On the practical side, then, it appears that punishment has only a limited function in social learning. Nevertheless it would be a mistake to assume that punishment has no place whatsoever in socialization or in maintaining conformity, though its central importance may be overdone. For example, Kurt Lewin has pointed out that punishment and threats of punishment, when strong, serve to block certain tendencies to react and keep the individual at tasks which may be unpleasant. If confronted with a situation where the chief motivation is to escape or "leave the field"—as Lewin would put it—but where, due to some threat, such as an authoritarian person or a physical barrier, the individual had to choose between doing an unpleasant job or being severely punished, he may well take up the enforced task as the lesser of two evils. Whether the presence of the threat makes the learning of the task any easier, of course, is not clear.⁹ In everyday social situations the probable appropriateness of punishment becomes bound up with the interplay of success and failure in relation to adjustment.

Finally, note should be made of those clinical and historical cases of individuals who come to desire unpleasant and punishing stimulation. The masochist is one, as are those religious fanatics who enjoy what to others would be highly painful experiences.

Discontinuity and Deprivation of Learning in Social Situations. As the child grows up his needs or motives change and the cues and responses related to the essential rewards also change. While it is true that many adjustive habits have a cumulative effect, as is the case with such skills as manipulating clothes in learning to dress oneself or handling toys with increasing discrimination, it is furthermore true that some skills are abandoned and new ones acquired as the child matures both physically and socially. For example, he has to give up sucking as he is put on solid food. In order to do so he must learn to handle cups, spoons, and other

⁹ For a good discussion of the literature on the effects of punishment on learning, see Hilgard, *op. cit.*, especially pp. 36-40, 134, 141, 214, 221.

utensils. Likewise, in terms of attitudes and values, what is expected of the young child in the way of acceptance and conformity may not be required of the adolescent. What we have here, apparently, is extinction from lack of practice, abetted by loss of drive or motive, and the substitution of new motives with new cues, responses, and rewards. Some of the problems of inner conflict may derive from the fact that the discontinuities in cultural expectancies induce in the individual antagonistic or un-integrated patterns of activity which are not easy to resolve.¹⁰

Somewhat akin to this discontinuity of learning is the deprivation of opportunities for learning. The most obvious instances of such are, of course, individuals who suffer from some constitutional handicap such as blindness, deafness, or muscular malformation or disease. Children raised under conditions of a minimum of social stimulation, the so-called feral or "wild" men, are others. In addition to these, there are wide deviations in the exposure of children who are physically and mentally normal to social-cultural learning. Moreover, the differences are evident in comparisons across cultural lines. Also there are variations along class and other group lines even within the same larger society.

Generalization and Discrimination. In the course of learning two important patterns or capacities emerge. One of these we call stimulus generalization or *generalization*, the other discriminatory response or *discrimination*. The two processes are closely associated. They have important practical bearing on social learning, including the matter of generality as contrasted with specificity of attitudes and rôles. Studies in conditioning have thrown a good deal of light on the way in which generalization and discrimination operate.

There is some tendency for the learning in one situation to spread or transfer to a like or similar situation. We know that if a dog is conditioned to the sound of a certain pitch or to a mild electric stimulus on a given spot on the skin or to a given colored light, it will, at the outset, show a tendency to respond with the conditioned reaction to sounds similar to the conditioned stimulus, or to touches on areas of the skin near the conditioned spot, or to other colored lights. This is called *irradiation*. This tendency to apply to similar situations not only applies to single-reaction systems but to patterns of the same kind.

With further training the animal can be taught to distinguish between two cues which may be rather similar. Let us suppose a dog is trained to salivate when a particular spot, A, on the skin is stimulated. If a neighboring spot, B, is activated in the course of this learning, the salivary response will also take place. Still, if with further training,

¹⁰ See A. H. Maslow, "Some theoretical consequences of basic need-gratification," *Journal of Personality*, 1948, 16: 402-416; and Ruth Benedict, "Continuities and discontinuities in cultural conditioning," *Psychiatry*, 1958, 1: 161-167.

stimulation of spot A be reinforced by periodic reintroduction of the unconditioned stimulus, say the food, in time the stimulation of spot B will not evoke the conditioned reaction.

But note still another aspect. If now point B be stimulated and then after that point A, the dog will not salivate. A spread of the inhibition has occurred. This is a process apparently similar to, if not identical with, that cited above of the inhibition of the inhibition. Thus arise discriminative reactions which involve the active blocking of a response which has itself become highly differentiated. Similar selectivity of reaction growing out of the more general early responsiveness has been observed when the stimuli are auditory or occur in other sense modalities.

In social learning, discriminative responses are highly important. For example, perception, to be discussed later, is certainly dependent, in part, upon training in specific cue-response connections which permit the individual to make adequate choices or discriminations among a wide range of possible responses.

Some further interesting features of such discriminative reactions must also be mentioned. For instance, a dog is first conditioned to give a response, say X, to a specific metronome rate, and to give a different sort of reaction, Y, to another rate. Then in the successive trials the experimenter begins reducing the difference between the two metronome rates. For slight changes in the rates the discriminative reactions remain. As the differences in the rates become still less and less, the animal begins to fluctuate between responses X and Y. If the differences are still further reduced, the animal is said to "go to pieces," to "become hysterical." In other words, he ceases to give either conditioned response but shows distinctive emotional reactions.

The implications of this type of interference of habit and attitude are clearly evident in man. Much neurotic or hysteric behavior is of just this sort. Individuals confronted with conflicting stimulus-response patterns between which they cannot choose or discriminate are reduced in the end to general disintegrated and childish mass behavior, because a person's adequate orderly conduct is dependent not only on inhibition and facilitation but upon certain differentiation in activity.¹¹

The kind of irradiation noted above may be considered a form of generalization. Yet stimulus generalization may go far beyond this simple type of learning. Through learning, a whole class of cues may serve to set off similar reactions.

The matter is neatly illustrated in the classic case of Albert, studied by Watson. This child at eleven months was conditioned to a marked but specific fear of a white rat by using a sharp and loud sound as the

¹¹ See John Dollard and N. E. Miller, *Personality and Psychotherapy: An Analysis in Terms of Learning, Thinking, and Culture* (New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1950).

unconditioned stimulus. The conditioning did not carry over to the room, the table, or to the blocks with which he played, but he was startled and started to cry every time the rat was introduced. But, once conditioned to this fear reaction to the rat, he also showed fear reactions—without previous exposure to these stimuli—to a small dog, to a rabbit, to a seal-skin coat, and even in a mild way to cotton wool. The authors remark that "the transference was immediate." There was in this instance the spread of a rather specific reaction to stimuli of like characteristics in some but not in all details.¹²

This spread of stimuli and reactions is basic to the process of generalization of experience, be it in ideas, attitudes, or overt habits. As Hull puts it,

"The tendency to generalization is of primary importance in biological economy, since without it organisms would need to undergo separate conditioning in order to react to every slightest variation in the conditioned stimuli, which, strictly speaking, are never exactly alike on any two occasions."¹³

The mechanism of generalization lies at the root of transfer of training, a topic of continuing interest not only to experimental psychologists but to applied psychologists as well as to practical men everywhere. The essential problem is: Will training or learning in one situation carry over or transfer to another? In an earlier day educators asked: Will mastery of mathematics and the classics help one later to master modern languages and the laboratory sciences or help one meet practical problems of everyday living? For decades there was a vigorous controversy over this question. Today most students of behavior accept the view that transference is possible where there are identical or nearly identical elements or cues in two or more situations. These may, of course, not only include like items in two sets of material to be learned, such as verbal matter, but training in logical thinking or other methods of attacking problems which training may have wide applicability.

Discrimination and generalization are both highly important in learning. Manual skills, precise verbal reactions, and capacity for quick and exact responses call for training in discrimination. But we do not live entirely in a world of specific cues which demand specific responses. Generalization is also needed to enable us to deal with situations which have many, if not all, features in common. Certainly the higher thought processes and the more exacting requirements of adaptation in complex society call for both.

Anticipatory Responses. Reactions designed to reach some goal or re-

¹² John B. Watson and R. R. Watson, "Studies in infant psychology," *Scientific Monthly*, 1921, 13:493-515.

¹³ C. L. Hull, "Learning: II, the factor of the conditioned reflex," in C. Murchison, *A Handbook of General Experimental Psychology* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1934), pp. 446-447.

ward may be greatly influenced by the fact that the individual in the presence of any cue—internal or external—tends to set up responses in anticipation of the consummatory or final response in the time sequences from drive to reward. There is a rich body of evidence for anticipatory responses from both animal and human psychology. A simple case is that cited by Hilgard and Marquis.¹⁴ They conditioned a dog to eyelid reaction by a puff of air on the eyeball. In the course of further conditioning they discovered that the animal would begin to wink prior to the actual stimulation by the air. Rats that have been trained to operate a lever in order to get access to a box containing food, or the reward, will begin sniffing and showing other reactions when placed in front of the lever, which reactions were originally associated with the actual taking of the food. In human terms we might say that the dog anticipated the puff of air and that the rats expected to be fed.

Anticipatory responses appear to arise as a result of what Miller and Dollard call the "gradient in the effects of reward" and from generalization. The principle governing the former they state as follows: "If a number of different responses are made to a cue and the last of these responses is followed by reward, the connection to the last response will be strengthened the most, and the connection to each of the preceding responses will be strengthened by a progressively smaller amount"¹⁵ This means that there is a hierarchy of effects in reinforcement, the greatest of which is that associated directly with the securing of the reward. But, in time, the various preparatory steps necessary to reach the correct reward will likewise be reinforced and those not contributory to success will suffer decrement or extinction.

In human learning it is often important to postpone the immediacy of reward by reinforcing certain aspects of the course from a given drive to a goal. We learn to react to symbolic cues such as promises of future reward rather than to accept the more immediate reward. For example, the child on an allowance is encouraged to save a part of it each week so that he may have some extra spending money the following summer while he is at camp.

When these preliminary or preparatory reactions become generalized to a group of similar situations, there arises a tendency for the responses near the point of reward to occur before their original time in the total response series, that is, to become *anticipatory*. In the case of the rat learning to run a maze in order to get food, the original strong stimulation was hunger which kept the rat running until the successful goal or food was reached. On subsequent occasions such internal stimuli as

¹⁴ E. R. Hilgard and D. G. Marquis, "Acquisition, extinction, and retention of conditioned lid responses to light in dogs," *Journal of Comparative Psychology*, 1935, 19, 21-58.

¹⁵ Miller and Dollard, *op. cit.*, p. 46. By permission.

salivation or chewing movements plus the stimuli from the runway itself will serve to facilitate and direct the rat to reach the final goal more effectively. This is a pre-adaptation to oncoming or subsequent stimuli which serve to prepare the organism to react to future situations.

In human learning anticipation is highly important. Much of our cultural training consists of prior definitions of situations and conduct in such a way as to facilitate socially proper and accepted responses. Role-taking, so important in the rise of the self and in all our social participation rests, in large part, on anticipation. Anticipatory reactions are crucial in communication. Moreover, social attitudes can only be properly understood within the framework of anticipation. Human purposes and intentions have their roots in anticipatory reactions. The essential feature of intention or purpose is, as Guthrie puts it,

"a body of maintaining stimuli . . . which . . . includes action tendencies conditioned during a past experience—a readiness to speak, a readiness to go, a readiness to read, and in each case a readiness not only for the act but also for the previously rehearsed consequences of the act. These readinesses are not complete acts but they consist in tensions in the muscles that will take part in the complete act."¹⁸

The importance of anticipatory response or expectancy will become increasingly apparent as we carry forward our discussion of personality problems.

Some Additional Considerations. Without extending our discussion into greater detail, mention must be made of the place of integration, of the interplay of preparatory and consummatory reactions and their probable relations to completion or closure of a given cycle of activity, and of the importance of the *Gestalt* or field in which the learning takes place. Also we must recognize the place of non-deliberative or unconscious learning, both with or without obvious motivation. Sooner or later, most learned reactions tend to fall into some sort of coördinated form which we call integration. This is apparent from many experimental studies as well as from common-sense observation in the acquirement of such skills as typing, skating, swimming, and the manipulation of tools or machines. But in other situations the integration appears to arise almost from the outset of the learning. In social learning it is well to realize that, though the linkage may be chiefly determined by some factor in the focus of attention and activity, there is usually a background of social cultural circumstance or situation which has distinctive functions in establishing the linkage. We must always recall that learned acts do not exist and operate independently or separately but in relation to others in a certain order and unity.

Woodworth and others, following Sherrington, the physiologist, have

¹⁸ E. B. Cullen, *The Psychology of Learning* (New York, Harper and Brothers, 1935), pp 205-206. By permission.

pointed out the advantages in distinguishing between preparatory and consummatory reactions in the sequence of acts from motivation to goal or reward. The former consist, in the first place, of alertness, attention, mental set, or readiness to act, doubtless related, in origin, to anticipatory responses. In the second place, preparatory reactions are those of trial-and-error character which are set up when the mechanisms of consummatory responses have been aroused, that is, goal-directed. These would be illustrated in one's efforts to recover a given road or trail when it had been temporarily lost. The consummatory reactions, of course, come to an end when the goal is attained.

There is some evidence, moreover, that the mere fact of completion of a given cycle serves to strengthen the learning. *Gestalt* psychology recognizes something of this in its "law of closure" which, though applied chiefly to perception, probably represents the operation of another principle than that of effect or reward. To quote Hilgard, "In a problematic situation the whole is seen as incomplete and a tension is set up toward completion. This strain to complete is an aid to learning, and to achieve closure is satisfying."¹⁷

Learning always takes place within some larger setting or field, and the Gestaltists have done us a great service in pointing out its importance. Even with animal experimentation, the conditions of lighting, noise, use of harness, apparatus, and all the paraphernalia to facilitate observation constitute a configuration which must have some influence on the learning itself. While the careful experimenter attempts to reduce these externals to a minimum, or in any case to try to take them into account in interpreting his data, nonetheless they are a part of the conditions of learning. In human beings the physical and especially social circumstances are probably even more important and yet they are all too often neglected. The presence of other individuals will certainly affect what is acquired, and as we shall see later the group climate in which socialization occurs may well be more significant than the particular habits which a parent is trying to inculcate into an infant or child. Then, too, human beings seldom have simple motives for what they undertake, and the place of motives, the priority among them, and various other phases of what is called "ego-involvement" must be taken into account. As we take up various problems of personality we shall have occasion to note how important these configurational and internal factors are in the success or failure of given adaptation.

Finally, in concluding this section, mention must be made of the importance of non-deliberative learning. Only a fraction of our internal adaptation and anticipatory reorganization goes on in full consciousness. Not only do the internal modifications arising from experience take place below the level of awareness, but many of the effects of these changes

¹⁷ Hilgard, *op. cit.*, p. 184.

are not directly apparent in consciousness at all. A great deal of our non-voluntary learning is of this character. While the behaviorists may be skeptical of the alleged importance of unintentional and unconscious learning, there is far too much evidence of its place in personal adjustment to be overlooked.

The history of invention and discovery gives ample proof that ideas and plans arise suddenly, without previous conscious deliberation by the inventor. And no end of everyday activities—overt or verbal—show that non-deliberative internal alterations occur. Such are the sudden appearances of impulses and images, slips of the tongue or pen, and numerous “unaccountable” gestures and overt acts. Likewise, nocturnal dreaming is further evidence that “the mind operates” outside the realm of consciousness. This whole aspect of internal activity has been given the descriptive term *unconscious*.¹⁸ Although this concept has been much abused by writers, and although many psychologists scoff at it, it nevertheless serves as a useful term to classify, though not to explain, certain aspects of internal activity which influence conscious thoughts, verbalization, and overt conduct. We shall use it in this descriptive sense.

The place of unconscious motivations and unconscious processes in behavior has long been recognized. But it was Freud particularly who, in dealing largely with mild sorts of mental disturbance, made us aware of the large number of our motives and mental patterns which lie hidden under the surface of the conscious mind. The first drives or needs of the new-born for food, liquids, rest, elimination, and the like are doubtless not conscious in the adult sense of that term. Only later do these take on conscious significance, but in the meantime cultural training has inhibited or repressed many of the more elementary expressions of these wants.

Throughout life social cultural learning plays the dominant part in directing the expression of basic physiological wants and later of those early but acquired wishes arising in the first years of life. These latter are illustrated by desires to have *all* the toys, *all* the power, *all* the attention of the mother, *all* the opportunities for expression that one can muster. But culture, in the form of parental or other taboos, builds up mechanisms of inhibition that sidetrack such desires or in various ways prevent their fulfillment. Yet the impulses or desires often remain. It thus comes about that a host of our wishes or drives become unconscious. The genuine motivation is often unknown to our consciousness. Moreover, in the expression of these motivations we develop a wide variety of substitute reactions. Altruism may often be a disguised wish for power. Sadistic impulses, dating in the individual back to rudimentary impulses to do injury to a person or object that has thwarted him, may find expression

¹⁸ Some new word might be invented to cover this range of facts or events, but little would be gained so long as the present term is not reified into a causal principle.

later in over-emotional patriotism directed against radicals within the national state, or, if one turns out to be a radical, against the conservative upholders of the *status quo*.

Then, too, in the development of cue-response connections directed to different means of attaining rewards the unconscious mechanisms may get in their work. This is evident in the fantasy and day dream, in the creative imagination of artist, inventor, or scientist, who finds that the solution to his problem does spring almost full-fledged into consciousness. In fact, the place of fantasy thinking has never been fully recognized or exploited as a means of solving difficulties. Our traditional philosophy and psychology have so overemphasized the conscious, logical, problem-solving functions that they have neglected, aside from a few brilliant exceptions, the possible place of unconsciously formed and free-associational mental processes as aids to the solutions of personal difficulties or to the creation of new culture traits.

IMITATION AND OTHER SOCIAL CONDITIONS IN LEARNING

Among the social situations which serve to facilitate or inhibit the learning process, imitation is of particular importance. But there are other factors, too, such as, suggestion, the presence or absence of spectators or auditors, competitive stimulation, the presence of co-workers, the use of praise or blame, the use of group discussion, and the place of sympathetic or hostile interests of others.

Imitation. The concept *imitation* has had a varied career in psychology and the social sciences. Many earlier writers considered it a special instinct which might aid in the learning process. This view has been largely abandoned. Others viewed it broadly as a mechanism to explain all similarity in institutions and behavior. The use of the term is obviously so loose as to be practically meaningless. More recently efforts have been made to define the term more closely and to bring it within the scope of systematic psychology.¹⁰

As a phase of social learning imitation may be used in two somewhat different senses. The first use is that of a descriptive category for the situation in which one person's response serves as cue to another, the imitator, to make a response nearly identical or highly similar to one's own act. This is what Miller and Dollard call "matched-dependent" imitation. The second use covers the situations where there is more or less conscious and deliberate copying of the acts of another. Let us examine some of the important features of each of the forms of imitation.

A simple illustration of matched-dependent imitation is given by Miller and Dollard:

¹⁰ See Miller and Dollard, *op. cit.*, especially Chaps. 6-13. This book attempts to restate a theory of imitation within the framework of Hull's behaviorism. Much of our discussion follows the viewpoint of these writers.

Two boys—Jim, aged six, and Bobby, aged three—were playing a game with their father in the living room of their house. The father explained that he would hide two pieces of candy while the children were out of the room. When he gave the signal they went to their rooms and looked for the sweets. When each child found his piece of candy, he could eat it. The father put one piece of candy under a pillow on the davenport and the other beside the radio cabinet. The older child came into the room, followed by his younger brother. The older boy, Jim, looked in the fireplace. The younger brother, Bobby, followed and looked there also. Jim looked inside the piano bench, so also did Bobby. Then Jim looked under the pillow on the davenport and found his piece of candy. Thereupon he stopped looking. Bobby was now helpless. He went again and looked under the pillow where his older brother had found his candy, but of course had no success. Finally, Bobby's candy was produced and given to him.

"On a succeeding trial of the same game, exactly the same thing happened. The younger child would look only in the places already examined by his older brother. He could not respond to place cues by looking for himself."²⁰

The basis for this behavior is found in the previous interactions of the two boys. The younger had long been rewarded for following or "matching" the behavior of the older brother. In other words, the latter had become a useful cue in many situations, though not in this one as it turned out, to the attainment of satisfying rewards. There had been a stimulus generalization built up to produce a simple form of leader-follower relation between the boys.

This kind of imitation is widespread in society and has sometimes been called "prestige imitation." The activities of leaders in directing and manipulating the responses of followers are often of this character. The leader serves as the cue for the followers to respond in a given way. The "father knows best" method of training children often consists of this kind of imitation. Cues which may or may not exist in the situation are neglected or denied and the individual of power and prestige becomes an adequate stimulus to induce a given response. The particular series of acts are acquired by reinforcement through reward, and contradictory acts are blocked out by non-reinforcement or extinction.

Conscious imitation or copying is a somewhat more complicated process than the simple matched-dependent type. The imitator must learn to discriminate between possible cues in the learning situation in terms of their similarity or differences and not merely follow the leader or model. True, at the outset there is usually some prestige figure who acts as an additional cue, but he serves essentially to help the individual make adequate or effective discriminations between various cues. He does not replace the situational cue itself; the individual must make some choices in selecting the cues and responses to follow.

Copying is one of the most important forms of social learning. Parents, teachers, preachers, and other transmitters of culture are constantly setting before others patterns of ideas and actions to be copied. Moreover,

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 93. By permission.

the prestige of these individuals aids them in criticizing, directing, and rewarding the trial-and-error acquisition of the desired kind of response. Later, as the internalization of cues and responses takes place, the individual as imitator can act as his own critic and director in copying. In fact, the self arises, as we shall see, by the individual's taking on the rôles and attitudes of others toward himself by the process of introjection. This process may be regarded as an aspect of imitation. The self then may act to facilitate the copying by use of thought or inner verbal cues whose origins are to be found in the actual contact of the individual earlier with parents and others. (See Chapter 7 on rôle-taking and the rise of the self.) Moreover, such functions depend on those internal processes which we call memory, imagination, and concept-formation. Hence, so far as imitation by copying is concerned, it is confined to socialized human beings since it involves what are traditionally called the higher mental functions.

Suggestion. Closely related to imitation in facilitating learning is suggestion. Suggestion means the influencing of another's thought or action by certain stimuli in situations where the recipient does not use his critical judgment. Its effectiveness depends upon the individual's being brought into a state of readiness to react. In this sense it is closely associated with the arousal of attitudes, since they are essentially incipient action tendencies. Suggestion is social in character and is usually considered to fall within the field of symbolic or verbal stimulation of one person by another. It depends on tendencies to react like others, due doubtless to our being conditioned to common stimuli and emotional sets toward or away from some object or goal. It involves selection of some stimuli and the blockage of others. It is itself not a mechanism but rather a general term to describe a certain form of social stimulation wherein verbal or other stimuli of a person or persons set off images, ideas, attitudes, or acts on the part of another person or persons because the images, ideas, and attitudes or acts of these latter do not inhibit the same.

Both external and internal factors are present in the operation of suggestion. External factors involve the use of visual, auditory, and other stimuli which arouse attention, activate emotions, and otherwise direct the oncoming acts or attitudes of the recipient. Internal factors include such items as fatigue, sleepiness, intoxicants, and other physiological conditions. In addition, the whole range of previous learning will play an important part. Ideas and attitudes of class superiority would predispose one to certain types of suggestion which would not affect those in the lower economic brackets. Habits and attitudes of submission to authority and power are most important. It is because we have been trained to give way to ascendant persons that the man of prestige is so effective in his suggestions as a model to imitate.

Competition. It has long been believed that competition will act to enhance learning. In our society parents and teachers set up rivalrous

situations in order to secure improved performance from children. Newspapers, radio, and television advertisers often try to increase sales volume by stimulating competitive attitudes and processes. The experimental literature on the subject is not entirely satisfactory, but Whittemore's studies are still highly regarded. He set up the problem of printing materials with rubber stamps from newspaper copy. He found that his subjects increased their speed under the instructions "to compete" although the quality of their performance was lessened. It was also found that, when two groups competed, there was an increase in speed, without, however, a marked change in the quality of the work turned out.²¹

Maller's study of coöperation and competition among school children brings out the fact that the two processes often occur together. He used a sample of over 1,500 grade-school children who were set a task of simple addition. Each example was presented on a separate sheet of paper. This afforded a measure of productivity, speed, accuracy, and so on. Under certain instructions the children worked for their own or "self" score, that is, in inter-personal competition with others. Under other instructions they worked for their class, sex-group, or other group as a whole, that is, coöperatively for a common, group goal. Among other findings, the following are pertinent to our present discussion:

(1) "The efficiency of work under competition was found to be consistently and significantly higher than under coöperation.

(2) "The difference in speed increased with the progress of work under the two forms of motivation. The curve of self work tends to rise with repetition while the curve of group work drops consistently.

(3) "The increase in speed produced by either competition or coöperation disappears with progress of work unless the motive is repeated.

(4) "Girls were found to score lower in cooperation involving speed. The difference between self and group work for them was larger than in the case of the boys. They were, however, more coöperative on the test involving choice, choosing to work for the group more often than the boys.

(5) "Positive correlations were found between cooperation and the following factors: mental age, intelligence, moral knowledge, resistance to suggestibility, deportment in school, character ratings by teachers and classmates, tests of honesty and inhibition, and neurotic index.

(6) "Negative correlations were found between coöperation and the following: speed of work, individual variability in speed, health history, health condition, vision, condition of teeth, nutrition, socio-economic status, frequency of attendance at movies, and weight-height ratio.

(7) "Coöperation with an organized team resulted in even greater efficiency than work for self, while cooperation with an arbitrary group, chosen by the examiner, resulted in lower efficiency than work for the classroom."²²

²¹ I. C. Whittemore, "The influence of competition on performance: an experimental study," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1924, 19:236-253, and "The competitive consciousness," *ibid.*, 1925, 20:17-33.

²² J. B. Maller, *Coöperation and Competition: An Experimental Study in Motivation*, Teachers College Contributions to Education, No. 384 (New York, Bureau of Publications, Teachers College, Columbia University, 1929) Quotations are from section on "Findings," pp. 159-162. By permission.

It is clear that for this sample coöperation for a group prize was less potent than the motive to gain a personal prize. There were, however, marked individual differences in motivation to coöperation or competition.

The two processes often operate together. Within a given group there may be a great deal of coöperation accompanied by strong competitive spirit toward an out-group. While the hypothesis has not been completely proved, there is much common-sense evidence that the stronger the feeling of coöperation within an in-group, the stronger is the competitive motivation with regard to the out-group.

In these matters, especially in co-working groups and competition, social and cultural influences are tremendous. Our long-established habit of training our children and young people in competitive attitudes and habits in the home, in the school, on the playground, and later in their vocations, provides a setting for enhancement of learning in competitive situations which might not hold true in a society in which cooperative and collective values had dominance.²³

Other Social Factors. The use of *praise or blame*, of encouragement or discouragement in facilitating learning, is evident from common-sense observation. Hurlock, after testing a group of children, divided them into three sections for later retesting. In one section the children were complimented and praised for their work; in the second they were reproached; in the third no special conditions of praise or reproach were introduced. Apparently praise and encouragement acted as good incentives for better work, chiefly, it is true, in accuracy. However, it appears that the effectiveness of discouragement decreases markedly if continuously applied. This is in line with what we know about the limited effectiveness of punishment in learning. The influence of praise or reproof is evidently greater with older and brighter children than with younger and duller ones.

Though some other investigations on the effects of praise or blame do not entirely confirm Hurlock's findings, there is enough evidence to confirm the popular opinion that, on the whole, children and adults do better work under positive social stimulation than under negative, although these results are doubtless qualified in terms of culture.²⁴

Spectators or auditors have varied effects on performance. Some studies show that the presence of spectators reduces the accuracy and increases the speed of the workers on paper and pencil tests; others, such as, in some manual skills, indicate an enhancement of accuracy, but other studies showed a reduction of speed. In one free word-association test the range

²³ For a good review of the problem of competition and cooperation as related to learning, see Mark A. May and L. W. Debb, *Competition and Cooperation*, Social Science Research Council Bulletin No. 25 (New York, Social Science Research Council, 1937).

²⁴ E. B. Hurlock "The value of praise and reproof as incentives for children." *Archives of Psychology*, 1924, No. 71, 11.

and quality of the associations were reduced by the presence of watchers.

In studying the effect of the *presence of co-workers* on performance, F. H. Allport demonstrated that in free word-associations, cancellation of letters, attention tests, multiplication, and other verbal tasks there was distinct speeding up of the reactions in all tests performed in a group as compared with results attained alone. However, there was apparently a decrease in the quality of the results.²⁵

Other social effects are indicated in studies of the influence of *group discussion* on the accuracy and quality of the individual's reactions. Bechterev and de Lange, using a variety of subjects (kindergarten children, teachers, and adult students), presented material which called for remembering details of pictures, judgment of tapping intervals, and such. After each individual had been tested, all the reports were brought together for class discussion. Then the individuals were tested separately a second time. On the whole, group discussion improved the reports both as to number of details recalled and as to quality of sound thought and judgment. But again much depends on the nature of the group discussion. Evidence from Jenness' study of estimates of beans in a bottle indicates that argument among members of a group may not improve their judgment.²⁶

In this, as in other complicated social situations, the attitudes of the participants, the effects of their previous cultural training, and no end of other matters play a large part in determining the results. It should be evident that some of the simple principles of conditioning or of trial-and-error learning deduced from the laboratory need qualification when applied to the matter of how the person in contact with his fellows, and constantly impressed by cultural and other subtle influences, acquires new ways of proceeding from drive or motive to a satisfactory attainment of his **goal or purpose.**

Sympathy, also, has its place in enhancing the learning of new modes of behavior. Kindly and gentle cooperation is most effective in arousing interest in the learning task; it stimulates pleasant feelings and emotions that remove fear and other inhibiting tendencies. It is highly important in all sorts of social situations and its contrasting function to that of strong aggressiveness will be noted later.

THE PERSISTENCE OF LEARNING

As we noted at the outset of this chapter, the crucial test of learning is the probability that a given stimulus-response association will be re-

²⁵ F. H. Allport, "The influence of the group upon association and thought," *Journal of Experimental Psychology*, 1920, 3: 159-182.

²⁶ W. M. Bechterev and M. de Lange, "Die Ergebnisse des Experiments auf dem Gebiete der sozialen Follextension," *Zeitschrift für angewandte Psychologie*, 1924, 21: 333-344. See also Jenness, "Social influences in the change of opinion: the role of discussion in changing group response is a matter of fact," *Journal of Abnormal & Social Psychology*, 1932, 27: 20-34, 27: 230-36.

peated at a later time. The retention of these connections is fundamental, for, unless effects do carry over to future situations as an aid to adjustment, the individual would be constantly confronted with making new associations. Learning provides a more or less stable and abiding foundation for future adaptations. The usual term for the manifestations of these after-effects is *habit*. In fact, learning is often called habit formation.

Canalization and Fixation. Old habits set the stage for new ones. What Holt called "canalization" is highly important in this matter.²⁷ Not only are habits selective; they become fixed in certain patterns with reference to drives and goals. Drives, whether learned or not, represent one form of canalization or fixation of impulses at a certain level of organization. What were termed in Chapter 3 as first and second levels of derivation in drives are illustrations. Obviously the course from drive or motive to reward may, in time, come to follow a more or less regular and hence predictable order. In this combination of selectivity and fixation a number of mechanisms operate. Of special importance are stimulus generalization and discrimination, so fundamental to perception and anticipation. They act to organize the drive-cue-response-reward sequence in ever more complex but effective ways. In the development of such structuralized processes, various types of learning may operate: trial and error, conditioned reactions, reasoning, and insight.

In time these fundamental patterns become so prepotent as to determine, in large part, almost all subsequent acquirement. Such persistent sets have significant bearing on what we perceive as well as on what we do. Moreover, the fundamental patterns are chiefly laid down in the early years of life, hence the signal importance of child and pre-adolescent training.

Function of Memory. For those effects which are expressed largely in verbal or symbolic forms we use the term *memory*. Habit and memory are alike since both involve the modification of neural tissue which results in the capacity of recurrence. Habit and memory, to be effective for action, must involve reproduction of effects. In memory this reproductive phase is usually treated in terms of recall and recognition. *Recall* refers to the reinstatement of acquired materials in symbolic terms, chiefly words. *Recognition* has to do with locating past events in reference to oneself and to the time and place.

Many of the same factors which play a part in the fixation of any given linkage are effective in the reproduction of the acts or symbols. Motivation, frequency, recency, primacy, and intensity all have a part. Thus, (1) Other things being equal, the linkages most frequently in use will most likely be operative later. (2) The initial or primary experience often tends to take precedence in memory over items acquired subsequently. For example, our first impressions of a new acquaintance and our first experience with

²⁷ See L. B. Holt, *Animal Drive and the Learning Process* (New York, Henry Holt & Company, Inc., 1931).

a novel situation are often remembered long after details of later contacts are lost. (3) Events which are recent in our experience tend to be retained and reinstated more easily than do those which were acquired earlier. Despite much talk to the contrary, there is evidently some advantage in cramming for examinations. (4) The intensity of the experience plays a large part in determining the nature of the retention and reproduction. For this reason learning connected with fundamental drives and with strong feeling-emotional states tends to be prepotent over other acquisitions. (5) And, finally, those experiences which are rewarded tend to be retained over those which are not—the principle of reinforcement.

These five factors play a part, then, not only in the original linkage but in their reproduction as well. So, too, the context or configuration is significant. Since we acquire new items of overt or verbal response in time sequences, in spatial order, and the like, we also reproduce them in somewhat the same fashion. To illustrate: once a person gets the correct cue, he can repeat a long-forgotten story. If a single line of verse comes to mind, the rest of a long poem learned years before may be recalled. Given the reappearance of the first few movements of a complicated act of skill, the rest of the series of specific movements unfolds in proper sequence.

The fact that a mere section or part of a rather complicated pattern of behavior may serve to reinstate the entire schema is referred to as *redintegration*. Although the term is usually applied to the verbal or symbolic aspects of learned activities, in essence the use of a segmental or partial overt movement as the cue to a whole set of acts follows essentially the same function. Again, in the development of this part-whole relation, generalization, discrimination, and anticipation play important parts.

Forgetting. Most acquired reactions become less effective, if not entirely lost, for lack of practice or repetition. We call this *forgetting*. We know that simple conditioned reflexes soon lose their effectiveness unless reinforced by practice and the occasional introduction of the original reward. Even well-established motor habits lose their selective and discriminative features without practice. The same is true of verbal learning.

The loss of learned matter is itself an active process, not a mere mechanical cutting off of given acquired items. The active character of remembering or of forgetting is also brought out in other ways. Common sense and carefully controlled observations on the reliability of testimony about past events illustrate the matter beautifully.

Crosland presented his subjects with one exposure of a series of pictures, bits of sculpture, written statements, and other stimuli. These persons then came back to the laboratory at stated periods and reported what they could remember of the things they saw in the first instance. Amazing changes took place. Not only were many details lost rather soon, but the details that were recalled were sometimes distorted as to size and shape or verbal relation to other features. Sometimes the items in two pictures, for example, were confused. Moreover, new items—not in the original series

at all—were introduced by some subjects, who on questioning were very certain that they had seen these things in the originals.²⁸

Studies of the testimony of persons at actual and "staged" crimes show the same sort of loss and modification. There is not only the loss of many features but falsification and the confusion of others, transpositions as to time and place, and a distinctive tendency to dramatize the recalled events.

Social-Cultural Factors in Remembering. What an individual will observe or otherwise perceive and what he will recall are connected with his own particular society and culture. As Bartlett well puts it, "In perceiving, in imaging, in remembering proper, and in constructive work, the passing fashion of the group, the social catch-word, the prevailing approved general interest, the persistent social custom and institution set the stage and direct the action."²⁹ In his important work on memory Bartlett presents ample evidence—as have other writers—to substantiate this viewpoint. A few examples from his book will serve to indicate his findings.

One observer who was shown a sketch of a hand pointing upward at some indeterminate object reported immediately that it was an anti-aircraft gun. This man had been for some time living in a community where the fearful expectation of air raids was a matter of common talk and interest.

One section of Bartlett's book is devoted to contrasting the verbal reports of individuals from two African tribes, the Zulus and the Swazis. Among the former he could quickly elicit a lively discussion of personal exploits in war, whereas among the latter he got but indifferent comment or complete silence when the topic of war was suggested. Yet with the Swazis, when he touched on the topics of cattle raising and the use of guile in dealing with their enemies, he secured great interest. Bartlett demonstrates that these differences can be understood only in terms of the historical factors operating among these two antagonistic societies. The Zulus have a long tradition of warlike activities; the Swazis have not. The latter have been highly successful as cattlemen, and as a means of avoiding overt conflict with their enemies have put great value on the use of deceit and clever diplomacy. Not only is the attention of a native determined by his customary values, but what he will remember is likewise so qualified.

In short, individuals give meaning to their experiences in terms of customary motivations, interests, and values. Moreover, novel experiences tend to be redefined into forms which permit linkage with the apperceptive mass of previous learning. In the next chapter the discussion of perception, traits, attitudes, and frames of reference will show more fully some of the factors in this dynamic process of linking the old to the new.

²⁸ H. R. Gerdner, "A qualitative analysis of the process of forgetting," *Psychological Monographs*, 1931, No. 1, 61, 69.

²⁹ F. C. Bartlett, *Remembering, A Study in Experimental and Social Psychology* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1932), pp. 207-210. By permission.

CHAPTER 5

Internal Organization and Interactional Processes

Against the background of constitutional factors, motivation, and learning, the present chapter will take up some of the important processes concerned with the organization and operation of personality. The first sections will deal with perception, traits, attitudes, and frames of reference as they concern the structuring of the individual's inner or so-called "subjective" world. Then we shall examine the more important psychological processes which enter into the interactions of individuals. These include, among others, identification, projection, rationalization, and compensation. Next we shall treat briefly the larger organization of perceptions, traits, attitudes and the interactional processes as they relate to the rôles and statuses of the individual in his social-cultural world. The chapter will close with a discussion of socialization. The topic of socialization will serve as a bridge to the following chapters which deal with language, the rise of the self, and the function of symbolic behavior.

Finally, it must not be forgotten that in most of the material of this chapter we are again dealing with intervening variables. That is, these processes and elements are set down as concepts which represent inferences logically derived from behavior. After all, no one has ever seen an attitude or trait, or a process of identification, projection, or, for that matter, socialization, except as these are inferred from social behavior itself. This, however, should not disturb the reader since many of the terms with which we deal are of this character. This is all in the best scientific tradition.

We begin with acts, not thoughts. Yet in time much of our activity becomes internalized, through learning, into ideas, traits, attitudes, and values. Even at the common sense level of observation people distinguish between thoughts and action. The field of action which involves the use of peripheral muscles in making possible movement in space we call *overt*. Habits in the usual sense belong to this category. The field of thought, often called *covert*, is the inner world of ideas, attitudes, systemic sensations which are not expressed vocally, the whole range of motives that we carry about with us in our private domain. Between habit or overt action—observable by those around us—and the internal world stands language or

communication, which partakes of the nature of both. That is, language consists of verbal or other communicable symbols which relate to both action and thought.

The field of mind is that of preparation or anticipation carried on largely in terms of imagination or covert activity before we proceed to overt response. (See Chapter 8 on symbolic behavior.) An earlier psychology described and analyzed the field of thought chiefly in terms of consciousness, that is, as an inner awareness by an individual of what is happening around him and, of course, of what is going on within himself.

PLACE OF PERCEPTION IN SOCIAL BEHAVIOR

Our discussion of discrimination, generalization, and anticipation, in Chapter 4, showed that in learning the individual is not a mere passive lump of protoplasm played upon by external forces or stimuli. Rather as noted in Chapter 2 the organism *goes out* to meet its external environment and in doing so *reorders* it in various ways. The nature of such going-out and reorganizing depends on the nature of our receiving apparatus and on the nature of our internal world. The latter, of course, is derived from motivation-reward patterns and all that has been learned in facilitating their activities.

The Nature of Perception. From a behavioristic standpoint *perception* may be defined as a discriminatory response dependent on the receptor or sense modality involved and on the effects or residues of prior learning which serve to control, in part, this response. In older psychological terms perception was briefly defined as sensation plus meaning. Various schools of psychology have differed as to the particular place which the perceptual processes had in the total psychology of the individual. For example, the Gestaltists give it a central place in their theory whereas many behaviorists consider motivation and learning as the central cores of behavior and would subsume perception under discriminatory response. Rather than bother with theoretical controversies let us examine the more important features of the perceptual processes.

Through perception we come into contact with the outside environment; we also perceive certain internal bodily changes. One function of perception is that of providing the *cues* in the drive-cue-response-reward sequence. That is, while most behavior is set in motion by some motive, the cue-response connection described in Chapter 4 depends on the discrimination which determines perception. Since previous learning builds up the foundation for such discrimination, the analysis of perception requires that we take the persistence and inner elaboration of learning into account. As already noted, this inner phase involves memory effects, ideas, attitudes, traits, and value systems. In short, it has both cognitive or knowing and attitudinal or reaction-tendency features.

In every perception some sense modality is involved, and while there

remain many problems of just how this receptor process operates, we are, for the nonce, more concerned with the manner in which the internal or meaningful elements in perception come into play. The crucial fact is that there is a creative and elaborative process involved between the sensation itself and the discriminatory response or actual perceiving. Furthermore, in this whole operation, the place of what is learned in the social-cultural context is fundamental.¹ In fact, perception means nothing unless we take the perceiver into account. As G. T. W. Patrick once aptly put it, "We see things, not as they are, but as we are."

Psychologists have variously designated the chief processes which go into the building up of the inner or meaning-giving functions in perception. Our discussion will center around selection, organization, and fixation.²

Selection. Perceptual selectivity refers to the fact that the organism reacts differentially to, that is, picks out, certain elements from the large number of possible elements of the stimulating situation. Such selection depends on a number of factors. Motivation or interest often plays a part. For instance a hungry man will notice a food advertisement whereas one with a full stomach might not. A wide variety of experiments have confirmed the place of motivation in the selectivity of perception. In one, a group of subjects who were not fed for a long time were presented certain ambiguous stimuli. As hunger increased to a certain point the subjects, making periodic judgments, tended to see these ambiguous things as food objects. With more intense and prolonged hunger this sensitization declined and they saw fewer food objects.³

So, too, people may omit some elements in the stimulus situation because they are not consistent with, or relevant to, their present "set." Moreover, rejection or acceptance will be much more evident when strong emotions enter into the selection. This is illustrated in prejudiced people who refuse to believe that members of minority groups have any merit.

The manner in which interest and emotion come into play in perception is neatly shown in various experiments on pre-recognition. By means of blurring a picture or word, or exposing it under low illumination, or by

¹ This is not the place to enter into an argument that basically all human perception is socially-culturally determined, or at least has large social-cultural components. But there is much to support this thesis long ago defended by G. H. Mead and more recently supported by the empirical research of such workers as Bartlett, Sherif, Bruner, and others.

² For a more extended discussion see J. S. Bruner and L. Postman, "An approach to social perception," in the symposium, *Current Trends in Social Psychology* (Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1948), pp. 71-118. Their fourth factor, "accentuation" is as they admit, really a phase of organization.

³ Among other such studies, see particularly, R. N. Sanford, "The effect of abstinence from food on imaginal processes: a further experiment," *Journal of Psychology*, 1937, 3:145-159, R. Levine, I. Chein, and G. Murphy, "The relation of the intensity of a need to the amount of perceptual distortion, a preliminary report," *Journal of Psychology*, 1942, 13:283-293. On the effects of prolonged starvation on perception, attitudes, and behavior, see Chap. 3, pp. 61-62.

other device, subjects were asked to say what they saw. In these situations clear and correct recognition is not possible. The subject fills in, guesses, or imagines what he says he saw. Such experiments are a way of finding out how the individual adds to, supplements, or modifies the stimulus. In one group of subjects, divided in terms of their value system or interests, as measured by the Allport-Vernon Study of Values, a religious subject shown the word "sacred" under conditions of insufficient stimulation, reported "Easter," and then on later exposures "divinity" and "sentiment." In contrast another subject who scored low on the religious-value test saw "sacred" successively as "sucked," "socked," and "shocked."⁴

In another phase of this same research on pre-recognition, McGinnies exposed neutral and emotionally charged words under varying rates of exposure time. Emotionality was measured by the Galvanic Skin Response (GSR) to these different words during the pre-recognition exposures. In addition, the thresholds of recognition, that is, length of time required for perceiving what the word was, were measured for both kinds of words. As might have been expected on the basis of clinical observations and common sense, the emotion-arousing words, such as "raped," "whore," and "bitch" induced much stronger emotional reaction than did neutral words like "apple," "sleep," and "glass." It took longer to recognize the former words on the exposure screen than the latter kind.⁵

This latter experiment illustrates that in some instances the individual defends itself by excluding or avoiding some kinds of stimuli. There is much everyday support for this as we know from slips of the tongue and other unconsciously determined malapropian responses. Likewise the change in perception brought on by extreme hunger, as noted above, is probably due to a shift from a positive anticipatory reaction to a defensive and rejective one as the hunger became more acute, that is, more threatening to the individual.

Mental set or expectation plays a part in selection. This is neatly shown in an experiment in which a list of ten words, four of them real words, the balance ambiguous, were presented to 160 women students, one half of whom had been given one set of instructions, the other half another. The former, the A-B group, were told that on exposure they were to look for words pertaining to animals and birds. The latter, the T-T group, were to look for words having to do with transportation and travel. The students, however, were not aware that they had been given different sets of instructions. As was anticipated, those in the A-B group reported finding animal and bird words six times as frequently as did the other group. In similar manner those told to look for travel and transportation words perceived five times as many travel-transportation words as did the other group.

⁴ Reported in Bruner and Postman, *op. cit.*, from E. M. McGinnies' research.

⁵ See E. M. McGinnies, "Emotionality and perceptual defense," *Psychological Review*, 1949, 56:244-251.

Against the background of the different instructions, individual variations are worth noting. Some persons in Group A-B saw "badger" for "baggage" (one of the actual words in the list). In contrast, in Group T-T some people reported "money" instead of "monkey" (another of the actual words) and associated it with travel. Slightly less than half of the responses to the ambiguous items were correct perceptions. Among some common alterations were "parrot" for "pasrort" (one of the ambiguous items) among members of Group A-B and "passport" for the same item in the T-T group. "Dack" (another ambiguous item) became "duck" for some in the first group while it was "deck" for some in the other.⁶

Organization. The development of perception is marked by a trend toward structure and order. The infant and child gradually move from perceptions of mass-variety, doubtless often blurred and chaotic, to those which are more differentiated and, in time, integrated. A similar shift from indistinctiveness and lack of definition to discrimination, generalization, and integration takes place with adults when presented with stimuli of undefined or unordered sort. In such a situation the individual does not know what he sees or hears. There occurs a kind of compromise between the external objective stimuli and the subjective elements, that is, between what is present by way of stimulation and what the organism is prepared or attempting to perceive. Ambiguous situations tend, in time, to become organized in line with some motive, past experience, or element in the situation.

As McGinnies has put it, "Perceptions are structured not only with respect to the limiting stimulus conditions, but also with regard to the possibilities of reward, need of fulfillment, attitudinal orientation, potential anxiety, symbolic value, and release from tension, to mention just a few."⁷

One of the best-known studies of perceptual structuring is that by Sherif on autokinetic movement. He showed that subjects either when alone or in a group tended to establish norms by which to judge the apparent movement of a spot of light in the darkroom.⁸ Excellent illustrations of the structuring of ambiguous or undefined stimuli are found in the results of Rorschach tests. (See the discussion of projective techniques in Chapter 11.) In fact, the organization of perception is one of the most valuable keys to an understanding of personality. Ideas, traits, attitudes, and values all enter into the structuring of perception. The concept *frame of reference*, to be discussed later, is really an outgrowth of perceptual organization.

Fixation. Finally the perceptual world tends to become stable and to remain relatively constant from moment to moment and from day to day.

⁶ E. M. Sapola, "A group study of some effects of preparatory set," *Psychological Monographs*, 1935, 46, 27-38.

⁷ E. M. McGinnies, *op. cit.*, p. 244. By permission.

⁸ For a convenient review of the original research see M. Sherif, *The Psychology of Social Norms* (New York, Harper and Brothers, 1936), Chap. 6.

This may be regarded as analogous to the trend toward a stable internal environment, by means of homeostasis, discussed in Chapter 2. Fixation, or anchorage, as Gardner Murphy calls it,⁹ has its roots in the recurrence of the same or highly similar stimuli and of the selection and structuring of the meanings given them. Psychologically it is a form of stimulus generalization described in Chapter 4 into which reinforcement also comes into play.

This building up of ideas and attitudes connected with recurrent responses means constructing, by reinforcement, a pattern of expectation. Such stable expectancy patterns provide an anchorage point from which different and new perceptions and reactions may be developed. Once more we note that fixity and flexibility go together in the adaptation of the individual to his environment.

Motive, Perception, and Performance. Everyday observations as well as careful experimentation show that perception fits into the cycles from motivation to response and reward. Certainly motivation plays an important part in setting perception or discriminatory cues into operation. These, in turn, furnish the direction in which response or performance will go. Moreover, perception is closely tied into remembering, image-formation, and other cognitive or intellectual processes. Perception has, then, really two directions or linkages. One of these is its connection of drive and response. But out of this relationship, and probably developing along with it, is its bearing on attitudes.

The neurological foundation of perception, of course, cannot be laid out in detail. Yet from introspection as well as behavior we may say that the selection, organization, and fixation are inherently a part of man's equipment for adaptation. There is truly a dynamic element in perception. As remarked earlier the organism goes out to meet its environment and this is illustrated in perception as well as in performance. The matter is well put in the words of Woodworth:

"It is impossible to look without trying to see, to listen without trying to hear. . . . When a new percept is in the making—when an obscure stimulus complex is being deciphered, or when the meaning of a cue or sign is being discovered—an elementary two-phase process is observable. It is a trial-and-check, check-and-trial process. The trial phase is a tentative reading of the sign, a tentative decipherment of the puzzle, a tentative characterization of the object; and the check phase is an acceptance or rejection, a positive or negative reinforcement of the tentative perception."¹⁰

Perception, in short, is an important bridge between motivation and action. And linked both to perception, as internal elements, and to action

⁹ Gardner Murphy, *Personality. A Biosocial Approach to Origins and Structure* (New York, Harper and Brothers, 1947), pp. 346-354.

¹⁰ R. S. Woodworth, "Reinforcement of perception," *American Journal of Psychology*, 1947, 60:119-124. Quotation from pp. 123-124. By permission.

are traits, attitudes, values, and frames of reference. These we shall examine in the next section.

ATTITUDES, TRAITS, AND FRAMES OF REFERENCE

It is difficult to make a direct approach to the conscious and unconscious features of the inner life. What goes on within the citadel of the mind can be known only by verbal or other symbolic communication or by overt act. Hence, if we wish to discover the passing or permanent features of a person's disposition and reaction tendencies, we do not ordinarily attempt a broadside approach. We piece together bits of everyday experience about the person in question. It is in this way that every person learns about another. For example, one man is easily enraged at a particular situation while another reacts calmly to the same or a similar one. At another time the behavior of these two men may be reversed. We find on the basis of many contacts with others that some person may be described as "petty," or "childish," or "aggressive," or as always wanting to "show off." Such popular generalizations arise from our observation of this person as he talks and reacts in a wide or narrow variety of situations. These specific behavior manifestations observable in others Stagner aptly calls *indicators* of the broader, more extensive, and persistent patterns of action.¹¹ And by the same token one may also learn to know himself.

The Nature of Attitudes. The word *attitude* has been variously used by psychologists. At times it is used in a narrow sense to mean the muscular set or spatial orientation of an animal or human being in the presence of a stimulus. In this sense we might speak of the attitude of a hunting dog as he points at a game bird. At other times it is used in a rather broad and loose way to cover practically the whole content of the inner life.¹²

Certainly, through the repetition of certain acts and associated ideas in response to stimuli, the individual develops specific or general reaction tendencies. These in time modify the interpretation of and response to new stimuli. To describe this aspect of human reactivity earlier psychologists employed the expression "determining tendency" or "mental set."¹³

In the narrow and more restricted sense attitudes are internal predispositions or readiness of the individual to react to some specific or general cue or stimulating situation. Attitudes are not innate or instinctive but result

¹¹ Ross Stagner, *Psychology of Personality*, rev. ed. (New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1948), p. 151.

¹² See L. L. Thurstone, "Attitudes can be measured," *American Journal of Sociology*, 1928, 33:529-554. The looseness of this use of attitude is reflected in the patent fact that the Thurstone and similar scales or "tests of attitude" more accurately get at beliefs and opinions than at attitudes strictly defined.

¹³ See E. B. Titchener, *A Textbook of Psychology* (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1911). It is well to call attention to the fact that many earlier psychologists, despite present inclinations in psychology to neglect their work, were quite as aware of the importance of attitudes and other often emotionally toned elements in the human *psyche* as are behaviorists today.

from learning, in the building of which differentiation, generalization, and especially anticipation have played a part. In truth an attitude partakes of the nature of an anticipatory response. Since attitudes represent a kind of telescoping of prior behavior into shorthand form, they have an important place in making for adequate personal adaptation. A knowledge of attitudes will greatly aid us in understanding, predicting, and controlling conduct. Let us note some of their basic features.

(1) As just noted attitudes are characterized by a readiness or preparatory set toward action. However, they are not to be confused with either the motive or the response itself. Regarding its relation to motive, Newcomb says, an attitude is "the *state of readiness for motive arousal*."¹⁴ The attitude may and does serve as the anticipatory pattern, and if linked to emotions, as it so often is, it will not only help incite the motive but acts to direct the response. That is, on the response side, attitudes "determine the range of specific responses that a person gives to any stimulating situation."¹⁵

Yet not every state of readiness is necessarily to be called an attitude. There must also be a pattern of organization and recurrence. These are associated with other features of attitudes to be indicated.

(2) Attitudes imply some kind of relationship between the individual and an object.¹⁶ These may be parents, friends, rivals; or groups of people, such as fraternity brothers, club members; or symbols or concepts of such objects and the values associated therewith. These stimuli make up what we may call the content of attitude. Behavioristically they serve as the discriminatory cues that arouse the readiness or anticipation to action. Such cues, moreover, may be externally or internally set in motion. If they derive from the former we link them to perception, if from the latter we regard them as cognitive or "mental" elements, such as images or ideas.

In the formation of attitudes, drives and motives play an important part. The child's attitudes toward his mother, for example, will arise out of the behavioral matrix involving his hunger needs, the nature of his contact at the mother's breast, her reaction to his nursing, and the kind of goal-reward or satisfaction that both attain from these interactions. Yet some of the objects toward which attitudes come to be related may grow out of verbal learning or the definition of the situation at the hands of others. Thus long before a child has a chance to have direct and perceptual contact with a Negro child or adult or a Roman Catholic or a Communist Party member, his parents, playmates, teachers, preachers, and others may instruct him in terms of their particular biases, attitudes, ideas, and stereo-

¹⁴ T. M. Newcomb, *Social Psychology* (New York, The Dryden Press, Inc., 1950), p. 118.

¹⁵ Norman Cameron, *The Psychology of Behavior Disorders, A Biosocial Interpretation* (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1947), p. 54.

¹⁶ The term *object* is used here, as elsewhere, to refer to any element in the situation, be it physical thing, person, group, institution, event, or any symbol of these.

types. What may begin, in fact, as a mere verbal belief or conviction may later take on the nature of an attitude.

(3) Attitudes, at least the socially more significant ones, are linked up with emotions and feelings: The affect associated with a given person, thing, or symbol will play a distinctive part in the building of an attitude toward it. Anxiety, aggression, love, hate, and other emotions as well as states of pleasantness or unpleasantness all have a place in the acquiring and maintaining of our more dominant attitudes.

(4) The fact that attitudes are related to objects means further that they have directionality. Attitudes not only mark the inception of overt response to situations, but they are characterized by approach or withdrawal, likes or dislikes, favorable or unfavorable reactions, avoidant or adient tendencies, loves or hates, as these are related to specific or generalized situations. In other words, they are goal-oriented and hence their place in values is apparent.

(5) Attitudes may be specific or general. That is, they may be directed toward specific stimuli or to whole classes or generalities of stimuli. A person may have a particular negative or positive attitude toward another, be he father, teacher, or policeman. And through the process of generalization one may also develop likes or dislikes for groups of persons. The strong sense of solidarity in an in-group represents a generalized attitude of the positive kind, just as a strong hatred of the out-group, as a unity, is a generalized attitude of negative sort. For example, we have attitudes approving or disapproving war in general or a particular war. We have attitudes toward Negroes, Italians, Germans, and Englishmen, but we may likewise have attitudes toward specific members of these racial or nationality groups. In short, attitudes may range in number and kind over a wide variety of stimuli or objects to which they refer or are directed.

A consideration of these various characteristics makes clear that attitudes play a part in our perceiving, thinking, emotions, and motivations. Moreover, attitudes are more or less permanent, recurrent, and organized aspects of our entire stimulus-central response system. In summary, then, *an attitude may be defined as a learned and more or less generalized readiness or predisposition to respond, perceive, think, and feel in a rather persistent and characteristic manner, usually positively or negatively, toward an object, be it person, thing, or symbol of same.*

Attitudes offer an important clue to the unraveling of human behavior. The building-up of attitudes, however, is so largely unconscious that often we are not aware of how they arise. Frequently the marginal impressions of an experience determine our response, because these tangential stimulations touch off the deep-lying attitudes.

Knowledge, Opinion, and Attitude. Since attitudes clearly have a bearing on perception and cognition, we must note the relation of attitude to knowledge and opinion. Knowledge refers to a more or less permanent

organization of perceptions and thought-processes about some feature of the person's world. Knowledge is one of the keys to meaning and rests on percepts, images, ideas, beliefs, and opinions. There are degrees of certainty in our knowledge, as students of logic and science are constantly reminding us.¹⁷ While knowledge and attitude are closely integrated in many of our acts, they are not identical from the standpoint of logical analysis. Knowledge, as a cognitive element, may be regarded as neutral. It is only when they become imbedded in attitudes and actions that thoughts become dynamic aspects of behavior.

Of particular importance to us is the relation of opinion—as a phase of the cognitive processes—to attitude. Opinions, which are verbal expressions of belief, are frequently discussed in relation to attitudes, and it is often assumed that verbal statements of like or dislike, of approval or disapproval, and so on give one a genuine clue to the attitudes of persons. Although the usual statistical test of attitudes is put in verbal form of some sort or other, the assumption that verbal expression is closely linked to the reaction tendencies implied in attitudes themselves is somewhat dubious. Much depends, of course, upon the degree of correlation between what a man says and what he does. What some persons say reflects pretty much what they do. What others say does not.

An individual well integrated to a stable culture may present a better correlation of word and deed than one living in a society with divergent and often antagonistic groups and values which demands a certain double-dealing if he is to escape censure. The degree of correlation of word and action also depends upon the unique organization which the particular individual has made of his life in reference to others—sometimes in contradistinction to the demands of his society. Truly the deviant person, the radical, the creative inventor, the genius, and likewise the delinquent, the criminal, the neurotic, and the psychotic, represent persons who, though diverging from the societal norms, may also be found to present in many instances a closer relation of word and deed than is found among those more conventional persons who on occasion criticize and ostracize them for their divergent behavior.

The Nature of Traits.¹⁸ The term *trait* is also used to describe certain persistent and fundamental features, both learned and native, of reaction patterns. In fact, the terms *trait* and *attitude* are frequently used almost

¹⁷ See David Krech and Richard S. Crutchfield, *Theory and Practice of Social Psychology* (New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1943), pp. 150-151. These authors use the concept *belief* to include "knowledge, opinions, and faith." In our context belief is considered as a sub-category of knowledge. It is largely a matter of semantic definition.

¹⁸ We discuss what, in an older psychology, were called "mental traits." These are psychological or behavioral features of the person and should not be confused with biological or organic traits of the sort discussed in Chap. 2. Both physical and psychological traits represent distinguishing features by which one person may be judged to be different from another.

interchangeably. However, by the term *trait* we usually mean certain persistent characteristics of a person's actions or ideas that are described by some distinguishing adjective. One is said to be neat, punctual, persevering, artistic, aggressive, submissive, conservative, radical, and so on. There are thousands of these trait names in English which represent a composite of human reactions to varied features of people's behavior. For example, C. W. Allport and H. S. Odbert in one study list 17,953 such terms.¹⁹ Despite a wide divergence in the use of the term *trait*, and despite a certain inclination among some writers to confuse it with *attitude*, the most satisfactory distinction at present seems to be that the trait is more highly generalized than the attitude and that it does not depend upon a specific object or stimulus for its directionality. It is assumed to be relatively independent of an object. Stagner, for instance, takes the position that trait is a larger, more inclusive concept than attitude, the latter, which is more distinctly related to some fixed or stereotyped idea or object, being perhaps well defined as "a trait on a small scale."²⁰

G. W. Allport also takes the position that traits do not have "a well-defined object of reference" but are generalized in quality.²¹ Moreover, he contends that they lack the directionality of attitudes. That is, the latter tend to typify reactions favorable or unfavorable, or of rejection or acceptance, of like or dislike, or of withdrawal or approach. They represent certain descriptive, even static, features of the personality rather than the dynamic ones. That is, for Allport, they refer more especially to the unique combination of characteristics that sets one person off from another. Detection and measurement of traits, therefore, are one method of portraying individual differences.

Yet it would be a mistake to consider traits as some sort of free-floating features of conduct that have no reference to goals or objects outside oneself. People may have general traits of punctuality, of ascendancy, or others, but in actual situations these express themselves in reference to some stimulus or other, and hence take on directionality. The point is that such reactions tend to be general, persistent, and more or less consistent within the limits which the society or group expects or which the culture demands or permits. (For further discussion of traits and attitudes, see Chapter 8.)

Frames of Reference and Unifying Themata. As the individual grows older, his attitudes and traits tend to become organized into larger value systems or frames of reference which serve to further his adaptation to his social and cultural world. There are doubtless a variety of fundamental frames of reference centered chiefly in the major motives or desires of the

¹⁹ See G. W. Allport and H. S. Odbert, "Trait-names: A Psycho-lexical study," *Psychological Monographs*, 1936, No. 211, 47.

²⁰ Stagner, *op. cit.*, p. 168.

²¹ G. W. Allport, *Personality: A Psychological Interpretation* (New York, Henry Holt & Company, Inc., 1937), p. 294.

individual, such as those concerned with bodily and economic security, with love and sexual life, with companionship, with the wishes for new experience, and with other motives such as were noted in Chapter 3. One might state the matter in another way. The individual develops certain *leitmotifs* which come to characterize his entire life. They are analogous to the recurrent musical patterns in a symphony which appear and reappear in varied combinations as the symphony unfolds. Or they are like the elements in the basic plot of a drama. We shall often note that, although thought or behavior may seem unique and particular to a given situation, behind such diversity there exists some basic patterning or "unity thema," as Murray terms it, which serves as an integrating or coordinating focus for a wide range of specific activities.²² Into the make-up of any fundamental frame of reference or of any unifying thema of life various combinations of ideas, ideals, habits, traits, and attitudes may enter. Some of these doubtless have their roots in the common or like exposure of individuals to their particular society and its culture. Others may and do represent a person's own peculiar reorganization of his experiences.

Autonomy, Uniqueness, and Style of Life. Although basic reaction patterns are linked together into larger frames of reference or into some dominant unity thema, it is also true that habits and traits and frames of reference take on a certain autonomy or independence of their own. The very process of canalization of responses provides a convenient interpretation of the mechanics of such autonomous behavior. These autonomous patterns often serve to set up and keep in motion rather complicated cycles of activity.

This autonomous character of some of our habits is the basic fact behind G. W. Allport's theory of the fundamental uniqueness of the personality. Not only do habits often tend to act as the drive or foundation for other habits, but their very independence, of course, makes for a certain distinctiveness in the life organization of each individual. Each person develops his own peculiar set of habits and related ideas, attitudes, and traits. This inter-relation of autonomy and independence of organization is, therefore, fundamental to what may be called the *style of life*—that particular life organization of each individual which sets him apart from his fellows despite more or less common cultural and social influences.

The uniqueness of a person, however, does not imply a lack of order and unity, which emerge out of experience. The fact of individual differences in style of life does not run counter to the adaptive advantage of learning, which implies a certain reduction of behavior to a minimal and orderly set of reactions. In short, the whole matter of learning illustrates an evident general principle of protoplasmic organization which we discussed in Chapter 2. There we pointed out the dual factors of constancy and flexibil-

²² H. A. Murray *et al.*, *Explorations of Personality* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1938).

ity. The same principles operate in the field of habit-formation. On the one hand there is a certain fixity of effects, a certain inertia of reaction pattern which may be either generalized or specific in character. On the other hand, there is a certain flexibility of responses. Habits do not completely encrust the individual in the "cake of custom," to use Bagehot's famous phrase. The individual with all his fundamental training retains a certain flexibility. In fact, this quality makes it possible for one habit to be built upon another.

But there are important individual differences in terms of rigidity or flexibility. Some persons develop a life organization which is highly inflexible. Others tend to go in the opposite direction. They are extremely changeable and inconstant. They never seem to have any stability of patterns beyond the most rudimentary and physiologically determined ones. Between these extremes most persons may be found.

Aims, Ideals, and Purposes as Drives and Ends. In the course of adaptation of the individual to his social and cultural world he learns to thrust some of his internalized and anticipatory activities into the future as the basis of a line of action. These are referred to as ideals, purposes, or ambitions, which are but learned and internally determined goals toward which one may strive. Ethical philosophy aims, in part, at stimulating such ideals or purposes in the individual as ought to make him a better citizen and a better, happier, more fully adjusted person.

In short, when we talk of aims, ends, or ideals, we are but stating in another way the principle of internal drive directed to some goal, but one which is acquired in the course of living with our fellows. These are not in essence something special, nor are they distinct from the more rudimentary drives, but they do serve to set off many short-run activities, the final goal of which may be very remote. The boy who aims to be a doctor, lawyer, engineer, or professor must set himself upon a long-time cycle of activity within which there will be hundreds of subsidiary cycles, all directed—if he keeps to his purpose or ideal—to the long-time end or purpose of his lifework.

The Interplay of Internal and External Activity. After the new-born individual begins with certain drives which lead to overt acts seeking to satisfy these urges and normally leading to the consummatory act that will complete any given cycle, he gradually acquires varied direct and indirect means of getting what he wants. Moreover, he comes to desire many satisfactions which were not present in the early weeks or months or years of life. The separation of activity into the field of thought, broadly considered, and that of action really arises from the learning of substitutive and novel means of securing our goals. Moreover, it is apparent that the elaboration of the inner world may be far more extensive than is its permissible expression in overt conduct. As the individual grows up through participation with his fellows in various groups, as he is influenced on

every hand by the customs, traditions, or folkways of his time and place, he not only constructs within himself new and divergent motives, but develops a whole set of images, memories, ideas, ideals, and purposes that get organized into his own particular inner world. Overt conduct does not permit the wide ramifications possible in the subjective world of imagination. Once one has committed himself to a line of conduct, it is not easy to go off in another direction. There is an inevitability about an overt act which must be recognized in preparing for it. Thus we may say that the directionality of conduct and the number of objects to which one may respond are steadily reduced as we pass from the field of inner thoughts, emotions, and impulses through verbal activity and attitude to the act itself. This is but another way of stating that there are various levels of expression: covert, verbal, and overt.

The world of thoughts, impulses, feelings, and emotions is wider and much more extensive than the world of verbal communication. In turn, the world of overt conduct is still less extensive than either of the others. The fundamental problem is the integration between these various levels, and many of the difficulties of personality adaptation with which we shall concern ourselves in later chapters are really phases of the divergences in the individual between the levels. To mention but one or two examples: We shall see that the aspirations of many individuals in our highly competitive society so far exceed their overt achievement as to produce strain and disappointment and make for neurotic or other compensatory reactions as a means of finding some relief from this stress. Or, as we shall see in matters of personal and public morality, people often carry with them a highly ethical verbal code which is quite divergent from their overt conduct.

In the process of adaptation to one's fellows and the world outside it often happens that what society and culture demand differs from what one wishes or wants. A person may define a given social situation, let us say in terms of his deeper wishes for power, while society, the community, or some special group has laid down definitions of the situation—the demands of behavior—which run quite opposite to these power wishes of the individual. Hence we speak of the opposition between an *individual or personal definition of a situation* and the *social or cultural definition of a situation*. Not that personal definitions are developed in a vacuum or without reference to social interaction. They usually are, but the individual definition expresses more completely the deeper, less sublimated, more rudimentary drives. In the formulation of these wishes, personal-social training—that is, learning not culturally determined—often plays a predominant part. It is not that these earliest acquired drives are unaffected by social contacts, as is implied by certain writers. Rather they are the outgrowth of the earliest relations of the child with his mother, father, brother, sister, or other person, and in the course of his growing up in society, other

demands, and other definitions are laid over them so as to inhibit and block their overt expression.

This is not to gainsay another factor, namely, the person's own reorganization of his experience in such a way as to express what he comes to consider his deeper and more basic wants. That is, each person in this sense is *unique*. As we have noted, he builds up his own *style* of life. No two persons' drives or wishes are quite identical. Moreover, the possibilities of rich elaboration of one's inner life through daydreaming, the fact that one need not communicate this to others—no matter how much the specific elements of the fantasy may derive from experience with others—makes it possible to develop a sort of private world into which others cannot enter. The extremes of this sort of activity are seen in certain pathological persons. But such extremes represent a certain failure at adequate and normal adjustment.

This inner world—relatively autonomous, made up of one's peculiar frames of reference and values, as well as those held in common with others—is not necessarily identical with the outer world of one's fellows. And such divergence of inner and outer world tends to produce some strain or stress in the process of adaptation. Half-measures may be necessary. Often the goal attained fails to bring the completeness of satisfaction that had been expected. And the residue of impulse or desire from such half-measures may lead to daydreams, to vicarious experiences, and may without doubt be one of the appeals of art and fantasy in our culture. In any case, the overt adaptation of the individual is always complicated by the possibility that the adjustment is not complete.

To understand the person, his drives, his wishes, his manner of meeting crises and other situations, and the nature of his satisfactions, it is essential always to know of this inner life as well as to know about his overt conduct. For this reason it is difficult to accept a strictly behavioristic approach to problems of personality. No matter how much one may object to terms such as perception, memory, image, concept, or the unconscious, or to identification, projection, and other so called "mental mechanisms," one must realize that they may and do serve as convenient terms to describe this inner world of experience without a knowledge of which one could not understand overt activity. Moreover, it must be remembered not only that fundamental learning is largely, if not entirely, social in character, but that the internalization of overt responses is at all points linked up with social interaction. In fact, the very mechanisms of internalization are themselves related to social contact.

ADJUSTIVE TECHNIQUES AND INTER-PERSONAL RELATIONS

In this section we shall explain a number of processes which serve to aid the individual's adjustment to himself and his fellows. Since we consider the central matter of adjustment to be one of tension reduction, that

is, personal problem-solving, these mechanisms are often viewed as private ones. Yet, in one way or another they also come to have social implications. In fact, they are some of the chief factors in inter-personal relations.

Among the most important of these mechanisms are identification, projection, rationalization, compensation, reaction-formation, and regression. After explaining these terms we shall indicate some of their inter-relations. In particular we shall point out that some of these mechanisms often occur in ambivalent or opposing relations to each other, and represent a kind of bi-polarity in the individual's response system.

The Nature of Identification. The process of identification is one of taking over into his own thought and actions the thought and actions of another. Identification functions as a means of tension-reduction by one's assumption of postures, traits, attitudes, habits, and rôles of others. The process begins early in life and is involved in much of the child's learning.

The word *identification* came into psychology from psychoanalysis along with a somewhat similar concept, *introjection*. Some writers use these terms as practically synonymous. Others use identification to refer more particularly to the overt imitative features and introjection to refer to the internalization or convert aspects of the process. We shall follow this distinction.

At the outset, at least, it is largely a non-deliberative assumption of responses like those of another. Thus, two-months-old babies have been observed to smile when others smile. By nine or ten months a baby will cry or sit and rock back and forth in a manner similar to that of other babies near by. This is doubtless largely an unconscious response. It represents the most rudimentary form of empathy, a term which broadly describes the assumption of acts, postures, gestures, verbalisms, feelings, and emotions of others.

Identification is basic to sympathy and cooperation. Its feeling-emotional foundation is that of pleasure and love. But the ability to place oneself in another's position depends upon learned reactions. The earliest training in sympathy and identification takes place with reference to the mother or some mother-surrogate, such as a nurse. The mother image really arises in this process of identification of oneself with the mother in the acts of feeding, bathing, being carried about, and otherwise given attention. How a person responds to himself and to others is definitely determined, in part at least, by these early social contacts with the parent. Later, identification is extended to other persons, father, brothers, sisters, relatives, friends, and various members of groups and in time, to all sorts of symbols which cluster about persons and groups. The person feels and speaks for his group. He acts as if the group's unity were his own. Some persons so easily identify themselves with various groups that we dub them "joiners." These persons easily think in terms of "we." They are versed in

play many rôles, and become rather easily adjusted to other people, at least in the outward form of participation.

Participation in conjoint group life is absolutely dependent on the ability of the individual members to identify themselves with each other's wants, aims, and manner of securing their satisfactions. It is through such mutual and common identification that coöperative habits, attitudes, and traits arise.

One of the most important effects of identification is the internalization of the moral codes and activities from one's parents and other adults. The rise of the conscience, moral self, or super-ego rests on the introjection of the definitions and controls of conduct which we accept from others. We learn to punish ourselves as others have punished us for infractions of the rules of society. The place of identification in the rise of the social self and of the moral attitudes and habits will be fully explored in Chapter 7.

While identification is a perfectly normal activity, it may, on occasion, take an extreme form. An example among neurotics is hypochondria or over-concern for one's health which, in turn, serves as an attention-getting device. A child who believes himself neglected by his parents may identify himself with an invalid member of the family and take on the symptoms of illness. More serious cases are found among those schizophrenic patients who contend that they are some religious or heroic figure, such as, God, the Virgin Mary, Julius Caesar, or Napoleon.

Projection. Of quite different character is projection. It is a means of adjustment or tension-reduction by attributing to others one's own traits, motives, habits, thoughts, feelings and emotions, and even rôle and status. As in identification the social-cultural situation will have much to do with the development of this mechanism. Projection is a normal process and probably lies at the basis of our distinctions between an internal and external world, between self and not self, and is an important phase of perception, especially that involving the distance-ceptors.²² Both identification and projection are important in building up social contacts. Both are phases of anticipatory responses in which imagination aids in the adjustment of one person to another. If identification consists in taking the actions and attitudes of others, into one's inner life, projection is an opposite process of externalizing one's expectancies by thrusting them on others.

Cameron makes a distinction between what he calls "assimilative" and "disowning" forms of projection.²³ The former is the more or less unconscious learning of the current projections of one's family, neighborhood,

²² The function of projection in attribution of meaning is neatly brought out in several "projection tests" such as the Rorschach. These will be discussed in Chap. 11. A more complete presentation of the various theories of personality, particularly as they relate to the interplay of culture and personality. See Chap. 10.

²³ Cameron, *op. cit.*, pp. 166-170.

class, or other group. This would be illustrated in the child's early acquisition of those in-group attitudes toward various customary out-groups which are largely, or in part, culturally accepted projections. The latter type of projection is illustrated in thrusting on other's traits, attitudes, and the like which have their roots in one's anxiety, hostility, and frustration. Projections of the disowning type usually derive from inner conflicts which are resolved by attributing motives, ideas, emotions, and actions to others. People who have some fault or wish of which they feel guilty are often intolerant of the same fault or wish in others.

Examples of projection are everywhere about us. The assimilative type is clearly apparent when the upper- or middle-class child acquires from his family and friends the practice of attributing to people in the lower classes, or "on the wrong side of the tracks," ambitions of mercenary and status striving which are part and parcel of the value system of the child's own family and class. Another example of common projection in an upward-striving society such as ours is the tendency of parents to project their own thwarted ambitions for a particular professional career upon their children.²⁵ Every college adviser or counselor knows the conflicts which arise in the minds of students who are all too often the unwilling victims of their mamma's or papa's wish that their child take up music or medicine or law, because the parent in question always wanted to be a musician, doctor, or lawyer but was prevented from it by one circumstance or another.

Projection plays an important part in prejudice wherein the members of one group attribute to another group characteristics which they themselves hate or emotions which they themselves feel but are ashamed of because of social taboos. It is the basis of scapegoating. It occurs in the development of the delusions of persecution so frequently seen in mob behavior, which are similar to the delusions found in the paranoiac patients in our mental hospitals. Projection is often evident in the public behavior of the agitator or highly emotional reformer who foists upon his followers his own "secret" or private resentment against some authority or institution which he dislikes. And since other persons (his actual or potential followers) may also have feelings of resentment (though usually not so violent) against similar persons in power or against like institutions, they come easily to accept the agitator's projection as their own feelings. That is, they *identify* themselves with the agitator's projection. This interplay of identification and projection is an important phase of the relations of persons to each other, especially in situations of in-group out-group conflict.

The more extreme forms of disowning projection are seen in paranoid personalities. These are individuals who attribute to others their own

²⁵ See Kimball Young, "Parent-child relationship: projection of ambition," *The Family*, 1927, 8: 67-73, for some illustrations.

violent and self-centered ideas and attitudes of hatred. One of the central symptoms is the development of a "persecution complex." (See Chapter 23.)

Compensation. No individual is completely adequate to every situation which he meets, and a good deal of our social learning is concerned with acquiring substitute responses in place of those which ordinarily follow from various stimuli. To take a docile or inferior rôle with others, or to admit inadequacy in the face of great odds may be highly frustrating, especially in a society that stresses upward striving. Such an inferior place undermines one's pride and self-esteem. In such instances one may seek to find some means to offset one's sense of incompetence. The term *compensation* is used to describe just such adoption of a substitute function or rôle which provides or tends to provide some tension-reducing satisfaction. The mechanisms of the conditioned response are doubtless operative in these cases.

When a boy is short in stature and weak in muscle, or a cripple, he may find release for his interest in athletics by frequent attendance at football, baseball, or other contests, by sculpturing figures of athletes, or by becoming a sports writer. This type of reaction is apparently universal. When an individual, however, becomes habitually emotional over his inadequacies and feels that he is distinctly inferior to those around him, he may become a more serious problem to himself and others. He may develop what in popular parlance is called an inferiority complex. These "complexes" are combinations of attitudes and feelings, often largely unconscious, and they may lead the person to make an undue effort to overcome his inadequacy.

Compensation is often linked up with strong self motivation. The man of small stature, with the loud voice who speaks up on every occasion, who is strong for "rights," who struts and preens himself in the public eye, who is fearsome lest he not be accorded the "proper" social prestige, is pretty obviously an instance of compensation. As with so many of these matters, it is the extreme expression of a trait or habit or set of attitudes that distinguishes the neurotic or inadequate person from others. So long as these traits are well socialized, they are perfectly natural and normal.

When the sense of frustration does not lead to compensation, the person who feels inferior may take the condition for granted. He may adopt a docile, submissive, dependent attitude toward others. He retreats as completely as possible from situations which demand self-reliant action. Such habits and attitudes of withdrawal, especially from social contacts, are often associated with daydreaming and with the development of behavior which we call introverted.

Sublimation. Another form of substitute response is sublimation. In this case the replacing behavior has ethical and social approval by per-

sons or groups with high prestige. Though sublimation has much in common with compensation, strictly speaking the latter concerns only the development of substitutive activities for *felt* inferiority. In sublimation we have not only ethical and social approval but also a replacement which may follow upon circumstances which do not necessarily produce any felt inferiority. The factor of frustration, however, is present as it is in compensation. But the substitute reaction is ordinarily milder and less vigorous than might be expected were it not for the various cultural factors.

The psychological mechanisms involved in various substitutions do not differ greatly, but what the activities mean for other persons, and for oneself in relation to them, is determined by the cultural content of these substitutions. The man who releases his sexual suppressions in the form of salacious talk may be avoided by others, just as the man who indulges in sexual perversions may be punished by his community. On the other hand, a woman in our society who has been deprived by circumstances of normal motherhood may win great respect for her work as a nurse, as the head of an orphanage, as a social worker, or as judge of a juvenile court. For this reason the mere analysis of the mechanism, the *how* of behavior, can never give us a complete understanding of the *personality*.

Perhaps the most noteworthy sublimations, at least in our society, lie in the field of rage and sex because these are the two fundamental reactions which are most held in check in the present cultural order. We canalize our habits in such a direction that these physiological impulses are drained off into activities given cultural approval by others. One of the most distinctive examples of this is seen in the repressive Christian sex mores. In Western society we permit the tremendous energy thus accumulated to be redirected into highly competitive activities which are considered proper and acceptable. Some writers have gone so far as to contend that all the so-called higher and more advanced cultures are largely the result of such sublimations.

Other forms of substitution which are neither morally nor legally accepted in the community are found in various sorts of perversions, criminal habits, and psychopathic disturbances that take the place of socially accepted adjustments. These are not sublimations but may serve for the individual somewhat the same purpose, although the most satisfactory sorts of substitutions of behavior *are those acceptable to the community*, because, after all, the individual lives most fully in the minds of others and reflects in himself their attitudes toward him.

Rationalization. Not only do we find varied types of responses built up in social interaction, such as identification, antagonism, projection, compensation, and sublimation, but people soon learn to make excuses or justify their acts to others and to themselves. We call this habitual

pattern *rationalization*. It is a means of keeping peace with ourselves and our fellows when our actual but often unconscious desires and their expression, were they fully known, would make us ridiculous, disliked, or even the subject of punishment by those in power. We all seek to justify our behavior. Most of the "reasons" we give ourselves and others are not the genuine causes of our conduct but are the excuses which we imagine will be acceptable to others and, incidentally, to ourselves. The real or genuine reasons are often hidden from us. These "good" and socially approved reasons are rationalizations.

Most of our rationalizations are culturally determined. That is, our society approves excuses for all sorts of conduct which may be motivated by very selfish and immoral motives hidden beneath the surface. Actually, social pressure is so evident in most situations that a man is considered poorly socialized who frankly admits that he does somewhat unconventional things because these acts represent to him his inner desires. An employer may rationalize his opposition to a strike by accusing his workers of communism and lack of patriotism when the claims of the strikers for better wages and hours may be sincere and in line with the standard of living which other employers and the wider public accept as customary. In such a case the employer often obtains support from a section of the community if his rationalized antagonism is couched in the stereotypes of communism and revolution.

Sometimes people believe rationalization to be pathological and evil. Really, however, this device provides a protection against the exposure of violent or unethical motives. The genuine motives can usually be brought to light only by careful analysis of past behavior and most frequently only by other persons sufficiently outside one's social-cultural frame of reference to manifest objectivity about human conduct. Rationalizations, at least those acceptable to our group, make for smooth and uninhibited behavior. It would be hard for us to participate in the society of our fellows if we were constantly aware of the true or actual foundations of our conduct.

Repression and Suppression. Any discussion of adjustive techniques would not be complete without considering the means by which the individual is able to reject or get rid of impulses, thoughts, and attitudes which in some way are considered to be harmful or threatening. Students of personality owe a genuine debt to Freud for having made evident the important place which repression plays in human adjustment. Some of the theoretical aspects of this topic will be discussed in Chapter 10. At this point we shall explain the process briefly since it helps us to understand other mechanisms.

In a broad sense repression refers to the blocking or exclusion of painful memories or other unwanted ideas, attitudes, and actions. In behavioristic terms it is but another name for inhibition which, as we

noted in Chapter 4, is a perfectly normal aspect of learning. In psychoanalysis repression is considered a fundamental mechanism for excluding instincts and their associated ideas from consciousness and overt response. Some writers distinguish between repression and suppression. They use the former to refer to the non-deliberative or unconscious forms of exclusion. The latter is applied to deliberate and consciously directed inhibition.

The repression and suppression of impulses and action-tendencies does not mean that they are lost. There is much evidence from everyday observation and more careful study that the inhibited materials may continue in some way or another to influence thought and behavior. The whole psychoanalytic theory of the unconscious is built upon the thesis that repression leaves residues which influence motivation, perception, attitude, and action.

Reaction-formation. When some impulse or idea has been repressed the individual may develop motives and ideas which are just the reverse of those hidden away. This process is called reaction-formation or reversal-formation. There are abundant examples. Repressed cruelty is overlaid with exaggerated concern and compassion for another. Repressed hostility is counterbalanced by undue love and submissiveness. The excessive boasting and exhibitionism of the kind noted in discussing compensation may be considered a case of reaction-formation. Alexander, in fact, equates over-compensation and reaction-formation.²⁰

Sometimes substitute reactions which, at first glance, look like sublimations, turn out, upon closer inspection, to be reaction-formations. In genuine sublimation there is emotional identification and a certain harmony or integration between the impulse and the substituted activity or goal. In reversal-formation, on the contrary, the protective coloration is often pretty thin and the repressed motive and action may reappear in any number of situations. Our culture, of course, provides the individual with a large repertoire of cues and responses that are psychologically kinds of reaction-formations. The code of polite manners often gives one a chance to disguise hostility and anxiety under socially accepted forms. The social accommodations which develop between conflicting classes, churches, nations, or other groups often have a large component of reaction-formation.

Displacement and Transference. Another form of substitution is that of displacement or, better perhaps, replacement. This consists in shifting one's reactions and attitudes from one object to another. The mechanism is that of the conditioned response. An office manager having had a rebuff from his superior may later take out his aggressions on his office help or on his family at home. The child's earliest sexual fixations are no

²⁰ See Franz Alexander, *Fundamentals of Psychoanalysis* (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1948), pp. 104-108.

doubt on members of his own family. Later they are displaced to individuals outside the family.

Transference is a special type of displacement. Its potency was first discovered in psychoanalytic interviews when the patient, in the course of telling his dreams, his intimate and formerly only half-verbalized impulses and thoughts, tended to fall in love with the analyst who often represented a combination of loved mother, father, or some other person in the patient's earlier life. The deep affections which develop between the teacher and children and between a minister and his parishioners are illustrations in everyday life of transference. The teacher or minister is often surrogate for someone who had been a love object in childhood.

Regression. In the course of developing ways of adaptation the individual acquires many habits and attitudes that operate more or less automatically. In the course of growing up and becoming a member of society, some habits are broken and replaced by others. What is expected or tolerated in a child of two or three years will not be approved when he is ready to go to school. Yet the patterns of acting which are acquired earlier are not all lost or dissipated. There is ample evidence that they become part of the vast array of potential response systems which make up what we call the unconscious. Under conditions of panic, extreme fatigue, intoxication, and illness individuals may act and think in ways which might be accepted in children but what had long since been replaced by more mature patterns. This reversion to earlier forms of thinking and acting is called *regression*. Parents are often witness to this process when a child of five or six years, faced with loss of attention upon the arrival of a new baby in the home, reverts to bed-wetting, temper-tantrums, and baby-talk. It is clear that he is making a bid for attention and affection in terms of what served the purpose earlier. The ease with which many individuals regress to childish dependencies during even mild illnesses is well known to mothers, wives, and nurses alike. In fact, regression is a form of displacement in which there is a shift to a habit which served an adaptive function at a chronologically earlier period. Extreme instances of regression are found among some schizophrenic and senile dementia patients who lose their sphincter controls, have to be hand-fed, and in general treated like babies, which psychologically they have become.

Ambivalence in Adjustive Processes. The term *ambivalence* refers to the individual's possession of many opposite and contradictory reaction-tendencies toward the same object or situation. It is a commonplace that an individual may both love and hate another. The child's image of an indulging-helping-loving parent may be counterbalanced by another image of the parent as a restraining-disciplining-authoritarian figure. A child's reaction to a sibling often alternates between feelings of affection and acts of hostility toward him as a rival for parental favors.

As a concept ambivalence represents but one instance of bi-polar activities in the individual. In the literature of personality, especially as it reflects Freudian psychology, bi-polarities are widely used. Among others note the life-death instincts, the pleasure-pain principle, self-other-world dichotomy, introversion-extroversion, sadism-masochism, and masculinity-femininity.²⁷

One constitutional foundation of ambivalence in man may be found in the drives themselves. Sometimes two drives or motives may struggle within an individual for expression. For example, hunger may compete with the sexual demands. Both drives cannot be satisfied simultaneously, and there may well be a certain struggle between them for dominance. Another factor which may operate to influence ambivalence is the periodicity or rhythm in the operation of many fundamental organic processes, for instance, activity-passivity. Then, too, the differentiation of behavior—that is, the building up of partial or segmental patterns—furnishes a further foundation for such opposition. The interplay of inhibition and facilitation in learning, offers a simple instance. Similarly, the contradictory directionality of rage and love, of like and dislike, provides other examples.

As the individual develops more complex patterns of acquired motives, attitudes, and traits, this same general fact is very apparent. A good instance is the oppositional character of identification, sympathy, and co-operation, on the one hand, and of antagonism, aggression, and competition or conflict, on the other. Lois B. Murphy has reported that among various groups of nursery-school children she found marked instances of children who were both sympathetic and cooperative and strongly aggressive and dominant. So, too, Green found in a study of friendship and quarreling among pre-school children that friends showed on the average a higher incidence of quarrelsomeness between themselves than did the children who are less friendly to each other.²⁸ The disputes of lovers are well known, as are oppositional reactions of members of many emotionally close-knit associations.

Struggle and Coöperation in Adjustment. Viewed from a larger standpoint, a good deal of adjustment takes place within a framework of the ambivalent processes of cooperation and struggle. Cooperation is an interactional activity marked by some joint action of two or more persons directed to some common goal or reward which may be shared. It is a *universal social process* and is evident in work and play alike. Struggle

²⁷ Logically it is obvious that this is a familiar instance of Aristotelian dichotomies so common in taxonomic classification. Present trends favor redefining such phenomena into points along a continuum.

²⁸ See Lois B. Murphy, *Social Behavior and Child Personality: An Exploratory Study of Some Aspects of Sympathy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1937), Chaps. 5-7, and F. H. Green, "Friendships and quarrels among preschool children," *Child Development*, 1933, 4:237-252.

or opposition is a process of social interaction which is marked by effort to outdo a rival or opponent with the aim of securing for oneself a given reward toward which both are motivated. Opposition is often divided into two sub-categories, competition and conflict. The former is a struggle among individuals for some good, material or symbolic, in which each strives to outdo the other in order to attain the reward. The central interest is in the reward, not in the opponent. In fact much competition is thoroughly impersonal. In conflict, although the final aim is the reward, the struggle is first directed toward the opponent who blocks the way to the goal. One has to get rid of the opponent before he can attain the reward.

The roots of coöperation lie in identification, love, and sympathy which are first built up in the close relations of child and mother. While the child, at the outset, is completely dependent on the mother for survival, there emerges in time patterns of interaction in which the child comes to play a more direct rôle. Later in play the rudiments of coöperation become clear in learning to take one's turn at the swing or slide. Still later the first team games depend on the child's ability to give mutual aid and to share in the rewards.

Oppositional responses arise chiefly from frustration. In the course of growing up and learning to be a member of society the child faces many situations which serve to block his drives and responses associated with efforts to satisfy his needs. Opposition, like coöperation, demands a variety of skills in problem-solving, and a number of the mechanisms we have described come into play in terms of inter-personal factors. Certainly identification operates in conflict as well as in coöperation. If a person could not imagine himself in his rival's place, he could hardly want the goal or reward which the rival desires. Projection likewise comes into action in assuming that another person wants the same thing. Or, in the case of cooperation, that another person will assist one in getting a given reward.

Struggle and coöperation may be viewed as bi-polarities of a larger molar order in which a variety of adaptive elements function. Though both have their sources in the constitutional structure and the initial interactions of infancy and early childhood, cultural training plays an enormously important part in stimulating, directing, and giving value to these patterns of behavior. Certainly most individuals brought up in the Euro-American culture system reveal certain deep-laid ambivalent patterns. On the one hand are those attitudes, traits, and values which derive from love and affection and are expressed in cooperation. On the other are those which derive from frustrations and attendant hostility and anxiety—all of which contribute to competition and conflict.

Adjustive Techniques as Defense or Escape. Some writers, especially those influenced by Freudian psychology, consider many of the mecha-

nisms just described as having functions of "ego defense" and/or escape.²⁹ These techniques are assumed to protect the individual from threats, dangers, and anxieties attendant on frustration and aggressive responses. All too often those who so use these terms imply that these processes are non-adjustive or even maladjustive without adequately defining either non-adjustment or maladjustment. Actually ego defense and escape are devices or means used by the individual in his efforts at adaptation to his social world and to himself. True, measured by the culture norms of a society, the overuse of one mechanism or another may be regarded as excessive and hence disruptive of sound social relationships. For example, in our society the extreme to which projection goes in the case of the paranoiac is labeled abnormal. But there are some societies in which similar projective techniques have led some writers to designate the core of an entire culture as paranoid.³⁰ Some groups in our society do not regard the sublimation of sexuality which leads to celibacy as a high value, but other groups do. Yet the point of view on this matter held by the Shakers in the nineteenth century would, if universally applied, have led to the disappearance of society itself.

Universality of Interactional Patterns. The interactional mechanisms always have a dual reference: (1) to the other person or object, and (2) to the internal pattern—to what we may call the self, or the personal organization of attitudes, traits, and ideas, or themata. We must never forget that these mechanisms arise in social interaction. They do not appear haphazardly. Rather they represent the substrata of social life everywhere. In fact, we raise this important question: Is it not possible that we have in these mechanisms the fundamental social-psychological processes which underlie all social behavior everywhere without regard to culture? In other words, may we not infer that, no matter how divergent overt conduct is, how different culturally acquired attitudes and ideas may be, there still remain not only the basic physiological drives to activity but also these social mechanisms that are universal?

It seems to me that in terms of human constitution, motivation, and learning, operating as they do everywhere in a societal matrix, we may postulate a universality of the chief forms of interaction. As members of a common species which is bio-social by nature it must be so. These mechanisms will differ in amount and intensity in terms of culture but they will not be completely absent anywhere.³¹ If this contention is

²⁹ See Anna Freud, *The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense* (New York, International Universities Press Inc., 1946). As an example of the use of these techniques as essentially for defense or escape, see Norman Cameron, *op. cit.*

³⁰ As an example of this idea, propounded during wartime, see R. M. Brickner, *Is Germany Incurable?* Philadelphia, J. B. Lippincott Company, 1943.

³¹ This assumption of the universality of human behavioral processes is what earlier anthropologists called "psychic unity of mankind." See Franz Boas, *The Mind of Primitive Man* (1st ed., New York, The Macmillan Company, 1911). Somewhat the same

sound, it follows that one may criticize those cultural anthropologists who talk only of culture and never of society and social interaction—that is, who ignore or neglect the basic psychological processes involved in the interplay of individual with individual in any given group. Society, if it means anything as a concept, means interacting personalities. It is not a thing, but a dynamic relationship or a configuration of persons in contact and communication with each other. Without contact and communication there can be no society, and without society, of course, there can be no culture.

SOCIALIZATION, RÔLE, AND STATUS

In this, the final section of the present chapter, we shall treat briefly the function of socialization in the development of the personality and the meaning of rôle and status as basic concepts in the description and analysis of the individual's total adaptive undertakings. More specific aspects of socialization will be dealt with in Chapter 6, on the development of language, in Chapter 7, on the rise of the self, and in Chapter 12, on problems of infant and child training. In all these, as elsewhere, the importance of rôle and status will be indicated.

Nature of Socialization. As is so often true of terms in social psychology, the concept *socialization* has been variously used. There are three somewhat different yet related meanings of the term. (1) It is used as a broad concept for the processes of inducting the individual into the social-cultural world. (2) It is used in a somewhat narrower sense to refer only to the social training of the infant and child in his earliest years. This is the usage frequently encountered in writings on child psychology. (3) It is also used to mean that form of social learning which has to do with the moral training of the growing child and adolescent.

Since the social sciences no longer view their work from a moralistic, normative standpoint, so far as collecting and analyzing the facts are concerned, this third usage is not employed by serious students of personality and social behavior. Reformers and preachers, however, continue to use it in this sense.

This third use of the term warrants comment. To link socialization only with moral training reflects a widespread notion that the only satisfactory learning in society involves the processes of love, coöperation, and sympathy, all tied into a moral scheme of things. In contrast, learning involving conflict and competition is *ipso facto*, from this viewpoint, bad, immoral, and to be avoided. This latter view limits socialization to training in coöperation, and in sympathetic and mutual inter-identification, and neglects that learning which relates to rivalry, jealousy, and struggle with one's fellows for given rewards. Certainly such a limited, norma-

problem made by Otto Kluckhohn in his discussion of dependable motives. See his *Social Psychology* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1937), Chaps. 5 and 6.

tive view has no place in any effort to build a science of personality.

For our purposes we shall use socialization in the first sense, though the importance of the early phases is clearly apparent. Socialization means that the individual learns the mores, folkways, laws, and other features of his culture in order to help make him become a functioning member of his society. He learns to identify himself with the aims and values of his family, neighborhood, class, and community. He may likewise develop competitive and conflictive responses of his in-group with regard to various out-groups. This learning begins very early in life and takes place involuntarily and non-deliberatively as well as consciously.

The whole process of socialization, of course, falls within the scope of the social act or interaction. In a broad sense it is another way of describing social learning, particularly those phases which have to do with training in habits, attitudes, ideas, and perceptions necessary to becoming a participating member of society.

Cultural and Personal-Social Learning. As was briefly noted in Chapter 1 there is an important distinction to be drawn regarding the nature of learning to which an individual is exposed. As he matures the young child is progressively inducted into an environment of mother, father, siblings, and others. Some of the social stimuli of these persons which reach the child reflect the culture or commonly accepted habits, attitudes, and ideas of the wider society as they are expressed in the family. As the child grows up and comes into contact with other primary groups, such as on the playground or in the neighborhood, and still later with secondary associations, like those of the economic and political orders, these cultural influences continue to play upon him. These effects we call *cultural learning*. But other stimuli which have little or no cultural foundation also reach the child. In fact, it would be a mistake to regard socialization as synonymous with cultural learning.

There are many person-to-person relationships that are not influenced or directed by the culturalized habits, attitudes, and ideas of a given group. Many of the earliest contacts of the child with the mother are not laid down in the culture. Such matters as the nature and amount of fondling, the impact on the child of the mother's fears and anxieties as they are expressed in her reactions, tones of voice, and the like, are to be regarded often as of a non-cultural though obviously of social sort. So, too, dominance-submission patterns which emerge from the spontaneous play life of children may have no distinctive cultural sources.

This kind of social but non-cultural learning the author calls *personal-social learning*. The word *personal* reveals its highly individualistic aspect, and the word *social*, the fact that it nevertheless arises in interaction.³²

³² Edward Sapir used the term *precultural* to cover the same idea. See his article, "Personality," *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1932), 12:85-88.

Personal-social conditioning is most effective in the early years of life, and for this reason its effects on the emerging personality are important. Many aspects which make for individual differences are thus derived. Also some, if not all, of the fundamental temperamental qualities, anxieties, patterns of aggression, and the like may have their roots in personal-social conditioning.

Most of the personal-social relations are later overlaid with cultural influences. But some observers have contended that though culture patterns regarding infant training may differ rather sharply, the personal-social conditioning is so important that it is not until after the first year, at least, that culture influences come into play. On the basis of his studies of white, Hopi, and Navaho children, Dennis concludes:

"The onset of distinctive cultural patterns naturally varies from child to child, but I feel, at least so far as Hopi-Navaho American comparisons are concerned, that distinctive patterns of behavior do not emerge until after one year of age. This corroborates the view that the characteristics of infancy are universal and that culture overlays or modifies a more basic substratum of behavior."³³

Cultural learning is perhaps more self-evident. From his primary and secondary groups the individual acquires his language and the skills and techniques of economic survival, learns to manage all sorts of mechanical devices and instruments and machines of manufacture and travel, acquires knowledge and habits regarding the exchange of services and goods, builds habits and attitudes in regard to family life, takes on the morality and legal obligations of his community, gets his standards of art, adopts the religious views and practices of his social world, and so on through the whole gamut of the larger patterns of culture.

Rôle and Status. Every person finds some function or activity within the group or society. This rests upon the identification which others made possible for him by their definition of his situations as well as by his own. Likewise every activity or function, or what we shall call *rôle*, leads to some social *status*, or degree of prestige, for the individual in his relations with his fellows. The rôle and status of a person are fundamental to his development.

The pattern or type of behavior which the person, both as child and as adult, builds up in terms of what others expect or demand of him we refer to as the *rôle*. The rôle is related to one's acceptance of the definition of the situation by others. Each group sets up its definitions of situations and lays out various rôles for the members. This process begins in the family and continues throughout life. Primary groups still have the largest responsibility in setting the rôle of the individual. For example,

³³ Wayne Dennis, "Does culture appreciably affect patterns of infant behavior," *Journal of Social Psychology*, 1940, 12: 316. By permission. This paper is reprinted in T. M. Newcomb and E. I. Hartley, eds., *Readings in Social Psychology* (New York, Henry Holt & Company Inc., 1947), pp. 40-46.

whether a person takes a submissive or dominant attitude, or whether he fully accepts the group definition or not later in life, may well depend upon fundamental training for his participation in the family or in the play group.

The demand or requirement to follow the patterns laid down for us by our fellows is a phase of social interaction which is found everywhere. The fact of *social expectancy* is basic both to playing of rôles and to social control. In all groups, apparently, and in hundreds of common situations, the expectations of others determine largely how we behave. The Chinese word for rude means "other than expected." The meaning of another's acts is linked up with this expected thought and action. Expectancy lies at the root of the sense of solidarity and participation itself. "We-feeling" is but another way of stating that the members think and react as their fellows expect them to. The citizen as a citizen must be patriotic or be cast out as traitor. The class-conscious proletarian has had built up for him ideas and attitudes which he must reflect if he is to remain in the Communist Party. Every group, class, profession, cult, and party with any strong sense of solidarity illustrates the same thing. The images of expectancy of what others will do and of what you will do yourself are important in the whole field of anticipatory behavior.

Closely tied up with rôle is the status of the individual. The terms *rôle* and *status* have often been used almost interchangeably in sociology, but there is a difference. Status is the position, the standing, accorded the individual within the group by his fellows. It does not imply high standing only, but position along the social scale. The rôle, in contrast, is what one does. It is activity, and status is one's resultant place on the prestige scale.

Forms of Rôle and Status. There are two types of rôle and status: ascribed and achieved. Ascribed rôles and statuses are those usually set down in advance by the cultural norms or expectancies without reference to innate differences in ability or strength and without reference to personal choice. Achieved rôles and statuses are acquired by the individual because of choice, talent, special capacity, struggle, or given performance.

Ascribed status usually implies some kind of distinctive mark or feature. Such are age, sex, and race. These rest essentially on physical traits, as culturally defined. Common age statuses are infancy, youth, maturity, and old age. The sex distinctions are obvious. Inter-race status is most commonly marked by color distinctions.

Achieved status is illustrated in our society by free choice of mates, in a man's becoming rich through operations in the competitive market, or attaining high position in a profession because of special knowledge and skill. However, one's culture may and usually does designate the steps or processes by which assumed or achieved status may be secured. In other words, it provides certain permissiveness and sets certain limits. A

man who made his money by vice, corruption, or other illegal and immoral devices would probably not be accorded the status that is given to one who follows the rules of the capitalist market. At least this is the **more or less ideal pattern.**

Into any given rôle and status a wide variety of such psychological components as attitudes, ideas, and traits may enter. Certainly in ascribed rôles the individual's personality will be highly influenced by his assumption of the characteristics which it calls for. Even in societies where one may acquire various rôles in terms of competition or cooperation, and differential skill and knowledge, many features of a given rôle, once attained, will be more or less laid down for the person. A simple illustration is the learning of polite manners by those whose rapidly acquired wealth may have enabled them to climb to a much higher rung on the social ladder than they occupied originally.

From one standpoint personality may be defined in terms of the various rôles and statuses which the individual has vis-à-vis his fellows. As noted in Chapter 1, one writer—Ralph Linton—has coined the expression "status personality" to refer to that particular approach to personality which deals with the individual's various rôles and statuses.³⁴ The importance of living up to the expectancies of others in taking on rôles and statuses will be made abundantly clear in later discussions of various areas of personal adjustment.

³⁴ See Ralph Linton, *Cultural Backgrounds of Personality* (New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1945), pp. 129-131.

CHAPTER 6

The Development of Language in the Individual

The three basic processes—action, communication, and internalized functions—are closely bound together. We separate them only for purposes of description and analysis. In this and the next two chapters we will examine them as they bear upon the linguistic development of the individual, upon the rise of the social self, and upon symbolic behavior. While language is the basic element in the communicative interaction of individuals, as we shall see, not all communication is linguistic. Manual, facial, and other gestures also have a place.

THE EMERGENCE OF COMMUNICATION FROM THE GESTURE

The emergence of communication as an aspect of the interactional process is of immense importance in the rise of more complex and effective adaptation of animal or man to the external situation. This is true both of the species and of the individual, and, since the social act of communication has its origin in the rise of gestures among prehuman forms, we shall sketch briefly the beginnings of this sub-overt behavior among lower animals before describing the rise of language in the individual.

One of the great turning points in animal evolution was the assumption of an erect posture and the concomitant further elaboration of the cerebral cortex. Various effects may be noted: The freeing of the forepaws from the function of locomotion made possible the evolution of the hands, which could be used in more discriminative and skillful manipulation of food, other material objects, and mates or offspring. The new manipulatory capacity, in turn, led to the development of tools and mechanical devices for further control of the environment. The postural relations of individual members to each other were altered because the animal now came upon his fellows in a more distinctly vis-à-vis manner. The visual world was enlarged through the development of the third dimension with the shifting of the eyes to a frontal position. The posture of sexual intercourse was changed, as were the bodily contacts of mother and young in nursing. Of particular importance was the release of the mouth and larynx from too immediate concern with food gathering.

which made possible the further development of vocalization. This latter change, moreover, enhanced the importance in interaction of auditory stimuli, both of one's own voice and of the voices of others. Along with these changes went further growth of the cerebral cortex, so basic to complex skills, vocalization, thought, and inhibition. Here we are particularly concerned with the emergence of new uses for the musculature of the snout, mouth, and throat, which had hitherto been occupied with finding and tearing food and which now became significant in new relations both to the physical world and to the world of one's own or nearly related species. It was now possible for the animal to employ his vocal mechanism for social ends, that is, to extend his participation with members of his own species, which in turn might make his adaptation and theirs more effective. The significance of this new use of the vocal organs lay particularly in the field of gesture.

The Nature of Gesture. Though the dictionary defines *gesture* as an action or motion of the body, head, or limbs, expressive of some idea or emotion or illustrative of some utterance, in our use of the term we shall include the vocal responses as well. A grunt, a sigh, or a shout constitutes a gesture just as much as do movements of the facial muscles or the hands.

We are concerned with the social gesture which is, in its origin, a truncated or incomplete act; that is, it is an incipient overt response which is changed in the course of its expression. A gesture fails to become a full-fledged or complete act simply because another member of the same species, seeing or hearing it, begins to respond to it and thus interferes with or modifies the oncoming act before it is consummated.

Originally, vocal expressions had no communicative significance; but among the higher animals, at least, the possession of similar vocal structure and function provides a foundation upon which communication may develop. Moreover, the animal hears his own vocalization—his grunt, his growl, his cry of rage or fear, or his love call—in much the same way as do other members of his own species hear him. So, too, when a man vocalizes an inner feeling or emotional state, he stimulates not only his fellows but also *himself*. Because gestures are indicative of overt acts to follow, they take on the rudimentary character of representative or substitutive acts. Thus it is within the field of gesture that sub-overt or communicative interaction developed.

In the evolution of the social life of animals the gesture has played an enormously important part. The cry of the frightened animal or bird gives a warning of incipient danger to fellow members of his species. If his fellows perceive the same situation, his cry may easily become a conditioned stimulus for their flight or fighting. In time his hearing his own voice and his own overt reaction become linked to such responses in others. For example, the love calls of the moose or the bird are indicative

of mating acts to follow. And the cry of hunger or pain by the young may bring aid from the mother. It is in this sense that we may speak of communication of the lower animals, for certainly their activities are constantly being modified by the oncoming acts of other animals. The matter is nicely illustrated in the rudimentary stages of a dog fight, where vocal and other expressions of rage may serve to set up reactions of escape or conflict. Smelling, growling, baring of teeth, thrusting the ears forward or back, and movements toward and away from each other precede the actual attack. In the sparring of the two dogs, the preliminary activities are largely gestures, indicative of more complete responses to follow.

Gestures are related to internal changes in the organism as well as to external changes in the situation. As we have seen, these internal changes, in their elementary form, consist largely of physiological tensions which make up the drives and their associated feelings and emotions. For example, at the mating season the male pigeon takes to strutting before the female and to calling her with peculiar vocal gestures. These are significant for the female in determining her responses to the male. But animal gestures are not true language in the human sense of the word. Bird or animal calls do not convey definite concepts, such as the *kind* of food or the *sort* of danger sensed by the animal. The sounds, however, do serve as signs to secure attention of other members of the species and to arouse in them like attitudes or tendencies to action. (See Chapter 8.)

Communication among Prehuman Species. Of particular interest to us as a background to the rise of the self and of human speech are the observations which have been made of the gestures of the apes. These provide us some indication of the possible roots of our own language. The vocal gestures of the apes are "subjective" and can only express emotions, or at best point out situations; they cannot designate objects symbolically. Yet the range of expression by facial and vocal gestures is very great—they can show rage, fear, despair, grief, joy, "pleading desire," **playful attitudes, and pleasure.**

Although the apes do not possess true speech or develop a self-feeling in the human sense, they have considerable sense of the activity of their fellows. Kohler has described how one female ape, Ischego, demonstrated affection and sympathy for other members of the band by helping them out in distress. So, too, apes engage in a good deal of cooperative as well as oppositional behavior. They show amazing discrimination concerning other apes, and some of them develop considerable skill in manipulating situations and the activities of others in order to gain a desired goal for themselves. Kempl has reported how one ape, by motions of the hands, distracted the visual attention of another ape from a wanted food object and in this way was able to procure the food himself when the neighbor was not watching. Such a gesture seems almost human, resembling a part

of a complex, planned social act. Although these illustrations show that apes are highly aware of the actions of their fellows, it is doubtful if they possess the capacity to view themselves as objects of activity—a capacity which is basic to the concept of the self.¹

Above all it is important to note that gestures, vocal and otherwise, are dependent on systems of accessory muscles organized so that partial or segmental activity may accompany or parallel the main overt acts of the organism. This makes possible a remote control of behavior, for every overt external act uses, as a part of the total reaction system, the responses of these accessory muscles—principally manual, facial, and vocal. Through learning, these segmental reactions may come to stand for, represent, or symbolize the complete act.

Since these gestures emerge in the field of social interaction, the control of other members of a species, and the control of oneself by others, are made increasingly possible. As Bawden puts it, "The substitution of the gesture for the completed act, of the spoken word for the gesture, of the written word for the spoken word, and then, within the confines of the now socialized behavior of the individual, of sub-vocal articulation for interlocutory discourse, introduced a technic for handling the remotest parts of the environment."² It is in this way that the gesture becomes a highly important component of the adjustment. Its place in the emergence of the sense of self in the human being is fundamental.

Cycles of Activity and Human Gestures. The gesture constitutes a basic unit of the communicative interaction of two or more persons, but it functions within the framework of the larger social act. Originally an outgrowth of emotional expressions, it comes to have in time a meaning for the other person. But symbolic responses are, at least in their inception, closely related to overt interaction, be it sexual congress, care of young, cooperative food-getting, struggling among individuals for some wanted object, or other behavior necessary in the drive-to-goal cycle.

Many of the fundamental drives of the new-born child, such as hunger and need for bodily protection, can be satisfied only in the social situation. That is, the course from drive to reward cannot go on to completion without the intercession of another person, usually, in our society, the mother or some mother-substitute. Later the drives, cues, responses, and rewards relating to bodily elimination, sleep, and play, and others also, become linked to the social interplay of child and adults, but for our purposes at present it is only necessary to point out the important fact that the survival of the child is absolutely dependent on the social act. Though

¹ See W. Kohler, *The Mentality of Apes*, rev. ed. (New York, Harcourt, Brace & Company, Inc., 1947), and E. J. Kopley, "Did consciousness of self play a part in the behavior of this monkey?" *Journal of Philosophy*, 1916, 13:410-412.

² See H. H. Bawden, "The evolution of behavior," *Psychological Review*, 1919, 26:217-276. Quotation from p. 264. By permission of the American Psychological Association.

Bühler³ has shown that it is not until babies are a few weeks old that they show any definite visual or auditory social recognition of mothers or other persons, we must not forget that from the day of its birth the baby, through nursing, care, and fondling, is beginning to be socially conditioned by tactile, olfactory, gustatory, and proprioceptive sensations to an interactional relationship with another human being. There is a tendency to overlook these rudimentary but basic sensorimotor roots of the social act of mother and child. In the earliest stages of social training, touch, taste, and smell, and our kinesthetic sensations are more fundamental to inter-person adjustment than either hearing or seeing, although the latter become dominant later. We shall discuss the broader significance of this whole matter in Chapter 12.

At the outset, the interaction of mother and child is not clearly distinguishable as to its overt and sub-overt or gestural character. Interaction takes place on an all-or-none level analogous to what occurs in the mass activity of the organism. The facial, bodily, and vocal gestures of the child are all closely bound up with the drive which incites a particular cycle. Specifically, crying and, later, whining are related to hunger need or painful stimuli from inside or outside the body. In time, cooing and smiling arise as a part of the total pleasant responsiveness of the baby in relation to others.

It does not take a young infant long to learn to distinguish human sounds from others or to discriminate among the former. Bühler has shown that very young babies do not distinguish between human vocal sounds and those made by mechanical means, but within six weeks or two months the child begins to react to the human voice and human facial gestures differently than to all other noises or visual objects. The response to the human smile is, in fact, one of the first evidences of social interaction at a level above those involving taste, smell, and muscular senses already noted. Bühler has summarized the development in these words: *

"The baby of three or four months reacts positively to the angry as well as to the kind voice and look, the five-to-seven months old baby reflects the assumed expression and also begins to cry at the scolding voice and threatening gesture; the eight-to-twelve-months old baby, however, begins to overcome the suggestion of the unfriendly grimace, the scolding voice, and the threatening gesture, and smiles again in spite of them, sometimes after several seconds of hesitation."

As Bühler says in interpreting these observations, up to five months of age the infant is probably not aware of fine distinctions in expression and tone, but reacts in more or less diffuse fashion without much discrimina-

³ See Charlotte Bühler, *The First Year of Life* (New York: The John Day Company, 1930).

⁴ C. Bühler, "The social behavior of children," C. Murchison, ed., *A Handbook of Child Psychology*, 2nd ed., rev. Worcester: Clark University Press, 1935, p. 377. By permission.

tion. The baby from five to eight months old, however, begins to perceive the whole face and is influenced pleasantly or unpleasantly by the expressive differences in voice and gesture. In turn, from the age of eight months to a year, the baby comes to "understand" the seeming scolding as a form of play, that is, to get a more selective identification with the adult. "That is why," says Bühler, "after an initial hesitation, he begins to laugh and to give sounds of pleasure." In other words, as the child grows older, the first responses become differentiated, and, moreover, they become more and more cut off from the original stimulating situation as signals or indicators of incipient interactions with others.

On the whole, the emergence of specialized or segmental acts or gestures as *important in themselves* is slow and gradual. Yet this growing distinction between overt and symbolic activity is most significant. To the child these gestures come to serve as indicators of the oncoming acts of others, and obviously his own reactions become associated with these gestures of others. It is on the basis of this distinction between two levels of activity—overt and symbolic—that both the self and language arise. The interaction involved in these two phases is the groundwork or configuration from which human—that is, social—nature emerges.

STAGES IN THE LANGUAGE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CHILD

For purposes of study, psychologists have classified the emergence of speech as falling into a series of four stages: (1) the *pre-linguistic*, characterized by random, unorganized, nonsocial sounds emitted by the child in the first weeks after birth; (2) the *babbling* or circular-response stage, wherein there are recurrent vocal combinations due to self-stimulation which soon merge into (3) the "*imitation*" stage, in which the recurrent babbling gets linked to the sounds made to the child by others, leading the child to a parrot-like repetition of these sounds, and (4) the stage of *true speech*, in which words as symbols of objects, acts, qualities, and relations are learned from his communication with others.

Certain criticisms may be offered concerning the traditional treatment of these data: (1) There is often a failure to realize that social interaction begins in overt conduct such as nursing and is linked to cycles of drive, cue, response, and reward, and only gradually leads over into the field of symbolic interaction. Moreover, the social configuration of early vocalization is frequently neglected because we do not know how to study its function. This is particularly true of the so-called second or "babbling" stage, the discussion of which tends to ignore the tremendous amount of verbal stimulation which surrounds the child long before true speech or even imitation has arisen. (2) Though discussion of linguistic development as marked by certain stages may be convenient, there is some danger that its gradual and continuous character may be ignored. Evidently there are no sudden or sharp changes but rather a continuous

extension of the use of vocal stimuli and responses. (3) Especially serious is the common failure to study language development against the background of, or in connection with, the emergence of the personality in the configuration of the social act. The usual description and analysis of the learning of words and sentences, of their number and length, and of the rise of the use of various parts of speech as classified by grammarians frequently neglects the relation of these symbolic factors to the expansion of the child's social contacts and the emergence of his sense of self. The relation of speech to thought and of these, in turn, to the self will take on more significance if we recognize this linkage. (4) Almost all studies of the language development of the individual have been confined to children living under Euro-American culture systems. We know practically nothing, from a cross-cultural point of view, about the linguistic acquisition among children of other societies, either civilized or non-literate. This should make us most cautious about assuming that the stages of language development, such as will be discussed here, are universal. Certainly the data regarding the learning of the parts of speech, of the ratios of nouns to verbs, and the significance of the use of adjectives and pronouns must all be understood as historical and culturally determined facts in our particular social-cultural world or what linguists call our "speech community." As we shall see in Chapter 8, the way people look at and understand their world is largely determined by the speech habits which they learn from their parents, relatives, and neighbors. With these cautions in mind we turn to examine the growth of language in children in our Western society.

The Pre-linguistic Phase. The birth cry, which the philosopher Immanuel Kant said was a cry of rage at being born, is purely an incidental reflex resulting from air being pulled rapidly over the vocal cords and causing their vibration. At the outset, the vocalization of the baby has no more social significance than do the movements of his legs, arms, or bodily organs except that the infant also hears the sound of its own voice for the first time and this, as we shall see, is important in speech development.⁵ Yet within the first few weeks the infant expresses a certain number of vowel and consonant sounds which are basic to true speech.⁶

Both vowels and consonants appear in the early vocalisms of the baby. Observers in our society report that in the first month after birth there appear such fundamental vowels as long *e* as in *see*, short *a* as in *pat*, broad *a* as in *father*, and short *i* as in *hit*. The first consonants are said to be *m*, *p*, *h*, and *b*. Later, *n*, *g*, *ng*, *r*, and *y* appear. These serve to per-

⁵ As noted in Chap. 2, there is evidence, however, that crying may take place in the latter stages of prenatal life.

⁶ Of course, the necessary neuromuscular apparatus and the proper growth of mouth and vocal organs and bony structure must be assumed.

mit vowel sounds to combine with consonants into syllables. Also gutturals and glottal stops appear early.

While there is some dispute as to the precise phonetic nature of these first sounds, the research of Curry and Irwin is regarded as among the most careful. They made phonetic records of forty babies during the first ten days after birth. They report that of more than 1,000 vowel sounds, 92 per cent were "front vowels," 7 per cent "middle vowels" and 1 per cent "back vowels." Of the consonants, the glottal sound *h* was the most frequently used. Occasionally *w* and *k* occurred. But the labials *b*, *p*, and *m* were not heard.⁷

Many of the earliest sounds which continue into the babbling stage seldom appear in the English speech, nor, in fact, in other Indo-European languages. This is the case with the clicks and gutturals. The human speech organs are structurally capable of a far wider variety of vocal sounds than any particular culture requires.

Although some writers characterize the first stage as reflexive crying, having neither emotional nor intellectual significance, it is apparent that very shortly vocalizations are not entirely random but become linked to various activities, especially to feeding and affective bodily states.

Lewis, who, it is true, made a very detailed study of only one child holds that there is a very definite relation between vocalization and states of comfort and discomfort. The back consonants, which appear early, are said to occur in states of satiety and comfort, especially in connection with swallowing and belching, associated with feeding. In contrast, he found *m*, *p*, *b*, and other front consonants to be common in states of discomfort arising from hunger.⁸

Just how much patterning of the early vocal sounds is related to painful or comfortable situations is hard to determine. There is much common-sense observation to the effect that cries of discomfort are, at the outset, more common than those of comfort. Those of intense pain, moreover, tend to be higher in pitch than those of the whimper or relaxed state of comfort.

At the outset, then, we must consider vocalization as a part of the total reactive or expressive system. Painful or pleasant stimuli alike, which set up reactions of primary excitement, may give rise to vocal activity since respiratory changes are closely associated with the fundamental adaptive reactions. Yet practice in feeding situations must come into play in building up early vocal training, since it involves the lips, mouth, and other oral functions also important in vocalization.

Although vocal responses do become associated with needs, vocaliza-

⁷ For a summary of this research, see O. C. Irwin, "Research on speech sounds for the first six months of life," *Psychological Bulletin*, 1941, 38:283.

⁸ M. M. Lewis, *Infant Speech: A Study of the Beginnings of Language* (New York, Harcourt, Brace & Company, Inc., 1936), pp. 29-35.

tion remains, in part, a form of random movement which goes on without obvious connection to specific needs of the moment. In fact, this characteristic of random vocal movement later becomes most important in reference to the babbling phase. Moreover, this gives an organic foundation for that later differentiation of vocal behavior from other behavior which has great importance in the development not only of language but of thought and of personality itself.

Early vocalization is clearly related to the basic drives and their satisfaction. We have already pointed out that some of the rewards, particularly of hunger and the need for bodily protection, cannot be obtained without the intervention of another person: mother, nurse, or other experienced individual. We noted also that such activities serve as the basic pattern for the social act. Later other drive-reward activities such as bodily elimination, sleep, and many acquired cycles, are linked to interaction with others. Though the cry of pain or hunger has no more social significance or meaning to the child than any other act, in time it becomes a signal or cue to another, usually the mother or nurse, to indicate pain or hunger or other condition of the baby. This association at first, however, depends upon the interpretation of others, largely in terms of their cultural training. For example, if the mother or nurse believes the cry to mean something to the baby, as it means something to her, she comes to wait on him, pick him up, turn him over, straighten out his clothes, pat him, or fondle him. Although stimulus of other persons in the first instance may have nothing to do with the crying, the attention of others to his vocalizations easily becomes a conditioned stimulus for the child. Already in the first months the foundations of cues to identification and rôle-taking are laid down in these vocal gestures. Such learned responses become fixed so that the child's cries or screams bring pleasant stimulations from others, such as stroking, feeding, or carrying. It will not be long before he will use vocal means to secure whatever he wants.

In this configuration of social stimuli, of course, not only words but tone of voice, facial gestures, and overt actions make up the world of others. It is interesting that, though it has been shown that in the first weeks the child cannot distinguish between human sounds and those made by mechanical means, very shortly such discrimination does arise and the child comes to attend to and respond differently to the actions and vocalizations of persons and things around him. Not only the actions but also the speech of others begins early to influence the infant as he learns to manage his own vocalizations, and in time acquires true speech. The first step toward this goal is taken at about two or three months, at which time the screaming stage passes over into babbling.

The Babbling or Circular-response Phase. The next stage in language practice is that of cooing, babbling, and "crowing." The age at which this begins varies with different children. Sometimes it appears as early as the

end of the second month, sometimes not until well into the fourth month.⁹

At the outset, the babble is shrill, loud, and somewhat unpleasant, later giving way to more pleasant sounds which approach true speech. The cooing and crowing and the attempted exercise of a wide gamut of sounds appear to be a pleasant occupation to the child. The vocalization itself is characterized chiefly by a continuous repetition of various vowel and consonant combinations. Blanton and Blanton state:

"In the girl baby studied, the first spoken sound occurred on the one hundred and fiftieth day—a soft volumeless, uninflected *a* (as in *father*) which she said after feeding.

"By the one hundred and sixty-fifth day, she had developed a wave-like movement of the tongue which resulted in a sort of grouping of undifferentiated vowel sounds—a sort of 'variations' of the theme *a* (as in *father*). In addition, she had the shrill pleasure-scream mentioned previously.

"By the two hundred and forty-ninth day (approximately eight months), the babble had reached its peak. It did not at this time, or ever, contain all the sounds of English speech, but it did contain sounds not occurring in English—Spanish, French, Anglo-Saxon, German, and African were represented and doubtless many others not recognized by the observer. The commonest vowel sounds were *a* (as in *about*) and the vowel diphthong represented by *y* in *my*. The commonest consonant sounds were *m*, *ng* (*sing*), and the French nasal (*Montaigne*), the sounds *b*, *d*, and *g*, and the Spanish *y*, plus the sound represented by *y* in the English word *you*, which was very common. The glottal stop was common; *h* was fairly so, and a bird trill sort of an *r*. Ordinary *r* (as in *red*) and *l*, also *f*, *k*, and *t*, were very rare; and the sounds of *th* in *thin* and *than*, the sounds of *s* in *sit* and *is*, the sounds of *sh* in *shoe* and *pleasure*, and the sounds of *tsh* in *chair* and *jam* did not occur at all. . . ."¹⁰

The babbling stage is an important feature of human learning because it provides practice essential to the control of speech mechanisms through the medium of hearing. It is in this period that circular responses are established between the sounds uttered and the responses made. That is, the sound itself becomes the stimulus for a like vocal reaction. Kinesthetic sensations return from the speech organs to continue to stimulate the neuromuscular patterns already operating, but there is added to this the all-important auditory stimulus which comes from the child's hearing his own voice.

Not only does the child hear himself vocalizing, but he also hears *another* person making sounds. His own sounds and those of others get linked together. At first these are probably merely aspects of the larger association of internal bodily changes and needs and the total world of visual, tactile, and other sensory-perceptual experiences. Early vocaliza-

⁹ See Dorothea McCarthy, "Language Development in Children," Leonard Carmichael, ed. *Manual of Child Psychology* (New York, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1916), Chap. 10, for a full review of the literature on linguistic learning. Her Table 1, pp. 482-485 summarizes a large amount of data on this topic.

¹⁰ Stanley Blanton and Margaret Blanton, *Child Guidance* (New York, The Century Company, 1927), pp. 95-96. By permission.

tion is reflexive, but its very practice tends to fix it in the stimulus-response system. As is well-known, any random movement may get linked to a specific response pattern. Applied to speech learning, the principle is particularly important. Holt remarks:

"It is well known that infants which are born deaf do not learn to speak even though their vocal organs be absolutely normal. . . . This is because a prerequisite to the acquisition of speech is the establishment of reflex paths from the ears to the vocal organs, such that a sound received at the ears causes the vocal organs reflexly to reproduce that sound as closely as their anatomical structure permits. These indispensable reflexes are established inevitably if the infant's audition is normal. For, as is well known, its random murmuring, cooing, babbling, and other more strenuous vocalizations are, during certain of its early months, well-nigh incessant. It exercises *at random* its entire articulable gamut. Now each sound as it is produced stimulates the child's own auditory apparatus, if this is intact, and each such auditory excitation finds motor outlet in precisely that set of the vocal organs which has just made that very sound and which will now make it again (a reflex circle). Hence the infant's persistent reiteration of any sound which it has made. . . . So, little by little, if the child has normal hearing it becomes able to repeat also those same articulate sounds which *other persons* utter to it; and is well on the way to speaking. . . . The reflex circle in fact gives rise to a general law of iteration: A child will repeat any of its own random acts provided that this action (simultaneously) stimulates, howsoever indirectly, any of its own sense-organs (and also, of course, that no other reflex steps in to interrupt)."¹¹

In other words, once the circular response is set up, it will continue until interfered with by some other internally or externally aroused stimulus-response pattern. It is a form of self-imitation arising from double stimulation—one stimulus or cue coming from the proprioceptive sensations from the lips, mouth, and larynx, and the other from the hearing apparatus. This type of learning is particularly important because the repetition of vocal sounds may be set in motion by sounds made by others as well as by the child himself. (See below.)

Certainly after the second or third month the vocalization of the infant acquires more and more social importance. As Shirley remarks, "Sometime between 2 and 6 months speech became a social reaction. The babies definitely babbled to the examiners at a median age of 25 weeks. Reports from the mothers gave a much earlier age for this reaction."¹² And Bean writes, "The desire for social approval is the strongest inducement for a baby to repeat a sound until it becomes a part of his permanent repertoire. Children try to attract attention even before the middle of the first year."¹³ In short, the social act begins to be increasingly a factor in the self-

¹¹ E. B. Holt *Animal Drive and the Learning Process* (New York, Henry Holt & Company, Inc., 1931), pp. 39-40. By permission.

¹² M. M. Shirley, *The First Two Years: A Study of Twenty-five Babies. II, Intellectual Development* (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1933), p. 51. By permission.

¹³ C. H. Bean, "An unused opportunity to investigate the psychology of language," *Pedagogical Seminary and Journal of Genetic Psychology*, 1932, 40-147. By permission.

stimulation which follows from the child's own babbling. Moreover, the rôle-taking process, in turn, arises from this social training. (See Chapter 7.)

The Imitation Phase of Speech. From the circular responses of the babbling stage it is but a step to the next, in which the self-starting, self-continuing vocal reactions of the child become associated with similar sounds uttered by another person. To quote the Blantons again:

"By the two hundred and eighty-fourth day (a little over nine months), the babble had changed in character. It was softer, less distinct, and more like speech. She [the subject] had developed a form of mimicry that often passes for speech. It is called echolalia. To illustrate, if 'bye-bye' was said to her, she responded with something similar. But this was true whether suitable things were being said or not, or whether remarks were addressed to her or not."¹⁴

This period usually begins toward the end of the first year. When a mother or other person vocalizes to the child, the effect on the child will be largely the same as if he himself uttered the sound. "Ma-ma," "pa-pa," "bye-bye," and the like are examples. The stimulations of others and of the child himself overlap. Moreover, studies in conditioning have shown that the young child's discrimination of sounds is not so efficient as that of the lower animals. When a mother says "doll" to the child, this may be closely enough associated with his own response of "da" so that he associates the two as one sound. So, too, such expressions from others as "papa," "mama," and "bye-bye" fit easily into speech combinations which he has already practiced over and over again. This social stimulation seems to reinforce his learning. This facilitates more precise rendition of speech sounds and lays the foundation for acquiring true words. Certain associations fixed at the outset by random vocalization in the babbling phase become the basis for more specific associations later. This "whittling down" from mass-activity responses to segmental, differential, and specific reactions is common here as in other learning.

In summary, two effects should be noted: (1) The child's own sounds, originally more or less of random kind, are linked to those of others, that is, to a *social* stimulus. (2) There is additional practice because of the emphasis upon those sound combinations which other persons associated with the infant most often use. Hence the sounds favorable to the speech of one's own society are selected and repeated, and other combinations—the gutturals, the clicks, and many nasals—are lost from lack of use. It must be noted, however, that not only words, but also tones, pitch, timbre, and intensity come into play. In short, the imitation stage, following as it does upon the babbling period, is important in reinforcing certain vocal patterns and in making particularly dominant the circular-response mechanism.

¹⁴ Blanton and Blanton, *op. cit.*, p. 96. By permission.

In all this we must not neglect the important factor of neuromuscular maturation. Social influences alone will not account for the changes, which must wait until the further physical development of the infant. Child training in vocalization and speech, as in other motor habits, is partially dependent upon growth, and in relation to both maturation and practice individual differences will appear.




FIG. 5. Schematic manner of showing how the child learns to say "ba" for "ball." Various sensory-motor association areas are indicated: K = kinesthetic center; T = tactile center; $A_{1,2}$ = auditory center; Vo = vocal motor center; V = visual center. The linkages between areas are indicated by connecting loops. (Other probable centers are omitted.) The process proceeds in somewhat this fashion. The mother presents the ball, which produces the visual perception, V, and at the same time says "ball," which induces an auditory perception, A_1 . The child repeats the sound as nearly as he can with "ba," directed from his vocal motor area, Vo. And through the stimulation of his own voice he gets a further auditory association, A_2 , which highly resembles A_1 . Also, the mother may put the ball into the child's hands, thus permitting activity in the tactile, T, and kinesthetic, K, centers. These various sensory-motor experiences get linked together through conditioning to form an integrated pattern of perception-association-response (meaning).

The Rise of True Speech: Comprehension and Talking. True speech arises, with children of normal constitution, sometime during the second year, at the latest during the second half of this year. As a rule girls begin to speak sooner than boys, the former between nine and eighteen months of age, the latter between twelve and twenty-four months. Social influences become increasingly important. Older persons who surround the child

help him to fix the verbal meaning to certain objects or situations. The reflex-circle mechanism continues to function, no doubt with even more **differentiation of patterns.**

To take a typical case, the child may first of all stimulate himself to a series of repetitions of the sound "ba." Later he may be stimulated to such a babbling by hearing his mother say "ba" or utter some sound like it. In the course of this learning the mother may bring a ball to the child and say "ball," which to the child is probably much the same sound as his "ba." The mother but introduces a visual cue—the material object itself—which becomes an additional conditioned stimulus to the pattern already formed of self-operating repetition of "ba, ba." By smiles, patting, and other gestures of approval the mother may say, "Oh, baby wants the ball," and present it to the child. Or she may say, "Would baby like the ball?" Hearing this, the child repeats "ba, ba" even while the delighted mother secures the object. When the child gets the ball, a whole series of other responses—tactile, visual, and kinesthetic—are associated with the sound. It is somewhat in this manner that the verbal meaning of "ball" is developed. The vocal response is part of a social act which in time comes to stand for, represent, or symbolize the ball and its relation to the whole configuration of circumstances under which it is learned. Later, of course, it may become separated into a *class* term or concept. Figure 5 illustrates the manner in which the child's associations are built up.

On the basis of this association of the ball with the mother's verbal response, it is but a step for the child to use the expression "ba" whenever he sees the ball even though the mother is not present. (See Figure 6.) Moreover, if he calls out "ba, ba," as he may and often does, the mother may secure a ball for him. He is thus learning not only the name of the object but also how to control it for himself through the medium of someone else's action.

As the neurological system develops, especially the association and memory areas of the brain, the effects of past perceptions remain as residues which serve to set up memory images. Later such a mental image or internal process may serve to set off the vocalization "ba," leading to a rearsenal of the previous vocalization. (See Figure 7.) Again, some person other than the mother may get the




FIG. 6. Schematic manner of showing how the child later comes to say "ba" when he sees the ball because of previous linkage of visual, V, and vocal motor, V₀, centers. The stimulation of his own auditory area, A₂, since it is also connected with the vocal motor center, would tend to keep up the vocalization of the expression, just as previously the self-stimulation had induced babbling.

ball for the baby. Or in another case the chance repetition of "ba, ba" may set up the memory of the ball and lead to further repetition of the vocal utterance "ba" until the ball is secured. The factors of social interaction in this learning situation can scarcely be overemphasized. All too frequently this self-stimulating aspect of linguistic learning is neglected.

Obviously, during the "imitation" phase and during early periods of true speech the child may not be able to pronounce words in adult fashion. Nevertheless, his approximations to adult standards suffice for his purpose.




FIG. 7. Schematic manner of showing how a memory trace or visual image, Vi, of the ball may, through its linkages, set up the vocal response "ba." This would be followed by further stimulation of the child's auditory center from hearing his own voice, and this, in turn, might serve to set up finger-hand movements from the tactile center, T, in anticipation of handling the ball, even if it were not actually available. We say that the child is calling for the ball when it is not present to sense. Of course, the chance vocal expression "ba" may itself induce the memory image of the ball, and this in its turn would set up the chain of associations.

Errors in pronunciation lead to what is called "baby talk." But baby talk would not persist so long as it sometimes does if older persons in the child's environment did not pick up these expressions and use them again and again in talking to the child. It might even be said that children learn baby talk from their parents, brothers, sisters, and others in the household. If parents insisted on correct enunciation and pronunciation, if they avoided many words too difficult for the infant's age, there would be less baby talk. Moreover, such talk is often tied up with various emotional and feeling situations of fondling, smiling, and otherwise paying great attention to the child. This additional stimulation helps fix these verbal habits.

In this period children often invent their own words for objects. These may be onomatopoeic or imitative of sounds, as "ting-ting" for a bell, or "bow-wow" for a dog. Or they may actually be original words, as with the child who called bricks "mums," another who referred to the pebbles in his hands as "pocos," or still another who called a buggy whipstock a "conger." Though the child may invent his own name for an object, it will not become significant as a symbol until others accept and use it in social intercourse. Only in this way does meaning arise. Moreover, children

often develop a sort of secret language among themselves in which the participants are only a few playmates. Jespersen reports that his son and two of his cousins had a word *kukukounen* "which they repeated constantly and thought great fun, but whose inner meanings I never succeeded in discovering."¹⁵ Other words may have an interjectional origin, although these apparently are linked to emotional and feeling states rather than to external objects. It is apparent, then, that early speech is not only associated with the naming of objects and situations, but also is tied to emotional expressions, to play life and fantasy, and to interjections.

VOCABULARY, GRAMMAR, AND OTHER EVIDENCES OF LANGUAGE DEVELOPMENT

As already noted at the outset, the use of words as symbols is closely tied to the totality of a situation. Only gradually does the child come to attach special, segmental, and truly differentiated functions to words. At first words stand for a combination of activities and objects. Thus "bath" stands for the tub, the water, the soap, the splashing, and a whole series of acts. "Mama" likewise is the mother and all she does for one. "Papa" is another adult of different dimensions and different actions toward one. It is only gradually that the particular denotations and connotations arise. A few words, in fact, stand for a wide range of situations, objects, and actions. The poet Carl Sandburg has put this fact entertainingly into the following stanzas:¹⁶

Seventeen Months,

This girl child speaks five words.

No for no and no for yes, "no" for either no or yes.

"Teewee" for wheat or oats or corn or barley or any food taken with a spoon.

"Go way" as an edict to keep your distance and let her determinations operate.

"Spoon" for spoon or cup or anything to be handled, all instruments, tools, paraphernalia of utility and convenience are spoons.

Mama is her only epithet and synonym for God and the Government and the one force of majesty and intelligence obeying the call of pity, hunger, pain, cold, dark—MAMA, MAMA, MAMA.

Growth of Vocabulary. The socialization of the child may be measured by noting his learning of words and their uses in the various parts of speech. It would carry us beyond our purposes to review the extensive literature on the growth of vocabulary in children.¹⁷ But some general facts must be indicated and some critical comments offered.

¹⁵ Otto Jespersen, *Language, Its Nature, Development, and Origins* (New York, Harcourt Brace & Company, Inc., 1922), p. 14.

¹⁶ From *Good Morning America* (New York, Harcourt, Brace & Company, Inc., 1928), p. 198. By permission.

¹⁷ For a full review of the important studies in children's vocabularies, see McCarthy, "Language development in children," *op. cit.*

Although reports on the vocabularies of children in our society have been accumulating for several decades, especially since the rise of child psychology in the 1890's, the particular observations for the most part have been confined almost entirely to one, two, or at best a few children recruited largely from highly educated families. Only in recent decades have some few studies appeared treating the data in statistical fashion with an adequate sample of children from all classes. Most of the investigations so far reported suggest qualifying questions of one sort or another:

1. What are the criteria of a vocabulary? That is, when is a word a word? This is especially difficult to determine in the analysis of the first verbal utterances. Because a child makes a certain sound combination that resembles an adult word, does it follow that the child knows what it means? Moreover, is it use of a word or comprehension of its use by oneself or another that is to be used as the standard?

2. What scientific controls are used by the observers? Most of the early investigations of children's speech development gave little or no information regarding the social setting in which the study was made, nor was there any attempt to consider the size and nature of the sample, or the sex, age, and, especially, the cultural backgrounds.

3. Are the reported investigations of vocabularies statistically reliable? That is, we need studies of sufficient numbers of children at differing ages and of differing social status to enable us to draw some conclusions about the growth of language in a given community or society. Certainly one hardly dare generalize on the basis of the early studies of only a few highly selected children from professional families.

4. Finally, there are practically no data on linguistic development of children outside our Euro-American societies. We greatly need such investigations as a basis for more adequate comparisons and generalizations.

The child learns to respond to words and sentences spoken by others before he learns to use words himself. What is often called "passive" language or comprehension appears before "active" speech. The former is characterized by *understanding* the words of others as witnessed by overt responses of following commands and directions. At the outset this passive response is perhaps not very different from the situation in which higher animals—for example, dogs, horses, and apes—respond to a vocal sign when certainly there is no evidence that they comprehend the stimulus in any proper human sense.

It is clear, as Sandburg aptly expresses the matter, that for the young child words do not stand alone. The first words are really word-sentences, called *rhemes*. As the German child psychologist, Stern, put it, "The child's first utterances are not words in the sense of the word, but *whole sentences*."¹⁸

In the first few months of true speech, then, the expressions are largely

¹⁸ William Stern, *Psychology of Early Childhood: Up to the Sixth Year of Age*, trans. by A. Barwell (New York, Henry Holt & Company, Inc., 1924), p. 148.

individual words designating total situations or actions, or both. Though often the first words are nouns, we must not for a moment imagine that there is no idea of movement or action involved. Words are born of social interaction in relation to objects, and at the outset apparently all words are a combination of name and action words. In fact, in one sense, the verb precedes the substantive in the evolution of the child's grasp of language, for the meaning of objects is bound up with their activity or movement.¹⁹

The published writings on the age when children use their first words differ rather sharply. One writer states that the true use of a word was observed as early as eleven months; another reports this as late as the fourteenth month. Still others say that their subjects used two or more words at one year of age.²⁰

Esper made an interesting tabulation of the first four words recorded for fourteen children by the Sterns. Esper reports that of the first "definite sound-sequences" 93 per cent were related to food, toys, and other objects; 78.5 per cent were also related to reaching, orientation, and other actions, and 50 per cent were distinctly related to father, mother, and other persons.²¹

Everyone familiar with young children senses a certain acceleration in the rate of learning words. Smith's summary of various vocabularies of pre-school children, 278 in number, showed that for 52 cases at one year of age the average vocabulary was three words; at eighteen months, for 14 cases, it was 22 words; at two years, for 25 children it was 272 words; at thirty months, for 14 cases, 446 words; at three years, for 20 youngsters, 896 words; at four years, for 26 cases, 1,540; at five years, for 20 children, 2,072; and at six years, for 9 cases, it was 2,562 words. It should be noted again that precise determination of what is a word, its meaning to the child, and the factors of intelligence and socioeconomic status must be borne in mind. On the average these children were slightly above the norm as measured by intelligence tests and were probably from the upper half of the socioeconomic ladder.²²

What a child from a highly educated background may do is shown in the Brandenburgs' observation of their own child between forty and fifty-two months of age. At forty months the sentences averaged 6.6 words in

¹⁹ On the function of the predicate in language and in thought, see L. S. Vygotsky, "Thought and speech," *Psychiatry*, 1939, 2:29-52.

²⁰ McCarthy, *op. cit.*, pp. 482-485, has an excellent summary of practically all the recent and more careful studies on the ages at which various items in language development appear. On the appearance of true words at eleven months, see W. Boyd, "The development of the child's vocabulary," *Pedagogical Seminary*, 1914, 21:95-124.

²¹ E. A. Esper, "Language," C. Murchison, ed., *A Handbook of Social Psychology* (Worcester, Clark University Press, 1935), p. 442.

²² M. E. Smith, "An investigation of the development of the sentence and the extent of vocabulary in young children," *University of Iowa Studies in Child Welfare*, 1926, No. 5, 3. The cases tabulated by Smith were not the same children. The author simply accumulated the available data from studies of individual children at these various ages.

length. The total vocabulary was 2,500 words, and in a sample day the child used 859 words or 34 per cent of the total vocabulary. In contrast, at fifty-two months the sentences averaged 7.5 words; the total vocabulary was 4,200 words, of which 1,000, or 24 per cent of the total vocabulary, were used on a sample day.²³

There is much variability in the rate of learning words. Shirley remarks on the basis of her investigation:

"Individual differences in the size of vocabularies used at the examinations were great. On the average each baby had spoken 36.9 different words in the examiners' presence by the age of two years; the range, however, was from 6 to 126 words. Only 274 different words were used by the entire group."²⁴

The reports on the age when full and true sentences first appear vary from the fifteenth to twenty-first months. But again much of this difference probably rests on just how the investigators defined *sentence*. In any case the first actual sentences are simple, with little or no use of modifiers. Only later do adjectives, adverbs, connectives, and pronouns come into use.

The analysis of children's vocabularies in terms of the formal classification of parts of speech may be quite misleading. For instance the important changes in linguistic and social adaptation which accompany the use of pronouns, such as the "I," "you," and "me" categories and the plurals thereof, may be obscured if all pronouns are grouped into a single class. As Goodenough, in discussing this topic, says, "Developmental processes are qualitative as well as quantitative, and in devising systems for classifying behavioral manifestations it is necessary to keep these qualitative changes in mind if the systems are to be useful."²⁵ Yet, we must not forget that the use of the various parts of speech—number, gender, tense, mood, and so on—is definitely linked to the child's growing discrimination of objects, situations, and relationships. The proper use of these goes hand in hand with the development of thought. (See Chapter 8.)

Bearing these cautions in mind a few findings may be cited. All studies of the early use of words report a preponderance of nouns. Boyd, for example, states that the first fortnight of the seventeenth month one child used 109 nouns, 30 verbs, 1 pronoun, 8 adjectives, and 8 adverbs. Née reports for her child 76.6 per cent nouns and 7.6 per cent verbs at eighteen months. At four years nouns constituted 55.3 per cent and verbs 21.5 per cent.²⁶ But we must recall that the first words, including nouns, are really

²³ G. C. Brandenburg and J. Brandenburg, "Language development during the first year: the conversation," *Pedagogical Seminary*, 1919, 26-27-40.

²⁴ Shirley, *op. cit.*, p. 66. By permission.

²⁵ Florence L. Goodenough, "The use of pronouns by young children: a note on the development of self-awareness," *Pedagogical Seminary and Journal of Genetic Psychology*, 1938, 52-333-346. By permission.

²⁶ Boyd, *op. cit.* and M. M. Née, "The speech development of a child from eighteen months to six years," *Pedagogical Seminary*, 1917, 24-264-243. Though done years ago, these studies still constitute sound contributions.

rhemes often indicating both activity and substantive elements. Yet, as the child grows up, the specific functions do become separated. For example, the Brandenburs recorded for their child on a day's words at 53 months as the following: 42 per cent of the words used were nouns, 31 per cent verbs, 12 per cent adjectives, and 7.6 per cent adverbs. Pronouns, prepositions, interjections, and conjunctions ranged from 3.3 per cent for pronouns to 1.0 per cent for conjunctions.²⁷

Apparently by the fourth year normal children have acquired some use of all the major parts of speech. Nice, for example, recorded the parts of speech of the total words used in conversations of one 30-month-old child, seven children of ages 3 to 10 years, and of six adults. Her analysis showed a marked contrast between the very early sentence stage and the later stages, with nouns decreasing greatly while verbs, pronouns, prepositions, and conjunctions increased markedly. For all conversations which she analyzed, except one, she reported that verbs lead in numbers and that adult conversation differs little from that of older children except for the increase in prepositions and conjunctions and a slight decrease in pronouns.²⁸

One of the most effective ways to study growth in vocabulary and meaning is to analyze the sentences used by children as to completeness, comprehensibility, mean length of response, and complexity. An example of such an approach, as related to differences in intelligence and socioeconomic factors, will be noted below.

The Relation of Language Growth to Other Factors. The development of vocabulary and capacity in language is evidently related to a number of other factors: sex, intelligence, motor ability, socioeconomic status and cultural level, the place of companions and associates, and the exposure to bilingual situation.

Practically all studies of language development to date show that there is a slight difference in favor of girls when the sexes are adequately matched as to intelligence, socioeconomic background, and as to type of interest called for in the tests. Feeble-minded boys begin to talk later than feeble-minded girls. This is true with normal-minded and superior children. Also, sex differences in favor of girls are revealed in various studies of comprehensibility and of functional analyses of speech in the early months of talking. From a comparison of the vocabularies of 51 children at eighteen months Blachly reports that, on the average, the boys used only 59 words while the girls used 78.6 words.²⁹ Other evidences of sex differences are at hand from the fact that boys show a higher incidence of reading disabilities and also of speech disorders than do girls.

²⁷ Brandenburg and Brandenburg, *op. cit.*

²⁸ M. M. Nice, "An analysis of the conversation of children and adults," *Child Development*, 1932, 3: 240-246.

²⁹ M. E. O. Blachly, "A comparison of the size of vocabularies of fifty children of the same age," *Proceedings of the Oklahoma Academy of Science*, 1923, 3: 151-155.

One interesting variation in the general pattern is revealed in a number of studies which show that the sex differences are more marked in children of the lower socioeconomic strata than among those of the higher levels. This suggests that there may be a differential in the exposure to opportunities for cultural learning between boys and girls among the lower classes. We need careful research on this question, however, before we will know the full answer.³⁰

The relation of language performance to intelligence is complicated by the fact that many intelligence tests themselves are largely verbal in character. However, it is generally accepted, on the basis of various studies, that children who talk unusually early are probably mentally superior to others and that feeble-minded children are nearly always late in learning to talk. Yet not all children who are retarded in talking are dull-witted. The whole matter of verbal opportunity in terms of occupational and social status must be taken into account.

In the early months of vocalization there seems to be a negative correlation between motor skills and talking. Shirley has shown that, when the child is rapidly building up his motor controls, there is a certain retardation of his vocalization. And on the average, after the child has learned to walk, the median utterances show a rapid rise and far surpass those of the prewalking period.

As we noted above, most of the early reports on children's vocabularies were made of children from families of superior social and occupational standing. A number of investigations which sampled children of various socioeconomic classes have shown that the children of the upper classes surpass those of the underprivileged in linguistic development. W. Stern, reworking certain data reported by Descoudres, a Belgian psychologist who studied 300 children of the upper and lower classes, contends that, on the average, the linguistic ability of a child of the upper classes is approximately eight months in advance of that of a similar child of the lower classes.³¹

McCarthy's study of 140 Minneapolis children between the ages of 18 and 54 months, equated as to intelligence and occupational status of the parents, clearly reveals the place of socioeconomic status and of cultural background in linguistic development. She used such criteria as mean length of spontaneous responses (set up by presentation of toys to play with or pictures to look at), functional analysis of "adapted information," questions and answers, and self-reference (egocentricity) in speech, sentence structure; and use of words in terms of parts of speech. She found among other things that (1) the mean length of statements by the children varied according to the occupational level of the family, the children of the

³⁰ McCarthy, *op. cit.*, pp. 551-555 has a good review of the whole topic of sex differences with ample references to the original literature.

³¹ See Stern, *op. cit.*, p. 176.

upper classes doing better than those of the lower; (2) in such matters as asking questions, making comments on toys or pictures, and naming objects, the children of the more privileged classes were superior; (3) the use of complex sentence forms was positively correlated with upper social status; and (4) in reference to parental occupation it was not apparent, as Drever has contended, that children of the upper classes used more nouns and fewer verbs than did children of less varied experience. As to differences in richness of response or sentence construction, when mental age was held constant, the differences between children in terms of parental backgrounds were considerably reduced.³²

It is evident that the type of culture to which the child is exposed will make a difference in his vocabulary. Children in the upper strata of society come into daily contact with verbal concepts much richer in range and content than do children of lower social status. There are also cultural differences between rural and urban children. A city child, without special opportunities, cannot be expected to learn about objects and situations familiar to a child on the farm. On the other hand, the rural child is at a loss to name and thus to identify objects and situations perfectly familiar to an urban youngster.

The child's companions or associates will also influence his vocabulary. Although some reports do not support the belief, it is a common assumption of experts that children who associate only with adults are linguistically more precocious than children who have the ordinary contacts with other children. Also, some investigators report that younger children acquire a larger vocabulary when they associate with older children. But other studies do not bear this out. McCarthy found, among the 140 children of varying economic status whom she studied, that "Children who associate chiefly with adults show a much greater mean length of response than do those who associate with children."³³ And in another report she states that

"The median percentile rank on length of response of the children who associated chiefly with adults was 70. For those who associated with older children it was 42.5 and for those who associated with younger children, 52.5, indicating a tendency for association with adults to be conducive to precocious linguistic development."³⁴

One report on this problem is that of Day, who compared twins with singletons (single children) in language development. She used a technique similar to that of McCarthy. She found that twins were retarded in

³² Dorothea McCarthy, *The Language Development of the Preschool Child* (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1930). See also J. Drever, "A study of children's vocabularies: I, II," *Journal of Experimental Pedagogy and Training College Record*, 1915, 1916, 3:34-43, 96-103, 182-188.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 69.

³⁴ Dorothea McCarthy, "Language development," in C. Murchison, ed., *A Handbook of Child Psychology* (Worcester, Clark University Press, 1933), p. 362. By permission.

all four measures of linguistic growth—length of responses, functional analysis, construction, and parts of speech. This retardation was most marked between the ages of two and five. The mean length of response of the twins at five years of age was slightly below that of the average singleton of three years. She found that twins tend to retain their infantile speech habits and that they make slower progress than do singletons in the development of adult sentence constructions. She believes the differences are largely, if not entirely, due to social influences, especially those arising from too close association of the twins with each other and from the consequent lack of opportunities for contact with individuals linguistically and otherwise more mature.³⁵

An even more exhaustive investigation has been made by Davis, who, using McCarthy's method and form of sampling, studied the linguistic development of 436 school children, aged 5.5 to 9.5 years. There were three groups: twins, singletons with siblings, and only children. Her result showed, among other things, that only children are distinctly superior in language development to children with siblings; singletons with siblings, in turn, are somewhat superior to twins. Yet for the children of the upper occupational classes, the twins "practically overcame their language handicap" by the time they reached their tenth year. This was not true of the twins of the lower economic strata. Twins are particularly retarded in articulation—perhaps because they manage to get along with each other and with those about them at a relatively lower level of articulatory adjustment than other children. They mumble along, as it were, because such practice suffices for the time, and Davis believes, as do others, that this handicap, if not overcome, may prove serious later in preventing an adequate command of language.³⁶

The subject of the possible retarding effects of bilingualism on language development has long been argued. The findings of various studies are quite contradictory, though there seems to be fairly good evidence that bilingualism does handicap the children of immigrant homes on several of the intelligence tests in common use.³⁷ However, most studies have failed to take into consideration the socioeconomic status of subjects, or whether they come from a monolingual home but go to a school which uses a different tongue, or if it be a matter of actual bilingualism in the home.

Smith's study of bilingualism in Hawaii was an admirable attempt to discover its effects on linguistic development. She had a sample of 1,000 children of different racial backgrounds and varying degrees of exposure

³⁵ E. J. Day, "The development of language in twins: I, a comparison of twins and single children," *Child Development*, 1932, 3, 173-179.

³⁶ E. A. Davis, *The Development of Linguistic Skill in Twins, Singletons with Siblings, and Only Children from Age Five to Ten Years* (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1937).

³⁷ See Otto Klineberg, *Race Differences* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1935), pp. 167-168.

to bilingualism and pidgin English. In general the children said they preferred to use English in one form or another. Compared to monolingual children of Hawaii and of continental United States, the bilingual island children were decidedly handicapped.³⁸

In summary we may say that, although language ability rests upon fundamental vocal structures and corresponding neural or brain development, speech itself is the outcome of maturation and of the exposure of the infant to cultural influences. It definitely grows out of human interaction. The Kelloggs, in their instructive volume reporting the comparisons of mental and physical growth of their own child with that of an ape which they had in their home for nine months, point out that the ape never learned to manage human sounds, nor did it show the babbling and other "practice" phases of linguistic development so common to infants. Although the ape was able to obey a large number of verbal commands and signs given by adults, and although it possessed a gamut of vocal responses for various emotional and feeling states, it never acquired the use of a single word in the human sense.³⁹

This should make us aware that we have always to take into account both constitutional and environmental factors. If the former are inadequate, the environmental factors alone will not induce traits or capacities. The same is true of inherently feeble-minded children and of children who are born deaf or who early become handicapped by extreme loss of hearing. The importance of social influences is also apparent from the sketchy and poorly controlled accounts of the language development of feral man. Persons reared in isolation or without social contacts do not develop human speech.⁴⁰

Among children of normal constitution and social-cultural opportunity linguistic development is directed and controlled in its later phases chiefly by the older and more experienced members of the family, the play group, and other associates. We can scarcely expect the child or adult of the limited social and cultural world of the manual laborer to match in language or thought the child or adult in the wider and more complex cultural world of the educated man. Finally, until we know the relation between higher thought processes and linguistic development, we shall never be quite certain how much the intelligence-test differences of children and

³⁸ M. E. Smith, "Some light on the problem of bilingualism as found from a study of the progress in mastery of English among preschool children of non-American ancestry in Hawaii," *Genetic Psychology Monographs*, 1939, 21:121-284, also, "A comparison of the English vocabulary used by children of non-American ancestry in Hawaii before they reach the age of seven years with that of kindergarten children in Continental United States," *Journal of Experimental Education*, 1940, 9:121-132.

³⁹ W. N. Kellogg and L. A. Kellogg, *The Ape and the Child* (New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1933).

⁴⁰ For a convenient summary and discussion of the relation of isolation to linguistic and other aspects of personal development, see Knutson Young, *Sociology: A Study of Society and Culture*, 2nd ed. (New York, American Book Company, 1949), pp. 113-121.

adults from varying socioeconomic classes are reflections of circumscribed or extensive exposure to culture and how much they are the result of some more inherent difference in the constitutional make-up of the members of these respective social classes.

CHAPTER 7

The Rise and Function of the Self

Common sense and casual observation make it clear that much of what we say and do centers around or derives from an awareness of self. On occasion a person may admit that he is motivated by self-interest. We hear individuals blaming themselves for something they did or said. Or you say to another, "Don't depreciate yourself," or of a mother that she "sacrifices herself for her children."

Any serious consideration of personality must consider the concepts of self and of self-consciousness. Self-consciousness is not identical with consciousness. The latter is the larger term for awareness, however vague, of the reaction to some particular situation. The baby may have some incipient perception of the booming, buzzing environment into which he is pitched at birth as well as some sense of certain bodily tensions. But he does not have self-consciousness. The latter is acquired through his relations with his mother, father, siblings, and others with whom he comes into contact. The growing awareness of one's self as agent or operator of action means that in time the individual distinguishes his responses from those around him. Personal identity and sense of continuity as actor sets one apart from others. In fact the separation in thought and action between the self and the not-self is crucial in the development of the personality. Yet, as we shall see, we have to be like others, largely through identification and imitation, in order later to become unlike them. Becoming unlike others, that is, becoming a separate self, rests on the development of discrimination and generalization.

We may define the self as the individual as he is viewed or known to himself within the context of interaction. It is the core of the personality. Some writers use the terms self and ego as synonymous, but in view of the different use of the latter concept by Freudian and some other psychologists we will do well not to follow this practice.¹

¹ Muzaffer Sherif and Hadley Cantril employ the concepts *ego* and *ego-involvement* in a broad general way much as we use the term *self*. See their *The Psychology of Ego-Involvements* (New York, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1947).

T. M. Newcomb distinguishes between *self* and *ego*. The former term he uses in much the same way as we do. He defines *ego*, however, more narrowly as "the self as a value to be protected and enhanced." See his *Social Psychology* (New York, The Dryden Press, 1950), p. 328.

reduced to a rather elemental level of emotional, impulsive interaction. Calling a child a black sheep often has the result of producing misconduct. He takes up the expected rôle induced in him because of the *images he receives of himself from others*.

Lois B. Murphy has described the results of a test of nursery-school children who were asked, on being shown a snake in the box, if they would like to cut it up and throw it away, and then subsequently, if they replied "Yes," were told that such action would hurt the snake. Especially interesting were the children who answered "Yes" to the first query and then "No" to the second after the explanation was made about hurting the snake. Four of the nine children who changed their replies were youngsters who, in many other situations which Mrs. Murphy studied, showed a distinct dependence on adults. It is evident that their replies were motivated in part by their wish to say what was expected.⁴

Then, too, there is no end of demands or expectancies laid upon the person by the groups to which he belongs. The little child is supposed to be "cute" and "pretty," but also "to keep out from under foot." Later the school child is supposed to sit quietly in school. And as a boy grows up, the model of being a man is laid before him in accordance with which he is to find a job, get married, and have a family. And the girl as she passes through adolescence to maturity is expected to continue beautiful, charming, and docile to her sweetheart, to become a good wife and mother, and to play a conventional rôle in society. So, also, it is assumed that the patriotic citizen will hate his country's enemies and that the good Christian will lead a moral life.

To summarize, then, human interaction is characterized by the fact that the action of one individual calls forth a reaction of another which modifies or qualifies the subsequent act of the first. In this way the person learns to control or direct his acts in terms of what others expect of him. Clearly such expectancy is fundamental to fixity and regularity of habits, attitudes, and ideas, and hence fundamental to predictability of behavior and to its control. When one knows in advance—in anticipation—that a given stimulus will set off a given attitude or act in another, one has a basis for predicting what the other will do. Such expectation and predictability are essential to moral stability in the individual and to social control.

ORIGIN OF THE SELF IN INTERACTION

For the infant at birth there is no distinction between self and not-self. This distinction has to be learned. At the outset the drives or wants of the baby are strong and imperative. Since these cannot be gratified without the aid or control of others, that is, within the context of the social act, he must acquire various cues and responses which mean conformity to the

⁴ Lois B. Murphy, *Social Behavior and Child Personality: An Eastern Study of Some Roots of Sympathy*. New York, Columbia University Press, 1937. pp. 221-222.

demands of others. For example, there are limitations and restrictions as to time and place of feeding, eliminating, and so on. This means that discrimination as to stimuli and responses are built up with regard not only to his own bodily tensions or needs but in regard to how and when the tensions will be relieved in part, through the interactions with others. From such beginnings the sense of selfhood emerges.

The Rise of the Self in the Social Act. The fact that the core of personality, the self, arises out of interaction was recognized by earlier psychologists, most notably by Baldwin and Cooley.⁵ The former, using the concept of imitation, described the development of self-feeling as the "dialectic of personal growth" and showed that the individual's concept of himself and his reactions as a self are dependent upon his contact with those around him. The latter, from general observation, and particularly from studies of his own children, indicated the tremendous importance of imagination as a basis for sense of self. Cooley's phrase, the "looking-glass self," is a neat way of saying that the individual's concept of self-hood depends upon the manner in which those around him treat him. But it remained for George H. Mead to present a more or less behavioristic description and analysis of the processes involved in the development of the self. The present interpretation has been definitely influenced by the work of Mead.

The rise of the *self* depends upon the capacity of the individual to be an *object* to himself. The essentials of this process of becoming an object arise from the introjection into our own reaction system of the response of another person to us. That is to say, one perceives oneself only after he has perceived others. In this process language plays a dominant part. The matter is illustrated by the development within the child of the habit of assuming the mother's words, tones, pronunciation, bodily gestures—in fact, by his taking over into himself the rôle of the mother. The configuration of activities of another person toward him is taken up and associated with his own responses. Thus is developed the ability at rôle-taking. The child acts, we say, first one part and then another. He can do this because he has associated these activities with his own needs, and the rôle-taking is a part of the whole expressive activity related to the expectancies of others.

In the process just described, the child comes to call out in himself the attitudes which others call out in him when they react to him. A girl is, in a way, the mother when she plays at being mother to her dolls. Or a boy is, in like sense, the father when he manipulates a toy in the father's manner. As Mead puts it,

⁵ See J. M. Baldwin, *Mental Development in the Child and Race*, 1895, rev. ed., 1906 (New York, The Macmillan Company) and *Social and Ethical Interpretations in Mental Development*, 1897, rev. ed., 1906 (New York, The Macmillan Company). See also C. H. Cooley, *Human Nature and the Social Order* (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1902).

"The self arises in conduct, when the individual becomes a social object in experience to himself. This takes place when the individual assumes the attitude or uses the gesture which another individual would use and responds to it himself or tends to so respond. . . . The child gradually becomes a social being in his own experience, and he acts toward himself in a manner analogous to that in which he acts towards others."⁶

This interpretation of the origin of the self places it definitely within the social act. Some social psychologists have failed to recognize this fact. To cite only one example, G. W. Allport writes: "The fusion of sensory impressions, particularly around the kinesthetic sense of postural strain and position, originates the sense of self."⁷ Others like Gardner Murphy, and Sherif and Cantril, while putting a good deal of stress on the importance of systemic sensations as an early basis of selfness, do not neglect the interactional factors. Murphy notes that while visual perception of the body, awareness of pain, touch experiences, various "striped-muscle strains," and hearing one's own voice are important in the development of self, another source of "the early self image" is the "mother image" which is associated with her contacts with the child.⁸

Differing from this view is Mead's cogent argument that the meaning of one's physical body derives from the words, attitudes, and responses of others to the child's body; these words, attitudes, and responses are taken over by the child. The latter's systemic sensations, his view of his body, the hearing of his own voice become linked to the self through the social act. As Mead contends, "The individual experiences himself as such, not directly, but only indirectly, from the particular standpoints of other individual members of the same social group. . . ."⁹ The awareness of the body as part of the self begins only as the child learns to take over social rôles from others. At the outset, "The mere ability to experience different parts of the body is not different from the experience of a table."¹⁰

It is not that the physical body along with one's name and clothes do not become important elements in the sense of self. They do, and we shall make note later of their importance, along with other items, as anchorage points in the self. It is a question of priority. From the standpoint of interaction the child does not have a sense of physical self first and then acquire a social self. Rather the process is reversed. The meaning of the physical body arises within the social act, not previously.

⁶ G. H. Mead, "A behavioristic account of the significant symbol," *Journal of Philosophy*, 1922, 19: 157-163. Quotation from page 166. By permission.

⁷ G. W. Allport, *Personality, A Psychological Interpretation* (New York, Henry Holt & Company, Inc., 1937), p. 163.

⁸ Gardner Murphy, *Personality, A Biosocial Approach to Origins and Structure* (New York, Harper and Brothers, 1947), p. 481.

⁹ G. H. Mead, *op. cit.*, p. 138. By permission.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 136. By permission.

Specific Rôle-taking. The assumption of a rôle, the duplication of the "other" which gives rise to the "me," to use Mead's terms, this reacting to himself as an object similar to another, has its roots in the overt interaction of mother and child, or of children playing together, or in other rudimentary forms of social intercourse. The matter is well illustrated in play. Young children play more or less individually; and interactions, if they arise, are likely to be with adults or with other children who may take their toys, invade their play space, or otherwise interfere with their responses. At this level the interactions are of an elementary sort. Many investigations of children's play have shown, however, a positive and significant correlation between chronological age and increased interest in direct or imagined interactional play. In our society, at least, children in their play take on the rôles of those around them or of persons of whom they read or about whom they have fantasies. As to the type of specific rôles learned at play in non-literate societies we have little or no information. With us, the child, playing alone or with others, may act, in turn, father, mother, engineer, policeman, fireman, chauffeur, air pilot, and so on; tiring of one—as the poet Wordsworth says—he proceeds to pass on to "con" another part. This rôle-taking tends to be highly specific, and the child introduces and dismisses these fanciful characters just as he might approach or withdraw from actual playmates. In all this the child talks to himself as others have talked to him or as he has heard other persons talk among themselves.

It is but a step from this type of overt interaction to his internalized duplication of the rôle of others in playing with imaginary companions. In this instance he may, through fantasy, fill the hours with a wide variety of imagined playmates whose social functions he assumes. Sometimes his imaginary conversations may go on for considerable periods in fancied worlds far removed from his own actual life.

The influence of culture upon play and rôle-taking is neatly demonstrated in various studies of children's play. Bott has reported that all of her sample of twenty-eight nursery-school children, between two and five years of age, most frequently indulged in imaginative constructive play involving home life or construction of houses. She also found that imaginative play interests ran high with reference to trains, automobiles, fires, robberies, and telephones. All these types of play involve types of people and situations in the child's world. Lois B. Murphy mentions seven play patterns in which the children in her nursery-school sample indulged. These were various domestic patterns built around family and household activities such as cooking, eating, and parental rôles; selling and buying; various forms of transportation; "punishing, playing policeman, and gun play in general"; fires and playing fireman; "killing and dying"; and playing at mythical characters such as Santa Claus, Cinderella, and the Big Bad Wolf (very popular with her groups at the time of the study). The rôles the child

picks up in this way are the cornerstones from which his concept of his self is built.¹¹

In the child's playing of these rôles with his companions or when he is alone, language has a central place, and as he talks to his fellows or to himself—in the varied rôles—he hears himself talking and replies. The child may say something as one character and reply as another, and then his response as the other person serves as a stimulus to himself in the rôle of the first, and so the conversation between various imaginary persons develops within him. Suppose he sets up in imagination a store situation: he offers himself something to buy and in turn buys it. Or as conductor and passenger he requests tickets one moment and hands one over to himself (as passenger) the next: he talks to himself as teacher and responds as pupil; he may, as policeman, even arrest himself! In these dramas he develops multiple worlds of persons within his own activity. These various groups of stimuli and responses get organized into a wide range of separate rôles, some actual, some imaginary, many related to his place in the household, in the schoolroom, on the playground, and various other places.

Originally, of course, this interaction takes place at overt and conversational levels, but, as it becomes internalized or introjected, an inner forum of activity develops imaginatively and finds expression in both overt and symbolic taking of others' rôles. As we noted above, this is fundamental to the child's learning to act as others anticipate he will act. It is, in short, the process of socialization, that is, the taking over of another person's habits, attitudes, and ideas and the reorganizing of them into one's own system.

General Rôles. In time the introjections of the various specific rôles of the child begin to get organized or integrated into larger patterns of response, perhaps because many of these imagined rôles actually overlap. A father at home has a certain function, as business or professional man he has another and thus furnishes a different "copy" for the child to follow. Yet in his playing of the father's rôles, there is, for the child, a certain continuity and commonality between the two. Mead refers to this larger ordering of rôles into a unity under the term "the generalized other." That is, out of a wide range of specific rôles of "others" which he has played, there emerges in time a generalized and more or less total rôle of the child. This becomes a part of the integrated self which grows up in everyday interaction with hundreds of specific persons whose attitudes and habits get woven into the child's own. The development of the generalized pattern is well indicated by Mead when he draws a contrast between the early play life of the child and the activity of the older child

¹¹ Helen M. M. Batt, *Personality Development in Young Children* (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1934); Lewis B. Maccoby, *Social Behavior and Child Personality* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1937).

or youth as a member of a team in a game with rules, differentiated rôles, and standard practices.

By the time the child in our society is seven or eight years of age, he begins to play simple, coördinated games of the type where the children choose up "sides" and make up a team. In such games each child performs the same task as his teammates, as in tossing quoits or throwing at a target, but the successes of each are added together to make up the total score for one's team. Here there emerges a rudimentary kind of teamwork. But in the team game proper—which the child learns in the prepubertal and early adolescent years—each player, while he has a specialized function, discovers that his rôle is qualified by the special tasks of his teammates and that in order to play his own part he must be able to play the part of these others as well—overtly and especially in imagination. In other words, in an organized game where a number of individuals are involved, and where each has his own function to perform, the person in taking his own rôle must learn also to take the rôle of everyone else in the game as well.

In the first games which the child plays the number of specialized rôles is usually limited, but it increases as he learns to play basketball, baseball, football, hockey, and the like. But in any case, in order to carry out his own part, he must know what every other member of his team is supposed to do or is going to do. He must also anticipate the actions of the opposing team's members. He does not, of course, have to carry all the possible patterns of action in mind at once, but he may have to have a dynamic picture of two or more other individuals present in consciousness at the same time. For instance, the first baseman's actions will be effective for making a particular play only if he can, in imagination, assume the ideas and attitudes of the pitcher, the catcher, and the man at bat. The successful ball player is just that one who is able to imagine the actions of others and thus in his own inner forum of thought or imagination be able to anticipate what they will do. Mechanistically he does actually experience in his own neuromuscular system incipient responses like those of the other players, both those of his own team and those of the opposing side.

In complicated games many of a player's own functions as well as these anticipatory reactions to what the others will do are put into rules and standard practices. These serve to limit and to define closely the specific rôles of each player in relation to all the others. It is interesting to observe that, even in rudimentary games, children themselves often make up rules on the spot to help define and thus objectify their varied behavior. As Mead remarks, "The rules are a set of responses which a particular attitude calls out."¹² When a greenhorn at a game does not follow the rules—that is, the expected patterns of action—he confuses his

¹² Mead, *op. cit.*, p. 152.

teammates as well as the opposing team. In short, the regulations and standard practices help the child to organize his various rôles into something of a unity, into a generalized pattern.

The application of this illustration to other social activities is apparent. In order to participate with other members of the family the child has to obey the rules of the family. He cannot forever decide on the spur of the moment to take a novel rôle; otherwise he would acquire no regularity of habits and attitudes. In other words, he must, in the first years of life, learn his more general rôle as *child* in the family. Later he will be pupil, comrade, industrial worker, religious participant, voter, and the like. But more than that, he must carry over from the family to other primary and secondary groups certain elements of the first rôles. Any social group or the larger community which "gives to the individual his unity of self may be called 'the generalized other.'"¹³ This involves an identification with the symbols of a given group or community, with its leaders, and with particular individuals or with the totality of members thought of as a unit.

Rôle-taking and Control. The nature of rôle-taking with reference to the development of the self may be illustrated from the long controversy among dramatists and critics as to whether the successful actor should identify himself completely with the rôles he plays on the stage. Some have contended that he should; others, that the actor must make a cold and dispassionate portrayal of the dramatic character. Constant Coquelin, the great French actor, took a middle ground, holding that an actor must always play two rôles: the character being portrayed, and his own critical self, which is useful in guiding the dramatic action. From our standpoint this is precisely what does happen in successful acting. There must be a dual consciousness. If an actor cannot vividly represent to himself, in imagination, the mental state or motive of the character he is to delineate, he can scarcely represent it to the audience. Imagining a given mental state and motive of another tends to set up emotional and motor responses appropriate to this state. But, once these are aroused, an alter ego—that is, the actor's own self—comes into the situation to direct and guide their expression. On the stage it is, after all, the overt responses and the words that count. Internal states of motive and emotion are only important or necessary in helping to produce the words and overt conduct of the dramatic character more effectively for the audience.

Obviously, the actor must not allow his responses to cross the tenuous line between assumed emotions and real ones. The actor *plays* a scene, he does not *make* one!¹⁴ As Metcalf puts it

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 154.

¹⁴ A demonstration of this matter occurred some years ago during a performance of *Hamlet*. A rather well known British actor—then touring this country—had become intoxicated shortly before the opening of the play. As the drama proceeded, he began repeating his own lines and even speaking those of the other characters as well. It was a somewhat amusing although pathetic illustration of the loss of his own critical self.

"Real emotions are out of place on the stage. If, for instance, an actor who is representing fear suddenly becomes afflicted with stage-fright, the real fear, far from improving the performance, actually spoils it. The audience wants to have its imagination stimulated, and welcomes the actor whose playing has this effect. The mutual attitude of actor and audience is, or should be, similar to that of children when they say, 'Let's pretend.'" ¹⁵

This duality of the actor's consciousness is closely analogous to the situation in real life. We are often confronted with a social situation demanding one sort of rôle rather than another, and we learn to conform to the expectations of others. We learn, furthermore, to control and direct this particular part in terms of another rôle, often the deeper and more integrated generalized pattern. And it is precisely this latter which prevents our playing at rôles which may be morally disapproved even though the immediate stimuli to do so almost overwhelm us.

The Generalized Rôle and General Attitude. The concept of the generalized other is basic to an understanding of the integration of the self. It rests upon the ability of the individual to develop general attitudes and ideas out of a wide variety of specific and concrete experiences, which, in turn, raises the recurrent problems of general versus specific attitudes and of transfer of training. Apparently an individual may have a range from specific attitudes and habits to general attitudes and habits. So, too, the individual may play more or less specific rôles in some instances and yet in others may develop the generalized or integrated self. The child is characterized by specific rôles, the mature and integrated adult by a generalized self. More or less generalized rôles may become linked to concepts of given primary or secondary groups, to those of a larger society or nation, or to humanity or mankind in general.¹⁶

RÔLES IN RELATION TO ATTITUDES AND ACTION

While later on we shall discuss the importance of group membership as an anchorage point for personality, we now want to introduce the topic of the relation of attitude to action as it is exemplified in the difference between latent or potential rôles, either specific or general, and the overt activity or response which takes place in any given social situation.

Attitudes and Action. It would be a mistake to assume that the child's or adult's rôle-taking is merely a reflection of other people's rôles and anticipations of him. While the individual takes over attitudes and rôles of others and internalizes them into his own particular personality structure, he still retains his own unique and individual make-up. This au-

¹⁵ J. T. Metcalf, "Empathy and the actor's emotion," *Journal of Social Psychology*, 1931, 2:235-238. Quotation from page 237, by permission.

¹⁶ The long controversy over "group mind," "collective consciousness," "illusion of universality," and other concepts of the group as against the individual would disappear if psychologists and others would recognize the whole process of interaction in which the individual, by accepting, or identifying with the generalized other of the crowd, audience, mob, nation, humanity, and so on, comes to react to these *as units* with reference to his own self.

tonomy and uniqueness depends, first of all, on variations in organic constitution, including differences in strength of drives, in intellectual capacity, and in emotional-feeling components. There are variations also due to differential exposure to social-cultural influences. Then, too, the demands of the immediate situation play a further part. As a result the final response or action is determined by a composite of such factors and is by no means completely predictable. There is usually some element of uncertainty in the final response, though this will vary from individual to individual and from situation to situation. For example, one could better predict the action of a campaign-hardened veteran under further combat conditions than one could the conduct of a raw recruit in like circumstances. Policemen and firemen learn to play rôles under crises such as riot, panic, fire, flood, and other disaster for which the ordinary citizen usually has no training at all. The individual variability in the response of the policemen or firemen will be much less than in the untrained person.

Not only is there unpredictability under such conditions but there is uniqueness and variation in degrees of spontaneity and creativeness among children and adults. The inventor, the artist, the military strategist, the creative planner, all represent the taking of rôles which have no "others" or prior models which merely require a duplication. We shall comment on the place of spontaneity and creativity in another connection. At this point we need but emphasize that careful students of personality recognize this aspect of self and personality. Mead's attempt to deal with this topic of unpredictability deserves our attention.

Mead's Theory of the "I" and "Me." In his treatment of the self, Mead faced the question: Is the individual in action completely the product of rôles laid down by those around him? That is, is the self merely a collection and integration of specific and general rôles, in other words of "me's"? Or are there some unique and unpredictable elements in our function as actor or responder to social stimulation—actual or imaginary? In an attempt to deal with this dynamic quality in action, Mead, following James, introduced the concept of the "I," which is set off against the "me" or "other"—either diverse or general in character. In fact, for Mead, the self in action must be considered as made up of both the "I" and the "me."

The "me," he says, really consists of the rôles and attitudes taken up by the individual from parents, siblings, and playmates, later from teachers, preachers, and policemen, and even from imaginary characters, which are worked over into one's own action and thought. Yet when the child does come to act, there is more to the matter than a mere duplication of the rôle which he has picked up from another. There is a dynamic feature in the whole interactive process, that is, the "I" or the self as actor. At the outset this is made up of the needs or impulses which carry the

organism into a given cycle of behavior. But in the process of interaction with others the active "I" begins to be affected by the various "me's" which the individual has taken over from others.

According to Mead, the simplest manner in which to describe the operation of the "I" or actor is to recognize that we know it only in memory. It always operates in the present. We are never quick enough to catch it except in retrospect. For Mead the "I" or actor is known or perceived only in historical retrospect.¹⁷

According to Mead, in gestural or linguistic interaction there is no sharp distinction between the "I" and the "me," although logically the latter serves as a phase of the object toward which the "I" responds at the moment. That is, in responding to another we react to him as an external object and also to an internal image of him, or to him as a "me." However, one cannot entirely predict what this response of the "I" to the "me" will be. *There is a degree of uncertainty in every overt act except purely reflex ones.* So, too, in reflective thought, which usually takes the form of internal conversation, the same mechanism operates. (See Chapter 8.) In either overt or covert activity the attitudes of other persons which one assumes as factors influencing his own behavior will constitute the immediate "me." But exactly what an individual is going to do about the situation—defined in terms of the "me"—he does not know completely in advance since the "I" comes into play only in the response itself.

In short, although the attitude or incipient action which a person may take toward others may be partially known in terms of his previous responses, the actual overt response which follows is not entirely predictable. It contains a novel feature. It is something which even the individual cannot completely anticipate. He may be aware of himself and of the situation, but precisely how he will react he never knows, as Mead puts it, "until after the action takes place." *Thus the "I" is the unpredictable, the unanticipated, the unique, the novel element in our thought processes and in overt action.* Mead summarizes the matter in these words:

"The 'me' does call for a certain sort of an 'I' in so far as we meet the obligations that are given in conduct itself, but the 'I' is always something different from what the situation itself calls for. So there is always that distinction, if you like, between the 'I' and the 'me.' The 'I' both calls out the 'me' and responds to it. Taken together they constitute a personality as it appears in social experience. The self is essentially a social process going on with these two distinguishable phases. If it did not have these two phases there could not be conscious responsibility, and there would be nothing novel in experience."¹⁸

¹⁷ This theory of the "I" or actor operating only in the present probably derives less from empirical evidence than from Mead's epistemology. See his *Philosophy of the Present* (La Salle, Ill., The Open Court Publishing Company, 1932).

¹⁸ Mead, *Mind, Self, and Society*, p. 178. By permission.

Mead's theory of the "I" and the "me" leaves something to be desired. He is quite correct in pointing out the difference between the rôle or "me" as a part of the internalized social experience of the individual which he has picked up from others and dynamic rôle-taker or actor in a given situation. Yet the latter in response is not something independent of, or entirely different from, the rôles introjected from others. Rather it seems to me that the actor phase may be viewed as made up of a combination of previously derived "me's" or "others" dynamically in operation plus the motives, emotions, and certain novel elements of the moment which come into play in overt action. These novel features may come from physiological conditions, such as fatigue, or from hypersensitivity, from some accidental aspect of the situation, or from confusion as to which particular rôle to play, or from some non-deliberate or unconsciously motivated factor. Certainly Mead admits that the "I," after it has acted, becomes a part of the "me." This can only mean that any particular behavior of a given time and place leaves a residue of effects—reinforcement, inhibition, and so on—which, in turn, remain to influence later actions.

The manner in which circumstances or deviance of potential rôles serve to modify the oncoming words or actions is illustrated in everyday life. A person remarks, "I wanted to give him a piece of my mind, but I thought better of it and said something else." This merely means that one combination was inhibited in its overt expression by another combination more in line with social approval. A further illustration from the drama comes to mind. The traditional "asides" indicate the operation of dual patterns of verbal expression—one communicated, one held to the level of sub-vocal yet audible thought. This pattern of the aside became in Eugene O'Neill's *Strange Interlude* (1928) the vehicle for an entire dramatic episode. There the sub-vocal thinking is made audible, so that the audience is let in on the thoughts and attitudes which the characters in the play are normally suppressing in their accepted conversations.¹⁹

The uniqueness and unpredictable factors, therefore, may be viewed in terms of a reorganization of introjected rôles plus a number of other factors, constitutional and experiential, which come into play. To repeat, the personality is characterized by a set of traits, attitudes, and rôles which are in relative conformity and consistency with the expectations of our fellows combined with traits, attitudes, and rôles which are idiosyncratic, peculiar, or unique—however one may label the latter. In his theory of the "I" and the "me" Mead was but trying to deal with

¹⁹ The recognition of variation in rôle-taking is also brought out in Eugene O'Neill's *The Great God Brown* (1926), in which the stage characters don their masks when they assume other rôles than those anticipated in the conventional situation.

this matter, and it is not necessary to accept all of his interpretation to appreciate the depth of his understanding of the self.²⁰

SOME STRUCTURAL ELEMENTS OF THE SELF

The self may be regarded as the core of the personality, but the two are not synonymous if we view the latter as a totality or combination of ideas, traits, attitudes, and values organized into rôles and statuses which have a social reference. We respond to many stimuli at an automatic and unconscious level without any conscious self-reference. Yet such actions would be regarded as expressive or indicative of the personality.

In the present section we shall examine various structural features of the self which therefore must also be viewed as aspects of the personality. At this point, however, we want to relate them to the function of the self as a social product but without reference to any necessary order of priority as to their appearance.

Anchorage Points for the Self. In the course of socialization, the individual comes to perceive and conceive the self with reference to his physical body, his name, clothing, ornaments, membership rôle and status as related to age- and sex-grading, to social class, and to other group or community sources of participation. Into these enter both cultural and personal-social learning. For convenience we may call these "anchorage points," from which, or around which, the individual conducts his life.

While the physical body is probably not the first source of self-feeling—certainly not in G. H. Mead's theory—nonetheless the body acquires the function of an important anchorage point. The kinesthetic and systemic sensations become conditioned to the feeding, fondling, and other responses of the mother or others which furnish the initial situations for the rise of self-consciousness. In this way they get linked to the rôle-taking which we have described.

A study by Horowitz gives some interesting facts regarding the physical body as an anchorage point in self-perception.²¹ Through questioning some children, Horowitz got suggestions about self localization which gave him a lead to a more systematic investigation.

In one interview of a three-year-old, he asked: "Who are you?" (A) "Joan." (Q) "Who is Joan?" (A) "Me." (Q) "Is this Joan?" (pointing and touching bed alongside). (A) "No." He then touched various objects and parts of her body, which brought forth such reactions as: Slipper — no; leg — no; head — no; body — yes; neck — no; and so on.

²⁰ For a suggestive analysis of this topic, see W. L. Kolb, "A critical evaluation of Mead's 'I' and 'me' concepts," *Social Forces*, 1944, 22: 291-296. See also Grace Chin Lee, *George Herbert Mead, Philosopher of the Social Individual* (New York, King's Crown Press, 1945).

²¹ E. I. Horowitz, "Spatial localization of self," *Journal of Social Psychology*, 1935, 6: 379-387. All quotations by permission.

"The child seems to localize Joan quite definitely in the abdomen and lower thorax; the back was not Joan, appendages and head were described as hers, but not her." A check five days later confirmed these basic locations. Another child, Lena, about Joan's age, at first located herself in the body. On further questioning she said it was not in the eye, head, nor left jaw, but in the right jaw. Joan's sister, at age of two and a half years, "localized herself in the mouth region . . ." ²² Mona, aged four years two months, said her "me" or self was in her head.

Adults have localized the self variously in the head, in the head and throat, and sometimes in relation to the particular situation. Horowitz reports that one person said that, when thinking, he localized the self in the head, just behind the eyes. But when looking out the window at various objects, the self was vaguely "'out there.'" When reading a newspaper, he located the self as in the space between his eyes and the sheet he was reading.

After his preliminary study, Horowitz prepared a questionnaire which he gave to 45 college students in a class in elementary psychology. One question was: "If you *had* to locate yourself at some one point either within or external to your body proper, some one point that 'is you,' where would that point (or area) be?" Of the total 32 replies to this question, some gave more than one location. Of those replies which could be classified, the highest number was head with nine notations; brain, eyes, and heart got six each; face and hands, four each; genitals and chest, three each; and shoulders, two. Those with one "vote" included the head, throat, lungs, fingers, abdominal and genital region, and body as a whole. Of the total 60 localizations, 36 might be said to be in the head region, the balance widely dispersed. In addition there were a number of responses difficult to classify. Some said they could not localize the self in the body; others put the self in a social setting of a group of people, as near the body, or as farther away, as a whole person, as home, as associates, and as "an invisible vantage-point from which all the world could be seen." ²³ While these replies were, by the very nature of the question, forced, they do show that many adults continue to locate the self as in the body or as some part of it.

Horowitz concludes his study by citing two case histories, in one of which he describes how, more or less accidentally, the nose became the physical focus of selfness. The other person localized the self, first in the left side of the body, and then more particularly in the left hand. The latter narrator, a graduate student in psychology, aged 24 years, neatly illustrates Mead's thesis that the individual interprets his body and its organs in much the same way as he deals with the rôles he takes over from other persons. The student writes

²² *Ibid.*, p. 381.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 383.

"The superior validity of the left . . . is established by a memory of the sixth year, at which time, when cleaning the nails of the left hand with those of the right, the left was personalized as asking who, then, would clean the right; and it was felt that such a pretty speech was too good, for the left hand began to clean the right to give it a chance to make the noble, unselfish speech."²¹

This instance is of further interest since the man in question notes that contrary to his considering the left hand as superior to the right and as the locus of self feeling, in Arabic countries the left hand is regarded as distinctly inferior because it is used as the cleansing agent following defecation. This is a good illustration of variation in self-perception due to cultural conditioning. We know very little about how individuals outside our own Euro-American society localize the self, either in regard to the body and its organs or otherwise. Certainly our own culture, with its stress on the importance of rationality and thinking, may serve to stimulate the idea that the head is the seat of the self. Furthermore, the early importance of the mouth would also enter into a fixation in the head region. On the other hand, romantic ideas about love, loyalty, and courage would tend to induce the location of the self in the heart. This is clearly a topic which might well be investigated cross-culturally in order to expose differences in the sources of self-perception.

From our own culture as well as that of other societies it is evident that the individual's name is a common locus of selfhood. With us the family name provides a symbol with which one's self may easily identify and from which it gets a feeling of security, both as a protection and as a shared experience with those close to one in the family. The personal name accumulates a host of associations with various rôles. The refrain of an old poem entitled "Just 'Fore Christmas" is an illustration:²²

"Father calls me William,
Mother calls me Will,
Sister calls me Willy;
But the fellers call me Bill."

One other example will suffice to make clear the importance of the personal name as the seat of self-perception and self-conception. Clodd cites the case of a Jamaican Negro, Quamina, who had contracted a debt. Before this was repaid he became a convert to Christianity, was baptized, and given a new name, Timothy. Later when his creditor asked for repay-

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 385. In terms of Meadian theory the same mechanism operates in dealing with the physical body as in identifying with others, see G. H. Mead, *The Philosophy of the Present*, p. 136 where he remarks about the sense of physical thingness, "The organism has stimulated itself, by its action on an object, to act upon itself in the fashion of the other object." That is, this involves a process of learning about and giving meaning to the physical world not unlike that used in learning about others by taking up their attitudes into ourselves. In the case cited by Horowitz, the physical "other" was the locus of the self, not merely a separate physical thing.

²² Eugene Field, "Just 'Fore Christmas," from *The Writings in Prose and Verse of Eugene Field*, vol. 4: *Poems of Childhood* (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1894).

ment, the Negro was amazed and contended that the money had been loaned to Quamina who was now dead. He, Timothy, was a new man—as the Church had told him—and should not be expected to pay a dead man's obligations.²⁶ In our terms, the man had been reborn into another self and the old one no longer existed.

Not only are the body and its organs and the name cues to self-perception, but, so too, are clothing, shoes, neckties, decorations and honorific titles, and other things closely associated with one's personal habits and status. These become self symbols, however, because the child, the adolescent, and the adult alike introject their worth from what others think about them. The child is rewarded by having a new suit and for keeping it tidy and clean. It thus symbolizes his rôle as a "nice" child. One may become attached to shoes, neckties, scarfs because they acquire a self-oriented meaning. And honorific titles and decorations provide an expansion of the self in social relations and hence give enhancement to self-regard.

Other more important anchorage points are found in the membership rôle and status of various groups. Since detailed aspects of these will be treated later, at this juncture let us but note that self-orientation is related to age, sex, class, and other group identifications.

Traits and Sentiments in Self-consciousness. In view of what has been said, there seems to be no evidence of any biologically inherited self-feeling.²⁷ Rather, self-consciousness rests upon the perception and conception of the individual's rôles and statuses which, though arising in overt interaction, have become covert. In this sense, as Mead remarks, the self develops and functions on the basis of "cognitive" or intellectual processes involving "the internalization and inner dramatization, by the individual, of the external conversation of significant" symbols.²⁸ In short, self-consciousness is reflective, and not reflexive in origin.

This does not mean that motives and emotions have no place in the genesis and operation of self-awareness. They do. The child's identification in rôle-taking and status-finding is colored by his emotions and feelings. This is evident in the important component of self-consciousness which is called *self-esteem* or *self-regard*, to use McDougall's term.²⁹

²⁶ Edward Clodd, *Magic in Names and in Other Things* (London, Chapman and Hall, Ltd., 1920), p. 169.

²⁷ Cooley posited an innate foundation for self-feeling, but never presented any evidence to support his contention. See C. H. Cooley, *Human Nature and the Social Order*, op. cit., p. 139. James also had somewhat the same notion but did not go beyond a vague assumption. See William James, *Principles of Psychology*, Vol. 1 (New York, Henry Holt & Company, Inc., 1890), Chap. 10.

²⁸ Mead, *Mind, Self, and Society*, p. 173. By permission.

²⁹ Despite his overemphasis on instincts, McDougall's contribution to social psychology was important. His theory of sentiments including those which centered around the self, was often ignored because he locked them up with his inadequate theory of the instincts. See William McDougall, *Social Psychology*, 1st ed. (Boston, John W. Luce

Self-regard may be viewed as an organization of traits and those emotionally toned attitudes otherwise called sentiments. Self-regard has many facets which are illustrated in the sub-categories of sentiments. On the one hand, there are terms, such as *self-reliance* and *self-assurance* which classify certain views of one's rôle and status. On the other, self-depreciation indicates a sense of inferiority about one's rôles and statuses. Then, too, finding excuses for our conduct is defined by the terms *self-justification* or *rationalization*. The nature and function of self-regard and the sentiments associated therewith are qualified not only by the situation in which they are expressed, but by culture. Let us note briefly some of these as they are found in our own society and in others.

The trait of self-assurance is associated with forcefulness and sense of individuality, into which enter components of hostility and aggressiveness. Individuals brought up under our culture, with its stress on personal success and upward social mobility, tend to be rewarded for showing such characteristics. In contrast, traits of dependence on others, such as we find in certain pietistic sectarian groups in our society or as are evident among the Hopi Indians, induce a different kind of self-image—one which views self-reliance, initiative, and personal aggression as quite immoral and threatening.

The justification of one's acts may become an important component of the self in operation. Again the cultural factors may well be of importance. If the culture demands some rationale for one's acts, excuses may also be expected for deviation from expectations. Whether rationalization is a universal aspect of social interaction may be difficult to validate; but it certainly is a widespread trait among individuals brought up in our Euro-American societies.

In Chinese society self-justification takes another form often called "face-saving." As one part of the self, *lien* represents the moral rôle which is marked by good conduct and personal responsibility. Loss of *lien* debars the individual from proper society and threatens him with insecurity and isolation. *Lien*, moreover, is regarded as an entity which may be preserved or lost as a whole. Another trait or component of the Chinese self, *mei-tzu*, refers broadly to acquired reputation and certain values derived from self-aggrandizement. *Mei tzu* may be built up by struggle, borrowing, faking, or any device which will increase its amount. Its function is to obtain prestige beyond one's ascribed place in the social structure. This aspect of the self is particularly evident in the upward striving middle classes. Noteworthy examples are found among merchants and military warlords.²⁰

& Co., 1908) Also his later, *Energies of Men* (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1923).

²⁰ Hu Hsein-Chun, "The Chinese concepts of 'face,'" *American Anthropologist*, 1944, 46:45-64

Motivation, Learning, and Self-involved Conduct. For the most part experimental psychology has paid little or no attention to the place of the self in motivation and learning. This is particularly true of behaviorists, so much of whose experimentation has centered on animals. Most clinical and social psychologists, however, have paid at least lip-service to the importance of the self in both motivation and learning. This is evident enough in Freudian psychology. Certainly in social psychology, such derived motives as, for example, need for affection, mastery or power, security, and for membership or sociability—to name but a few—are all self-oriented.³¹

With reference to behavioristic learning theory, however, students of personality have either tended to neglect it altogether or, if they refer to it, to explain learning in very general terms as due to tension-reduction through the operation of the Law of Effect. Some students of personality, however, are not satisfied with such simple faith in behaviorism. G. W. Allport, in particular, has kept up a running argument with those who accept the Law of Effect as sufficient for subsuming all or, at least, the major features of human learning. While this is not the place to enter into the debate,³² it is important that we state some cautions about the interplay of motivation, learning, and conduct. As we noted in Chapter 4, learning may be viewed as a phase in the adaptation of the individual to his environment, physical and social-cultural. In this context, also, motivation and situation must be included. The behaviorist thesis "that living organisms learn when and only when they solve a problem in the sense of reducing a tension, relieving a discomfort, deriving a satisfaction"³³ has some limitations. This is particularly so with regard to symbolic learning and especially that which involves moral values. Human beings do not always seek rewards or goals that are merely biologically satisfying. The hedonistic theory of motivation breaks down here, as it has in other systems of psychology, if one attempts to use it to explain, for example, "why a martyr goes to the stake, why a bomber makes suicide dives, why an anchorite forswears all earthly joys, why a member of an underground keeps silent in the face of torture."³⁴ In human beings all sorts

³¹ For an illustration of growing realization by experimentalists of the need to deal with the self in terms of motivation and learning, see E. R. Hugard, "Human motives and the concept of the self," *American Psychologist*, 1949, 4: 374-382.

³² The literature on this topic is rather extensive. For a convenient introduction to it, with listings of earlier articles, see "Symposium: the ego and the law of effect," *Psychological Review*, 1946: 53-307-347, containing the following articles: P. B. Rice, "The ego and the law of effect," pp. 307-320; O. H. Mowrer, "The law of effect and ego psychology," pp. 321-334; and G. W. Allport, "Effect: a secondary principle of learning," pp. 335-347. The quotations from these below are by permission of The American Psychological Association.

³³ Mowrer, *op. cit.*, p. 326.

³⁴ G. W. Allport, "Effect: a secondary principle of learning," p. 342. By permission.

of interests, values, and ways of life develop, including self-interest or self-regard, which serve to influence the nature and rate of our learning. The self-assertive individual may be so highly motivated toward some goal that he persists for long periods of time in spite of many recurrent punishments in the form of failures. Then, too, some people get satisfaction or reward from the effort itself.

In considering learning in the social act, we may break it down into component parts and meanings. For example, in the motivation and learning with regard to economic welfare, a man may become more engrossed with the game of making money than with the satisfactions which come from spending his income. In the fine arts, certainly, rewards are apparent before the completion of the symphony, the drama, or the ballet. In other words, interest and part-completion play a part in providing reinforcement.

The function of self-regard or self-image may be quite complicated in such cases. Certainly self-involvement can scarcely be reduced to mere "emotional arousal, either appetitive or affective."³⁵ To do so would be to ignore the complex development of the self in terms of gestures, language, and the internalized symbol systems, both rational and irrational. Certainly reward and satisfaction must be defined very broadly to include these things: morally valued painful experiences, partially completed acts, and art for art's sake. Then, too, self-reward is common. What Thorndike aptly called the "confirming" or "O.K." reaction serves both as a reward and as a further motivating agent.³⁶ Such a confirming response is evident in acts leading to self-approval, particularly those of moral quality. G. W. Allport's stress on functional autonomy of the self and its motives is worth emphasizing here.³⁷

In summary, then, we may say that motivation and learning must be considered as related to the self in its various ways. This is particularly so in matters having to do with our symbol systems. And, since the latter are basic to personality, it should be clear that self-involvement must of necessity enter into most of our important social acts. It must be remembered that *learning represents a residual effect of prior adjustments which precondition, yet, in all but our most automatic habits, scarcely ever completely dominate subsequent activity.* Adequate learning provides for variation in the expected situations of the future. Where learning does not allow for some flexibility, adjustments to changed conditions may prove inefficient and even damaging rather than rewarding.

³⁵ Mowrer, *op. cit.*, p. 322. Italics in original.

³⁶ E. L. Thorndike, *The Psychology of Wants, Interests, and Attitudes* (New York, D. Appleton-Century Company, Inc., 1935), pp. 41-42.

³⁷ See G. W. Allport, *Personality, A Psychological Interpretation*, *op. cit.*, Chap. 7.

INTEGRATIVE AND DISSOCIATIVE ASPECTS OF THE SELF

While in one sense we may and do have, as James put it, as many selves as there are persons who recognize us and carry an image of us in their minds, this does not mean that we are constantly forming and re-forming the fundamental structures and function of the personality.³⁵ There do arise from the earliest period of development certain consistencies and regularities of behavior. These depend, moreover, upon the integrative processes of the organism and upon the recurrences found in somewhat similar situations. It is thus that we shift from specific rôles to generalized ones. There are many situations which diverge rather markedly from others, and in order to adapt ourselves to them at all successfully we must acquire a capacity for differentiation and selection among motives, cues, and responses. In short, we acquire certain drive-stimulus-response-reward systems that tend to be similar, and others that differ rather sharply. In this way, then, different selves emerge, geared to varying social contexts. The whole matter may be stated in terms of integrative functions, on the one hand, and of autonomous or dissociative functions on the other.

For our purposes here, *integration* refers to a coördination or working together of a variety of rôles with their attendant habits, attitudes, and ideas. At the infantile level, the source of rôle-taking lies in specific social acts that are related to the child's primary motivations of hunger, thirst, bodily elimination, sleep, pain avoidance, and the like. Later, at the level of self-organization, integration consists in the centering or focusing of the varied rôles around some dominant goal or core of activity. It represents a process of generalization of widely varied experiences. The moral man, the good citizen, and the good Christian are concepts of such *integrated activity*.

In contrast, *dissociation* is but another name for the segmental behavior linked up with variation among our motives and in the situations to which we must adapt ourselves. Such behavior takes place more or less separately, that is, autonomously, from other activities. Thus, in the earliest situations we learn a large number of segmental activities which may be carried on parallel with others once they become habitual. Walking, maintaining our bodily balance, and many other activities may be carried on while we do something else, such as read, converse, or indulge in thought. Both integrated and dissociated activities are perfectly normal and natural. Both are necessary to efficient adaptation. It is only when the dissociation becomes extreme that serious difficulties arise, as will be brought out in Chapter 23. For our purposes at this point we wish to note the occurrence of multiple personalities as evidence of the function of

³⁵ James, *op. cit.*, p. 294.

integration and dissociation in the development of rôle-taking and self-consciousness.

Multiple Selves. The fact of multiple personality is strikingly shown by those unusual cases of separate and distinctive self-organization which exist within the same physical body. For example, one self, say X, may be composed of rôles built out of attitudes, ideas, and habits related to one sphere of interests and social situations. A contrasting or contradictory self, Y, may be built up from opposite attitudes, ideas, and habits developed either in overt interaction or in the realm of imagination, in another world of interest and situations. Unfortunately the data on multiple personalities consist almost entirely of descriptions of ideas and behavior manifest during various periods of marked dissociation. There is little material on the historical factors in the lives of these persons which would enable one to trace the links in the chain of events leading to the sharp division noted in these pathological individuals. Most students of such behavior regard it as a special manifestation of hysteria, the source of which is some need or anxiety, which, being incompletely repressed, is handled by dissociation.

Multiple personalities are sometimes classified into the *alternating* and the *double* varieties. In the former an individual reveals two or more self-organizations which are successively or periodically dominant and in which each self is unaware of the existence and activities of the other. In the latter cases there is one organized self with one or more subordinate systems of behavior. As a rule the dominant self knows nothing of the activities of the subordinate self or selves.

A classic instance of the alternating personality is that of Ansel Bourne reported by James.³⁹ Bourne, a clergyman of Greene, Rhode Island suddenly disappeared and all trace of him was lost. As A. J. Brown he settled in Norristown, Pennsylvania, where he opened up a small business. As the latter self he was a quite different man than he had been as a minister. In the sense of any personal memory Mr. Brown never knew of the existence of the Reverend Ansel Bourne.

One of the best-known cases of dissociation is that of Miss Beauchamp, described by Prince.⁴⁰

The Beauchamp Case. This young woman manifested at different times four rather distinctive personalities, and under some conditions still other selves. The four chief selves Prince called: B I or the normal Miss Beauchamp; B II which appeared when B I was under hypnosis; B III, dubbed by herself as "Sally"; and

³⁹ James, *op. cit.*, pp. 391-393.

⁴⁰ Merton Prince, *The Dissociation of a Personality, A Biographical Study in Abnormal Psychology* (New York, Longmans, Green & Company, 1905). This interesting book, which C. H. Mead wittily called "that psychological dime novel," contains a wealth of detail which may be recast into terms of interactionist psychology.

B IV whom "Sally" called "The Idiot." The four more or less organized selves revealed remarkably distinct attitudes, traits, and rôles.

During certain periods two personalities alternated in domination. At other times two personalities seemed to exist side by side. During the former states there was a more or less complete control of one life organization over the alternate self. In the latter there seemed to be a co-existence. In some instances one of Miss Beauchamp's personalities knew of the existence of the others. In other situations the various personalities knew nothing of each other. Some of the striking details may be summarized as follows:

During one period, lasting nearly a year, B I and B IV alternated in supremacy, each self showing continuity of memory for the time it was in control. B I was a shy, humble, weak invalid, very religious, highly suggestible, submissive, and altruistic. She was easily fatigued and led a life of retirement. In contrast, B IV was markedly aggressive, given to outbursts of anger, intolerant, quarrelsome, vain, and distinctly irreligious, and, though in a manner sociable, thoroughly despised children and old folks. She was energetic and constantly on the go. Both B I and B IV showed strong affect, but, whereas the former was easily swayed by her emotions, the latter kept them well in hand.

The rôle which B III, or Sally, played is an interesting aspect of this curious case. For six years she moved in and out of this human drama. She was a mischievous, childish person who showed a remarkable consistency of conduct throughout, there being no evidence of any maturation during the entire period. Sally existed alongside B I and B II. She herself claimed, for example, that she had a co-existence along with B I, that she knew what B I was doing and thinking and yet could on occasion occupy herself with her own thoughts. Moreover, she disliked and despised B I.

At times Sally was able to get complete domination over B I, especially when the latter was tired or run down. When Sally gained monopoly, she often indulged in all sorts of impish activities aimed at embarrassing B I. She would write her impudent notes and leave them about for B I to find when she, in turn, had returned to dominance. Or she would play practical jokes on B I, as on the occasion when she unraveled B I's knitting and wound the yarn all over the furniture of the room.

Under the able hands of Prince, "the normal personality" was restored, largely by the synthesis of B I and B IV. Sally began to feel herself "squeezed out" during this period. Whether, in this synthesis into a normal person, Sally remained as an unconscious (or, to use Prince's term, subconscient) self depends upon the interpretation which we put upon these data.

The striking fact is not only that the cases of multiple personality demonstrate attempts at adaptation, but that any adjustment may take a variety of forms and directions. Dissociated personalities represent extreme instances of tendencies that are incipient in all of us.

Another instance of sharply divergent self-organization, though hardly to be considered medically pathological, was that of Mrs. John Curran of St. Louis, who, as Patience Worth, turned out hundreds of poems and several novels, some of which latter became well-known.

Case of Patience Worth. Mrs. Curran, with no intimation of what was coming, would fall into highly abstract states—not a true trance—and begin automatic writing. Sometimes she would turn out as much as 5000 words in one ex-

ning. She had absolutely no conscious control over what she wrote. No two of her longer products were in the same literary style; some were in Old English, others decidedly modern in form and content. There was no revision of what she wrote. She had no formal education beyond grammar school. Her general reading was meager and desultory. She had, however, a high general intelligence.

Mrs. Curran was never able to offer any rational explanation of her literary work. She believed Patience Worth to be "the discarnate spirit of an English woman who lived in an age now long since past," an idea probably derived from her acquaintance with spiritualism and a neat illustration of a culturally derived rationalization.⁴¹

These cases, as others of extreme dissociation,⁴² must be considered as falling within the general framework of self-organization in terms of interaction. While normal individuals often show a wide range of differing rôles or selves, these tend to be bound together—though perhaps somewhat loosely—by certain basic centers of activity. In contrast, pathological dissociation occurs when a segmented organization of rôles—that is, separately coördinated ideas, habits, and attitudes—comes to dominate the organism. As Mead puts it, dissociation "is a process of setting up two sorts of communication which separate the behavior of the individual."⁴³

The study of multiple personality throws a significant light on various aspects of Mead's theory of the self. It is clear that dissociation is linked to the processes of memory and forgetting, and Mead, like James, emphasized time and again the high importance of memory as fundamental to the continuity and consistency of rôle-taking. Yet the organization of these various rôles or selves does not depend only upon overt interaction with one's fellows alone. The whole development of separate or divergent rôles or selves in normal or pathological persons rests upon the mechanism of inhibition and its attendant processes of differentiation and discrimination, and upon conscious and unconscious integration and dissociation.

The matter has important implications for normal personalities. Ordinarily we have a series of selves or rôles—more or less integrated, perhaps, around some symbolic center or generalized rôle—which operate in varying social situations, but most of us doubtless have dozens of other potential selves which never become manifest in everyday life. With normal individuals, however, these submerged selves may appear under grave crises, under alcoholic or other narcotic stimulation, in dreams, and in daydreams. But, as James charmingly put it, most of us would like to be a whole series of selves: a *bon vivant* and a lady killer as well as a philosopher, a philanthropist, and a money-maker, or a great warrior or a "tone poet." Though such different characters may be possible, they

⁴¹ Charles E. Cury, "Patience Worth," *Psychological Review*, 1919, 26: 397-406. Quotation from pp. 405-406.

⁴² For a review of the important known cases, see William Taylor and M. Martin, "Multiple personality," *Journal of Abnormal & Social Psychology*, 1944, 39: 281-300.

⁴³ Mead, *Mind, Self, and Society*, op. cit. p. 143.

are, from a practical point of view, impossible of attainment, and most of us go through life tethered more or less closely to a small range of varying selves—linked as they are to the fundamental group situations and basic values.

Integration and In-group versus Out-group Relations. The coordination of needs or tendencies—both native and acquired—within the person depends upon the nature of the group participation. In the early years the identification of the child with the parents and family situation is complete. As he grows up, he identifies himself with his fellows in the various groups to which he belongs. But, as his group contacts reach outward, the intensity of the participation may decrease. The identification in the family circle is intimate and deeply emotional. The identification of the member with an international scientific association may be highly impersonal, intellectual, and only slightly emotional, except perhaps as the membership enhances the self. There is a kind of scale of identification from a deep and abiding sort with one's mother and father, or, as an adult, with one's mate and one's children, on through the various primary and secondary groups to those ill-defined publics or crowds of which we may be but temporary members. Moreover, in secondary groups our identification is likely to be segmental and largely to group symbols rather than to persons.

As we know, such identification covers but half of the process of integration. Man is not only filled with love, sympathy, and friendly reactions of approach and coöperation; he is also filled with hatred, dislike, and antagonistic reactions of withdrawal, or of competition and conflict. The ideas, attitudes, and habits built up toward the out-group are important. Personality integration is accomplished by the interplay of these two sets of opposite patterns, such as love and hate, like and dislike, sympathy and disgust, approach and withdrawal, coöperation and competition or conflict. These dual patterns run throughout our particular social order at many points. They are reflected in culture because they exist in man and in his reactions with his fellows. For example, as he grows up, he learns from his mother, father, siblings, playmates, neighbors, and others in his primary contacts a whole set of attitudes and ideas about his own particular groups as set off against other persons and groups who are not acceptable, toward whom the expected attitudes are those of avoidance, distrust, and even fear and hatred. Out of specific rôles which he acquires at home, in play, and elsewhere, he learns, for example, to keep away from the children on the other side of the tracks, or he believes that Catholics or Jews are not to be trusted by little Protestant boys and girls, or that Negroes are inferior to whites. And along with these negative ideas and attitudes—in fact ambivalent to them—he learns the superiority of his own groups: family, play group, neighborhood, and community.

Not only does the child learn specific rôles in relation to particular out-groups and in-groups, but there often arises a "generalized other" centered in a series of in-groups to which he belongs: his own family, his neighborhood, his social-economic class, and his own nation. In contrast, there is a negative or ambivalent generalization of experience toward the outsider, the members and the symbols of a series of out-groups: families of lower social class, other classes as groups, and other nations and races. That is, in one's family there are certain symbols of identification, like the family name, of expectation, such as what one is supposed to do in certain circumstances, and so on. In similar manner, in every in-group to which we belong there are symbols of identification in the name, in the ideals and myths of the group, and in the expectations and demands regarding the future. So, too, in the nation we have the name, the flag, the map, the national anthem, the insignia of office, and the like. In short, the whole mechanism of generalizing our experience into larger and integrated self patterns is linked up with the ambivalent nature of group identifications. Some persons remain integrated and generalized in experience at the level of their family, others at that of a particular religious body or social class. In an era of strong nationalism most persons do not go beyond the symbols of their own country, and the rise of a generalized other respecting international relations lies largely in the future. It may well be that the high degree of integration which one develops at any one of the group levels is dependent in part on the existence of strong counteracting habits and attitudes toward out-groups.

THE SELF AND MORAL CONTROL

In a broad psychological sense social control implies that a stimulus fixes or delimits the response, although there are limits to this in terms of previous learning. Unless such previous experience furnishes the foundation for a reception of the stimulus and consequent response as anticipated by the stimulator, control in the sense of our broad definition is not forthcoming.

For children as well as adults both the specific word and the purely vocal gesture play a part in regulating others. That language is basic to the control of other persons in the social situation should be evident from much of our previous discussion. The vocal gesture and the word indicate an oncoming act and hence tend to bring the recipient of the verbal utterance under control by setting up in him an expected or incipient action.

But the term *social control* is usually employed in the social sciences in the narrower sense of moral and legal control, that is, direction and delimitation of responses that are defined within the mores and the accepted law. From this standpoint social or moral control may be defined as a form of cue directed toward modifying or inhibiting the behavior of others of the same group or society for the welfare and continuity of the group or

society, and any act of an individual may come to be defined within the framework of social control. It is evident, that moralization is but a special phase of the larger and all-inclusive process of socialization.

One of the major features of culture is the vast body of institutionalized regulations, long established. These may take the form of overt coercive devices or of symbolic ones, chiefly in verbal form. One of the basic problems before us is how to relate the outer forms of control, such as coercion, force, and violence, with the symbolic forms, especially words, and finally how control operates in the inner features of the person, that is, in relation to his attitudes and ideas. It has long been recognized that the most effective social control stems from the inner convictions of the individuals concerned. When functioning normally, the individual wants to act in the prescribed way. He knows, in fact, no alternatives.

Guilt and Shame as Internalized Controls. Like other socialized patterns, effective control mechanisms are built up through rôle-taking. The growing child gets his moral rôles by imitation of his parents, teachers, and others. In time the rôles as to what is "right" and "proper" become internalized into the conscience or superego, as Freud termed it. The superego is developed from the moral "me's" or rôles which culture has foisted upon the growing individual. When the superego, the "me's" of moral behavior, picked up from family and community, comes to dominate us, we tend to fit neatly into the social order and to obey its mandates quite consistently. When the superego does not completely dominate the id impulses (using Freud's term for basic impulses or needs) or modify the ego (perception and reason in Freud's sense), the individual may make adjustments to the societal demands more in keeping with his own wishes.⁴⁴

The manner in which the moral rôle or superego develops is neatly demonstrated in a case of a five-year-old-boy who was being analyzed by Jenny Waelder. When the topics of masturbation and associated fantasies began to appear during the analysis, the lad, hitherto shy and inhibited, became very aggressive. As Anna Freud tells the story:

"In the analytic hour he pretended to be a roaring lion and attacked the analyst. He carried a rod about with him and played at 'Krampus,' [a devil in German folklore], i. e., he laid about him with it on the stairs, in his own house and in my room. His grandmother and mother complained that he tried to strike them in the face. His mother's uneasiness reached its climax when he took to brandishing kitchen knives. Analysis showed that the child's aggressiveness could not be construed as indicating that some inhibition on his instinctual impulses had been lifted . . . He was simply suffering from anxiety. The bringing into consciousness and the necessary confession of his former and recent sexual activities aroused in him the expectation of punishment. According to his experience, grown-up people were angry when they discovered a child indulging in such practices. They shouted at him, checked him sharply with a box on the ears or

⁴⁴ For a brief summary of the meaning of id, ego and superego, see Sigmund Freud, *An Outline of Psychoanalysis* (New York, W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1949).

beat him with a rod; perhaps they would even cut off some part of him with a knife. When my little patient assumed the active rôle, roaring like a lion and laying about him with the rod and the knife, he was dramatizing and forestalling the punishment which he feared. He had introjected the aggression of the adults in whose eyes he felt guilty and, having exchanged the passive for the active part, he directed his own aggressive acts against those same people. Every time that he found himself on the verge of communicating to me what he regarded as dangerous material, his aggressiveness increased. But directly his forbidden thoughts and feelings broke through and had been discussed and interpreted, he felt no further need of the 'Krampus' rod, which till then he had constantly carried about with him, and he left it at my house. His compulsion to beat other people disappeared simultaneously with his anxious expectation of being beaten himself."⁴⁵

The development of the moral part of the self, then, consists in internalizing the definition and conduct which parents, teachers, preachers, judges, probation officers, club leaders, recreational directors, and others have laid before the child. Conformity to the codes leads to reward; failure to conform, to punishment. When this punishing function becomes integrated into one's inner life, the conscience is born.

In the process of moral training, however, an important problem arises. Does telling the child verbally what is "right" or "wrong" have any marked effect upon his subsequent conduct? That is, what is the relation of verbal moral instruction to subsequent moral conduct?

Moral Knowledge and Moral Conduct. In our society, from the onset of language, but long before he is faced with concrete moral choice, the child is equipped with words which are believed to define moral situations in advance. The issues, with their accompanying ethical words, are laid upon the child in the hope that he will thus be effectively prepared to face problems of conduct successfully later on.

While there seems to be no clear evidence of complete causal correlation of the knowledge and the use of moral words with overt action, no one doubts that the two are linked together. The real problem concerns the possible use of moral words as guides to specific moral conduct, just as verbal instructions may be an aid in acquiring many manual skills. However, the use of words in training for moral conduct—in contrast to manual acts which may be broken down into simple specific units that may be *named*—is limited because we are not yet able to break down moral behavior into sufficiently concrete specific units of activity to which we can give specific names. There is no such link between verbal terms and specific acts. We have rather a host of vague general terms with a great deal of emotional and even fantasy quality. Most societies ensure moral conduct by means of maxims, slogans, commandments, and other verbal instruments of broad but vague denotation. Hence the basic prob-

⁴⁵ Anna Freud, *The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense* (New York, W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1946), pp. 123-124. By permission.

lem remains unanswered: How well will moral words learned before the child meets a concrete moral situation aid him in directing his conduct when the situation does arise?

Moral Views and Moral Action. A person has but to open his eyes and ears to realize that adult professions of morality do not correspond any too closely with moral actions. What men say, what they profess, is often at considerable variance with what they do. Verbal reactions seldom have to correlate perfectly with overt reaction, except in exact science and its applications. Vocal adherence to moral codes will satisfy hundreds of situations where overt conduct is not demanded.

Yet an emotional strain may be set up within the personality by the divergence between profession and practice. In a society like ours, where Christian morality has a difficult time of it to match with business practices, where the making of money outweighs most other considerations, the verbal code is often a matter of mouthing a ritualistic phrase. The tolerance we show for the man who makes millions by dishonest stock manipulations, or by vice, gambling, and bootlegging, indicates that in American society, at least, the true moral code is rather different from that taught by official religion and morals, or from that found embodied in the law.

Although moral codes differ in various societies, the strain between verbal concepts of morality and overt conduct is common everywhere. In closely knit religious communities with a simple economic order and direct primary-group controls one often finds an amazingly high correlation between the moral culture norms and the daily conduct of the communicants. In a complex, highly diverse society like that of western Europe or America today, such integration of personality and social order is rare indeed.

THE MATURE PERSONALITY

While it is difficult to define the mature personality in accurate terms, we all have some notion as to what maturity means. In line with our standpoint, a satisfactory definition would have to take into account the cultural interpretation of maturity of a given society. What we consider maturity might not correspond to the norms of another time or place.

In our society the institutional evidences of personal maturity consist of such things as attainment of the legal age to vote, the getting and holding of a job, the taking of a wife and accepting of family responsibilities, and participation in the life of one's community. The psychological components are less easy to state. But among other features maturity is marked by generalized rôles centering around these institutional expectancies. This means, of course, responsibility, consistency, and continuity in rôle-taking. In considering maturity it is important also to know how the individual regards himself, his sense of objectivity and

the balance of fixity and flexibility. Then, too, we should consider the organization of rôles and goals with respect to his work, love life, creativity, ideals and moral values, and his general life philosophy.

Consistency and Continuity. Consistency and continuity of self rest upon certain uniformities in organic structure and function, on the one hand, and upon certain recurrent and persistent features of the social situation and attendant rôles on the other. It is obvious from our discussion that the emergence of patterns of consistency is gradual. When we say that the child is impulsive, inconsistent, forgetful of what he "should do"—that is, of his expected rôles—we are merely stating the fact of wide-ranging and more or less specific rôles arising in each new situation. While wide variation in rôles is ordinarily characteristic of the child, it is also true that many adults remain fixed in personal development at rather rudimentary stages, illustrated in the case with which they take on the rôles of those about them. We often say that these persons lack a personality of their own or that they have a chameleon-like nature, changing their rôles rather quickly and completely to fit every shift in the social situation. So, too, the person without character is one who has no generalized other of the kind demanded by the mores of the society in which he lives. The young child has no character in this sense because he has not yet developed an integrated rôle in terms of the moral expectancies of the community. Likewise, the fanatic in politics, religion, or economics is frequently a person whose rôle-taking remains at a relatively childish level, because he fails to reckon with the possible or anticipated rôles of others in society, except those that his own imagination concocts. And the disintegration of personality which marks many psychotics is often but an example of a retreat to more infantile rôle-taking. (See Chapter 23.)

The Person's Views of Himself. One way to judge maturity is to discover how the individual views himself, not merely how others regard him. Among other features degree of objectivity and nature and degree of flexibility are important.

Objectivity about one's self involves, first of all, an understanding or capacity to see one's self-attitudes and rôles in a detached, self-critical way. This detachment, of course, may be regarded as a kind of generalized other, an outgrowth of consensus of various individuals with whom one has been in contact.

One of the most healthy aspects of self-objectification is a sense of humor about one's own attitudes, values, and actions. It means that one does not take oneself too seriously, that one's values are not regarded as final and unchangeable, and that what one does is subject to review by self-criticism. To be able to laugh at the things one admires or values highly and to see through one's own pretensions is, in our society at least, one mark of a mature personality.

Another important feature of maturity is a reasonable balance between fixity and flexibility. Stability of certain basic habits, adherence to the moral codes of one's society, and persistent faith in the underlying values, expressed in loyalty, dependability, and responsibility for one's actions, are surely necessary to maturity and hence to a sound and stable society. However, upon this foundation variation and flexibility may be built. The mature individual learns that the moral code, for example, represents a modal—not a completely rigid definition of conduct. There are exceptions, extenuating circumstances, which sane public sentiment and the law of equity both recognize. In the mature individual mistakes or poor adjustment will lead not to automatic repetition of the same but to modification and change of attitude and action. Capacity and willingness to change, of course, rest on insight, planning, and the application of humor.

Another phase of flexibility is found in the capacity of the self to widen the range of his social interest and interaction. The narrowly self-centered person who views all he does in terms of what he "will get out of it" often discovers, in time, that he has lost his friends and that his lack of capacity for empathy restricts his personality. The paranoid individual who is suspicious of those around him cuts down his opportunities for sympathetic relations with others. His paranoia prevents him from taking the rôles of others into himself and hence narrows the development of his own personality.

In our society, at least, planning for the future is also a mark of the mature person. The individual is expected to direct his life along those channels which will bring personal rewards in the way of love, wealth, and prestige. That this is not a universal feature of personality is evident when we recall that among the Hopi, for example, personal striving is not considered good form. Among the Hopi, planning for self-aggrandizement is frowned upon and the mature person among these people would not show such characteristics.

Moreover, the individualism of our society lends itself to the development of uniqueness and autonomy which G. W. Allport has stressed as so pertinent to mature personality.⁴⁶ His theory reflects his particular interpretation of certain deeply laid cultural values of our society. As we have noted before, the personality is made up of traits, attitudes, values, and habits, some of which conform to those of others, some of which are peculiarly one's own. Complete uniqueness would be considered as atypical as would complete robot-like conformity.

Organization of Rôles and Goals. The adult personality is characterized by a wide range of motives and goals organized into certain rôles, both specific and general. With us the more important ones center around

⁴⁶ Allport, *Personality, A Psychological Interpretation*, op. cit.

work, love, creativity, moral values and ideals, and a general philosophy of life.

The work patterns of any society concern getting a living. We not only expect the individual to develop a high level of aspiration as to occupation and its rewards, but to strive hard to attain it. The striving demanded by the competitive way of life "keeps us on our toes." But it also induces anxieties at the threat of failure.

The stress which we place on struggle for wealth as a measure of successful work induces rôles and goals which stand in sharp contrast to those built up around the Christian virtues of love, kindness, sympathy, and coöperation. We encourage aspirations, at least at verbal levels, to the Christian ideals, but usually put more emphasis on attitudes and rôles centered on individual attainment of wealth and status. (See above.)

The need for love and affection has its roots in the earliest months and years, but in various forms it continues throughout life. Identification is the chief mechanism involved in the development of affectional rôles. The mature personality expresses his affections for others and his complementary needs of theirs for him in a variety of ways.⁴⁷ The patterns of affection among adults, however, range from those which have carried over from childhood to those which, by our standards, would be considered evidences of maturity. The former are illustrated by men and women who continue to be tied to their mothers' apron strings, that is, remain in a dependent rôle. The attitudes and rôles associated with the love life of the mature person show a capacity for heterosexual attachment to a mate, and an extension of one's self-regard to include high appreciation of the others' attitudes and values. Some further comments on this will be discussed in Chapter 14.

One important expressive system in adult life, though often neglected, is creativity. This consists of a particular set of traits, attitudes, values, and habits organized into specific or general rôles which set in motion what we call creative behavior. Such activities include "inventing, designing, contriving, composing, and planning."⁴⁸ Because we have learned to give such high respect to the exceptional performance of the genius, we are likely to regard creativity as a special quality which ordinary mortals lack. This view, of course, is thoroughly unscientific. Probably some amounts of creative ability are to be found in all individuals. Psychologically, creativity is related to fantasy thinking and play life. It represents an extension of the self from the more or less humdrum and expected routines of life. Some creative interest may find its outlets in the more or

⁴⁷ Robert F. Winch has developed a suggestive theory of complementary needs. See his *Courtship and Marriage* (New York, Henry Holt & Company, Inc., 1952).

⁴⁸ J. P. Guilford, "Creativity," *The American Psychologist*, 1950, 5:444-454. Quotation from page 444.

less passive seeing, hearing, or otherwise perceiving sports and games, paintings and sculpture, music, motion pictures, television shows, or other forms of entertainment. In some individuals, however, creativeness plays a more active part in one's life. The inventor, of either technological devices or new social doctrines, is such a one. There are also the artists, architects, engineers, and others whose inventiveness and planning are central to their careers. Most people, of course, do not fall into this category.

Creativity is closely tied to spontaneity of response but the demands of routine in so much of our daily living may prevent its development. The mature personality will try, however, to find some kind of balancing activities in hobbies, in recreation, or through religion. There are doubtless hidden resources of creativity in children and adults which are seldom realized. The schools have done something, but not enough, to stimulate creativeness in children and adolescents. Only occasionally does the adult who has not already developed creative hobbies become stimulated to spontaneous attempts to do something novel, such as to take up art, or music, or the drama, as a release from the rigid demands of life. Where this has occurred we often find that individuals have hidden talents, the expression of which gives them great pleasure.

Social psychology owes a great debt to Moreno for his recognition and use of the interplay of spontaneity and creativity in studying the social and personal adjustments of individuals. The particular techniques which he and others have developed are known as psychodrama and sociodrama and certain related features of sociometry.⁴⁹ As early as 1911, Moreno, in Vienna, Austria, used what he called "the spontaneity theater" as a part of his psychotherapy. He remarks, "Historically the psychodrama grew out of the principle of play." He used the "play as a principle of cure, as a form of spontaneity, as a form of therapy and as a form of catharsis . . ." He believes play to be "*a positive factor linked with spontaneity and creativity.*"⁵⁰ The person or persons are set a task of using a stage to act out a given part or rôle. By play-acting, that is, by playing or creating rôles of others or acting out one's own desires, the individual, be he patient or not, comes to see himself more objectively, that is, as others see him. Not only does this mean objectivity about oneself, but the dramatic sessions provided a certain emotional release from anxiety. This is what the Greek dramatic critics called "catharsis" or

⁴⁹ An extensive literature has grown up around these topics. For orientation the student may read J. L. Moreno, "Interpersonal therapy and the psychology of inter-personal relations," *Sociometry*, 1937, 1, 1-76, his, "Sociometry and the cultural order," *ibid.*, 1943, 6, 299-344, and his articles in *Psychodrama*, 1940, 1, 1-42. See also his earlier monograph on sociometry, "Who shall survive? A new approach to the problem of human interrelations," *Nervous and Mental Disease Monograph Series*, 1934, No. 58.

⁵⁰ J. L. Moreno, "Hypnotherapy and psychodrama," *Group Psychotherapy*, 1950, 3, 1.

"cleansing"—a function of the drama which has long been recognized.

The distinction between the psychodrama and the sociodrama lies in the standpoint and purpose which the therapist or research worker has in mind. Both use the stage and the dramatic situation of rôle-playing. The former, however, is concerned "with inter-personal relations and private ideologies." Sociodrama, on the other hand, deals "with inter-group relations and collective ideologies."⁵¹ That is, the former focuses its attention on trying to help the individual with peculiarly intimate problems. The latter centers its attention on modifying group concepts and stereotypes. For example, psychodrama has been used to help a husband and wife solve some of their marital difficulties. Sociodrama, by contrast, has been used to alleviate intercultural conflict between Negroes and white people, viewed as antagonistic groups.

With reference to spontaneity and creativity, such dramatic therapeutic sessions stimulate capacity for taking the standpoint and rôle of another, or for expressing in a social setting one's own loves, hates, and anxieties, all of which *creates* a new social situation and helps teach one detachment about one's own attitudes, values, and rôles. Participants in psychodrama or sociodrama are not prepared or rehearsed in advance. Also the audience through identification with the drama before them experiences a catharsis and may get an insight into their own rôles which they did not previously have. In other words, this device gives a means of stimulating the growth of flexibility and of breaking through "the cold stereotypes of social attitude."⁵² The implications of this rôle-taking technique for solving labor-management, marital, racial, and other conflicts are striking, and in time more carefully controlled and testable methods of using these devices should be developed.

The increasing mechanization of daily life and the growth of secondary and highly temporary and specialized contacts with our fellows tends to produce a type of social isolation which might be partially offset by training in spontaneity and creativity. Through the home and school alike a more adaptable and creative ability at assuming the rôles of those around us might be learned. This capacity, in turn, might serve to offset some of the later effects of the sense of personal atomism which comes from living in mass society.

We have already discussed some aspects of moral ideals in relation to moral actions. We need only remark that the mature personality, under our culture, is one who strives to bring his moral beliefs into line with his moral conduct. Judged by the achievement of such a goal, one would

⁵¹ Moreno, *Psychodrama*, p. 352. It is clear that Moreno's distinction between "private" and "collective" ideologies reflects, in part, the kind of distinction drawn by Durkheim and others between the individual and group or collective consciousness.

⁵² Gardner Murphy, *op. cit.*, p. 352. On the use of these devices in teaching, see C. C. FLECKNER, "Rôle playing and the development of insight," *Social Forces*, 1949, 28:195-199.

have to admit that few people in our society attain the highest maturity. But the ideal itself has a function in motivating individuals to certain kinds of striving whose effects cannot be gainsaid. It must not be forgotten that the social order is, in large part, a moral order; otherwise society would fall apart. It is important to recognize that the personality is a social product, an important segment of which is the moral rôle. Hence the effort to coördinate the verbal aspects of morality with actual conduct means that the personal integration, on the one hand, and the moral order of society, on the other, are brought into some rational working relationship.

Finally we must realize that the mature person has some kind of unifying philosophy of life, although if an individual were to ask his friends to state their philosophies, their replies would be mostly verbal vagaries. Among important life interests, however, religion has long served as the life core of most people. While few can verbalize their faith, nevertheless religion gives a meaning to the universe and man's place in it that furnishes a focus to one's existence. In a world dominated by materialistic and deterministic philosophies, it still affords an expression of hope and visions of something better and more congenial to deep-laid wishes for completeness and harmony and unity with the world around us. Whitehead, the mathematician and philosopher, puts it thus:

"Religion is the vision of something which stands beyond, behind, and within, the passing flux of immediate things; something which is real, and yet waiting to be realized; something which is a remote possibility, and yet the greatest of present facts; something that gives meaning to all that passes, and yet eludes apprehension; something whose possession is the final good, and yet is beyond all reach; something which is the ultimate ideal, and the hopeless quest."⁵³

Mysticism and emotional thrill are two essential features of religious experience for the individual, but they may find their expression in his life organization in varied ways. In fact, the culture of our society offers outlets for people along a certain continuum of religious experience. We permit wide latitude in religious practice. We may have standardized our economic and political behavior, but in art and religion, at least, we allow considerable flexibility. As in the relation of the masses to standards of art set by sophisticated critics, so in religious experience the upper classes may easily fall into the error of assuming that religious experience for all should conform to the highly intellectualized forms suitable to themselves. No one is prepared to say *what* kind of religious experience or church affiliation is *best* for people outside one's own social clique. This is a matter of life organization, social status, and rôle, affected by a host of factors touching on other phases of life—physical, economic, political, and familial.

⁵³ A. N. Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World* (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1926), p. 274. By permission.

One person may find the greatest satisfactions in otherworldly contemplation; another may find his satisfaction in contact with the everyday world in an effort to make it a more desirable place in which to live. Certain religious groups favor the ethical, mundane interests, departing considerably from more elementary supernaturalism. They put little emphasis upon otherworldly interests and concentrate directly upon problems of social reform.

We may say, then, that religious experience, operating in a society in various approved ways, offers the individual a balance or outlet for unrequited wishes, for unfulfilled hopes, for desires to be at peace and harmony or in mystical unity with the universe. God, no matter how defined, serves as an ideal, as a source of comfort and perhaps of punishment, at least if we regard religion as closely linked to morality, as Christians do. The image of God gives a wider meaning or significance to our mundane behavior. God is a generalized other serving to balance and even to integrate our activities in a world where the complex calls of everyday life are often confusing, distractive, and even disorganizing.

Yet some individuals do not have a religious core to their lives, defining religion in the sense of a more or less mystic feeling. Such persons find substitutes for religious devotion to their work, to art, to political movements—such as communism or fascism—to some health cult or to other interests that carry them outside themselves. It is doubtful if many people could go through life without some anchorage outside their own narrow and immediate self-interest. Philosophy, in one form or another, gives the person a focus of life and a foundation on which to build a more extended self.

CHAPTER 8

Symbolic Behavior and the Self

As we noted in Chapter 6, language is but a part, not all of the communicative process. Animals are able to communicate by virtue of the fact that the response of one—vocal or otherwise—serves as a cue or signal for others to act. These cues are called signs. While a good deal of man's communication, especially of the interjectional and emotional kind, is similar to such interaction of animals, true human communication depends on the use of symbols. Symbols are linguistic aids, tools for, or means of, conveying ideas from one person to another.

The present chapter will deal with the interplay of language, meaning, and the self. The discussion will center chiefly on the following topics: (1) the cultural setting of symbolic behavior and communication; (2) the relations of language, communication, and thinking; (3) the two forms of thinking, objective and fanciful; (4) the communication function of vocal and other expressive gestures; and (5) the relation of language to motor skills and other forms of observable, overt action.

THE CULTURAL SETTING OF SYMBOLIC BEHAVIOR AND COMMUNICATION

The social-cultural source of language as regards individual acquirement has already been discussed. Yet for a full understanding of the place of language in the larger context of society and its culture, we need to examine further certain implications of this derivation. Communication, which takes place chiefly through speech and writing, is possible only because of a certain agreement or consensus between or among participants. In fact, the very word *communication*, the roots of which are the same as the terms *community* and *communion*, comes from a Latin term meaning to act and think in common, that is, together. When there is not some agreement or consensus as to words and their meaning, although individuals may use words from the same speech family, we say that they misunderstand or "talk past" each other.

Importance of Agreement. Consensus in the field of communication, in turn, rests on what is sometimes called the "categorical attitude" toward the environment. This involves a tacit assumption first, that we may name and converse about objects and events, second, that, through language and associated thought, we may classify objects and events, and, third,

that such naming and classifying permits a more effective manipulation of the environment.

There is, however, a deeper and in some ways more fundamental consensus of which individuals are usually unaware. This concerns the nature and form of the grammar of a given language. Such matters as the use of number, gender, case, tense, and the way words and sentences are put together are crucial. The grammar of a given language provides the common cultural base or frame of reference from which the individual views and understands his society and all its cultural ramifications. Such concepts as causality in nature, or the assumption that things may have definable attributes, or a consideration of relationships and the use of comparisons among objects and events are all closely linked with the structure of a language. In truth, *it is language and its associated forms of thought which determine the nature of our world, and not the world the nature of our language and thinking.* However, because people generally take their grammar and vocabulary for granted, we must examine the implications of these "common-sense" views in contrast to what the science of linguistics has taught us. People have a kind of "natural logic" or background of assumptions—seldom explicitly stated—which orients them not only to their language but by means of it to their entire culture. Such orientation is learned at an early period in life and largely in an unconscious or non-deliberative manner. As Whorf puts it:

" . . . The fact that every person has talked fluently since infancy makes every man his own authority on the process by which he formulates and communicates. He has merely to consult a common substratum of logic or reason which he and everyone else are supposed to possess. Natural logic says that talking is merely an incidental process concerned strictly with communication, not with formulation of ideas. Talking . . . is supposed only to 'express' what is essentially already formulated nonlinguistically. Formulation is an independent process called thought or thinking, and is supposed to be largely indifferent to the nature of particular languages. Languages have grammars, which are assumed to be merely norms of conventional and social correctness, but the use of language is supposed to be guided not so much by them as by correct, rational, or intelligent thinking. . . .

"Natural logic contains two fallacies: First, it does not see that the phenomena of a language are to its own speakers largely of a background character and so are outside the critical consciousness and control of the speaker who is expounding natural logic. Hence, when anyone, as a natural logician, is talking about reason, logic, and the laws of correct thinking, he is apt to be simply marching in step with purely grammatical facts that have somewhat of a background character in his own language or family of languages but are by no means universal in all languages and in no sense a common substratum of reason. Second, natural logic confuses agreement about subject matter, attained through use of language, with knowledge of the linguistic process by which agreement is attained, i.e., with the province of the (deceased—and to its notion superfluous) grammarian. Two fluent speakers of English (let us say, quickly reach a point of assent about the subject matter of their speech; they agree about what their language refers

to. One of them, A, can give directions that will be carried out by the other, B, to A's complete satisfaction. Because they thus understand each other so perfectly, A and B, as natural logicians, suppose they must of course know how it is all done. They think, e.g., that it is simply a matter of choosing words to express thoughts. If you ask A to explain how he got B's agreement so readily, he will simply repeat to you, with more or less elaboration or abbreviation, what he said to B. He has no notion of the process involved. The amazingly complex system of linguistic patterns and classifications which A and B must have in common before they can adjust to each other at all, is all background to A and B."¹

The linguists go on to point out that all of our thinking and doing are conditioned by such background elements. Consensus itself, whether it involves lovers agreeing to get married, conciliation in labor disputes, making of contracts and treaties, discussion of public issues, or the observation and verification of scientific facts, rests on such agreement "reached," as Whorf says, "by linguistic processes."

In short, language is not merely the mediator of ideas previously worked out in one's head, but language, particularly its grammar "is itself the shaper of ideas, the program and guide for the individual's mental activity, for his analysis of impressions, for his synthesis of his mental stock in trade."² Thus, the external environment does not determine the manner in which we examine and interpret it. Rather this is determined by the culturally derived percepts and concepts—carried in language—with which we take hold and order the world around us, both physical and psychological. What Sapir called "the tyrannical hold that linguistic form has upon our orientation in the world" applies to practically every aspect of man's life, both at the everyday common-sense level and at that of the expert and scientist as well.

Cultural Variations in Consensus. This rather abstract discussion will become more meaningful if we give some concrete examples of the way in which linguistic forms influence our perception and conception of the world. These illustrations will deal chiefly with variations in forms of gesture and greetings, in classifications of objects and events, and more technical matters, such as concepts of time, comparison, and causality. Moreover the first cases will contrast our own with other cultures and their languages. Later examples will indicate sub-cultural differences within our own society.

To a person naively immersed in his own culture and lacking any knowledge of another, the forms of gestures relating to greetings, beckoning, assent, dissent, and the like found among other peoples seem silly. People tend to assume universality for those forms of behavior to which

¹ Benjamin Lee Whorf, "Science and linguistics." Reprinted from *The Technology Review*, April 1940, vol. 42, pp. 229, 230. Edited at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. By permission. This article is reprinted in T. M. Newcomb and F. L. Hartley, eds., *Readings in Social Psychology* (New York, Henry Holt & Company, Inc., 1947), pp. 210-218.

² *Ibid.*, p. 231.

they are accustomed. Our manner of shaking hands we take for granted, but it is by no means universal.

"Among the Wanyika [of Africa], people meet by grasping hands and pressing their thumbs together. . . . The Ainu [of Japan] draw their hands from the shoulders and down the arms to the fingertips of the person greeted, or they rub their hands together. . . . Polynesians stroke their own face with the other person's hands. . . . Some peoples greet by placing one arm around the neck of the person saluted and chucking him under the chin."³

In parts of Africa the gesture requesting approach is to hold the hand in front of one, with the palm outward, and move the hand toward the person addressed. Obviously this would confuse a person brought up in Euro-American culture where the hand or the index finger is moved toward one's own face when one wishes another to approach. So, too, the gestures indicating "yes" and "no" differ.

"The natives of New Zealand show assent by elevating the head and chin instead of nodding as we do. The Turk expresses negation by throwing his head back and simultaneously making a clucking noise with his tongue. The inhabitants of the Admiralty Islands indicate a decided, vigorous negative by means of a smart, quick stroke of the nose with an extended finger of the right hand, if the negative is doubtful or hesitant, the finger lingers on the way and is rubbed slowly across the face."⁴

Not only do we take our own language forms for granted, but we are sometimes amazed to discover that other peoples operate with languages in which there is no sharp line between the parts of speech, such as nouns and verbs, or where there are, strictly speaking, no stem words, no prefixes or suffixes, or other forms of word combinations which we naively assume to be universal. Among the Nootka, of the Pacific Northwest, for example, the simplest speech form is a sentence, not a word. This is illustrated in Figure 8.

Whorf further elaborates the matter in these words:

"In figure 8, we have a simple, not a complex, Nootka sentence. The translation, 'he invites people to a feast,' splits into subject and predicate. Not so the native sentence. It begins with the event of boiling or cooking, *tl'imsh*, then comes *-ya* ('result') = cooked, then *-is* ('eating') = eating cooked food; then *-itl* ('going for'); then *-ma*, *-ita* (those who do) = eaters of cooked food; giving *tl'imshya'ista'itma*, which answers to the crude paraphrase, 'he, or somebody, goes for (invites) eaters of cooked food.'"⁵

³ From E. T. Haller, *Principles of Sociology* (New York, Harper and Brothers, 1933), p. 101. These selections are from a wide variety of anthropological sources. By permission.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 103. By permission.

⁵ Reprinted from Benjamin L. Whorf, "Languages and logic," *The Technology Review*, April, 1941, 43:250-272. Edited at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Quotation from page 270. By permission.

Differences in systems of classification are neatly shown by contrasting the Navaho with ourselves. The linguistic patterns of these people foster what seem to us an elaborate and at times unnecessary minutiae of




FIG. 8. Different ways in which English and Nootka formulate the same event. (Reprinted from Benjamin L. Whorf, "Languages and logic," *The Technology Review*, April, 1941, 43.251. Edited at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. By permission.)

classification. Moreover, they tend to stress concrete activities and have little place for abstractions. To note another example:

"The general nature of the difference between Navaho thought and English thought — both as manifested in the language and also as forced by the very nature of linguistic forms into such patterns — is that Navaho thought is prevailingly so much more specific, so much more concrete. The ideas expressed by the English verb 'to go' provide a nice example. To Germans the English language seems a little sloppy because the same word is used regardless of whether the one who goes walks or is transported by a train or other agency, whereas in German these two types of motion are always sharply distinguished in the two verbs *gehen* and *fahren*. But Navaho does much more along this line. For example, when one is talking about travel by horse, the speed at the animal may be expressed by the verb form chosen. The following all mean 'I went by horseback':

- | | |
|-------------------|--------------------------------------|
| ʔi ʂiʔ niya, | (at a walk or at unspecified speed). |
| ʔi ʂiʔ yildnoozh, | (at a trot). |
| ʔi ʂiʔ neeliqʔ, | (at a gallop). |
| ʔi ʂiʔ yilghod, | (at a run). |

When a Navaho says that he went somewhere he never fails to specify whether it was afoot, astride, by wagon, auto, train, or airplane. This is done partly by using different verb stems which indicate whether the traveler moved under his own steam or was transported, partly by naming the actual means. Thus, 'he went to town' would become:

<i>kintahgóó 'íyá,</i>	He went to town afoot or in a non-specific way.
<i>kintahgóó bil 'í'ibqáz,</i>	He went to town by wagon.
<i>kintahgóó bil 'ó'oot'á,</i>	He went to town by airplane.
<i>kintahgóó bil 'í'í'éeł,</i>	He went to town by boat.
<i>kintahgóó bil 'ó'ooldloozh,</i>	He went to town by horseback at a trot.
<i>kintahgóó bil 'ó'ooldghod,</i>	He went to town by horseback at a run (or perhaps by car or train).
<i>kintahgóó bil 'í'nooltqá,</i>	He went to town by horseback at a gallop. ⁶

At still more abstract levels, such as have to do with concepts involving relationships, attributes, comparisons, and causality, we find further evidence of sharp differences. Dorothy D. Lee has re-examined some of the reports of B. Malinowski on the linguistic patterns of the Trobriand Islanders.

We find from her discussion that the Trobrianders apparently have no word to convey the idea of causation but only that of "make into" or "accomplish" in the sense of a total sequence.⁷

"... The accomplishing activity and the uninterpreted sequence of two events, are illustrated in the following excerpt, in which a Trobriander describes *taytu* (yam) magic: 'We plant *taytu*, already it lies in the ground. Later on it hears magic above; already it sprouts . . . The garden magician goes alone and charms. He (then) remains, he reposes, on the third day he will go and recite magic, he will make-emerge the *taytu*.' . . . Again, pure sequence of events is given in the following description: 'We charm, he-might⁸ -be-quick . . . he-might abound, we-might-sagali.' (We would charm, the palms would ripen quickly, the nuts would become abundant and we could make a sagali.)"⁹

As Lee remarks, we may interpret this according to our own cultural point of view as "causation or teleology" but it is very doubtful if the native Trobriander thinks of this as anything but a "simple sequence." The same sort of conception is evident in their view of effects which follow the breaking of a taboo.

[A Trobriander] "was asked what would happen if a man broke the rule of exogamy. He said an insect would grow in the body of the offender. Malinowski wanted to know exactly how this would happen. The informant said it was like maggots in a corpse, the corpse just makes them. In the same way the insect is

⁶ From Clyde Kluckhohn and Dorothea Leighton, *The Navaho* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1947), pp. 198-199, 199-200. By permission.

⁷ From Dorothy D. Lee, "A Primitive System of Values," *Philosophy of Science*, 1940, 7: 55-578. All quotations from Lee are by permission.

⁸ The *might* does not indicate probability, but is merely an arbitrary and convenient way of rendering an obscure non-temporal particle (Lee's footnote).

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 357-358.

made in the body of the exogamy-breaker. Under given conditions, maggots invariably follow death; yet we would not maintain that death causes maggots." ¹⁰

While in our society, from a scientific view, this failure to trace causal sequences may be labeled illogical, it must be recalled that common-sense ideas are often at about this same level. Even in scientific matters, it is not so long since the notion of "spontaneous generation" was well-accepted in biology.

In much the same way the Trobrianders interpret the relationship between sexual congress and paternity. Malinowski's statement that the Trobrianders had no idea of the causal relation between intercourse and child-bearing has often been understood to mean that these people were completely ignorant of physiological paternity. Seen in the light of their grammar and logic, which does not provide for thinking in terms of causation in our manner, the native statement makes sense. These people simply view copulation as preceding pregnancy but go no further in their interpretation of these events.

So, too, the Trobrianders lack a "cause-and-effect pattern of thought" as regards events in time, or history.

"On the one hand, the Trobriander uses no clear temporal categories in his speech. What Malinowski calls a future, is used to indicate the past, the present and the future, as well as the potential, event. The article—*l* serves to point to the past, to indicate the present emphatically and definitely, and to show accomplishment. *Boge*, which Malinowski renders as *already*, also stands for the present. Sequence may be stressed, but not in relation to specified time. Though sequence within a sentence is usually an index to sequence of occurrence in time, the sentence often reverses this sequence, putting the present before the past. This is illustrated in the following phrases: 'Coconut, areca-nut he fruit, no he-might-flower,' when, obviously, the flowering is expected to come before the fruit; and, 'This-here (old part of taro) he-might-rot-away, already he-stand-up new-sprout, already he-rot-away old-taro.' It is the modal or aspectual, not the temporal, phase of the event, I believe, which is really brought forward. Potentiality, achievement, completion, definiteness, emphasis are indicated at most; and the event remains self-contained and essentially unrelated." ¹¹

Along with this lack of concepts of history, these natives have no conception of "progressive change, no idea of one event leading up to another." The past is not an ordered series of events but a "chaotic repository of unrelated events." All these patterns of thought reflect their particular linguistic forms. They do not lack the intellectual capacity to think as well as we do, but they have developed their own ways of thinking in the face of needs and situations which are interpreted otherwise. As Lee puts it:

"The absence of devices for the expression of causality and the means and end relationship is not an isolated fact in the Trobriander language. In fact, the Tro-

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 358.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 360.

biand sentence is a series of self-sufficient words with almost no morphological mechanism to relate one to the other. The only relational device which occurs, is a type of possessive, with a strong substantival flavor. Otherwise the words are self-contained. Pronominal particles which indicate either the subject or the object are incorporated in the verb. There is nothing morphological in the sentence to indicate the relation of noun to noun, of verb to verb, or noun to verb. Even position in the sentence is not used for this purpose. For example, there is nothing, either in morphology or in sentence position, to tell the hearer whether the man bit the dog, or the dog the man. In this, again, I see a degree of aloofness on the part of the Trobriander, and an implication of the self-sufficiency of each object of knowledge; an interest in the essential rather than the accidental or relational. I am not maintaining here that the Trobrianders recognize no relationship or attribute whatsoever. Obviously, if such were the case, I should be forced to hold that they have no language, since all words are, at base, attributive and classificatory. But I want to make the point that the name which the Trobrianders give to an object applies directly to the nature of the thing, and only incidentally to its attributes. The Trobriander does not analyse the nature of things, to dissolve it into attributes or relationships; he does not direct his interest toward transcending the object in any way whatever. His attitude toward events, historical and mythological, points to this conclusion; so does his reason for the keeping of a taboo;—it was *ordained of old*. It is not the pressure of authority which motivates the observance of the taboo, but the nature itself of the taboo. The observance of the taboo is an end in itself.

"Things as well as events are viewed aloofly, as complete and disparate. Objects are good not because they are of use, but because of an element which went into the making of them; because they contain goodness. According to Malinowski, even magical potency is such an ingredient element. . . ." ¹²

It is clear that these natives are primarily interested in particular events and not in classifying them or their attributes. So, too, they make little or no use of terms of comparison. There are only two terms, and these used rarely.

"These are *makawala*, whose generic meaning appears to be *to be of a type with*, and *ituuwali* which apparently means *to be distinct from*. There is no grammatical device like our own adjectival suffixes for the expression of relative degree, as *-er* and *-est*; terms like *relative*, *comparative*, *equal*, *normal*, *average*, are lacking. . . .

"We discover, then, in the Trobriander language, a sentence composed of essentially disparate and unrelated words. We find that, in his speech, the Trobriander rarely compares, does not express causality or the telic relationship, feels no conventional urge to go beyond the fact into its implications or relationships. . . ." ¹³

These various illustrations serve to show how varied are men's symbolic interpretations of their world and their activities. Whether we perceive and conceptualize the environment and our place in it in terms of disparate events with no particular reference to past or future, or whether we dissect nature and ourselves in terms of "a collection of rather distinct

¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 361-362.

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 364, 365.

objects and events corresponding to words," as Whorf puts it, will depend on the relationship of our conduct to the linguistic tools which we use to interpret it. Moreover we should be cautious in assuming that our particular frame of reference and understanding of the world is the only correct one. As Whorf has said:

"Western culture has made, through language, a provisional analysis of reality and, without correctives, holds resolutely to that analysis as final. The only correctives lie in all those other tongues which by aeons of independent evolution have arrived at different, but equally logical, provisional analyses."¹⁴

With this caution in mind let us now turn to examine certain important aspects of the inter-relation of language, meaning, and communication with particular reference to individuals living in Euro-American societies and their culture.

THE RELATIONS OF LANGUAGE, MEANING, AND COMMUNICATION

In development action precedes thinking. Only gradually does the young child develop his inner life of thought, and, long before he has reached this stage, he has learned to adapt himself outwardly to a wide variety of situations. The shift from overt activity to thought consists in the internalizing of certain of the segmental or partial responses which are a part of a larger process of adaptation. Toward the end of the first year of life, or in the second, there begins to emerge a certain division of the child's reactions. Some of these develop into symbolic responses, chiefly language; others continue in the direction of more specific overt conduct. We have already noted how gestures serve to indicate the oncoming acts of another person and how they may become associated with the major activities of a social situation. We have also described how the child's vocal gestures, in particular, take on a meaning for the mother, and through her reaction to these in time come to have meaning for the child. That is, certain sounds of the child, and later, words serve as representations or symbols for a variety of activities. Yet we must never forget that the child's understanding of the behavior of others—and in due course of his own activity—begins with a social act into which only gradually words come into play.

Language, Anticipatory Reactions, and Meaning. The words which develop out of these early vocalizations are simply further extensions of the gesture—more definite and precise in defining the situation and thus in controlling it. They become more exact cues to other persons of one's desires and oncoming acts. They reveal, in fact, a neat inter-relation of the present needs to past reactions, on the one hand, and to future reactions, on the other. Moreover, language helps to control the movement both of

¹⁴ Whorf, *op. cit.*, pp. 266, 272.

the other individual involved and of the person himself. Thus words set up (1) expectation or incipient action in the person spoken to, and also (2) expectation or incipient action in the one speaking.

This double aspect of language is highly important for the understanding of personal traits and in the adjustment of one individual to another. The expectancy set up in others by our own verbal responses—as well as by our general bodily postures and gestures—is the foundation of that common-sense prediction of behavior without which we could not operate as social beings. Whenever we act toward another person, we set up in him certain expectancies or “claims” on us. If we offer a child a toy, there is aroused in him an anticipation that we will carry this gesture into the complete act of giving, since we have already by our gesture set up in him the incipient reactions of acceptance or refusal, that is, to begin to use the toy. If we disappoint him, we inhibit the continuation of this incipient response and stimulate another which he did not expect. An illustration at the adult level is that of the flirt whose gestures of love-making toward another are labeled false because he or she sets up anticipations which are not carried out.

The implications of this expectancy for overt behavior, and for moral conduct, in particular, are profound, and we shall refer to the matter in other parts of this book. Expectancy is a form of anticipatory response as described in Chapter 4. The way in which such a pattern is built up in the child is summarized by Latif as follows:

“. . . This cutting down of the infant's original adient efforts toward food, to mere gesture, provides the infant also with a 'meaning' connected with his gesture. The mother by solicitously proffering the bottle on seeing his incipient striving for food (his 'gesture'), produces in the child the following sequence of reflexes, and these, after sufficient repetition of the meal-time experience, become connected as a chain reflex: internal hunger stimuli (appetite or drive)—gestures of food adience, (the mother sees and steps in) mother as visual stimulus and nursing bottle as visual, tactile and olfactory stimuli—motor exploration (perception) of mother and bottle, and motor appropriation of the bottle and its contents.

“For the first few times the advent of the mother with the bottle is a necessary link in the sequence of reflexes. But, as in all learning of chain-reflexes, after some repetitions the proprioceptive afferent impulses returning to the central nervous system from one movement have become canalized into the motor paths of the next following movement, and are sufficient of themselves to produce the movement. From this it is clear that the mother herself is not an actually necessary link in the chain. On the contrary, if the mother does not see the infant's gesture and bring the bottle, the infant's next movements will be as *before*, to recreate its mother and to grasp and carry to its lips the (not present bottle). . . . And precisely this is what we have all often seen, and said, 'The baby is definitely looking for his mother, he wants her to bring the bottle.' Such is the physiological mechanism of 'expectation' and 'purposive' action in general. This 'expectant' recreation of its absent mother and grasping reach for the absent bottle are the

gesture's meaning in the experience of the infant. They mean, translated into words: 'I want mother to bring the bottle.'"¹⁸

It is in this way that the reaction or gesture of a second individual, in this instance the mother, becomes associated with the gesture of the first, here the child. This linkage of the perception or imagery of the mother's response to the child's own response influences his subsequent act or gesture toward the mother. For example the child's hunger drive and crying become associated with the mother's voice, fondling, kissing, and nursing him. Such association furnishes the foundation for the child's *future* gestures and acts toward the mother. In short, the most rudimentary social activity of a given individual always implies another individual *reacting to this act*.

Expectation and meaning begin in overt interaction. But their further development depends on the growing importance of gesture and language, that is, of communication, since the latter is but preparatory to overt behavior. The whole interplay of language, communication, and meaning is well stated by Dewey:

"A requests B to bring him something, to which A points, say a flower. There is an original mechanism by which B may react to A's movement in *pointing*. But natively such a reaction is to the movement, not to the *pointing*, not to the object pointed out. But B learns that the movement is a pointing, he responds to it not in itself, but as an index of something else. His response is transferred from A's direct movement to the *object* to which A points. Thus he does not merely execute the natural acts of looking or grasping which the movement might instigate on its own account. The motion of A attracts his gaze to the thing pointed to; then, instead of just transferring his response from A's movement to the native reaction he might make to the thing as stimulus, he responds in a way which is a function of A's *relationship*, actual and potential, to the thing. The characteristic thing about B's understanding of A's movement and sounds is that he responds to the thing from the standpoint of A. He perceives the thing as it may function in A's experience, instead of just egocentrically. Similarly, A in making the request conceives the thing not only in its direct relationship to himself, but as a thing capable of being grasped and handled by B. He sees the thing as it may function in B's experience. Such is the essence and import of communication, signs [symbols], and meaning. Something is literally made common in at least two different centres of behavior. To understand is to anticipate together, it is to make a cross reference which, when acted upon, brings about a partaking in a common, inclusive, undertaking."¹⁹

As action gives way to gesture and true language, **symbols**—largely verbal—become more important in the management of behavior. And finally the internalization of gesture and verbal, visual, or other symbols provides us with the world of *meaning*, that is, inner anticipatory processes

¹⁸ Israel Latif, "The physiological basis of linguistic development and the origin of meaning," *Psychological Review*, 1934, 41: 41-85, 155-176, 246, 263. Quotation from p. 75. By permission of the American Psychological Association.

¹⁹ John Dewey, *Experience and Nature* (Chicago: Open Court Ed. Co., 1925), pp. 176-179. By permission. Dewey uses the term *sign* here as we do *symbol*. See below.

—both conscious and unconscious—which function in the rise of organized inner life and in the control of overt adaptation.

Symbols and the Growth of Meaning. As we noted in Chapter 6, in the first stages of acquiring language, the word and the object are linked together in the totality of the stimulus and the response. The association of words with objects which the child gets from parents and others constitutes for him a total configuration. So, too, in the uttering of his first words, the object and the name go together. It is only with further conditioning that the name and the object get separated with increasing discrimination. It is this cutting loose of the word from the rest of the context of the particular experience which permits words as symbols for objects to come into full play. A *symbol is a stimulus—largely verbal, pictorial, or material—which stands in place of, or suggests, or represents, some object, situation, or relation, by reason of some association of the two in experience.* The symbol is an abbreviated substitute for something else. It stands in relation to this “something else” as a part to a whole. In the case of symbols, in theory at least, “we care nothing for what they are in themselves, but everything for what they signify and represent.”¹⁷ Symbols serve as handles, as convenient devices by which to take hold of, or to control, the world of situations around us, both social and material. That is, they are *power devices*.

Before going on, a word should be said about the distinction between signs and symbols. Unfortunately students of language and meaning have not always been consistent in the use of these terms. Following most current views, we use the concept *sign* to mean any cue or learned stimulus which sets off, or leads to a response. Thus, in training a dog to respond to a whistle by approach to his master, in anticipation of being fed, the sounds become a sign or substitute stimulus to feeding. Our own everyday life is full of such associations. We say that “dark clouds mean rain” and in expectation of this event take an umbrella or raincoat to work or school. Signs are also used in social relations. In the first weeks and months of life, the baby, through whimpering, crying, smiling, and laughing learns to control others, and these vocal and facial gestures serve as signs to the child and to the adult long before the former has acquired true speech and hence the use of symbols.

Symbols grow out of repeated use of signs. In fact, a symbol is but a special kind of sign which has consensus and convention to back it up, that is, to give it social meaning. Words as symbols are more effective than other gestures or signs because they more specifically locate objects and situations in time and space, and characterize and qualify them as to number, kind, and relationship, or indicate inter-relations of persons, of

¹⁷ John Dewey, *How We Think*, 1st ed. (Boston, D. C. Heath & Company, 1910), p. 171. In actual practice, of course, symbols often come to have great value in themselves.

things, or of things and persons. And as a person builds up patterns of interaction, his expectancies tend more and more to be expressed in verbal symbols.

Symbols take on the character of both stimulus and response. Utterances are substitutes for situations and become capable of setting up appropriate behavior toward these situations, but they are also themselves substitute responses—thus taking on the character of objects in themselves. The object spoken of is itself a response or behavior object. As E. A. Esper remarks, words and objects for most people seem to have a "natural, inevitable, and inherent" association, and "for the ordinary speaker, the object is what its name says it is."¹⁸ This fact is often forgotten when we discuss language in relation to behavior and to thought.

The meaning of any stimulus or object, therefore, lies within the response which the individual makes thereto, and the interiorization and reduction in overtiness of the latter are largely the bases of conscious and of the closely related unconscious mechanisms. As H. S. Langfeld says,

"Without response there would be no consciousness. No matter how many or how strong are the stimuli and the resulting afferent impulses, without the efferent impulses and specific response, either incipient or overt, an organism would have no awareness of a world; so far as that organism is concerned there would be no experience."¹⁹

The meaning of an object is our incipient reaction to it, *plus* our feeling-emotional tone. The motor nature of both conscious and unconscious functions is shown in Max's studies of changes in the neural action currents of deaf mutes. For both subjects and controls the shift from waking to sleeping revealed a sharp decrease in peripheral muscular action. But in the deaf mutes, dreaming was usually marked by motor responses in the arms and fingers, and like reactions accompanied their solving a variety of difficult mental tests. Clearly the whole proprioceptive system is intimately bound up with what we ordinarily call thinking.²⁰

As important as these proprioceptive and peripheral motor processes are, we must realize that the basic constitutional foundation of language and meaning lies in the cortical centers of the brain itself. The wide and complicated associations necessary to thought and communication could not be carried on if the cerebral cortex were defective. For example, idiocy and low-grade imbecility are certainly correlated with lack of de-

¹⁸ E. A. Esper, "Language," in Carl Murchison, *A Handbook of Social Psychology* (Worcester, Clark University Press, 1935), p. 449.

¹⁹ H. S. Langfeld, "The historical development of response psychology," *Science*, 1933, 77: 243. By permission.

²⁰ L. W. Max, "An experimental study of the motor theory of consciousness. III. action-current responses in deaf mutes during deep sensory stimulation and dreams," *Journal of Comparative Psychology*, 1935, 14: 469-486; also, "Experimental study of the motor theory of consciousness. IV. action-current responses in the hand during awakening, kinesthetic imagery, and abstract thinking," *ibid.*, 1937, 24: 301-344.

velopment or malfunctioning of the frontal lobes of the brain, and, although the precise relation of brain structure to the middle grades of feeble-mindedness (upper levels of imbecility and low-grade morosity) is not known, it is a sound inference that inadequate cortical development is a basic factor in serious mental deficiency. Without a soundly functioning cortex, speech, thought, and the higher development of consciousness would not be possible.

Various studies of aphasia (a condition of loss of speech due to brain injuries) are interesting in this connection. The work of Head and others shows that the adequate use of language depends upon the ability of the brain to direct the appropriate formation of vocal sounds.²¹ A man may perceive an object and yet be unable to formulate the words necessary to describe it or otherwise designate it to another. Or, again, there may be a loss of some important inhibitory center of the brain which serves to control and direct speech. When this is out of normal function, the patient may talk endlessly in a stream of relatively meaningless words. The content of meaning and language derives from social-cultural training, but the neuro-muscular—that is, appropriate organic—structures and functions must be intact, or the content cannot be learned, retained, or recalled.

These constitutional factors aside, at the social-psychological level, meaning is an outgrowth of the dual reference of behavior which we have already noted. A response is always directed to some part of the environment. The eye and hand, for example, follow the contours and relations of objects and their movements. We may call this the *objective reference* of the specific reaction. But every overt response has a corresponding attitude, concept, and feeling-emotional tone within the organism. This we call the *internal* (subjective) aspect of behavior. Since in human learning, words become attached to external events or situations and to concepts, they come to be a part of the total complex of reactions. In short, words likewise take on a dual reference: toward the outside, toward the object or situation, and toward the inside, the motivations, feelings, emotions, concepts, attitudes, and awareness of bodily changes.

Meaning, therefore, has two features: the objective reference characterized by *denotation*—that is, the location of the object with its properties and qualities perceived or conceived in time or space—and *connotation*, the suggested and implied ideas and feelings which cluster about the word. In connection with meaning language serves to tie together the overt and covert aspects of activity. It provides the link between the inner feelings, emotions, and motor or attitudinal sets, and the peripheral bodily movements of adjustment (the external reference) toward objects, social and material. And, whatever our view of the relation of thought to lan-

²¹ HENRY HEAD, *Aphasia and Kindred Disorders of Speech*, 2 vols. (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1926). See Asenath Petrie, *Personality and the Frontal Lobes* (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1952).

guage, certainly the latter is the tool of social intercourse out of which meaning is born. We hold, therefore, the essential thesis that language serves a symbolic and instrumental function in relation to meaning.

The relation of language to meaning is well brought out by common-sense observations and psychological experimentation. In one experiment a number of drawings of relatively ambiguous geometrical figures were exposed to two groups of subjects until they learned to associate the geometric figures with a given list of words. Each group, however, was given a different group of words. Later the subjects were asked to reproduce both the words and the associated drawings. The effect of language on learning recall was amply demonstrated as shown in Figure 9.²²

Though conscious and unconscious meanings arise from the internalization of overt activity, especially of verbal responses, and though at the level of organic change this involves the operation of incipient or reduced motor response, a full understanding of meaning requires that it be related to social interaction and to the rise of the self, especially as overt interactional patterns themselves become mirrored within the individual.

The Inner Forum of Thought. Thinking largely consists, then, in carrying over into internal operations, that is, into the memory and association, the various stimulus-response patterns, especially the verbal ones, which have arisen in social transactions. And, although words are learned as a part of the total reactive system, in time the individual comes to use them internally in anticipating his own action and that of others. For example, he will talk to himself as he has talked to others and as others have talked to him. In short, thinking takes on the nature of an inner forum in which social acts—now symbolized—are manipulated within the organism, just as originally our acts were qualified by the acts of others. As John Dewey says, thinking in this sense takes on a dramatic—that is, a social—character. *If the self arises in the dialectic and overt relations of the individual with others, thought represents but an extension of this process into the field of internal preparation or anticipation of social reaction.* Thought is a covert symbolic interaction, and although, as Vygotsky points out,²³ inner speech tends to be reduced to highly abbreviated forms of verbalization, the social nature of thought is not therefore totally lost.

Thought apparently begins in the introppection of playing first one rôle and then another—rôles which have their inception, as we know, in the overt field of activity between persons. The child's rudimentary rôle-taking, as when he learns to talk first as farmer, then as merchant, and so

²² See L. Carmichael, H. P. Hogan, and A. A. Walter, "An experimental study of the effect of language on the reproduction of visually perceived form," *Journal of Experimental Psychology*, 1932, 15: 74-82. Figure reproduced by permission of American Psychological Association.

²³ L. S. Vygotsky, "Thought and speech," *Psychiatry*, 1934, 2: 29-52.

on through a long gamut of specific rôles, comes to be reproduced in inner speech as well as in words heard by others.




FIG. 9. Stimulus figures and examples of reproductions which conformed to the visual representations of the object-names of word lists I and II. (From Leonard Carmichael, H. P. Hogan, and A. A. Walter, "An experimental study of the effect of language on the reproduction of visually perceived form," *Journal of Experimental Psychology*, 1932, 15:80. By permission.)

The growth of meaning, then, parallels the internalization of rôle-taking. By introjecting the attitudes, ideas, and habits of others into himself the child begins to think. But we may well ask: how does this process develop? Mead has provided us with a suggestive answer in his discussion of the development of the generalized other. As the child acquires more general rôles, he also develops the capacity to internalize the abstract symbols or concepts which characterize them. In fact, both specific and general rôles depend for their development upon their linkage to the

words which define them. The two processes go together. The mechanism in both is essentially the same, that is, one rôle (or the symbols associated with it) is set off in a conversational pattern against another rôle or segment of its symbolized experiences. As Markey puts it, "Within a symbolizing behavior system there is one part of the integrated behavior which stimulates and presents absent situations, past events, possible future events—the whole range of the universe for which adequate symbols are at hand."²⁴ In short, thinking is not only reflection, but also self-reflection, that is, the duplication within of the interaction which has its origin externally.

At more abstract levels such internalized interaction involves the use of concepts which define a certain generalization and differentiation of experience. Psychologically considered, a *concept* represents a reorganization of various aspects of perceptual experience in which some element or feature with a verbal label comes to stand for the whole experience, in which qualities of objects and actions are characterized by words indicating generalization or in which actions and states of being are represented by general terms. While concepts are expressed largely in the form of verbal or other symbols, their usefulness arises from their relation with various specific features of overt activities in the first instance. For example, as noted in Chapter 4, a child who has been conditioned to fear of a furry animal, a rat, has been known to express fear on his initial contact with other animals or inanimate objects of different size and activity when they possessed the features of furriness. The generalization of this response represents the probable root of abstraction—that is, selection of some particular aspect out of a totality. It is through such a process that children come in time to make judgments and determine courses of action not alone in terms of total stimulus situations, but with reference to specific features of them.

Furthermore, the relations of objects or actions to one another give rise, by means of discriminative responses, to still other and novel reactions, to qualities of objects, or to objects as a class. For instance, an automobile is a perceptual object which may be repeatedly presented to the child, and later there are other automobiles. Gradually he comes by the aid of words to form a conception of a class of objects called automobiles. His segmental reactions to the mechanism of motion and conveyance of these concrete objects and his neglect of such features as color or trade names, lead to the use of the word as a general cue to designate a whole class of vehicles. Hence in the process of differentiation of responses, on the one hand, and of generalization or abstraction of them, on the other, the concept arises. Or, to take another example, how does the child come to distinguish between his own father as a perceptual object and the class

²⁴ J. F. Markey, *The Symbolic Process* (New York, Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1928), p. 138. By permission.

of other men? The following illustration, adapted from E. B. Holt, shows how specific and general terms arise.²⁵

At the outset, the child, when he learns to call his father by the name "Papa," will call any other man by the same term, because he is not yet aware of any difference between his father and other men. At the outset, all men elicit the same responses in the child, and the word "papa" is simply linked to these responses and characterizes them in an abbreviated way. But, as the father repeatedly visits the nursery, talks to the child in a special manner, appears with particular toys or indulges in particular activities, these combined features come to differentiate the papa from other men whom he sees and hears. In other words, the continued or repeated reactions of the father to the child and vice versa get more and more closely associated with the word "papa," and the activity and the word together come to be the meaning. The denotation of the word "papa" grows narrower, and sooner or later the contacts with other men will be associated with someone *not* papa, that is, a social object who reacts differently and for whom one has no adequate anticipatory reactions. For instance, if the father has a beard, the contact with a man who has none will be different. The visual and kinesthetic impulses are not the same as those associated with the motor pathways which produce the sounds "papa." In this way, then, the child comes to distinguish between the father as a specific and concrete object and all other men. This is but the reverse process of building up class concepts of men in general, which would include the father. That is to say, the inclusion of the father in the category of men is dependent, in turn, not upon the differences between the perceptual father and other men but upon similarities—themselves, however, related to differences from persons, say, who wear skirts and who do other things to and for the child.

The process of abstraction, therefore, involves finding out both differences and similarities in the larger field of concrete reactions to specific objects or persons. In time there emerge concepts of class, qualities, and attributes which, in turn, may be associated with, or compared to, other classes, attributes, and qualities. It is on such bases that all manner of general terms are developed. *Quadruped* comes to stand for all four-legged animals, but not for those with six or two legs. *Redness* is a quality deriving from innumerable specific visual responses. So, too, *truth*, *honesty*, *justice*, *virtue*, and like terms come to stand for certain general attributes of everyday conduct. Without these concepts the highest forms of thinking could not be carried on. As we shall see, however, these and like terms easily get cut loose from their moorings in concrete perceptual experience and come to take on functions rather unrelated to their original ones. That is, they become not concepts but stereotypes or false and vague

²⁵ See E. B. Holt, *Animal Drive and the Learning Process* (New York, Henry Holt & Company, Inc., 1931).

concepts, free-floating throughout conversation and writing, with no solid meaning but often carrying much emotional freight.

To summarize, then, language gives us a means of handling the abstractions of concrete experience. Without words we could not use concepts in our adaptive relations. The names of specific objects or persons are, in time, supplemented by verbal symbols for classes, qualities, attributes, and relationships. And the names of the latter no less than those of the former we learn from our society. In short, verbal concepts are fundamental to the development of meanings of situations, objects, and persons and to all the intricate elaborations of these. Yet for the child, and for adults in most circumstances, meanings exist at the level of practical usage. A chair is "something to sit on," a knife is "something to cut with," and so on. But conceptualization, of course, goes far beyond this and involves us in universals of classifications, categories, propositions, and relationships which it is the purpose of formal logic to examine. Nevertheless, we must never forget that the development and use of the concept are tied up with language, which, in turn, is related to cultural learning and communication. No matter how far abstract words depart from the concrete everyday realities, no matter how far they become associated with the illogic of feelings and emotions or how persistently grammar and logic try to keep their use within the bounds of cause-and-effect relations, words remain in the end linked to social interaction, directly or indirectly. They are used with reference to some situation which has become internalized as a phase of anticipatory behavior, but their full meaning can be understood only by reference to the wider world of overt conduct.

TWO FORMS OF LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT

Thinking and its related language range in form and quality from the emotional, wishful, or highly personal sort to that which is logical, intellectual, and impersonal. In this section we shall examine the two forms of thought and of language.

Objective and Fantasy Thinking. In the course of elaborating the anticipatory phases of behavior—the field of mind, as the older psychology put it—nothing is more important than what is called associative thinking. But we may distinguish between two forms of such a process, one called logical, controlled, and objective, the other termed variously fantastic, autistic, or dereistic.

Objective thinking or reasoning is fundamentally a logical and controlled association of events and their symbols. It is open to verification by others—by statistical, experimental, or other scientific methods. It rests essentially on our experience in manipulating objects or persons outside ourselves and bringing them under our control. The objects and their situational complexes may be checked against a certain consistency of motion and force in the external world for which we construct symbols

to represent cause-and-effect relations of motion or action. These are anchored to actual concrete experiences in the world of men and objects outside ourselves. This gives rise to what Pearson aptly called "disciplined imagination," which is essential not only to scientific discoveries but to new inventions and to great art as well.²⁸

In fantasy, on the other hand, the associations are free-ranging, uncontrolled, and from the standpoint of formal logic, illogical. In fantasy thinking, personal wishes and emotions tend to dominate our internal functions. Such associations grow out of mere contiguity of terms, of events, or of persons which have no necessary external or objective cause-and-effect relationship. The associations of similars or opposites, and the linkages of contiguities of time and space, are employed, as in reasoned thinking, but in fantasy associations the connection is undisciplined and free-floating. This is evidenced in daydreaming or in the practices of magic wherein the name comes to stand for the object. For example, among primitive or peasant peoples a medicine man or the witch may cast a spell over a man by the use of his name. Or a clay or wax effigy of a person may be used to invoke evil power believed to be injurious to the person's health or fortune. For the personality this association may be as significant as if the linkage were scientifically verifiable. Although conditioning in the derelict field takes place more in the realm of free imagery and verbal concepts than in terms of the objects and situations for which these images and words stand, the contrast of fantasy and logical thinking rests fundamentally upon the cultural acceptance of the conditioning stimuli and responses, and upon its place in the organization of the self and not upon the mechanisms themselves. It is the manner in which these stimuli are integrated together toward consummatory and socially meaningful behavior which determines the differences between the two forms of thought.

The Rise of Two Forms of Thought. Both logical and fantasy thinking develop as the child learns his way about in his social and material world. In early childhood only gradually does the difference between word as object and word as symbol develop. In fact, it is just at this point that the distinction between the two forms of thinking becomes important.

We have seen that linguistic reactions have two references, one to the external world of objects, the other to the inner world (the subjective states). And the sense of power which words come to afford the child arises from two somewhat different areas of his experience. The first is the potency, the magic, of the utterance which produces the desired change in the external world. The second is the internal strength of the wish or motive which sets up the verbal utterance itself. We must not forget that the most significant words are learned in situations which are critical to the child or which are defined as critical for him by others.

²⁸ Karl Pearson, *The Grammar of Science* (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1892).

The first basic words are related to such activities as feeding, bodily comfort, elimination, sexuality, preparing for sleep, and play, usually accompanied by strong affect. In such situations, mother, father, siblings, or other persons play important rôles. And, when the child learns words as power devices, his subjective states are heightened by wish and accompanying feeling. Freudian psychology recognizes this fact in the concept of the "omnipotence of thought."

Words are often used by children and naïve adults as if they produced or created things or events outside oneself. In discussing his investigations of children's thought and language, Piaget reports the following conversation to show the child's linkage of word and object:

"Ar (6½) remarked during a building game: '*And when there weren't any names . . .*'"

"Be (6½) replied: 'If there weren't any words it would be *very awkward* (*on serait très ennuyé*). *You couldn't make anything. How could things have been made?*' (if there hadn't been names for them)? The name thus seems to be a part of the essence of the thing and is even a necessary condition of its being made."²⁷

The roots of such belief lie in the fact that the use of words often profoundly alters the external situation toward which the child responds. Yet, when the word does not produce the desired changes in the outside world, the wish with its expectation or anticipatory activity remains. Moreover, the child discovers that he may secure a pleasurable state by continuing this utterance, elaborating it and talking *as if* the object were there. This *as if* pleases him. Thus he creates a daydream world, a form, not of escape, as some would say, but of inner experience to satisfy a need with elaborations of all sorts. These produce a new and rich world inside himself. These give him pleasure and self-satisfaction when the external events cannot be changed to his liking. This is the way in which the fantasy life is created; and in this world words as well as visual or other imagery play a distinctive part. Fantasy may even take the form of invention of words for objects or situations which no one else understands. So, too, the whole habit of imaginatively playing the rôle of real or imagined persons which were discussed in the previous chapter falls into this same category of experiences.

In contrast to fantasy, the child acquires the names of actual objects and situations, and by their internalization learns to manipulate them with reference to objective cause-and-effect relations. For instance, the habits of bodily care, of contact with others, of manipulating toys and other implements or tools, are increasingly qualified by effective use of logical thinking, not, of course, in the form of a syllogism, but in the sense of realizing actual causal association of events and words. The child, in the

²⁷ J. J. Piaget, *The Language and Thought of the Child*. New York, Harcourt, Brace & Company, Inc., 1926. p. 62. By permission.

words of Freud, is increasingly made aware of the "principle of reality" outside himself. The whole matter is neatly illustrated in the graded series of items included in various tests of intelligence. Beginning with such matters as eye movements, hand-eye coördinations, simple perceptions of differences in form or color, with numbering or counting objects, they proceed to demands for recognition of similarities, to distinctive use of words to denote objects, relations, and qualities, and the whole paraphernalia of verbal judgment.

Gradually, of course, the child comes to distinguish between these two forms of thought, at least in a practical way. He learns that many wants are not entirely satisfied by fantasy. On the other hand, ridicule of a desire or an act may drive the child into such fantastic elaboration of his own private world that he may lose the usual contact with others. In the more extreme instance of schizophrenia the patient's daydream world may replace rather completely the world built up by customary contact with other people.

Forms of Thought and Communication. The personality develops as the child's communication increasingly takes on an objective reference to others. Such growth is linked closely with the rise of logical thought and external reference in verbal expression. At the outset of his development the child's striving is directed toward securing some sort of working relation with the world of his fellows and with the material objects that surround him. In his early years the child has not developed very fully the capacity to imagine himself from the point of view of the other person. Only gradually does he come to take the position of "the other" in conversation. It is not that the speech reactions are not from the outset socially learned by contacts with other persons; it is rather that the forms of thought and verbal expression only gradually acquire this "other" reference as a phase of the self.

From his investigations of Swiss children Piaget has shown (at least for his particular sample) that during the first seven years or so the child's language is directed by self-expressive, egocentric interests and not by a desire to place himself in the position of the person to whom he is talking. In one research project Piaget recorded the language of two boys over a considerable period of time. Forty-seven per cent of one child's spontaneous conversation was distinctly egocentric; for the other the percentage was 43 per cent. Only after the age of seven, contends Piaget, does genuine social collaboration in thought, through "true" conversation, begin to dominate the child's life. During this first period words spoken are not used from the point of view of the person addressed, but only from that of the speaker. In developing what Piaget called "socialized" communication children at the outset show more interest in mechanical, non-personal objects than in matters of human behavior itself. For example, it was found that their stories about mechanical matters were more socialized

than those about persons. Apparently the egocentrism of conversation disappears in relation to material, mechanical situations before it does in situations involving persons and their conduct. This fact may have some bearing on the development of thought in relation to material and social objects. Certainly it is evident that even among adults there is a great deal of conversation which is not truly built out of an interest in understanding the addressee, but largely concerned with expression of egocentric beliefs and attitudes.²⁸

Other researches confirm the general thesis of Piaget. M. E. Smith writes of the young child's speech:

"In the strictest use of the word, very little of the younger children's talk is conversation. It rather approaches monologue, being a running commentary on the child's own actions, as in the case of Boy 30, aged two years, eleven months: 'I am making cake. . . . I'm going. No, I got, I got. My finger can get in. Just fell, I make something out of sand. Some splashed out,' or, as an expression of his desires, when the same child goes on. 'Let me pat. I want some more blocks. Can I have that track? Won't go. That's enough. I want some. I want some more. I want vinegar jar.'"²⁹

It might better be said that these remarks are self-assertive rather than egocentric. As Mead would say, the child does not develop his truly socialized speech until he has learned to play the rôle of another person. As the child becomes socialized in his contacts with others, he develops a more objective thought and speech. Self-centered fantasy thinking and talking, however, do not disappear. But more important is the fact that such forms of thought themselves become, in time, tied into the culture of the particular time and place.

Logic and Fantasy in Culture. In one form or another both logical and fantasy thinking and the language associated with them find a place in the culture of every society. The use of either or both of these kinds of thought rests fundamentally upon consensus. We must not imagine that it is only scientific thought which is accepted in our own society. Taking our own society as a point of reference, in fact, we may construct a continuum ranging from highly culturized objectified thought to that which is of highly individualized and of non-communicative fantastic sort. At one end we would have logic and material science, at the other extreme the fantasies of the psychotics locked up in our mental hospitals. Between these extremes we would find all the forms of thinking, both logical and illogical.


As we move down the phases of thought forms from the objective natural sciences toward the fantastic, we find that the social sciences possess much more of the undisciplined fantasy of everyday life than the former

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹ M. E. Smith, "An investigation of the development of the sentence and the extent of vocabulary in young children," *University of Iowa Studies in Child Welfare*, 1926, No. 5, 3:21. By permission.

largely because workers in these fields have not been able to develop adequate methods or to free themselves from the illogical ideologies furnished them by their own folkways. Likewise, in the field of empirical knowledge there is a mixture of both forms. In the world of art—notably in literature, music, sculpture, and painting—we find a highly culturized set of standards which involve both forms of thought. Moreover, at the growing end of art, such as present-day surrealism and the writings of James Joyce and Gertrude Stein, there are productions which most people in the Western world would doubtless look upon as unintelligible nonsense definitely on the “lunatic fringe.” So, too, while certain religious patterns are considered sound because of wide acceptance, other religious expressions would be considered distinctly autistic. From these latter kinds of fantasy it is often but a step to the extremes of highly individualized productions of the psychotics themselves.

The whole matter may be summarized in the following fashion:



It must not be forgotten that fantasy as well as logical thinking has a highly important place in the creative advances of both science and art. It is only for purposes of discussion that the two forms of thought are treated as rather distinctive processes. Actually one form merges easily into the other, and there is in creative thinking a constant interplay of both.

In logic, science, or art the very disciplining of symbolic associations implies a certain fixity and limitation to any production of contradictory or novel thought. Once we have delimited an object or event or a class of objects, events, attributes, or relations by a given concept, we have by that very act set bounds to further new associations of these with each other or with other objects or events. In fact, the logician and scientist sometimes typify what Thorstein Veblen called “trained incapacity,” that is, a mental set of the specialist which prevents him from making new linkages. But in the process of free association or fantasy thinking old connections are broken and new ones may emerge. What appeared to be incongruous is now brought together. There is no better illustration of this, in fact, than in the history of science itself, wherein the greatest advances have been made by those who dared to break with scientific tradition by means of new concepts and new experimentation.

Fantasy thinking is in truth as “natural” and “normal” as objective thinking. The importance of the former for the individual and for the

group lies in its use and communicability. When fantasy becomes non-communicative, its possible function in interaction is thereby reduced. Thought and language thus lose their social and public character and exist only in the private world of inner conversation with oneself. In the extreme instance this may in time lead to rather complete isolation of the individual from his fellows. In contrast, when fantasies are turned outward toward the fields of mechanical or other invention, toward art, religion, or philosophy, by that very fact they become a part of the stream of interaction and culturized meanings that may be shared by others.

THE COMMUNICATIVE FUNCTION OF VOCAL AND OTHER EXPRESSIVE GESTURES

Not only words and sentences serve to convey meanings, but pitch, tone, rhythm, and other features of the voice do the same. Certainly domestic animals respond to caressing tones or harsh commands, not in terms of symbolic meanings, but as a part of their conditioned reactions to vocal gestures. In much the same way young children, long before they learn to talk, react to tones and cadences of the voices of persons around them, just as they themselves acquire variations in their own vocal reactions as a means of controlling others. Pleasant sounds associated with caressing and harsh tones linked to commands provide a basis for their interpretation, that is, anticipation, of the oncoming responses of others. However, as Major well put it: "If a child were accustomed to hearing soft words and being beaten at the same time, such words would come to arouse fear and trembling. If, on the other hand, gentle and caressing treatment were associated in the experience of the child with harsh sounds, the latter would soon come to be soothing and quieting."³⁰

In more mature human communication non-language vocal activities are also of great significance. As a popular remark has it, "It is not so much what you say, as how you say it that counts." Meanings arise therefore not only from the words we hear but from these vocal gestures.

"Natural" Symbolism in Sounds. Sounds in and of themselves may induce or suggest certain symbolic meanings. The vowels *o* and *u*, for example, are said to be "heavier" or "gloomier" or "more ponderous" than *i* and *e*, and high-pitched *ee* is said to strike a hearer as "thin" or "sharp." In one experiment along this line Newman gave a series of nonsense words, arbitrarily given meanings involving size, and secured judgments as to which word denoted "larger" or "smaller." Thus *glupa* and *glopa* were given the meaning "horse," and most of the subjects, on being asked which word of the pair "signified to them the larger . . . horse," tended to select the latter, *glopa*. The longer vowel sound seemed "larger" to them than the short one. It is evident that such symbolic judgments are not produced by

³⁰ D. R. Major, *First Steps in Mental Growth: A Series of Studies in the Psychology of Infancy* (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1906), p. 286.

linguistic elements themselves. There is no correlation between cultural associated meanings and the distribution of vocal sounds. Apparently non-linguistic factors such as "position of articulation, acoustic resonance, frequency, size of oral cavity, vocalic length, consonantal voicing, and phrasing, etc." were basic determinants in the rise of meanings.⁴¹

Sounds as such do produce symbolic effects on us in spite of specific conditioning to the contrary. In fantasy thinking the *Klang* association—that between sound and word—is very frequent. The proper name Strong gets associated with power in the child's mind, or *Stuhl* with a tendency to thievery and the like. And this sort of association is common among schizophrenics.

Some Features of Non-linguistic Vocalisms. One's reaction to and interpretations of another are influenced not only by facial, manual, and other bodily gestures, but by such vocal features as timbre, pitch, tone, rhythm, and pronunciation. Social-cultural training, of course, plays an important part in the use and meaning of these matters.

The quality or *timbre* of the voice doubtless rests upon constitutional make-up, but it may be modified by learning. If a man speaks in a gruff or coarse-grained voice, it does not mean that he is basically crude or rude. He may be merely reflecting his occupation or social class. Another expressive feature of the voice is *intonation*, in which both individual and cultural variations have a part, as in English, where we raise the pitch of the voice at the end of such a sentence as "Is he coming?" But this is culturally, not naturally, determined for us. Each language, moreover, has its own "melody patterns," as Sapir calls them.⁴² Thus a Japanese talks in a monotonous voice because his speech has been so developed.

Rhythm is also to be considered. In English our habit of accenting certain syllables and minimizing others is not due to the desire to be emphatic. It is just the standard conventional pattern. In other languages the rhythm may be quite different. So, too, variations in *pronunciation* make for different effects upon the listener. A person may pronounce certain vowels or consonants with a distinctive timbre or in some peculiar manner, and we may imagine affectation. But we must know the social and cultural background on which his speech training is built before we can fairly attribute this to innate organic difference or personal idiosyncrasy.

Aside from these items, matters such as *continuity* of speech and *style* of expression are important. As Sapir remarks, some individuals talk in broken "uneasy splashes of word groups," others in a more continuous

⁴¹ S. S. Newman, "Further experiments in phonetic symbolism," *American Journal of Psychology*, 1933, 45:53-75. See also, Edward Sapir, "A study in phonetic symbolism," *Journal of Experimental Psychology*, 1929, 12:225-239.

⁴² See Edward Sapir, "Speech as a personality trait," *American Journal of Sociology*, 1927, 27:892-905. The material on the non-linguistic elements is drawn largely from this article.

fashion. Likewise, *speed* of speaking and the manner in which words are put together are important. Here again we must reckon with the cultural norms and the social situation as well as with possible individual variations. The soft-toned, slow-speaking Southerner or the rapid-fire Italian may quite mislead listeners if cultural conditionings are not considered.

Students of speech are aware of these matters at the empirical level, and public speakers, preachers, actors, and lecturers, generally, develop their own standard patterns. Thus, a boy raised in a community dominated by the fiery emotionalism of a revivalistic denomination may judge the Oxford intonation of an Anglican minister at his service not only as unpleasant but as hypocritical.

Judging People by Voice. Vocal configuration as such is definitely a factor in the estimation of personal traits, as both common sense and experimentation have shown.

Allport and Cantril gave ten tests of ability to 600 students in order to discover their ability to estimate the personality traits of various speakers heard over the radio or a loudspeaker system. The voices were to be matched with certain "outer" and "inner" traits of the unseen speakers and with summary sketches of their "total" personality. The least successful judgments were made on such items as handwriting, complexion, and height. Rather better matchings were made with age and photographs; still better were judgments of occupation, political viewpoint, extroversion, ascendance-submission patterns, and the Spranger list of dominant life interests or values. But the most successful matchings were those with the overall sketches themselves.³³

Another study had speakers express various selected moods or feeling-emotional states by sounding vowels or consonants from A to K. These were recorded and then played back to the subjects, 388 students. There was much variation. Yet, on the whole, the judgments agreed remarkably with the intended mood of the speakers. The order of the percentage of correct judgments, ranging from 91 per cent as the most accurate to 73 as the least, was as follows: determination, doubt, sneering, sadness, amazement, pity, fear, awe, laughter, anger, and torture. Women judges did slightly better than the men, a result which illustrates a frequent common-sense judgment that women, in contrast to men, tend to pay more attention to clues in personality of this sort: voice, facial expression, manual gestures, and the like. (It is perhaps just such differences that give rise to the notion that women are more "intuitive" than men.)³⁴

Manual, Facial, and Other Bodily Gestures. Not only do vocalisms qualify interaction as well as indicate personality features, but manual,

³³ G. W. Allport and Hadley Cantril, "Judging personality from voice," *Journal of Social Psychology*, 1934, 5: 37-55.

³⁴ D. Dusenberry and F. H. Knower, "Experimental studies of the symbolism of action and voice. II, a study of the specificity of meaning in abstract facial symbols," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 1934, 25: 67-75.

facial, and other bodily gestures influence communication and likewise reveal traits of the individual. So-called "expressive movements" may not always contribute directly to overt adaptation, but they do reveal important personality characteristics and are certainly important at the communicative level of interaction. Such movements not only affect social adaptation but furnish a foundation for characterization of others as possessing certain traits. In this sense, then, they certainly are adaptive.

As to the place of such gestures in communication and inter-personal adjustments, we have as yet few really adequate data, and the results of research on the significance of these muscular movements as indicators of personality traits have been highly inconclusive. This is due to a number of factors, especially (1) inadequate criteria as to what constitutes an emotion, mood, or trait; (2) lack of definite terms to characterize emotions, moods, and traits; (3) poor sampling and lack of proper experimental controls in the investigations; and (4) variation in standpoint, as illustrated by the theoretical divergences between those who would study these matters in terms of separate, discrete elements and those who emphasize general and "totality" features of personality. Then, too, in most of the early studies investigators used single photographs ("stills") to display particular traits or moods (more recently motion pictures have been employed). It would carry us beyond our present purpose to examine these studies at any length, but one or two suggestive investigations will be noted. However, as pointed out in Chapter 3, where we discussed emotions, the meaning of emotions derives essentially from cultural and not from natural causes.

Dusenberry and Knowler, as another part of the research on symbolism of action and voice cited above,²² found that their student subjects made reasonably good judgments of the meaning of facial expressions. For their main sample who saw the motion pictures (388 students) the order of percentages of correct judgment, ranging from 100 per cent agreement as the most to 83 as the least accurate, was as follows: laughter, fear, awe, anger, sneering, pity, doubt, determination, sadness, and torture. In these judgments women were superior to men. The estimates made from the "stills" were less accurate than those from motion pictures.

Estes had 323 judges estimate the personality characteristics of fifteen male subjects as revealed in motion-picture records of certain activities, such as removing coat and shirt, playing games, building a house with cards, and holding a lighted match in one hand until it was entirely burned out. While he secured fairly satisfactory results, he did find that the accuracy of judgments varied with the judge, the subject, and the particular aspects of the personality to be estimated. To quote:

²² H. Dusenberry and F. H. Knowler, "Experimental studies of the symbolism of action and voice. I, a study of the specificity of meaning in facial expression," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 1938, 24:424-436.

"Judges who have strong interests in either the graphic arts or dramatics are more successful than those whose dominant interests are in the sciences and philosophy. Subjects who are introverted in the sense of having a liking and a capacity for contemplative observation and for the analysis and reconstruction of experience tend to be least accurately judged. Conspicuously well-judged traits are inhibition-impulsion, apathy-intensity, placidity-emotionality, and ascendance-submission."⁸⁶

The analysis of handwriting or graphology has been shown to reveal certain personality traits, but most of the work in this field has not been too carefully controlled and the results are often not clear. Studies in a wide range of expressive movements undertaken by Allport and Vernon are suggestive.

They took into account such items as verbal speed, drawing speed, rhythmic speed, over-estimation of angles, length of stride, and areas covered by such things as total writing, blackboard figures, and foot movements. By correlating the results of their tests, they postulated three coherent, consistent, and general behavior forms: (1) *areal*, or the tendency to fill up space, whatever the movement and however made; (2) *emphasis*, or the tendency to stress certain phases of expression; and (3) *centrifugality*, or the tendency to outward rather than inward movement. Thus the nine measures of expansiveness of movement produced a "corrected" statistical correlation of internal consistency of .82. This means that, if a particular individual writes large, he will also *tend* to cover much space in drawing—whether with hand or foot—to over-estimate angles, to walk with a long stride (in proportion to his height), and to use long strokes in checking a list of trait names about himself. In the same way there was found to be a certain consistency with reference to emphasis and in regard to inclinations to move "out" rather than "in," that is, to be outgoing rather than "indrawing" in movements.⁸⁷

These studies and others show that certain personality traits may be exposed through such movements, that there is a certain consistency and generality among them, and that, in turn, they may be indicative of deeper structural features of the entire personality. Other studies have used gait, facial gestures, and other bodily features as indicators of traits, but we shall not review these.

No one has uncovered the sources of these somewhat consistent clusters of features, but doubtless constitutional factors, such as strength of motor response, fatigue, organic injury, or special talent, have their part. Personal-social conditioning, especially in the mother-child relations, may have a place. Finally, cultural training will also influence these responses.

⁸⁶ S. G. Estes, "Judging personality from expressive behavior," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1938, 33, 235. By permission of The American Psychological Association.

⁸⁷ G. W. Allport and V. E. Vernon, *Studies in Expressive Movement* (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1933).

Not only vocal expression but manual, facial, and other gestures may in large part be predetermined for the individual by his society's anticipated or permissive patterns of reaction in this field of gesture. The stolid face of the Plains Indian or of the Scandinavian, like the expansive, mobile face of the Italian, is the result, in large part, of cultural conditioning.

G. W. Allport links up his work on expressive movements with his wider theory of style, which, he says, "is the most complex and most complete form of expressive behavior," and "concerns the whole of activity." Style is but another name of individuality and uniqueness, and it reaches into verbal, artistic, and everyday overt behavior. Into its development go drives, temperamental and emotional qualities, motor skills, intellectual abilities, and all the other factors which make up the total personality.⁸⁸

So far we know little of the actual cause-and-effect relations, if any, between these bodily movements and psychological traits, attitudes, and responses. For example, we do not know the probable developmental relation between expansive, centrifugal movements, long stride in walking, large handwriting, and the outgoing, extroverted personality, nor, per contra, the probable relation between narrow, confined gestures, small, cramped handwriting, other centripetal features, and the inward, introverted type of individual.

Some analysis has been made of certain of the dynamic relationships in the field of apparently meaningless muscular movements. Krout has made a rather exhaustive study of what he calls "autistic gestures," that is, dissociated, "vestigial," and "abstracted" responses "which are seemingly irrelevant" to the particular situation in which they occur. These may involve arms, hands, fingers, legs, and feet or head, face, eyes, and torso. "Autistic gestures" are illustrated by scratching the ear, running hands through the hair, or picking the nose. Krout has found that these movements arise, in large part, as a result of inner conflict and come to take on symbolic form as a substitute for verbal or other expression which might grow out of such inhibition. The gesture, in other words, serves as a release of certain tensions which characterize the blockage produced by conflicting impulses.⁸⁹

In summary, we may say that all these gestures, vocal, facial, manual, or otherwise, not only offer clues to traits and attitudes, but must be considered as behavioral backgrounds to a great deal of our conversational and overt interactions. But full scientific understanding of these remains a task for future research. For the present we can only note and describe them and recognize them as important aspects in the interplay of individuals.

⁸⁸ G. W. Allport, *Personality, A Psychological Interpretation* (New York, Henry Holt & Company, Inc. 1937), pp. 459-460.

⁸⁹ See among others, for example, M. J. Krout, "Understanding human gestures," *Scientific Monthly*, 1939, 49:167-172.

LANGUAGE AND OVERT RESPONSE

Another interesting and practical problem concerns the possible relation of verbal reactions—sub-vocal or audible—to the acquirement or management of overt acts.

Language and Motor Skill. The practical implications of a possible correlation of language and motor habit are important. For instance, in manual training, how valuable are the teacher's spoken instructions to the pupil regarding how to manipulate a particular tool? Or can one tell another how to play tennis, golf, baseball, or other games involving motor agility? Certainly it has long been assumed that verbal directions aid in the training of others, and there is some evidence to support this view from laboratory experiments.

One favorite method has been to use verbalization in various maze-learning situations. Lambert and Ewert found that performance in blind-fold tracing of a maze with a pencil is improved by verbalization of the memory patterns of the maze.⁴⁰ The subject might aid his progress through the maze by saying to himself: "Turn to the left, once to the right, twice to the left, double the distance, then goal."

The everyday application of this principle is apparent. Not only may a teacher tell a would-be golf player about his stance, grip, and so on, but the golf player in attempting to improve his stroke may talk to himself as a part of the total preparation for his swing. That is, he takes over the rôle of instructor and directs his own behavior from his inner forum of thought. The important matter apparently is that the skill can be broken up into units of movement that may be verbalized, and that the verbal directions may actually guide or lead the kinesthetic-tactual senses. Thus, even before a specific act is finished, the individual may say "better to the right" or "an upswing" in regard to the next act. Second, verbalization makes possible rehearsal in words between the various trials at the motor skill itself.

Esper has pointed out that this is not a one-sided affair. He has shown that verbal learning itself is often improved by its association with some manual movement. For example, in one experiment the subjects were asked to recite verbally certain manual movements they had already learned rather thoroughly. Many of them did best when they indulged in incipient finger movements. (The manual skill had involved certain finger movements over an apparatus of keys to be pressed down.) On the other hand, some subjects apparently did not need or use this additional manual cue to the proper sequence of verbal recital. Frequently a combination of motor and verbal responses makes for efficiency in learning either motor or verbal skills. The limitations of using only verbal instruction with ref-

⁴⁰ J. F. Lambert and P. H. Ewert, "The effect of verbal instructions upon stylus maze learning," *Journal of General Psychology*, 49, 2, 6, 1957.

erence to motor performance is universally recognized. Mere listening to directions from others or talking to ourselves is no substitute for motor practice.⁴¹

Another factor to note, however, is the evident absence of verbal cues in certain complex motor acts. We all know painters, sculptors, or skilled manual laborers who cannot possibly verbalize their skills for themselves or others. So, too, there are some types of activity which do not easily acquire verbal labels. Certain of our feeling, emotional, and physiological reactions are of this sort. Many of our inner experiences are peculiarly private because they cannot be verbalized. The very nonsocial nature of much of our visceral and emotional activity is perhaps one reason why we do not communicate it. As a result, general and rather vague terms come to define much of our organic and emotional behavior.

Other Relations of Language and Overt Action. The very specificity of a word, especially as it relates to objective reference and directive thinking, furnishes a focus for discriminative response. In this sense it is superior to a vague, general motor and feeling set. The word not only labels the situation and acts as an inciter to action; it also becomes a precise surrogate for the goal.

Our English grammar illustrates how language not only reflects the structuring of social activity but also serves to direct it. The indicative mode, for example, permits an affirmation about a person or thing; the imperative, a command or request, and so on. The subjunctive mode, on the other hand, is used to define situations regarded as doubtful or as likely contrary to fact or as a conditional situation. So, too, the declarative sentence with its direct statement of fact or opinion is unlike the exclamatory which expresses feelings and emotions. A verb in the active voice indicates that the thing or person is or does something while the passive voice reveals that something is done to the thing or person.

As we noted earlier in this chapter most people are quite unaware of the grammatical forms which help them to define the nature of their world and direct their reactions to it. The sense of selfness, the meaning of one's rôle, the forms of thought are all bound up with language and related symbols. We would not be either social or human without them.

⁴¹ E. A. Esper, "Language," in G. Murchison, ed., *A Handbook of Social Psychology*, op. cit., p. 448.

CHAPTER 9

Typology: Facts and Theories

The formulation of general or categorical ideas about other people and their behavior is a widespread habit. The recurrence of like conduct and of like circumstances provides the framework for some sort of generalization into class terms. Repeated contacts of a child with a number of adults some of whom tend, on the whole, to treat him kindly and sympathetically, others harshly and unsympathetically, will easily lead him to consider these individuals as falling into such groups as those who are pleasant and congenial, and those who are the opposite. Moreover, adults furnish the growing child with verbal devices for classifying people in order to help him define his own future conduct in relation to others. All through life we continue in this habit of pigeonholing persons into various types as to physique, temperament, and conduct.

Yet we may dismiss with a word many of the common beliefs which foster the concept of type in everyday life. On the basis of faulty psychology the man-in-the-street acquires notions such as that red-haired persons are given to quick temper, that a hatchet face is one of a money-seeker, or that brunets are given to romantic love. The whole foundation of popular characterology—be it phrenology, palmistry, or what not—rests upon this sort of uncritical association of certain specific items of physical features with typical behavior manifestations. Other illustrations are found in the folk belief that Communists have shaggy hair, dark visage, and murderous intentions, that all Frenchmen are great lovers, and that all Englishmen lack a sense of humor. In fact, the typology used by most people frequently rests on little more than ordinary stereotypes. However, it would be a mistake to assume that typology has no serious foundation in fact.¹ Just as we develop general concepts in dealing with material objects, we tend to generalize in dealing with people.

In the present chapter we shall describe some of the more important efforts at dealing with individuals in terms of types, first with reference to psychological traits, second, with regard to body build, and third, as to chief social rôle. Against the background of these materials, the chapter

¹ Some psychologists are highly skeptical of any effort to formulate a typology. For example, R. T. LaFare and P. A. Farrissworth discuss typology as if it were largely nothing but a special kind of stereotyping. See their *Social Psychology*, 3rd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1943). The whole subject, however, is of too serious import to be dealt with in these terms.

will close with a critique of the theory of typology especially as regards validating hypotheses or formulating laws upon whose foundation we may predicate and predict behavior.

PSYCHOLOGICAL TYPES

As with so many other allegedly modern ideas, we owe to the Greeks, especially to Hippocrates, who lived five centuries before the Christian era, the debt for having first introduced the concept of type applied to the feeling emotional or temperamental features of personality. Classical writers, upon the basis of the physiological theories of their time, believed that the body contained four fluids or "humors," yellow bile, black bile, phlegm, and blood, which tended to determine the fundamental disposition. As one or another of these predominated in an individual, a corresponding temperament developed. Thus the four temperaments were: (1) *choleric* (from *choler*, meaning yellow bile), characterized by irascible, hot-tempered make-up; (2) *melancholic* (from *melas* and *choler*, meaning black bile), marked by a depressed, sad, and gloomy outlook on life; (3) *phlegmatic* (from *phlegm*, meaning mucus), indicated by sluggish, apathetic disposition; and (4) *sanguine* (from *sanguis*, meaning blood), characterized by the cheerful, hopeful, or even ardent nature. Although long since discarded by science, these ancient theories as to temperament have continued to influence popular thinking on personality.

In everyday life as well as in literature and philosophy, individuals classified others into kinds or types which, in turn, were considered as indicative of certain behavior. The matter is neatly illustrated in Shakespeare's *Julius Caesar* (I, ii) wherein Caesar remarks regarding Cassius:

Let me have men about me that are fat.
Sleek-headed men and such as sleep o' nights;
Yond Cassius has a lean and hungry look;
He thinks too much. such men are dangerous.

In contrast, Shakespeare's Falstaff is depicted as a fat and jovial character. He symbolizes a popular notion that stout people are, in general, good-natured.

During the nineteenth century various attempts were made at type classifications. Some of these described three bodily types, as did Carus, a German biologist, with his *phlegmatic* whose digestive organs were prominent; the *athletic* who had strongly developed skeleton and musculature, and *asthenic* who was characterized by narrow chest, long body, and poorly developed muscles. Others divided up biotypes into four kinds and still others preferred dual classifications.²

² For a brief review of some of the earlier typologies, see Anne Anastasi and J. P. Foley, Jr., *Differential Psychology*, rev. ed. (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1941), Chap. 13.

The emphasis on the two-type dichotomy began with Emil Kraepelin's discussion of those serious mental disorders called the "functional" psychoses to differentiate them from disorders which have a clear-cut organic foundation.³ He distinguished between the manic-depressive psychoses and dementia praecox or schizophrenia. Later psychiatrists and psychologists thought they saw in these syndromes the pathological exaggeration of mental traits and conduct common to normal, ordinary people. Kraepelin's influence on the theories of typology has been very marked.

It would carry us too far afield to review all the many efforts to typify normal and pathological personalities. However, the would-be evidence that individuals may be grouped into dual or multiple categories can hardly be ignored. Let us review some representative studies and theories.

Pavlov's Theory of Types. Very suggestive and telling support for a theory of types has come from the research of Pavlov, the Russian physiologist who first began serious studies of conditioned responses. He and his students observed certain distinctive and persistent characteristics in the dogs which they used in their experiments.⁴

For instance, certain animals form positive conditioned reflexes quickly and effectively. Once formed, these learned responses tend to remain stable under even adverse and suddenly changed situations. Pavlov termed these the *excitatory* group or *choleric*s. Other dogs are slow to acquire positive conditioned reactions, and, once formed, these are feeble and unstable. In contrast, these animals quickly learn inhibitory reflexes, and in any crisis or unusual circumstances their positive conditioned responses are soon lost and the inhibitory reflexes tend to prevail. These dogs he classified as the *inhibitory* type, or *melancholic*s. Between these extremes are those animals which have a well-balanced capacity to form both types of conditioned reflex. These were called the *central* or *equilibrated* class. This last class reveals two sub-types: the lively, active sort—the *sanguines*—and the quiet, sedate, and "self-contained,"—the *phlegmatics*.

The weak, feeble, inhibitable type of dogs often make excellent experimental animals, when the task before them is not too complicated or difficult, since they are docile and easy to control; but, on the other hand, new and undue stimuli easily disturb them. The well-balanced type is obviously the most desirable for most experimental work.

Pavlov implies that these constitutional differences rest upon heredity. He believed that the inhibited type possess a weak cortical organization; that the sub-cortical and hence less educable areas of the brain tend to dominate their adaptation. The observations of James on the dominant or submissive behavior of a group of dogs seem to support in general Pavlov's

³ Emil Kraepelin, *Psychiatric* (4th ed., Leipzig, Barth, 1899). The student may consult his *Clinical Psychiatry*, trans. by A. R. Dendendorp, new ed. (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1907).

⁴ I. P. Pavlov, *Lectures on Conditioned Reflexes*, trans. by W. H. Gantt (New York, International Publishers Co., Inc., 1927).

contention for a certain innate constitutional factor in these differing types of animals.⁵

Pavlov believed that this typology could be applied to human beings and likens the inhibitory type in its milder forms to the hysterical personality, and in its more extreme manifestations to the schizophrenics. The highly excitable type, in contrast, he likens to the neurasthenic and manic-depressive personalities. Hysteria and schizophrenia he considers essentially pathological forms arising from a cortical weakness which makes for an easy formation of inhibitions. These are characterized by heightened and uncontrolled suggestibility, emotionality, and general inability to manage personal crises. Although no systematic effort has been made to check this theory with humans, it is suggestive. But further research is needed on this matter.

Jung's Theory of Introversion and Extroversion. Perhaps the best-known theory of psychological types is the division into extroversion and introversion developed by Jung who, at the outset of his career, was a follower of Freud.⁶ Broadly speaking, these groupings represent two different organizations of basic traits, attitudes and other features of the inner life. The *extrovert* is one whose fundamental orientation is toward the external world. In contrast, the *introvert* centers his attention in himself, in his inner or subjective world, and his contact with the situations around him—people or things—is predominantly colored and changed by his efforts to retreat from the impress of this outside world into his own inner mental sanctum. He finds his chief values and satisfactions within a realm which he has re-created subjectively for himself.

Jung begins with the assumption of a fundamental life force or energy which in human beings tends to take one or the other of two directions, either outward toward the external environment, or inward toward one's subjective life patterns. The first provides the foundation of the extrovert, the second, the introvert.

As suggested by these philosophic ideas, others have assumed this division of types to be largely determined by heredity rather than by learning. Moreover, there has arisen in our society the notion that somehow introversion—on the whole—represents an ineffective psychological adjustment, while extroversion is "more normal." Moreover, the extreme instances of each have been frequently equated to the two fundamental functional disorders: the former to schizophrenia, the latter to manic-depressive psychoses, so that it may be said that if these two sets of traits do rest on heredity they also show a potentiality for pathological breakdown. If it be contended that the internalization of behavior indicates a "higher" evo-

⁵ W. T. James, "Further experiments in social behavior among dogs," *Journal of Genetic Psychology*, 1939, 54:151-164.

⁶ Carl G. Jung, *Psychological Types* (New York, Harcourt, Brace & Company, Inc., 1922).

lutionary stage or process—biologically speaking—one might defend the thesis that the essential subjectivity of the introvert represents a species advance over the extrovert, who might be considered a type with less well-developed features of mentation. While this is all largely hypothetical, we must realize that the belief that extroversion is superior and more desirable than introversion only reflects the cultural values of our own time.

To return to Jung, the life energy may take the form of "rational" processes determined by what he calls "objective values," that is, activity which may be verifiable in terms of logical analysis. Or it may take the form of "irrational" processes, determined chiefly by "accidental perceptions," chance, and more or less illogical associations. The rational processes, in turn, he divides into two fundamental functions, "thinking" and "feeling." In parallel fashion he segregates the irrational into what he calls "sensation" and "intuition." The former are dominated by reasoning and judgment, the latter by intensity of perceptions but not by rational judgment. Each broad type, extroversion or introversion, therefore, may in turn be organized around one of the fourfold features: thinking, feeling, sensation, or intuition. The outstanding characteristics of each of these eight subtypes are as follows:

1. The *extroverted thinking type* accepts the world of the senses and uses them as the basis for logical analysis and construction of his reality. This thinking is influenced essentially by external data, and conclusions as to experience tend to agree with these objective facts. Jung contends that the more extreme individual of this sort is inclined to be short-sighted and to develop rather fixed formulae for dealing with his world. His acceptance of the logic of events outside himself may lead to a certain rigidity of personality which prevents sympathy and understanding of his own emotions and feelings, as well as those of others.

2. The behavior of the *extroverted feeling type* is consistently determined by the feeling for the external object. Such an individual tends to feel and act according to the demands and expectations of the situation. In his social rôle, the individual follows more or less the conventions and demands of the group to which he belongs. He identifies himself easily with the emotions of those around him. Jung contends that this type is found far more frequently in women than in men. If this be so, it probably reflects cultural differences rather than original nature.

3. The *extroverted sensation type* is definitely conditioned by and oriented to the sensory, concrete features of a given object or situation. Jung believes that men incline toward this pattern in contrast to women, who run to the feeling type, but, again, in making such an assumption he is obviously rationalizing certain sex differences dependent not on biology but on culture. He also maintains that this sort of person tends to be a thorough-going realist who takes the world as he finds it. For example, one of this sort might either be a sheer pleasure-seeker or accept the

morality of his community as thoroughly sound. Thus, while the hedonist might be classified as the extroverted sensation type, the adherent to the time-honored mores would also fall into this category. In other words, the differing social rôles of such persons would depend largely upon the sort of cultural "copies" set before them.

4. The *extroverted intuition type* is more difficult to describe. For a person of this sort, the external object does not control his perception or sensation. Rather it offers him a suggestion for elaborating the possibilities of the object as something to manipulate or control. The objective world is a cue to action rather than a director, as would be true of the introverted sensation type. Speculators, business promoters, salesmen, and news-reporters with a nose for news are said to have such characteristics. Also, many women fall into this category.

5. The *introverted thinking type* is marked by ideational patterns which are almost completely organized subjectively to suit the individual. This sort of person tends to be indifferent toward the objective world of the extrovert. According to Jung, Charles Darwin might be classed as "the normal extroverted thinking type," and Immanuel Kant as an example of the "normal introvertive thinker." Persons of this latter sort tend to isolate themselves from the world of material objects, to live largely in the realm of theories, ideas, and ideals. They are notably impractical, often thoroughly indifferent to financial matters, to clothes, and to persons around them.

6. The *introverted feeling type* is also dominated by the subjective factor, but, unlike the extroverted feeling class, which is controlled by external events and runs perhaps to enthusiasms or depressive moods, these individuals live within their own internal world of emotions and feelings. Their inner life follows strong ego wishes, but, unlike the introverted thinking type, they tend to go in for daydreams dependent on immediate emotional and feeling tone. They are often silent and retiring and seem to others to be thoroughly at peace with the world.

7. The *introverted sensation type*, unlike the extroverted sensation type, develops the meaning of the sensation in terms of what Jung calls the "subjective sensation-constituent released by the objective stimulus."¹ This sort of person, though attending to the external world, so completely dominates his perception of it by his subjective, internal states that the given perception is always recast into predetermined patterns or meanings of his own. He reacts much more egocentrically than the extroverted sensation type.

8. The *introverted intuition type* directs his attention upon his own imagery. These images are the clues to his activity. He lives within himself, using the imagery as points of departure for still other images and inner experiences. This type is exemplified in the mystical dreamer, seer,

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 501.

or religious prophet, or in the fanatical crank or artist. Often the products of a dreamer or an artist may be so remote from the ordinary experience of those around him as to be practically meaningless to them.

Doubting whether people divide themselves easily into two distinctive classes of extroversion and introversion, some writers have assumed that these represent extremes of a somewhat continuous distribution of traits or attitudes. Most people lie between these two extremes showing features of both extroversion and introversion. These have been labeled *ambiverts*. Moreover, if we accept Jung's sub-classes, we must realize that the four functions—*thinking, feeling, sensation, and intuition*—may appear in any given individual, though in actuality one of these modes might predominate over the others. Thus a particular person's response to the world and to himself might be said to be *typically or characteristically* in this or that modality, but this would not imply an absence, necessarily, of the other features.

For that matter, Jung does not deny that individuals who express the predominant extroverted or introverted attitudes necessarily lack the opposite components. He maintains that the extrovert's ambivalent tendencies toward introversion lie hidden in the unconscious. In fact, Jung argued that a compensatory mechanism was at work here. Not only does the extrovert suppress his introverted tendencies, but, for example, the thinking extrovert inhibits his other psychological functions, feeling, sensation, and intuition. In the same vein the introvert of any given sub-class may suppress not only his extroverted tendencies, but also the other psychological functions which are not a phase of his particular type or pattern.

Attempts to Validate Extroversion-Introversion Typology. Various psychologists have attempted to validate measures of introversion or extroversion. On the whole, these efforts have not been very successful. For one reason there is failure to agree on the definitions of these two concepts. Freyd, one of the first American workers to try to use these concepts, defined the extrovert as one in whom there is a "diminution of thought processes in relation to directly observable social behavior, with an accompanying tendency to make social contacts", the introvert, in contrast, is "an individual in whom exists an exaggeration of the thought processes in relation to directly observable social behavior with accompanying tendency to withdraw from social contacts." * It is clear that Freyd defines all extroverts in terms of Jung's extroverted intuitive type, and all introverts he defines essentially as Jung does the introverted thinking type. Most people tend to follow this distinction.

But other definitions and criteria of introversion and extroversion have been set up. J. P. Guilford and R. B. Guilford in analyzing their test of introversion (made up of items from various other tests), found that this

* Max Freyd, "Introverts and extroverts," *Psychological Review*, 1924, 31: 74-87. Quotation from pp. 74, 75. By permission of The American Psychological Association.

test alone involved attempts to measure not less than eighteen different traits. From their statistical manipulations of the data they tentatively named the four most significant clusters of these traits as follows: (1) tendency to fear the environment, to shrink from it; (2) emotional sensitivity to the environment; (3) impulsiveness; and (4) interest in self.⁹

A number of attempts have been made to develop tests or inventories of introversion and extroversion. One of the most satisfactory of these has been developed by J. P. Guilford on the basis of his use of factor analysis (see Chapter 11) as a method of uncovering the basic dimensions of these types.¹⁰ These five factors have been summarized by North as follows:¹¹

- "S—Social introversion-extroversion. A high score indicates shyness, a tendency to withdraw from social situations and to be seclusive. Low scores indicate sociability, a tendency to seek social contacts and to enjoy the company of others.
- "T—Thinking introversion-extroversion. A high score indicates an inclination to meditative thinking, philosophizing, analyzing one's self and others, and an introspective disposition. A low score indicates a lack of introspectiveness and an extroverted orientation of the thinking process.
- "D—Depression. A high score indicates a chronically depressed mood including feelings of unworthiness and guilt. A low score indicates freedom from depression and a cheerful, optimistic disposition.
- "C—Cycloid disposition. A high score indicates the presence of cycloid tendencies as shown in strong emotional reactions, fluctuations in mood, and a disposition toward flightiness and instability. A low score indicates stable emotional reactions and moods and freedom from cycloid tendencies.
- "R—Rhythymia. A high raw score indicates a happy-go-lucky or carefree disposition, liveliness, and impulsiveness. A low score indicates an inhibited disposition and an over-control of the impulses."

North gave this inventory, along with an intelligence test and the Kuder Preference Record, to 170 students in Columbia University. By using factor analysis he came up with "two primary dimensions" of personality: "(1) cycloid emotionality and depression, and (2) impulsiveness or freedom from restraint."¹² The former was found to be somewhat positively correlated with literary interests and negatively with "intelligence, interest scores in mechanics, computation, and science." The latter revealed "a significant positive correlation with weight-height ratio and interest in persuasion, and is correlated negatively with computational interest scores."¹³ On the other hand, age, sex, and education were not

⁹ J. P. Guilford and R. B. Guilford, "An analysis of the factors in a typical test of introversion-extroversion," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1934, 28:377-399.

¹⁰ J. P. Guilford, *An Inventory of Factors STDCR* (Beverly Hills, Cal., Sheridan Supply Co., 1940).

¹¹ R. D. North, Jr., "An analysis of the personality dimensions of introversion-extroversion," *Journal of Personality*, 1949, 17:356. By permission.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 366.

¹³ *Ibid.*

significantly correlated with either dimension, at least in these subjects.

Another and rather extensive attempt to study introversion and extroversion is that of Eysenck and his collaborators.¹⁴ They gave a large number of physical and psychological tests to 700 male neurotic soldiers. Using a form of factor analysis they came up with two main factors which they tentatively called "neuroticism" and "extroversion-introversion." With regard to the latter, which is our concern here, Eysenck summarizes their important findings regarding the characteristics of introversion and extroversion in these words:

"Putting the results given in this table into a descriptive paragraph, we find that (neurotic) introverts show a tendency to develop anxiety and depression symptoms, that they are characterized by obsessional tendencies, irritability, apathy, and that they suffer from a liability of the autonomic system. According to their own statement, their feelings are easily hurt, they are self-conscious, nervous, given to feelings of inferiority, moody, day-dream easily, keep in the background on social occasions, and suffer from sleeplessness. In their body-build vertical growth predominates over horizontal growth; their effort response is poor. Their intelligence is comparatively high, their vocabulary excellent, and they tend to be persistent. They are generally accurate, but slow; they excel at finicking work. . . . Their level of aspiration is unduly high, but they tend to under-rate their own performance. Withal, they are rather rigid, and show little intra-personal variability. Their aesthetic preferences are towards the quiet, old-fashioned type of picture. In aesthetic creation, they produce compact designs, often having a concrete subject. They do not appreciate jokes very much, and sex jokes in particular are not much favoured. Their handwriting is distinctive.

"In comparison, (neurotic) extroverts show a tendency to develop hysterical conversion symptoms, and a hysterical attitude to their symptoms. Furthermore, they show little energy, narrow interests, have a bad work-history, and are hypochondriacal. According to their own statement, they are troubled by stammer or stutter, are accident prone, frequently off work through illness, disgruntled, and troubled by aches and pains. In their body-build, horizontal growth predominates over vertical growth; their effort response is quite good . . . Their intelligence is comparatively low, their vocabulary poor, and they show extreme lack of persistence. They tend to be quick but inaccurate; aspiration is low, but they tend to over-rate their own performance. They are not very rigid, and show great intra-personal variability. Their aesthetic preferences are towards the colorful, modern type of picture. In aesthetic creation, they produce scattered designs, often having abstract subjects. They appreciate jokes, and are particularly fond of sex jokes. Their handwriting is distinctive."¹⁵

Other Theories of Types. Several other dual and multiple typologies have been put forward. We note only a few of them for illustrative purposes.¹⁶ Most of the dual classificatory systems appear to have been in-

¹⁴ H. J. Eysenck, *Dimensions of Personality* (London, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1947).

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 246-247. By permission.

¹⁶ For a short but insightful review on typologies, see Donald W. MacKinnon, "The Structure of Personality," Chap. 1 in J. M. V. Hunt, ed., *Personality and the Behavior Disorders*, 2 vols. (New York, The Ronald Press Company, 1944).

fluenced by Kraepelinian or Jungian concepts. Bleuler's *syntonic* and *schizoid* follow rather closely Kraepelin's dichotomy into manic-depressives and dementia praecox categories. Wertheimer and Hesketh divided personalities into the *syntropic* and *idiotropic*. The former is similar to Jung's extroverted feeling type, the latter, to his introverted thinking type.¹⁷

Rorschach, whose projective tests will be described in Chapter 11, proposed the type-terms *extratensive* and *introversive*. These are much like those of Jung, though Rorschach denied any debt to the former except in the names he used. The extratensive person shows more outgoingness, more labile emotions and feelings, "stereotyped intelligence," and greater motor skill, in contrast to the introversive who has greater creativeness, "more individualized intelligence," more stable emotions, and less easy contact with the physical and social world outside.¹⁸

Of all the various dual-type theories which have their foundation in Kraepelin's work, none, aside from Jung's, is so elaborate or has been so much discussed as Kretschmer's. But since he has attempted to link up his psychological with a morphological typology, we shall discuss his work in the next section.

Not satisfied with the formulations of Kraepelin and Jung, some writers have produced three type-classifications. One such is that of Rosanoff, who lists three types of personalities: (1) the *anti-social*, which is marked by malingering, pathological lying, criminalistic tendencies, certain hysteric manifestations, and the predominance of an "overweening selfishness"; (2) the *cyclothymic*, which is constitutionally related to the manic-depressive of the Kraepelinian dichotomy, characterized by fluctuations of mood and by emotional instability; and (3) a class which he maintains is marked essentially by "chaotic sexuality." This last type is represented chiefly in schizoid individuals who show a split between the intellectual and emotional-feeling activities, retreat from social contacts, elaboration of rich fantasies, and striking maladjustments in the love life. As suggested by Rosanoff, this last-named class the personality structure resembles that of schizophrenia.¹⁹

Although he never systematically elaborated his theory of types, Freud classified the basic personality manifestations into *erotic*, *compulsive*, and

¹⁷ See Ernst Bleuler, *Textbook of Psychiatry*, A. A. Brill, ed. (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1924) See also, F. I. Wertheimer and F. E. Hesketh, "The significance of the physical constitution in mental disease," *Medicine Monographs*, 1926, No. 10.

¹⁸ Hermann Rorschach, *Psychodiagnostics*, (trans. by Paul Lemkau and B. Kronenberg (New York, Grune & Stratton, Inc., 1942)

¹⁹ A. J. Rosanoff, *Manual of Psychiatry and Mental Hygiene*, 7th ed., rev. (New York, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1938). Rosanoff's use of the concept "anti-social" is unfortunate. He probably has the so-called psychopathic inferior in mind. It is often assumed that this disorder derives from biologically inherited traits or predispositions (See Chap. 23.)

narcissistic. The first is marked by a predominance of love interests and outgoing sympathetic identification with others. The second is characterized by highly organized and inflexible patterns of habit and thought. The third is essentially the strongly self-centered person who would have the world revolve around himself. In addition Freud made allowance for certain paired (mixed) types: erotic-compulsive, erotic-narcissistic, and narcissistic-compulsive, an obvious concession to the difficulties in any simple plan of typification.²⁰

PHYSIQUE AND PERSONALITY

Not only have many attempts been made to group psychological characteristics under certain types, but some proponents of typology have gone farther in an effort to correlate body build with inclination to disease and with temperamental and other mental variations of the individual. The tendency of people with certain body build to suffer from certain maladies was noted by the ancient Greeks. Thin and lean individuals were found to be prone to tuberculosis, and fat and muscular ones to apoplexy. In the nineteenth century Beneke, a German pathologist, believed that there was some causal relationship between what he called the *rachitic* type or a mixture of old digestive and cerebral types of the French and tendency to rickets, between the *carcinomatous* or heavy, muscular form and cancer, and between the *scrofulous-phthisical* or thin and narrow bodies and inclination to scrofula and tuberculosis.²¹

As to mental features, popular psychology has long believed in some causal relation between physical and mental traits. For example, phrenology, now discredited by science, assumed that particular traits, such as honesty, perseverance, amateness, and others were correlated with particular contours of the skull. Similarly, there are still many popular notions which correlate complexion, facial form, posture, and various gestures with intellectual and emotional characteristics. Certainly some careful studies of expressive movements have shown that posture, gait, and gestures are indicators, along with others, of certain facets of personality. (See Chapter 8.) But neither complexion nor facial form shows any significance except as part of a social stimulus to others which may, in turn, serve to affect response.

One of the most critical analyses of physical features as clues to personality has been summarized by Paterson in these words:

"One hundred and twenty-two physical measurements were considered in testing the hypothesis that judgment, intelligence, frankness, will power, ability to make friends, leadership, originality, and impulsiveness are revealed by various physical characteristics. Ratings of these character traits as exhibited by the

²⁰ Sigmund Freud, "Libidinal types," *Psychoanalytic Quarterly*, 1932, 1:3-6.

²¹ For a short review of these ideas, see W. H. Sheldon, "Constitutional factors in personality," Chap. 17 in W. McV. Hunt, ed., *op. cit.*

thirty subjects employed in the experiment were secured from intimate associates and pooled in such a manner as to yield an unusually reliable index of those traits. These pooled ratings were then correlated with each of the physical measurements, with the net result that the average of 201 correlations between variations in physical traits and variations in character traits (presumed by character analysts to be closely related to the physical traits) is exactly zero. Here is a beautiful statistical refutation of the sweeping claims indulged in by devotees of physiognomy."²²

These and other studies appear to put the quietus on typology, especially as it tries to relate physique and personality traits. But the topic is one easy to scotch but hard to kill, and European and, later, other students have continued research in this field.

Kretschmer's Typology. The best-known attempt to link physique with personality was made by Kretschmer, a German psychiatrist. Against the background of a general theory of morphological types, he undertook a rather elaborate set of measurements and observations of patients in various mental hospitals and clinics. He states his method in these words:

"When a fairly large number of morphological similarities can be followed through a correspondingly large number of individuals, then we . . . register the measurement. From this we reckon the average value, and thus the outstanding common characteristics come out clearly, while those peculiar marks which only occur in isolated cases, disappear in the average value. [Kretschmer also made judgments on the basis of visual impressions, drawings, and photographs.] Only those characteristics which become strongly marked in the average values are described as 'typical' . . . Our description of types . . . refers not to the most frequent cases, but to ideal cases, to such cases as bring most clearly to view common characteristics which in the majority of instances appear only blurred, but which, all the same, can be empirically demonstrated."²³

On the basis of his work, Kretschmer divided his cases into three more or less distinctive physical types: the asthenic or leptosomic, the athletic, and pyknic.

The *asthenic* is characterized by a lean, narrowly built frame, poor blood, inadequate skin secretion, narrow shoulders, long, thin arms with thin muscles, delicately shaped hands, a long, narrow chest, and a thin stomach. The lower limbs are built on lines similar to those of the upper. The face is angular. There are some variations, but these are the most noticeable features. The *athletic* type shows strong development of the skeletal framework and the muscles. The skin is firm and healthy. The shoulders are broad, the chest thick, the abdomen well covered with layers of muscles; the trunk tapers toward the middle region, the pelvis is narrow, and the legs are tapering and shapely. The arms are heavily

²² *The Measurement of Man*, J. A. Harris and others (University of Minnesota Press, 1930), p. 128. By permission.

²³ Ernst Kretschmer, *Physique and Character: An Investigation of the Nature of Constitution and of the Theory of Temperament*, trans. by W. J. H. Spott (New York, Harcourt, Brace & Company, Inc., 1925). Quotation from pp. 18-19. By permission.

muscle. The face is firm, the jaw prominent, and the nose tends to be short and snubby. The *pyknic* type, which according to Kretschmer does not reach its highest development until middle age, is characterized by pronounced development of the rounded figure, fatness about the trunk, and a deep, vaulted chest which broadens out toward the lower part of the body. The limbs are soft and round and display little muscle relief, as do those of the second type. The shoulders are usually rounded and pushed slightly forward.

Kretschmer admits that these types do not always appear in pure form, but are sometimes mixed with others. He also classifies some of his cases as dysplastic, that is, marked by distinct asymmetry of organs. The recognition of mixed and dysplastic forms opens the gate to a recognition of a continuous variation rather than an all-or-none set of categories. We shall discuss this point later.

As to type of personality, Kretschmer divided his first sample of the psychotic and serious neurotic individuals, following Bleuler, into circular or cycloid and schizophrene or schizoid. He found that the majority of the former fell into the *pyknic* category, and the bulk of the latter into the combined asthenic-athletic class, which for his purposes he regarded as really one type. The frequency distribution of his first 260 patients is shown in Table 4.

Table 4
PHYSICAL AND PSYCHIC DISPOSITIONS OF 260 PATIENTS *

	Circular		Schizophrene	
	Number	Per cent	Number	Per cent
Asthenic	4	4.7	81	46.2
Athletic	3	3.5	31	17.7
Asthenic-athletic mixed	2	2.4	11	6.3
Pyknic	58	68.2	2	1.1
Pyknic mixture	14	16.5	3	1.7
Dysplastic	—	—	34	19.6
Deformed and uncataloguable forms	4	4.7	13	7.4
Total	85	100.0	175	100.0

* Modified from Kretschmer, *op. cit.*, p. 35. By permission.

Kretschmer was well aware of the fact that there were many deviations from the average or central tendency of his groupings. He also realized that his patients came almost entirely from the Swabian population of his part of Germany, though he says that later confirmation of similar distributions were furnished by other psychiatrists for the Rhenish region. In line with his thesis that the pathological cases represented but extremes of physique and personality found in normal people, he later undertook to

apply his methods to samples of the normal population. As to psychological types he divided the latter into *cyclothymes* and *schizothymes*.

The *cyclothymes* are marked by alteration between "raised (gay) and depressed (sad)" moods. They also have a "wavy temperamental curve" which fluctuates between "mobile and comfortable." They are "adequate to stimulus—rounded, natural, smooth." The *schizothymes* show some alterations between high sensitivity and cold aloofness and reveal a "jerky temperamental curve" with alternating thought and feeling. They are "often inadequate to stimulus—restrained, lamed, inhibited, stiff . . ." As to physical types the former tends to be pyknic, the latter "asthenic, athletic, dysplastic, and their mixtures."²⁴

Kretschmer illustrates his two great divisions by citing historical characters in various arts, sciences, and fields of practical life. Table 5 summarizes his classification of the special dispositions among three major classes of persons: poets, scientists, and leaders of the masses of men.

Table 5

CLASSIFICATION OF DISPOSITIONS OF THREE KINDS OF LEADERS *

	<i>Cyclothymes</i>	<i>Schizothymes</i>
Poets	Realists Humorists	Pathetics Romantics Formalists
Experimenters	Observers Describers Empiricists	Exact logicians Systematists Metaphysicians
Leaders	Tough "whole-hoggers" Jolly organizers Understanding conciliators	Pure idealists Despots and fanatics Cold calculators

* *Ibid.*, p. 261. By permission.

Attempts to Verify Kretschmer. Many students of personality have tried to check Kretschmer's claims. Many of the European studies report confirmation but the important investigations done in the United States are critical. One of the early researches on Kretschmer was undertaken with a prison population in Illinois. Extensive physical measurements were made and a variety of psychological tests were given. The study reported, among other things that: (1) the prisoners showed about the same distribution of the morphological traits as the non-criminal population; (2) it is not easy to detect the different types "by mere inspection" and that evidently there is a more or less continuous progression from those features which define the extreme asthenic to those that characterize the "best" pyknics; (3) without any attempt "to explain the foundation" of the physical variations, important differences in mental-test performance for the

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 258. Taken from Table 15. By permission.

three types are evident; and (4) the asthenic subjects reveal schizothymic tendencies, the pyknics reveal cyclothymic tendencies, and the former are more unsocial than the latter. As a matter of fact, in some tests the alleged distinctions were quite evident, as in the reaction times in writing, cancellation tests, and others. On the other hand, distraction tests devised to demonstrate "inhibition"—such as "writing-while-counting"—revealed no differences between the pyknics and the others. In concluding their report, these authors state:

"Our results support in a general way the Kretschmer theory of physical and temperamental kinds, in that a relationship between physique and character of performance is demonstrated. They tend to modify the theory, however, by breaking down even Kretschmer's loose conception of 'types' and insisting on the concept of a general progression both of performance and of physical characteristics . . ." ²⁵

More rigid controls were applied in a study by Klineberg and others. Their sample was reasonably homogeneous and they found no overlapping between those asthenics and pyknics who, on the basis of physical measurements, were selected as "pure" for each type. Yet when they applied the results of a variety of psychological tests, including cancellation, intelligence, perception, and emotional adjustment, the differences between the two groups of "pure" types were not statistically significant.²⁶

When a reasonably good sample of the general population is examined with a view to uncovering valid distinctions among the three physical types, the results are not, apparently, clear cut. The generally negative findings may, in part, be due to the theory and method which most American psychologists have used in trying to verify Kretschmer's typology. In particular, this has to do with the matter of handling the data as representing discontinuous or continuous series of measures or variables.

Sheldon's Theory of Physique and Personality. A widely publicized effort to produce a more satisfactory approach to the topic of body build and psychological characteristics has been made by Sheldon and collaborators. Sheldon eschews the idea of types as representing discrete entities. Rather, he aims at developing a sound "constitutional psychology—a psychology of basic individual differences—first by devising a technique for describing human morphology in terms of continuous variables.

²⁵ G. H. Mohr and R. H. Gundlach, "The relation between physique and performance," *Journal of Experimental Psychology*, 1927, 10: 117-157. Quotation from p. 157, by permission of the American Psychological Association.

²⁶ Otto Klineberg, S. F. Arch, and H. Block, "An experimental study of constitutional types," *Genetic Psychology Monographs*, 1934, 16: 140-221. An unpublished follow-up on this study is reported in Anastasi and Foley, *op. cit.*, pp. 443-446. It tends to confirm the earlier findings and interpretations. For a brief review and classification of still other studies of Kretschmer's types, see W. H. Sheldon, "Constitutional factors in personality," Chap. 17 in J. McV. Hunt, ed., *op. cit.*

and second by defining and measuring analogous first-order variables of temperament."²⁷

In order to determine the body types, Sheldon first used conventional anthropometric measurements of individuals. Later he abandoned this in favor of a method of determining the basic features of the body by the use of photographs of each individual in three exposures: frontal, lateral, and dorsal, on a single film. These pictures gave him a tri-dimensional distribution which he could quantify by projecting the photographs on a grid of equal-appearing units (or by printing the negatives on grid-paper). From these pictures he developed a schema for classifying body build into three somotypes, consisting of modal features called endomorphy, mesomorphy, and ectomorphy.

The endomorphous components refer to degree to which the digestive organs are over-developed in relation to other physical features. Those who predominate in this class have relatively large abdominal and thoracic cavities. They tend to have a soft, flabby, round *habitus*. The mesomorphous components refer to the degree to which bone and muscle predominate. An extreme example of this component would be the "strong men" of the vaudeville and circus. The ectomorphous features concern the degree to which linearity and fragility are in the ascendancy. The extreme ectomorph is the skinny person with long and fragile bones and under-developed musculature.

In dealing with his data statistically, the strength of each component—endomorphy, mesomorphy, ectomorphy—is rated on a seven-point scale. Any given somatotype, then, may be stated by using three numbers, the first to designate the extent of the endomorphous features, the second, the mesomorphous, and the third, the ectomorphous. Therefore any given individual's somatotype is a composite of all three patterns and his placement in a range of types would depend on which of the three components predominated over the others. For example, a 7-1-1 would be the extreme endomorph, a 1-7-1, the extreme mesomorph, and a 1-1-7, the extreme ectomorph. A 4-4-4 would represent the mid-point on the scale, and a person approximating this physique would be average or balanced as to body build. On the basis of his first large sample, Sheldon described 76 somatypes.²⁸

In actuality, Sheldon admits that such physical components are complex and continuous variables, and that the somatotype is an oversimplification for purposes of providing certain boundaries in classification. He

²⁷ Sheldon, *op. cit.*, in J. McV. Hunt, ed., *Personality and the Behavior Disorders*, vol. 1, pp. 537-548. Copyright 1944 by the Ronald Press Company. By permission.

²⁸ W. H. Sheldon, S. S. Stevens, and W. B. Tucker, *The Varieties of Human Physique* (New York, Harper and Brothers, 1940). In statistical probabilities there could be theoretically 343 somatypes. It may be that an application of Sheldon's measures to a large and truly representative sample of population would add to the number of empirically distinguishable somatypes.

remarks: "The somatotype provides the basis for a morphological taxonomy which is both comprehensive and statistically manipulable. The bugaboo of types thus disappears in a continuous distribution in which every physique has a place, and the establishment of norms becomes a routine."²⁹

To determine the components of temperament Sheldon and his co-workers selected 50 traits from a list of over 600 found in the literature on personality. A high percentage of those selected are related to the introversion-extroversion dichotomy. They next gave intensive interviews to a group of 33 young men, mostly students, and rated them on a seven-point scale with respect to these 50 traits. Every rating was correlated with every other and from the table of inter-correlations the experimenters worked out three clusters of traits. Using further correlations, they dropped out certain items and added others, until they finally had a "Scale of Temperament" consisting of 60 items, 20 in each cluster. These clusters of components were named viscerotonia, somatotonia, and cerebrotonia.

Viscerotonia is marked by a tendency to easy living, relaxation, pleasure from eating and drinking, sociability, conviviality, complacent tolerance, and general need for people and for affection. "The motivational organization is dominated by the gut and by the function of anabolism."³⁰

Somatotonia represents an ascendancy of interest in vigorous physical assertiveness, expenditure of muscular energy, and love of power and action. There is also willingness to take risks and a certain callousness and directness of manner in dealing with others. The basic motivations are those of "vigor and push."

Cerebrotonia is characterized by restraint and inhibition. There is a desire for privacy, concealment, and an avoidance of social contacts. People who fall in this category seem "dominated by the inhibitory and attentional functions of the cerebrum" and they eschew "somatic and visceral expression."

Using his morphological and psychological scales Sheldon has worked out correlations between body types and personality. He reports for a sample of 200 university men that endomorphy tends to be associated with viscerotonia (correlation of two ratings was .79), mesomorphy with somatotonia (correlation of two ratings, .82), and ectomorphy with cerebrotonia (correlation of two ratings, .83). These correlations are much higher than those reported from other studies of physique and personality. Sheldon believes that his ratings get at deeper and more essential components of personality than do the usual tests. On the other hand many critics say that it is not clear just what this means and also that the high correlations may be due, in part, to well known halo effects in rating. Certainly attempts to check Sheldon's thesis by using objective and stand-

²⁹ Sheldon op. cit. in J. McV. Hunt, ed., *op. cit.*, pp. 539-540.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 541.

ardized test scores in place of ratings reveal that correlations between somatotype and psychological test scores are much lower, about of the order found in other correlations of body build and personality characteristics. Child's and Sheldon's study of a group of Harvard men who had been given objective tests yielded low correlations, the highest being .21; and Fiske's study of a group of adolescent boys gave no significant correlations of body build with intelligence or personality traits.³¹

As a check on his basic theory, Sheldon, with the aid of various co-workers, has undertaken studies of delinquent boys and a large number of psychiatric cases. If the volume on delinquency³² may be regarded as a sample of the scientific testing of a thesis, workers in the field may anticipate disappointment. As Sutherland has pointed out, Sheldon's criteria of delinquency are highly questionable. Moreover, the efforts to link delinquency with the somatotypes and personality and psychiatric types were not rewarding. For example, Sutherland reviewed the published case descriptions of the 200 boys in Sheldon's sample and classified them as to "civil delinquencies" on a five-point scale (0-1-2-3-4) in which

"0 was given when the biography stated that the youth had no known civil delinquency or when the delinquencies reported were minor violations of the law characteristic of practically all college students. A score of 4 was given to those youth who were described as gangsters engaged progressively in more serious crimes and integrated in a criminal culture. The other scores were intermediate."³³

Sutherland then compared his judgments with the somatotypal and psychiatric categories as given by Sheldon. In summarizing his cross-tabulation, he states:

"The most delinquent do not differ significantly from the least delinquent on any component of any of the indexes . . . Although the mesomorphic and manic components increase consistently with increasing criminality and the ectomorphic and heboid [hebephrenic] components decrease almost consistently with increasing criminality, these trends are very slight and they are not accompanied by analogous trends in the other components. The general conclusion is that in this group of 200 youths the variations in civil delinquencies are not significantly related to variations in Sheldon's indexes of constitutional psychology. This conclusion conflicts with Sheldon's preconceptions and conclusions, but it is based on his data and it is probably the most important result of his study."³⁴

³¹ I. L. Child and W. H. Sheldon, "The correlation between components of physique and scores on certain psychological tests," *Character and Personality*, 1941, 10:23-34; and, D. W. Fiske, "A study of relationships to somatotype," *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 1944, 28:504-519.

³² W. H. Sheldon, et al., *Varieties of Delinquent Youth: An Introduction to Constitutional Psychology*, New York, Harper and Brothers, 1949.

³³ E. H. Sutherland, "Appraisal of varieties of delinquent youth," *American Sociological Review*, 1951, 16: 9-13. Quotation from pp. 12-13 by permission.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 13. By permission Sutherland used the concept "civil delinquency" to refer to types of behavior considered contrary to the legal codes of our society. Sheldon

The most serious critics of the Sheldon system question the adequacy of a schema whose foundation rests on the original study of but 33 individuals. True, other groups were studied later, but largely to sharpen and complement the original list of 22 traits for measuring the three alleged components of temperament. This is evident in the procedure. The basis for adding a new trait to the list was that it would correlate highly and positively with the traits in one of the original categories and negatively with those in the other two clusters. The later changes in the list of traits largely depended upon the way the original analysis was carried out. As Anastasi and Foley put it: "The small number and the relatively unrepresentative nature of the subjects employed in this initial experiment make it ill-suited to play such a fundamental part in the development of the entire schema of temperament classification."³⁵

Despite such limitations, Sheldon's contribution cannot be denied. Although the original sample was small and although the system of identifying components by inspection of a correlation table leaves much to be desired, and although efforts to apply the method to various populations have not yielded any significant findings, nevertheless his efforts to deal with typology in terms of a continuous rather than a discontinuous series of items or variables is commendable.³⁶

SOCIOLOGICAL TYPES

The possibility of classifying people in terms of their principal social rôles has been recognized almost as long as the possibility of determining dispositional types. Theophrastus, a disciple of Aristotle, in the third century before the Christian era, attempted to classify the rôle and status of individuals in society. In the book *Ethical Characters* he describes types such as "the flatterer," "the boor," and "the coward." Since his time many have tried to imitate him.

The Social Type. In present-day social science the concept of *social type* has come into rather common use both in theory and as possible aid in empirical research. One of the best-known of these is the "ideal type" of Max Weber.³⁷ This is a logical construct or model which does not correspond to any given, unique individual, institution, or group. As a con-

writes about other kinds of delinquency—largely his own concepts and not those of the professional students of delinquency and crime. For example, at one place Sheldon says "The delinquency" is to "teach a child to feel and express reverence for the word God." Most readers of Sheldon's book will be amazed at the large amount of extraneous discussion contained therein. To note one example, a good deal of the space in the final long chapter is a strong polemic against religion, especially in its theological aspects.

³⁵ Anastasi and Foley, *op. cit.*, p. 451. By permission.

³⁶ While the experimental design was inadequate, the attempt to correlate Sheldon's types with basic interests and values of life made by Charles Morris is ingenious and suggestive. See his *The Open Self* (New York, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1948).

³⁷ Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, trans. by A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons (New York, Oxford University Press, 1947).

struct it may be used as a guide or standard in describing and analyzing particular instances of social-cultural data or personality. Some of the systematic implications of the ideal type will be discussed in the next and final section of this chapter.

Thomas and Znaniecki in their study of the Polish peasant in Europe and America used the concept *social type* in distinguishing between character and temperament. The latter, they held, was largely determined by constitutional, even hereditary factors; the former, consisting of organized and relatively stable attitudes, was largely the product of social interaction.

With respect to the rise of character, they predicated three social types: (1) the *Philistine*, or practical man, who overemphasizes the wish for security and safety; (2) the *Bohemian*, who inclines toward new experience, is flighty, and lets his hedonistic impulses and the immediate situation, rather than staid and consistent interests, determine much of his behavior; and (3) the *creative* man, who, though relatively stable, possesses the capacity for modification of attitudes and wishes in terms of some goal or aim of a creative sort in any number of different fields such as art, religion, morals, mechanical invention, politics, and economics.³⁸

Spranger, a German philosopher, propounded a theory of social typology in which he divided people into six fundamental "attitudes" or "dominant value directions": the *theoretic*, the *economic*, the *esthetic*, the *social*, the *political*, and the *religious*. The dominant mode of the personality, or what Spranger calls "character," is determined by one of these fundamental "values." While in actuality there may be mixed types, his theory is concerned only with the pure, "eternal," or *ideal* types. He believes that a theory of types is feasible for conceptual purposes. These are verbal constructs to be used to characterize the basic forms or styles of life organization. Spranger was not concerned with attempting to describe the many-sided variations of actual living or historical personalities. To do this latter would involve what he called an "individualizing procedure."³⁹

We may summarize the features of each of Spranger's types as follows: (1) The *theoretical* is dominated by the search for truth. In striving for this goal the person takes a "cognitive" attitude or strictly objective view of the world. (2) In contrast, the *economic* type is controlled by an interest in the strictly useful things of life. He prefers his relations to take a utilitarian turn. (3) The *esthetic* type is fundamentally concerned with the beautiful. Such a man finds his highest values in form, symmetry, and harmony. (4) For Spranger the *social* type has for its highest value, interest in and love of other people. This sort of person is sympathetic, kind,

³⁸ W. I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecki, *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America* (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1927).

³⁹ Eduard Spranger, *Types of Men: The Psychology and Ethics of Personality*, trans. by P. J. W. Pigors (Halle, M. Niemeyer, 1928)

unselfish. (5) The *political* type is primarily concerned with the securing of power and domination over others. Spranger does not mean to confine this type to what is ordinarily considered politics, but to what the Germans call the *Machtmensch* (the power-man) in any field. (6) The *religious* type finds its principal interest in unity with the cosmos. Such a person is mystical and tends to identify himself with the totality of the universe.

Spranger probably never had any notion that this conceptual scheme of his would ever be put to the test of empirical classification of people. Two research workers, however, Allport and Vernon, using his categorical criteria, devised a "study of values" scale for distinguishing the interests and values of individuals, and several investigations have shown that, except for the section of the test dealing with Spranger's *social* type, it has considerable reliability and validity.⁴⁰

Murray has recast Spranger's six-fold classification into four common types: (1) the *theorist* which includes scientist, generalizer, logical and rational thinkers, philosopher, and "writer of programs and principles"; (2) the *humanitarian* which includes considerate and coöperative friend and associate, tactful host, dependable political party man, devoted doctor and minister, and faithful lover; (3) the *sensationist*, illustrated by the playboy sensualist, romantic adventurer, artist, and lover of elegance and form; and (4) the *practical man of action*, seen in the farmer, technician, soldier, laborer, business and political executives, surgeon, explorer, and efficiency expert.⁴¹

In dealing with political leadership, Lasswell has developed a theory of social types, the chief ones of which are the administrator or bureaucrat, the boss, the diplomat, the agitator, and the theorist. (1) The *administrator* operates an institution or agency along precise, orderly, and fixed lines. He has a basic desire for emotional security and stability which can best be provided by a compulsive orderliness, precision, and rigidity of habits. (2) The *boss* is a hard-headed opportunist concerned with the manipulation of a political machine to keep himself and his clique in control. (3) The *diplomat* is concerned with manipulation of political power through suave manner, calmness, patience, clever, and often insincere use of conversation and social graces. He is essentially a bargainer for political ends, and combines some of the qualities of the undercover man, the entrepreneur, and the military strategist. (4) The *agitator* is given to reform and revolutionary plans. He views the *status quo* as bad, evil, and decadent, and furnishes verbal pictures of a new heaven and a new earth to come. He is often marked by intense self love, strong belief in verbal stimuli, and great faith in magical or fantastic devices for reforming the world.

⁴⁰ G. W. Allport and P. E. Vernon, "A test for personal values," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1931, 26: 231-248.

⁴¹ H. A. Murray, *Explorations in Personality* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1938), p. 727.

(5) The *theorist* applies his energies toward making a systematic analysis of the environment, attempting thereby to formulate a consistent, logical picture of his world. He may be interested in reform, but again he may want to preserve the *status quo*. His emotional security comes from dependence on general principles, on verbal abstractions.⁴²

Personality Type and Social Type. We may well ask: What, if any, are the differences between the personality and social types? Burgess has given us a suggestive lead in this matter which will serve to indicate the importance of drawing such distinction.

Personality type, he contends, derives chiefly from the constitutional background and from fundamental early training. The social type, in contrast, arises from the principal rôles and the status which one secures from the community in which he participates. The personality type or "pattern" is defined "as the sum and integration of those traits which characterize the typical reactions of one person toward other persons." This pattern is formed in the first years of life through conjunction of constitutional and acquired factors, and remains, with some modification and extension, fairly constant throughout the rest of life. In contrast, social type "does not refer to the mechanisms of personality reactions, but to attitudes, values, and philosophy of life derived from copies presented by society." It is the rôle assigned by society and assumed by the individual which creates the social type. For instance, in the case of Stanley, as a social type, he was a "runaway," a delinquent, a "Jackroller" during one period of his life; later he became a salesman and "respectable citizen." All too frequently we mistakenly think that abrupt and revolutionary alterations in social type represent fundamental changes in the basic personality structure. Certainly Stanley's personality patterns of egocentricity, desire for personal victory in any competitive situation, his verbal manipulative powers, and his sensitivity to criticism did not change. This is evident in his many unsuccessful trials at various occupations.

Burgess holds that modifications in personality are very slight after the first years. He says,

"Our hypothesis is that personality patterns, since they are fixed in infancy and in early childhood, are likewise susceptible to reconditioning only in this same period. The conditioning of social types takes place in later experiences and may accordingly be reconditioned in youth and maturity."⁴³

This distinction between personality type and social type is important. The former may be considered the basic life organization of the individual in terms of the nature of his overt conduct and his inner values, meanings,

⁴² H. D. Lasswell, *Psychopathology and Politics* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1930).

⁴³ See Burgess' interpretative comments in Clifford Shaw, *The Jack-Roller* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1930). The quotations are from pages 193, 194. By permission.

themata, attitudes, traits, disposition, and the like. It is essentially a matter of *how* one responds to himself and others. Burgess believes this to be pretty thoroughly predetermined, as to major lines, by heredity and fundamental constitution.

The present writer, who, in general, agrees with this distinction between psychological and social types, would place much more emphasis upon the earliest personal-social conditioning, but would by no means deny or neglect the probabilities that biologically inherent factors play an important part in the entire development of personality structure. On the other hand, social type reflects what the individual does in his various group contacts, and the manner in which these, in turn, influence his status. In short, the type of social rôle may change with variations in participation, but the personality type is, for the adult at least, a much more fixed and inflexible feature of his total make-up. As we noted in Chapter I, Linton, in discussing somewhat this same problem, distinguishes between the basic personality and what he terms the "status" personality.⁴⁴ The former would fall into the category of the personality type, the latter somewhat into what Thomas, Burgess, and others refer to as the social type.

The recognition of this distinction should clear up many misconceptions among psychologists in their discussion of typology. As an example: some of the items in tests of introversion-extroversion really relate to social rôle rather than to the dispositional mechanisms—the *how*—of social interaction. That is, if we ask what people do rather than what they value, or what emotional meaning they give their experiences, we may be tapping their social rôles, not their underlying intellectual-emotional make-up.

The relation of personality type to social rôle is an important theoretical and practical problem. Are some personalities better suited to certain rôles than to others? How much is social adaptation itself facilitated or hindered by a failure on the part of the individual and of his fellows to recognize these differences? Such problems have obvious bearing on vocational adjustment, on the appeals of various religious or political faiths, and doubtless on the intimate relations of the family—to say nothing of their possible bearing on the appeals of different sorts of leisure-time activities, hobbies, and the like.

The matter is well illustrated in Kretschmer's discussion of various kinds of life activities which fall within his major classification of *euclothymes* and *schizoclothymes*. He is really dealing with the relations of social to personality types when he puts realistic and humorous poets, or empirical experimentalists, or "jolly" organizing leaders under the former, and the poets of pathos, romance, and formalism, or logicians, or idealistic and fanatic leaders under the latter.

⁴⁴ Ralph Linton, *The Cultural Background of Personality* (New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1945).

There has been some effort to correlate introversion with certain occupations, and extroversion with others. Freyd found that mechanically minded individuals tended to be introverts, and that "socially" inclined persons, such as executives, were more likely to be extroverts. Laird states that inspectors, accountants, and research engineers tend toward introversion, in contrast to executives, foremen, and nurses, who are more often extroverted. In a sample of teachers studied by Pechstein there was a preponderance of introverts. And Conklin found business-school students, pre-medical students, and life-insurance salesmen decidedly more introverted than students of journalism or of English literature, or bank employees.

So, too, the report of Fleming, based on forty years' records at the Dorset County mental hospital in England, suggests the possibility of linking up personality types with certain occupations. Dividing the patients with functional disorders into introverts and extroverts, he found that, on the whole, the former tended to be represented by such vocational groups as students, engineers, bookkeepers, surgeons, dentists, chemists, soldiers, carpenters, stonemasons, bricklayers, and lawyers. Those diagnosed as extroverts tended for the most part to be farmers, blacksmiths, policemen, railwaymen, shepherds, merchants, managers, and business directors.⁴⁵

The broader theoretical aspects of the relation of personality to social rôle bear, first, upon the important question of the constitutional foundation of both personal differences and possible type classifications. Second, it brings into focus the importance of social interaction, especially in the early years, in fixing the basic mechanisms of interaction for the rest of life. Finally, the adaptation of individuals of particular kinds of constitutional and psychological make-up to social expectancies in rôle throws into relief one of the profoundest problems of social psychology and social science; namely, the relationship between the social order and culture, on the one hand, and the *how* and *what* of the individual's life organization, on the other. Thus, if there are fundamental and perhaps inherited factors making for types of personality, how far may a particular culture go in altering these types? For example, assuming, for the moment, that Jung's types have an organic, even inherent basis, will a society which places its chief interest and values upon extroverted activity, with emphasis also upon external conformity, break down because in the end it leaves little or no place for the interests and values of introverts? This is a difficult matter to settle in our present inadequate state of knowledge, but it

⁴⁵ For the details of these studies see, Freyd, *op. cit.*, Donald A. Laird, "How personalities are found in industry," *Industrial Psychology*, 1926 1 654-662; E. S. Conklin, "The determination of normal extrovert-introvert interest differences," *Pedagogical Seminary and Journal of Genetic Psychology*, 1927, 34 27-37, and G. W. T. H. Fleming, "Introverted and extroverted tendencies in schizoid and syntonio states as manifested by vocation," *Journal of Mental Science*, 1927, 73 233-239.

is a problem which is bound to arise as our studies of human personality and culture are extended.

CRITIQUE OF TYPOLOGY

The topic of human typology has been much discussed by psychologists and other social scientists. On the whole those psychologists who favor an atomistic, trait approach to their data question the usefulness and validity of typology. Other psychologists and many clinical psychiatrists who are interested in the totalistic or the whole-personality approach are more favorable. Still others, not committed to any particular school of thought regarding personality, are desirous of knowing what empirical tests may be applied to various assumed typologies or, for that matter, whether empirical studies in psychology may not uncover certain configurations of behavior-units which may be stated systematically in terms of typology.⁴⁰

A first approximation to an adequate understanding of physique, psychological dimensions of personality, or social rôles by means either of trait or type analysis is a matter of taxonomy. That is, it is a question of a certain classification system. As is clear from biology, a systematic classification of its data into species, families, and varieties does not explain said data, though it helps to understand certain features or characteristics of the organisms placed in various categories. Moreover, research into dynamic inter-relations (causation) may be facilitated by setting up taxonomic models as the foundation of hypotheses to be tested empirically. Viewed in this light, attempts to deal with personality in terms of types as well as in terms of specific traits makes some sense, the critics to the contrary notwithstanding. In this final section we shall discuss some of the larger issues in typology both as to theory and empirical research.

Approaches to Typology. A type, like a trait, is a construct, not a material thing. But a construct may be of varying degrees of abstraction, and some psychologists regard the concept of type as too abstract to be scientifically useful. Obviously the only utility of this or any other construct lies in aiding us to formulate propositions and hypotheses that will facilitate controlled description and analysis with a view to subsequent sound generalization and hence prediction.

The more important discussions of human typology have raised some significant theoretical and methodological problems. First, are we to regard types as heuristic devices or are they empirically derivable? Second, are types to be viewed as large, molar units, or variables in a discon-

⁴⁰ While our interest here is in the typing of personalities, it should be noted that the topic of typology is not confined to psychology of individuals. It has been applied to collectivities or groups as well as to institutions and to whole cultural systems. See Howard Becker, "Constructive typology in the social sciences," Chap. 2 in H. E. Barnes, H. Becker, and Francis B. Becker, eds., *Contemporary Social Theory* (New York, D. Appleton-Century Company, Inc., 1949).

tinuous series, or as clusters of smaller traits or units which may be examined as continuous variables?

Heuristic typology is deduced from theory and takes the form of concepts, assumptions, and hypotheses which provide a means of making general statements about certain recurrent events, be they group, institutional, or personal in form. It selects from the minutiae of happenings only those repetitive ones which are thought to contribute to making general statements. Such selection may distort the rich concrete reality of daily life and it may even choose to posit extreme forms of relevant features, be they physical, psychological, or social in nature. An example, noted above, is that of Max Weber's "ideal type." He utilized the type concept of "rational man" in discussing certain recurrent evidences of market operations in a wide range of historical instances. He never assumed that all the features of these varied historical examples were the same. He "abstracted" from them evidences to support and demonstrate his ideal type of rational processes in human interaction.⁴⁷

An heuristic typology may be put to various empirical tests as has been shown by Weber and later workers. The method represents a reconstruction of past events something like that which the geologist uses in retracing the steps for a given geological period. In the field of personality such reconstruction of the past, as an aid to understanding the present and predicting the future, is a basic aspect of psychoanalysis which we shall discuss in the next chapter.

Empirical typology is derived from concrete data rather than from theory. It attempts to summarize and organize data from observations of individuals. The means of determining a set of types, two-fold or multiple, may, as in the case of Jung and Kretschmer, be of a rather rough and ready sort. Nonetheless their typologies were empirically oriented. Moreover, most of the earlier typologies employed not single but multiple features or traits as criteria for differentiating one type from another. In his discussion of typology, Klüver not only points out that the type entity is a multiple or cluster of items but that these represent a dynamic system of interaction and not some mere additive compilation of one trait to another. "The typological method isolates systems, the inter-relations of which are or must be established."⁴⁸ Moreover, Klüver, like others, has insisted that as important as statistical methods may be in developing types, we must not overlook the place of logic in composing any typology.

⁴⁷ For suggestive discussions on the theory and method of typology, see R. F. Winch, "Heuristic and empirical typologies: a job for factor analysis," *American Sociological Review*, 1947, 12: 68-75, and J. G. McKinney, "The rôle of constructive typology in scientific sociological analysis," *Social Forces*, 1950, 28: 235-240. Both cite a wide range of literature on typology.

⁴⁸ Hendrik H. Klüver, "Typological method. E. Kretschmer's study of physique and character," *Analysis* 9, in S. A. Price, ed., *Methods in Social Science* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1931), p. 183.

The second major problem of typology concerns the matter of treating types as discontinuous or separate variables or as extremes of some underlying continuous variable. Winthrop has noted that all typologies may be subsumed under one of three categories: (1) those using what he calls "pure characteristics," (2) those of "distributed characteristics," and (3) those representing a mixture of (1) and (2). In the first classification the distinctive features of a type exist on an all-or-none basis. That is, an individual is presumed to be either pyknic, athletic, or asthenic; or introvert or extrovert, and so on. The distinguishing features are thought to be qualitatively so sharply set off from those of other types as to constitute separate variables. In the second classification the distinctive features or "indicators are present in some proportion in all individuals." For example, in Sheldon's schema everyone is partially endomorphic, mesomorphic, and ectomorphic. For his system the modality or predominance of one cluster of features over another determines the type category in which an individual is to be placed. The mixed typologies may be subdivided into those in which all the features are present in some degree in some individuals, those in which certain of the features are present in some degree in all persons, and finally typologies "in which no one of the indicators is present to some degree in all individuals."⁴⁰

Whether they intended to do so or not many of the early typologists gave the impression that they viewed their types as falling into the first classification. And, while Jung may have been somewhat cautious in this matter, certainly those who first took up his theory of introversion-extroversion tended all too frequently to divide mankind into one or the other category. This blanket stereotyping of people appeals to the untrained person since it fits so neatly into the naïve pigeonholing of behavior which simplifies the day-by-day life for most individuals.

More serious attempts to deal with the introversion-extroversion dimensions of personality, however, tended to regard them as representing a continuum of basic traits, the extremes of which might be designated as representing one type or the other. Such workers view types as convenient devices for describing the more extreme segments of a continuous gradation of traits or clusters of traits found in some amount in all individuals. The same point applies to the Sheldon formulations, despite the somewhat inadequate techniques which he may have applied. So, too, Stephenson has worked out, by one kind of factor analysis, methods of relating clustering of characteristics of individuals rather than correlating item traits as such for a given population. This permits a treatment of various traits

⁴⁰ Henry Winthrop, "The theoretical basis of biotypology," *Philosophy of Science*, 1943, 10:131-139. Quotations from page 134. See also Winthrop's papers: "The fundamental problems of biotypology," *Journal of General Psychology*, 1944, 31:151-177; and, "A contribution towards a scientific program for a systematic constitutional typology," *ibid.*, 1947, 37:139-159.

or features as they cluster in a given person who could then be compared with other individuals in any given series of continuous variables.⁵⁰

The theory of clusters of characteristics which may be dealt with statistically, especially by factor analysis, has had wide vogue. As Cattell states it: "A *correlation cluster* is the statistical basis of a continuous type, or rather of two opposite types—that formed by a simultaneous high endowment in the pattern of traits and that represented by a simultaneous low endowment in all the traits."⁵¹ The roots of the cluster theory, of course, lie in clinical psychiatry and psychology where the concept *syndrome* has long had wide usage. An illustration of such clustering as a clue to typification is found in the work of J. P. Guilford and R. B. Guilford who, by applying factor analysis to the scores on certain tests of introversion, found that a combination of basic traits, such as social avoidance, emotionality, submissiveness, depression, shyness, and meditative thinking, characterized individuals who fall into Jung's category of "thinking introversion."⁵² (See above.)

A different method was worked out by Zubin. Rather than start with the assumption that introversion and extroversion represent the extremes of a continuous scale of traits, he reversed the usual standpoint and selected empirically "two contrasting groups of individuals" of acknowledged differences in personality organization. He matched sixty-eight schizophrenes and sixty-eight normal persons in terms of age, sex, race, nativity, education, and occupation, and tested them with a carefully devised inventory of seventy items dealing with subjective and overt characteristics. Then by means of statistical devices he found certain "families" or classes of like-structured responses which would serve to set off the schizoids from the normal individuals. That is, on certain clusters of particular items members of the former resembled each other very markedly. The normals, too, had their distinctive groups.⁵³

In dealing with types as representing gradations on a continuum we must not forget that in so doing we are trying, by means of logic and scientific method, to find a sound way to deal with a mass of complicated data as to physique, psychological make-up, and social rôles. Yet, to take another example from studies of introversion and extroversion, we must not overlook the fact that the tests of these or other dimensions of personality

⁵⁰ See William Stephenson, "Correlating persons instead of tests," *Character and Personality*, 1935, 4:17-24.

⁵¹ R. B. Cattell, *Personality: A Systematic Theoretical and Factual Study* (New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1950), p. 12. Italics in original.

⁵² J. P. Guilford and R. B. Guilford, "Personality factors S, E, and M, and their measurement," *Journal of Psychology*, 1936, 2:109-127; and "Personality factors D, R, T, and A," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1939, 34:21-36.

⁵³ J. Zubin, "A technique for measuring like-mindedness," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1938, 33:508-516; and "Socio-biological types and methods of their isolation," *Psychiatry*, 1938, 1:237-247.

are constructed and standardized on the statistical theory of unimodality or normal probability distribution of said traits. This very fact tends to set the stage for finding continuous rather than discrete and bimodal or multimodal distributions. Zubin well points out that "The continuity in distribution may have been a result of the logical consistency of the scoring key rather than of the behavior of human beings."⁵⁴

One may, however, legitimately ask if it is necessary to deal with clustering of features under the statistics of the normal probability curve. It might well be that, by employing the statistics of attributes rather than that of variables, we may investigate the clustering or cohesion of ideas, traits, attitudes, and habits in such a way as to reveal contrasts that might lead to generalizations, which, in turn, might become extremely useful for the prediction and control of individual conduct.

The statistics of attributes do not deal in scalar units of equal size, but with qualities that are found grouped together in certain ways, the presence or absence of which may be recorded in such a form as to be compared in terms of likely association, sample by sample. Such devices may prove to be particularly adapted to the analysis of types which tend to take on an all-or-none aspect. Even if the data in question should fall into a form approximating the normal probability curve, an approach to classification is not thereby entirely invalidated. We should never forget that the statistical treatment of variables permits a certain typification. Those who scorn typology should remember that the use of any average or any index of variation represents a kind of typification. Any such measure is but a device for symbolizing common or uniform aspects of a given distribution.

In line with this point, we might, for example, choose to break a distribution of traits or persons with clusters of traits, into quartile or into sigma units, and on the basis of certain extremes label those cases, which fall within certain boundaries of the scale, say introvert or extrovert. Thus, we might agree that those cases falling within one and a half sigmas from the mean might be called ambivert and those outside these limits either introvert or extrovert, depending on whether they lie on one side or the other of this larger modal group. Under the normal curve this would signify that approximately 7 per cent would be extrovert, and an equal percentage introvert, the others being ambivert or of mixed characteristics. This illustration is purely hypothetical, of course, but it shows the manner in which a certain proportion of a given frequency of an adequate and unbiased sample might be classified by these typological terms without unduly altering a useful concept of generalization.

⁵⁴ Zubin, *ibid.*, p. 239. For a discussion of this point as it applies to intelligence tests, and by inference to most alleged measurements of non-intellectual functions, see F. G. Boring, "The logic of the normal law of error in mental measurement," *American Journal of Psychology*, 1920, 31:1-33.

Typology and Generalization. G. W. Allport, Stagner, and many other psychologists contend that typology neglects and belies the rich variability and uniqueness of personality. To answer these critics means to enter into the entire problem of a *science* of personality. Surely a scientist may object to a theory of types, either, logical or empirical in origin, as inadequate to deal systematically with certain kinds of data. And, if he finds the typological treatment inadequate, he may well initiate other methods and theories for dealing with the data. But science cannot be built out of the unique, nor can objections be made to typology because it does not take into account every particular in relation to body build, human response, or social rôle. As Becker aptly remarks, "The belief that the constructed type is rendered useless because exceptions to it can be found is childishly naïve."⁵⁵

In developing a satisfactory theory of personality, including a possible place for typology, the following considerations must be noted: (1) Despite individual variations, the constitution of the human being reveals certain features common to all members of the species, for example, the major organic systems, the fundamental needs, and the cycles of activity which concern their satisfaction. This commonality therefore affords a certain *constant* which must be considered in our theory and research. (2) There are variations in the nature and extent of the modifications which experience—that is, adaptation to the environment—makes in the individual with reference to wants and satisfactions. Nevertheless, despite these deviations, there remain certain constancies or recurrences of similar if not identical stimuli, both internal and external, as well as constancies of response which make for uniformity and commonality of life organization. In other words, the repetition of the material and social-cultural situations and the fundamentally stable characteristics of the organism which control the responses thereto tend to foster uniformity in the patterning of behavior and thought.

Obviously deviations and particulars are present in human conduct; there are everywhere degrees of generality and of particularity. It seems to me that it is only upon the basis of these two sets of facts, that is, *uniformity* and *variation*, that we realize a logical need for some terms of classification or typification if we are to arrive at any sort of general and comparable concepts in the hoped-for science of personality. If, of course, we take the position that these divergences, these individual differences, completely overshadow generality, that each individual is really unique and lacks anything in common with another, then we must of necessity give up any hope of typification. In fact, over-attention to, and dogmatic faith in, specificity of traits, attitudes, and habits may well lead to such extreme emphasis upon the uniqueness as to prevent scientific comparative treatment of personality. But are we faced with quite such

⁵⁵ Howard Becker, *op. cit.*, p. 39.

a sharp dichotomy between complete uniformity or commonality and uniqueness? Actually, individuals do seem to fall into certain clusters of behavior patterns, and, as obviously inadequate as common-sense typology about this fact is, we must contend that everyday experience gives some foundation for developing general concepts about behavior and for classifying individuals under certain general terms.

The problem is really one of selecting those criteria of traits, attitudes, values, and habits which will serve as central tendencies of a cluster or class of persons and will set them off from another cluster or class. The heart of our present difficulty lies here. We have not yet hit upon completely satisfactory differentiating criteria of personality make-up.

It may well be true, as MacKinnon says, that "types are crude pictures of personality,"⁵⁶ but efforts to clarify this picture are going forward. This is especially so in various efforts to determine empirically the validity and usefulness of typologies, not only in regard to personality but in respect to group and institutional data as well. Certainly we should not desert this problem simply because it is beset with difficulties. Rather it should be a challenge for further research.

⁵⁶ MacKinnon, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

CHAPTER 10

Theories of Personality

Peoples everywhere make generalizations about human conduct. Among non-literate groups and in the pre-scientific eras of literate societies these generalizations are found in myths, legends, and proverbs which describe and explain motivations and actions. It is only in more complex and sophisticated societies that philosophers and scholars have attempted systematic theories about personality. A *theory* is an abstract and general statement of fundamental principles designed to explain particular events or facts which we know concretely. Applied to personalities, theories and generalizations are useful in understanding and in explaining man's inner life and outer conduct. Both scientific research and satisfactory practical treatment of behavior problems require some sort of theoretical frame of reference or standpoint if valid conclusions regarding the individual's life organization are to be made.

In the study of personality there have emerged no end of theories, and some of them have already been discussed in Chapter 9 on typology. In this chapter, we shall review certain other contemporary theories particularly those which have their roots in psychoanalysis, in individual psychology, and in recent social psychology and cultural anthropology.

FREUDIAN THEORY

Psychoanalysis has been a topic of much bitter controversy between those who consider it a vicious form of medical mythology if not outright malpractice and those who have developed and used it, either in complete agreement with its founder, Sigmund Freud, or in some more or less modified form. No matter how one stands on this question, there is little doubt that Freud's work has had a profound influence on the study of personality. It is impossible to characterize the theory of Freud in a few paragraphs, and the variations of it are many. The present, somewhat didactic summary is at best an approximation to a more complete statement.

The founder of psychoanalysis did not set out to develop a theory of personality. Freud, as a practitioner in psychiatry, was concerned with helping individuals who were emotionally disturbed and rendered ineffective to themselves and to others. From their inner life, his patients reported, among others, such symptoms as undue fears and anxieties, disturbing dreams, insomnia, feelings of unworthiness, fatigue, and general

incompetence. At the level of overt activities they reported sexual impotence, inability to make decisions where decisions were required, emotional outbursts that to the patient and others had no meaning, slips of tongue, and many other reactions which "did not make sense."

Out of his practice in Vienna, Austria, which was confined rather exclusively to well-to-do middle-class urban individuals, Freud began to make generalizations and to shape a theory of personality. To the present-day students of human behavior, his theory often seems to be a mixture of curious biology and mentalistic psychology. For example, while he did not press the matter, he believed in the inheritance of acquired characteristics, something no longer held in biology, but common enough in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. And his concept of the unconscious and its mechanisms are not accepted by hard-headed behaviorists. (The latter substitute other terms to deal with these phenomena.)

The open-minded student, however, will read Freud's writings with a sympathetic understanding of the cultural setting of his work and with a realization that his theory was built out of therapy and not from carefully controlled experiments or clinical observation of individuals under conditions of sound sampling and with our recently developed tests and other techniques. Once the reader has mastered the terminology and has grasped the use of the case analysis, he will discover that Freud was as thoroughgoing a determinist as any scientist could be. In fact, his views represent one of the most devastating determinisms in all psychology. His denial of free will, indeterminism, and other comfortable doctrines of theology furnish simply one other reason, along with his emphasis on sexuality, for the considerable emotional resistance to psychoanalysis as therapy or theory.

For the purposes of this book, it is not necessary to trace the long history of psychoanalysis.¹ Rather we shall give a brief résumé of the major aspects of psychoanalytic theory, covering such matters as the basic assumptions regarding the individual and environment, developmental stages, mental mechanisms, and the structure of the personality.

Individual and Environment. The subject-matter of psychoanalysis "is human behavior viewed as conflict."² The individual is regarded as

¹ For a brief history of psychoanalysis, see Sigmund Freud, *Problems of an Analysts* (New York, Brentano's, 1927). A more comprehensive account of the earlier developments will be found in Freud's "On the history of the psychoanalytic movement," reprinted in his *Collected Papers*, Vol. I (New York, International Psycho-analytical Press, 1924). The following are convenient sources for the most important of his works: *The Basic Writings of Sigmund Freud*, trans. and ed. by A. A. Brill (New York, Modern Library, Inc., 1938). See also: *A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis* (New York, Boni & Liveright, 1920); *New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis* (New York, W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1955). And his posthumous: *An Outline of Psychoanalysis* (New York, W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1941).

² See Ernest Kris, "The nature of psychoanalytic propositions and their validation," in Sidney Hook and M. J. Kestel, eds., *Freud and Experience* (Ithaca, New York, Cornell University Press, 1947), p. 241.

in a more or less constant state of striving or struggling for satisfactions which a hostile environment, especially the social world, tends to redirect, restrict, and often completely deny him.

To aid in his adjustment to the world, the individual is equipped with a certain amount of energy. This energy is postulated as being expressed, as to form, in two fundamental tendencies which Freud, in poetic vein, called "*Eros*," or the "life" or "love" instinct, and the "*destructive*" instinct or "death" instinct. "The aim of the first is to establish ever greater units and to preserve them thus—in short, to bind together; the aim of the second, on the contrary, is to undo connections and so to destroy things."³

The energy expressed through life instinct is termed the *libido* and it may take both generalized and specific forms and directions. It may be directed toward the external world of persons and things; it may be inhibited in its more primal form but sublimated in outward manifestation; or it may be directed inward to give rise to the strong self-preservative patterns. The destructive instinct may likewise be expressed differently: it may be directed outward as overt aggression; it may be repressed, as the result of either internal or external pressures, which, in turn, may result in certain regressions to more primary levels of activity; or it may be turned inward upon the self, taking the form of self-injury or self-punishment. These two instincts are said to stand in a bi-polar relation to each other and to combine and recombine in a variety of ways in the development of the individual. But before examining the manner in which the personality develops, some other basic Freudian concepts must be noted.

Mind and Mental Mechanisms. As a set of operating postulates, Freud divided the human mind or what he called "the psychical apparatus" into three parts or levels: the *conscious*, the *pre-conscious* (earlier termed the *fore-conscious*), and *unconscious*. The first is the mental awareness of the inner or outer world present at a given moment in time. The second represents the potential source of memories and old associations upon which we may deliberately draw now or later. For example, though one may not have a given person's name in mind at the moment, there would be no difficulty in recalling it at once if the occasion demanded it. The third level, the unconscious, is not directly available to deliberate recall but is held to be far more extensive and important in determining our lives than either the conscious or the preconscious. As a matter of fact, it controls much of what goes on in the other two levels.

According to Freudian theory the content of the unconscious derives first of all from the biologically rooted instincts and associated processes which later came to be called the *id*. Another source of the unconscious, however, is the residue of impulses or effects which result from the inhibition of responses. This inhibition the Freudians call *repression* and is a

³ Sigmund Freud, *An Outline of Psychoanalysis*, op cit. p. 20. By permission

central concept to their entire theory. The conscious and pre-conscious, on the other hand, are intimately related to the processes of perception, imagery, memory, and conceptualization which function in the individual's adaptation to the external world. In Freudian terms the conscious and pre-conscious are linked to the ego. (See below.) The division of "mental qualities" into conscious, pre-conscious, and unconscious however, "is neither absolute nor permanent" although the workings of the latter can be uncovered only under somewhat special conditions which act to overcome resistance.⁴

The operations of consciousness are not identical with those of the unconscious. The former are governed by logical considerations, either in a rigid, objective form, or in a less rigid but nonetheless directed and controlled way. On the other hand the unconscious has a kind of logic of its own, that of "free association" or fantasy. This does not, of course, mean that the workings of the unconscious are not those of a strict cause-and-effect relationship. Every association is determined by its relation to others, and serves as an important source for getting at the complex of factors which enter into the personality. What is meant, then, by "free association"—as used in psychoanalysis or in psychology generally—is that the mental linkages are not directed or controlled by conscious selection or inhibition. However, the processes of consciousness and of the unconscious are closely linked together and some of the activities which seem rational and logical turn out, on closer examination, to be dependent on irrational and illogical activities of the unconscious.

In the course of his work, Freud developed a whole series of relatively new concepts to describe the conscious and unconscious processes. Many of these concepts have passed into social psychology although frequently with somewhat altered meanings. Since most of the important of these terms were discussed in Chapter 5, we need not go over them again, except to note that of all these so-called "mental mechanisms," repression and regression are central to the Freudian theory.⁵

In the course of learning to get along in one's environment, physical and social, the growing child discovers that he cannot have his own way on every occasion. Parents and others impose a variety of controls over his impulses in the form of punishment. By conditioning, the impulse or drive and the response toward the given goal become linked to fear or anxiety which is painful and unpleasant. This fear or anxiety, in turn, induces repression. Freud distinguished between two kinds of repression—primal repression and after-expulsion. The former, which he assumed to have deep racial roots in form of "archaic ideas" attached to the instincts, keeps from

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 38.

⁵ See William Healy, Augusta F. Bronner and Anna M. Bowers, *The Structure and Meaning of Psychoanalysis* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1937), p. 211. Despite its curious format and lack of psychological illustrations to several chapters, this book remains a useful guide to the major Freudian concepts and analyses.

consciousness material that never was conscious. The latter acts to push conscious and pre-conscious impulses and ideas into the unconscious. After-expulsion is the type of repression with which the psychoanalyst has to deal in his therapy and is therefore the type which must receive most attention from those who try to systemize the Freudian psychology. A second means of adjustment consists of using forms of response which no longer are effective and appropriate to a given situation but which at an earlier age or stage of development may have had some adjustive efficiency. This return to earlier patterns is what is meant by regression.

Developmental Stages. The individual with his energy mobilized through two basic instincts is said to go through a series of more or less fixed and universal stages of development as he passes from infancy to adulthood. Let us note the main characteristics of each.

(a) The first is the *infancy period*, lasting approximately from birth to five years of age; this period is divided into two phases: the "pre-genital" and the "early genital." The former, in turn, is sub-divided into "oral stage" and the "anal stage." The oral phase is marked by intense concern with the pleasures of feeding. Sucking, swallowing, and incorporating are largely reflexive at the outset, but shortly acquire further meaning in the form of attachment to the mother's breast, an object-fixation or *cathexis*, to use the Freudian term. Biting and other pain-inflicting reactions of the child give him his first destructive or sadistic pleasures. Gradually attention begins to shift to the eliminative functions associated with rudimentary pleasures. The oral and anal stages lay the foundations for an absorbing interest in one's body and its operations.

The early genital or phallic stage is one in which the child gives initial expression to his sexuality. Pleasure is derived from touching, rubbing, and showing others the genital organs. The child is full of questions and fantasies about his sexual functions.

From these early oral, anal, and sexual interests emerges self-love or narcissism. Members of the family and playgroup come to serve largely as objects to satisfy the child's selfish wishes. Yet they also act to control his demands and repression comes into the operation. During the phallic phase, moreover, the child's strong fixation on the mother becomes apparent. This marks the inception of the Oedipus complex. (See below.)

The essential demand of the infant during this period remains under what Freud called the "pleasure principle"—the desire for sensuous satisfactions, and the concomitant desire for completely selfish attainment. The organism, at this juncture, operates on an all-or-none pattern. In this infantile phase, of course, it is concerned chiefly with physical or physiological activities. Associated with this libidinous urge is another, that of absorption and control of the world for one's own satisfaction. When this demand is frustrated, the rudimentary destructive impulse (the death instinct) comes into play, and the erotic drive may be shunted aside. This

sadistic, aggressive trend may be directed outward on others or on physical environment, or it may be obliged to turn inward to self-punishment, an essential factor in the rise of the superego. (See below.)

(b) The second stage is called the *latency period*, and runs from about the fifth to the twelfth year of life. It is marked by repression, reaction-formation, sublimation, and normally by identification with the parent of the same sex. The attention of the child is more and more directed outward to other persons and the material world with a corresponding decline of the more obvious sexual interests which characterized the former stage. The inhibitive or repressive processes which began in the first months and years continue and result in more or less eliminating the infantile overt manifestations of sexuality. At the same time the child continues to divert his now somewhat sublimated love interests away from the mother, father, and siblings or other close household members to other persons, such as playmates or teachers and other adults who enter into their world. Moreover, as this trend away from overt affection takes place, the aggressive responses become increasingly linked up with the expression toward the world.

(c) The third or *pubertal period* is begun at the time of sexual maturation and a heightened concern with erotic activities. There is a re-arousal of overt libidinous interest, which usually takes two directions: one of self-centered character, witnessed in the recurrence of masturbatory activities—which usually had their origin in the infancy stage; and the other, of heterosexual sort, evident in the growing interest in members of the opposite sex. From this stage the individual normally passes on to adult heterosexuality and marriage.

The crucial foci in all this development concerns the love life and ego. In infancy the basic attachment is to the mother. In connection with this fixation and dependence the child develops an overpowering demand for all her love, affection, care, and attention. According to the Freudian theory, at the early stages this may take the form of an unconscious if not conscious wish for direct, organic satisfactions of what are essentially sexual and closely associated physiological interests. On this basis arises the Oedipus complex—a configuration of emotions, feelings, attitudes, and ideas representing this attachment of infant to parent of the opposite sex. In the normal development the direct biological demands are repressed or redirected in a variety of ways by the rise of masturbatory interests, by substitution of other persons or things as a source of pleasure, or by more or less direct inhibition of these impulses in the face of the requirements of the material world and of society for individual conformity. During the imposition of restrictions and punishments upon the growing child there arises in him an association between his all-powerful drives for organic satisfaction and the demands of parents and others, which results in another configuration of ideas, beliefs, and feelings—the so-called

"castration" complex. That is to say, he comes to feel or sense that he has lost his former potency, and the deprivation may serve to motivate his drives for personal domination (ego satisfaction), or it may serve as the basis for a growing sense of inferiority. In fact, this introjection of the power pattern of others means that the fear of losing his own potency in time dissolves the earlier Oedipus complex. That is, the boy—from fear of deprivation, increasingly introjected into his own inner world—sublimates his strong attachment to the mother, partially by diffusing his affection on other persons, including a growing identification with the father and his power. The girl, on her part, goes through a somewhat similar change. She, too, represses and sublimates her strong fixation on her father partly by directing her affection to other persons. This often includes a return-identification with her mother and the development of feminine traits which play a part in her final attainment of heterosexual attachment to her own mate.⁶

Structure of the Personality. As to the organization of the personality, or what in psychoanalytic theory is called the "character," Freud postulated three interacting "psychic substructures or systems," the id, ego, and superego, which may be in conflict with each other or operate in combination "according to their developmental level, to the amount of energy vested in them, and to their demarcation and interdependence at a given time."⁷

The *id* comprises at the outset the inherited urges or instincts and their reservoir of energy. It aims to gratify these basic needs through the operation of the "pleasure principle." If it had its way it would brook no interference with the outward expression of its biological demands. It is amoral and illogical from the standpoint of society and culture. The *id* is also the seat or source of the original unconscious but in time it acquires a wealth of impulses and action-tendencies which may have once been expressed but which are subsequently suppressed or repressed under the social pressures of mother, father, and others.

In its struggle for satisfaction the *id* may direct its energies upon any number of objects, revealing a "great mobility of cathezes" and may, moreover, make use of "special symbols" and various mechanisms, such as, condensation and displacement.⁸ In these activities it may draw upon the *ego*.

The *ego* develops out of the original *id* under the influence of the

⁶ The complications of Oedipus formation and dissolution in Freudian theory are many and they need not be pursued here. The student will find Healy, *et al.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 158-164, helpful in giving a schematic picture of the development and effects of the Oedipus complex for the boy and the girl.

⁷ Heinz Hartmann, Ernst Kris, and R. M. Loewenstein, "Comments on the formation of psychic structure," in *The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child*, Vol. 2 (New York, International Universities Press, Inc., 1946), p. 14. By permission.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

external environment though it is never completely differentiated from the id. In coming to terms with the outside world the individual acquires the "reality principle" which stands in contrast and often in conflict with the "pleasure principle" so important to the id. The foremost functions of the ego are perception, thinking, and acting. Through them the ego tests the present situation at hand and also anticipates the future. If one were to equate the id to the broad concept *instinct*, one might equate the ego to the concept *reason*. In handling the reality of the world the ego uses identification, logical thinking, and weighing of ends and means. It tries to bring about modifications in the external world to its own advantage. The ego records its past reactions in the pre-conscious. But it also has an unconscious aspect which easily merges with the deeper unconscious of the id.

The *superego* arises out of the relations of the id and the ego as they face the moral codes of society. The beginnings of the *superego* lie in the deprivations which parents and others impose on the child's id impulses. In our society these have to do with punishment of the child—threatened or actual—with his interest in, and manipulation of, the genitals, or with other infractions of the accepted moral codes. Later, with the emergence of the Oedipus pattern, the child's overt libidinous attachments to the parent of the opposite sex is met by castration threats—either actual or symbolic. These produce anxiety, guilt, and fear of loss of love. Various defense mechanisms including among others, repression, projection, and displacement frequently come into play to offset these threats. Moreover, through introjection the child takes up the punishing attitudes toward himself, and what may be called the moral self or conscience is born. This, added to earlier worries, induces a moral anxiety and sense of guilt. These serve to keep one's impulses and conduct within the framework of the sanctioned and proper conduct.

The *superego* operates largely at an unconscious level. It often acts in a tyrannical manner toward the ego and is thought to afford the id certain destructive and instinctual outlets in the form of severe self-punishment.⁹ When there is a somewhat rational balance between the ego and the *superego*, the individual experiences a fairly harmonious adjustment. But tensions may and do arise between the ego and *superego*. In this connection Freud remarks:

"The torments caused by the reproaches of conscience correspond precisely to a child's dread of losing his parents' love, a dread which has been replaced in him by the moral agency. On the other hand, if the ego has successfully resisted a temptation to do something that would be objectionable to the *superego*, it feels its self-respect raised and its pride increased. . . . In this way the *superego* continues to act the rôle of an external world toward the ego, although it has become a part of the internal world."¹⁰

⁹ See Freud, *An Outline of Psychoanalysis*, p. 22.

¹⁰ Freud, *ibid.*, p. 122. By permission.

That many Freudians regard the superego as a damaging and unhealthy development to happy life is evident in the words of Anna Freud, daughter of the founder of psychoanalysis. She writes:

"It [the superego] is the mischief-maker which prevents the ego's coming to a friendly understanding with the instincts. It sets up an ideal standard, according to which sexuality is prohibited and aggression pronounced to be anti-social. It demands a degree of sexual renunciation and restriction of aggression which is incompatible with psychic health. The ego is completely deprived of its independence and reduced to the status of an instrument for the execution of the superego's wishes; the result is that it becomes hostile to instinct and incapable of enjoyment."¹¹

When the superego functions at the conscious level, the person perceives it as a fear of bad conscience or as obedience to some ideal. The most effective controls of the superego, however, are those which take effect more or less non-deliberately and automatically, that is, unconsciously.

Some features of the rise and function of the superego were treated in Chapter 7 in discussing the rise of the moral qualities of the self. What sociologically are called the mores correspond in the personality to patterns of ideas, attitudes, and habits related to the demands of the superego or conscience.

This summary of Freudian theory omits many details which, if given, might make some of the concepts more meaningful. Before taking up some of the important criticisms and gaps in Freudian theory, let us look at the theories which other practitioners in this field have made but which represent certain departures from the *echt* Freudian position.

MODIFICATIONS OF FREUDIAN THEORY

As the practice of psychoanalysis in the hands of various people spread from its original center in Vienna, deviations from Freud's own views were bound to arise. Two of the earlier defections centered around Carl G. Jung and Alfred Adler. For our purposes, the most important contribution of Jung was his theory of personality types, and this has been reviewed in the previous chapter. Comment on Adler will be given below.

Other modifications in psychoanalytic theory appeared after those of Jung and Adler. Melanie Klein's views on infantile development and Otto Rank's thesis of the importance of the birth trauma, while interesting, are tangential to our purposes and will not be discussed. Horney's and Fromm's insistence on the central place of cultural conditioning, and especially Kardiner's efforts at connecting personality and culture represent important departures and extensions from true Freudianism and

¹¹ Anna Freud, *The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense* (New York, International University Press, 1946), p. 59. By permission.

their views will be examined. Brief comment will also be made on the work of Sullivan and Murray.

Adler's Theory of the Ego. Once a colleague of Freud's, Adler, another Austrian physician, developed a theory of personality development in different terms from Freud's.¹² For Adler life is characterized by a fundamental, inherent, purposive impulsion toward some anticipated goal of perfect achievement. This striving takes place largely through a basic desire for power, unified into an ego that should not be dissected into component parts if one would comprehend its true meaning. In the early years each person develops his own special "style of life" which, in time, becomes a more or less fixed pattern. Over against the individual are three aspects of the world toward which the adaptation must be made: to one's job, love life, and other social contacts.

Possessed of this potent ego drive, the infant finds himself hedged about on every hand. Physically he is inferior to his elders; he has to accommodate himself to their wills. The frustration of outgoing impulse gives rise to inferiority feelings, and these come, in turn, to activate further the tremendous demands for power. All through life other blockages of desire may arise, with corresponding incitement or inferiority and further enhancement of the demand. Often the person must find outlets in a variety of substitute ways. Adler referred to these as compensation.

The rather simple formulations of Adler stand in sharp contrast to the complex theories of Freud. Adler gave up the whole conceptual system based on the unconscious. Moreover, he discounted the central place of sexuality, which Freud emphasized. He dealt almost entirely with his patients at the level of conscious processes, especially with the patient's present mental conflicts. He did not engage in prolonged psychoanalytic interviews, leading back to the infantile roots of such disturbances. While he got life stories from his patients, he explained their difficulties to them largely in terms of their contemporary troubles in social adjustment. In this he resembles the *Gestalt* school. (See below.) He advised them on reorganizing their lives entirely in terms of conscious and deliberate self-control.

Strictly speaking, Adler should not be considered a psychoanalyst at all, if by that we refer to one who uses the techniques which Freud developed for dealing with neurotics.¹³ Yet his work did grow out of psy-

¹² See Alfred Adler, *The Neurotic Constitution* (New York, Moffat, Yard & Company, 1916), *The Practice and Theory of Individual Psychology* (New York, Harcourt, Brace & Company, Inc., 1924), *What Life Means to You* (Boston, Little, Brown & Company, 1931).

¹³ See "Report of the British Medical Association on psychoanalysis," *British Medical Journal, Supplement*, June 29, 1929, 1:262-270, Appendix II. This report takes a firm position that the term "psychoanalysis" can legitimately be applied only to the method evolved by Freud and to the theories derived from the use of this method" (p. 266). While such restriction has been attempted in the United States, deviations from the strict Freudian theory and analytic techniques as well have been common.

choanalysis and, despite his later departure from Freud, his findings, especially as to the important place of the ego motive, must have influenced the Freudian recognition of the same.

Theory of Horney. Of various deviations from Freud which, however, do not completely reject his work, those of Karen Horney have had considerable vogue, especially among certain social scientists in the United States.¹⁴

Horney's basic contention is that Freud overemphasizes the importance of instincts and of organic development by inevitable stages from birth to maturity. The "instinctivist orientation," in which the influences of the environment are secondary, should, she believes, give way to a "sociological orientation," in which cultural conditioning would have a central place in any theory of personality development and function.¹⁵ As one example of this she enters a strong demurrer to the Freudian thesis that femininity and masculinity derive essentially from deficiencies in the instincts. Instead she holds that what are often regarded as organic foundations of sex differences actually arise from variations in cultural definitions.

From this shift in emphasis it follows, in the second place, that neuroses result from "cultural factors," that is, they "are generated by disturbances in human relationships."¹⁶ She does not hold, as do the strict Freudians, that the neuroses result from the ego's fear of being overwhelmed by id-derived instincts or of being punished by an over-severe superego, born of the alliance of the Oedipus and castration complexes. Rather the neuroses arise from "all those adverse influences which make a child feel helpless and defenseless and make him conceive the world as potentially menacing."¹⁷ In other words, the neurosis is the result of the failure of certain specific devices to maintain safety or protection. Horney is even critical of the concepts of "ego" and "superego." She contends that as Freud uses the former term it is not a universal aspect of personality "but a neurotic phenomenon."¹⁸ As for the latter concept, she feels that Freud's attempt to equate this to the whole moral system as internalized by the individual is inaccurate. She certainly does not believe that we should regard the neurotic's suffering vis-à-vis his superego as representing a deep conflict between man's moral code and some kind of natural and biological striving to a normality which, if not harassed by the superego, would result in a better adjustment. Rather she believes that much neurotic suffering arises from what are essentially "pseudo-moral problems" which

¹⁴ Horney's views are conveniently set forth in the following books, all published in New York by W. W. Norton & Company, Inc.: *The Neurotic Personality in Our Time* (1937), *New Ways in Psychoanalysis* (1939), *Our Inner Conflicts: A Constructive Theory of Neuroses* (1945), *Neurosis and Human Growth. The Struggle toward Self-realization* (1950).

¹⁵ Horney, *New Ways in Psychoanalysis*, p. 9.

¹⁶ Horney, *Our Inner Conflicts: A Constructive Theory of Neuroses*, p. 12.

¹⁷ Horney, *New Ways in Psychoanalysis*, pp 9-10

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

actually symbolize a person's unwillingness or inability to face up to the fundamental values and codes of his culture.

In line with her cultural standpoint, Horney explains the neuroses as basically due to disturbances in three fundamental aspects of human relations. The first of these is the tendency to move toward other people—a tendency which has its roots in love and the need to belong or be closely related to others. The second is the tendency to move “against people” which has its foundations in striving for power and prestige through aggression. The third aspect derives from the exaggerated inclination to move “away from people.” Here the concern is with one's self, which the neurotic believes can best be protected by withdrawal from others, through what Horney calls the “neurotic detachment.” In place of ordinary contacts with one's fellows, the neurotic daydreams of a perfect world in which he is the center of attention.¹⁹

These three motivations along with the “need for exploitation,” however, are not confined to the neurotic. They are fundamental to the normal person and arise out of man's social-cultural contacts. The neurotic is but one who has not been able to manage these motives and their course to goal or reward in an adequate fashion. The neurotic needs help in lessening the power of his mismanaged and twisted motives so as “to restore the individual to himself, to help him regain his spontaneity and find his center of gravity in himself.”²⁰

In light of Horney's rejection of the instinctivist and genetic approach and her contention of the cultural bases of the neuroses, it is not surprising that she puts much less emphasis than does Freud on the place of sexual problems as the “dynamic center of neuroses.” For her, “Sexual difficulties are the effect rather than the cause of the neurotic character structure.”²¹

Views of Fromm. Erich Fromm approaches the topic of personality as a lay analyst and social psychologist with a strong interest in history and cultural anthropology. He, like Horney, does not hold that the satisfaction of instinct is the central task of the individual. Rather it is an adjustment or learning in line with the social-cultural demands of time and place. Hence for Fromm, “those drives which make for the *differences* in men's characters, like love and hatred, the lust for power and the yearning for submission, the enjoyment of sensuous pleasure and the fear of it, are all products of the social process.”²² In short, “man's nature, his passions, and anxieties are a cultural product.”²³

¹⁹ Horney's analysis of these factors is found in *New Ways in Psychoanalysis*, Chaps. 3, 4, and 5. See also her *Our Inner Conflicts. A Constructive Theory of Neuroses*.

²⁰ Horney, *New Ways in Psychoanalysis*, p. 11.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

²² Erich Fromm, *Escape from Freedom* (New York, Farrar & Rinehart, Inc., 1941), p. 12. By permission.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

The mechanisms of repression and regression are sound enough but must be seen as operating within the social-cultural matrix in which the individual grows up. Moreover, the Oedipus complex is a particular historical product of patriarchal family life wherein the child tries to free himself from parental controls. The sexual element, including castration fears, may or may not be important, depending on the particular familial situation.

In keeping with his cultural orientation, Fromm rejects the strict Freudian conceptions of character structure as depending on various fixed stages of development: oral, anal, phallic and so on, or on slightly different statement of types as obsessional, narcissistic, hysterical, and the like. However, he develops his own scheme of character types. They are: (1) the *receptive* person, who is marked by willingness to take on attitudes of others; he is friendly and outgoing. Such individuals emerge from family and other early training which is warm and emotionally secure. (2) The *exploitative* individual manipulates others for himself; he is demanding rather than friendly and outgoing. Persons of this kind come from homes which are characterized by suspiciousness, anxiety, and unwillingness to give,—an atmosphere which induces a “feeling of scarcity.” (3) The *hoarding* kind of person, similar to the compulsive type, arises from social-cultural training of a certain kind—not from a fixation on the anal period of stage-wise development as the strict Freudians would have it. He is stingy, self-centered, and obsessively meticulous about himself and his possessions because he has had feeding, toilet, and other training from mother or others who induced in him a compulsive and ungiving attitude. (4) Another type is the *marketing* personality, so common under capitalistic culture, who is opportunistically oriented. (He probably has much in common with the exploitative type.) And finally, (5) there is the *productive* character known for his capacity for love and creativity. He is adaptable, has initiative, and is appreciative of others as well as of himself.

Neurotic difficulties arise not only from deprivations and frustrations forced on the growing individual's basic drives but also result from new needs induced by one's culture. If a society and its culture puts heavy stress on destructiveness, we may expect personality problems to focus, in part, around aggressiveness. In other societies the emphasis on coöperativeness may act to produce other kinds of personality difficulties.

Modern man, in particular, is the victim of a curious interplay of massing, as to numbers, and sense of isolation, separateness, and impersonality. Fromm holds that certain of our neuroses really arise from this social situation. The neurotic, like others, has a strong urge to belong and to be with others. In trying to get back to satisfying group membership he may use the methods of sado-masochism, destructiveness, or automaton conformity. The first of these is featured by excessive dependence on another, an effort to get something for nothing. The other person may be

viewed as a "magic helper." The most extreme form of sado-masochism is found where the individual desires and gets physical and/or mental punishment from another. The destructive technique consists of eliminating others and thus producing another and perhaps even more terrifying form of isolation. The extreme is seen in the complete nihilist. Another mechanism is that of blind and submissive conformity to the culture. These means of adaptation sought by the neurotic are found in less intense form among others in our society.

Sullivan's Contribution. Harry Stack Sullivan, a clinical psychiatrist, was what might be called a quasi-Freudian. He was empirically rather than theoretically oriented. His most telling work was in trying to bring certain schizophrenic patients back into the stream of normal society and culture. Out of this and other clinical observations he fashioned his "theory of inter-personal relations" or "theory of the self-system." For him, given a biological foundation, the personality emerges out of the social-cultural influences that play upon him. The human being has two major motives and corresponding goals: pursuit of satisfaction of biological needs, and pursuit of security, the core of which is feeling of belonging and of being accepted by others. While the two are closely inter-related the cultural influences are particularly evident in the latter.

Personality development goes through a series of stages—not in terms of some set of inevitable biological factors but in the process of socialization. These include the following: (1) infancy to maturation of linguistic ability; (2) "childhood to the maturation of the capacity for living with compeers"; (3) "juvenile era," marked by further cooperation and discovery of the wider community; (4) pre-adolescent period, characterized by shift from self-centeredness to full "social state"; (5) early adolescent phase, covering pubertal changes and gradual patterning of sexual attitudes and behavior; (6) late adolescence leading to maturity.²⁴

It is through these various stages that the adult self-system comes about. The qualities of the person are largely those which have found acceptance or recognition by the individuals, especially in the home, during the earlier phases of development. The later influences of inter-personal relations build on these primary ones. Within the social matrix, other potential tendencies in the individual are excluded or dissociated. From the approval of parents and others the infant and child gets a feeling of well-being, which Sullivan called "euphoria." From disapproval and inhibition at the hands of these others the initial anxieties appear. Secondary anxiety arises later from threats that the dissociated thoughts and feelings

²⁴ See Harry Stack Sullivan, *Conceptions of Modern Psychiatry* (Washington, D.C.: The William Alanson White Psychiatric Foundation, 1947), p. 19. Two other important sources of Sullivan's theory will be found in his papers: "Psychiatry: introduction to the study of inter-personal relations," *Psychiatry*, 1948, 1: 121-134, and "The meaning of anxiety in psychiatry and in life," *ibid.*, 1948, 11: 1-13.

may break through to modify the established self-system. The self-system, by this time, has "an emotional stake" in maintaining itself, that is, there is a certain "rigidity in the personality" which "increases the potentiality for anxiety."²⁵ In this sense, Sullivan's idea of anxiety is somewhat akin to Freud's insofar as both recognize that it arises from inner impulses which threaten one's relations to others which if broken or modified in terms of social expectations may lead to some form of punishment. For Sullivan, however, the source of this inner impulse was not the instinct but the habit, idea, or motive which had been learned through social contact with others.

Murray's Theory. Henry A. Murray has likewise drawn heavily upon Freudian psychology in the development of his particular approach to personality. A medical man like Sullivan, Murray was trained in clinical psychiatry. He became interested in theoretical formulations about personality from his work in therapy. During the 1930's at Harvard University, he conducted an extensive study of personality manifestations of a sample of college men. As a part of the report on this research he has given us what he calls "Proposals for a theory of personality."²⁶

This is a wordy presentation with dozens of neologisms. One of the first of these is his use of the term "personology" for the field covered by what we call "the psychology of personality." As a personologist Murray tries to steer a compromise course between those workers who stress only the behavioristic standpoint and those who emphasize the inner aspects of the individual.

The individual organism is characterized by "rhythms of activity and rest," that is, he may be viewed as living in constantly recurring cycles. Any given cycle is set up by a certain need—native or acquired—which induces activity directed toward some particular goal or aim. Need is a logical construct standing "for a force . . . in the brain region . . . which organizes perception, apperception, intellection, conation and action in such a way as to transform in a certain direction an existing, unsatisfying situation."²⁷ Needs may be classified as primary or viscerogenic, those basically physiological in nature, and as secondary or psychogenic, those which "have no subjectively localizable bodily origins."

The external situation is defined by the concept *press*, that is, objects which thwart or facilitate the flow of events within the individual from the need to the end-effect or consummation which is characterized by satisfaction or sense of failure. In the course from need to end-effect various "actones" go into operation. These may be muscular movements,

²⁵ Clara Thompson, *Psychoanalysis: Evolution and Development* (New York, Heritage House, Inc., 1950), p. 126.

²⁶ Henry A. Murray et al., *Explorations in Personality: A Clinical and Experimental Study of Fifty Men at College Age* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1938).

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 124. By permission.

"motones," or verbal responses, called "verbones." Since the factors of movement imply directionality, the term "vector" was introduced to indicate this fact.

Another group of important concepts are those of thema, unity, and integration. While needs may be instigated from changes going on within the organism or from press outside, in any "complex behavior" there tends to arise "a particular press-need combination" or "creature-environment interaction" which is termed a "thema." Moreover, in time, various unity-themas emerge which characterize whole groups of mental and behavior manifestations from drive to consummation. And in this process, a tendency to unification or integration of the total personality is much in evidence.

Murray's treatment of variability introduces a wide range of details into which we need not go here except that he lists a large number of "manifest" and "latent" needs, and certain "internal factors" such as "ego ideal narcissism and superego" and various conflicts in which the superego is involved. In addition to these, a dozen or more "general traits or attributes" are proposed.

In addition to needs, press, traits, and inner states, the concept of "complex" finds a place. This is defined as an "enduring integrate" or combination of needs and means of satisfaction arising in the first three years of life which integrate "determines (unconsciously) the course of later development." A complex is only abnormal, he says, "when it is extreme."

Finally, by accepting the double-aspect theory of mind "that every conscious process is the subjective aspect of some regnant brain process, but not every regnant brain process has a conscious correlate"²⁸ Murray is able to accord an important place to the concept of the unconscious which he defends because it provides "the most reasonable interpretation" of many observed facts. He views his Thematic Apperception Test—to be discussed in Chapter 11—as a useful device to uncover unconscious processes.

Theory of Kardiner. One of the most important modifications of strict Freudian psychology is to be found in the work of Abram Kardiner, himself a psychoanalyst of extensive practice. In collaboration with a number of social scientists, especially with Ralph Linton, the anthropologist, he has attempted to coordinate Freudian theory with certain findings of cultural anthropology.²⁹ From an analysis of data on non-European and es-

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 49.

²⁹ In the early 1930's, Kardiner began holding seminars with a number of social scientists to see if some kind of conceptual bridge might not be constructed between psychoanalysis and the social sciences. This work began to fructify after Ralph Linton joined the group in 1935. For several years thereafter Kardiner and Linton cooperated closely and two of Kardiner's chief publications to date are the result of this collaboration. They are: *The Individual and His Society*; *The Psychodynamics of Primitive Social*

pecially non-literate peoples, he has developed a number of suggestive concepts, hypotheses, and tentative generalizations. For purposes of brief review these are the concepts of basic personality structure, of primary and secondary institutions, and of the distinction between projective and rational systems. As to hypotheses he has departed considerably from Freud's instinctivist doctrines by stressing the close interplay of culture and personality.

Kardiner's basic purpose is to use what he calls psychodynamic principles and techniques in an effort to clarify the possible causal inter-relations of culture and personality. With respect to culture he is chiefly concerned with what he terms institutions. At first he defined an institution "as any fixed mode of thought or behavior held by a group of individuals (i.e., a society) which can be communicated, which enjoys common acceptance, and infringement of or deviation from which creates some disturbance in the individual or in the group."³⁰ Later he modified this by giving the concept a distinctive psychological turn: "Institutions should be defined to mean what people do, think, believe, or feel. Their locus is within the human personality; and they have an accommodative or adaptive function."³¹ He is not concerned with the total personality which must take into account idiosyncratic or highly unique features. Rather he deals with what he calls the "basic personality structure" which is "that group of psychic and behavioral characteristics derived from contact with the same institutions. . . ." ³² It is admittedly not a very exact concept, but one that

"merely indicates that within the limitations prescribed by institutions, the individual is obliged to react in one way or another, and whatever the outcome in the form of *individual character*, the institutional background is the axis on which various individual polarities revolve."³³

With this general aim, then, "to show that different institutions create different personality structures,"³⁴ Kardiner proceeds to work out a number of other important constructs or concepts. First, he divides institutions into primary and secondary. The former include, among others, family organization, in-group patterns, fundamental disciplines of training in feeding, weaning, and control of eliminative and sexual functions,

Organization (1939), and *The Psychological Frontiers of Society* (1945). Both volumes are published by Columbia University Press of New York.

For a condensation of Kardiner's essential views, see his paper, "The concept of basic personality structure as an operational tool in the social sciences," in R. Linton, ed., *The Science of Man in the World Crisis* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1945), pp. 107-122. The various quotations from Kardiner's work which follow are by permission of his publishers.

³⁰ Kardiner, *The Individual and His Society*, p. 7.

³¹ Kardiner, *The Psychological Frontiers of Society*, p. 25.

³² Kardiner, *The Individual and His Society*, p. 12.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 412.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 455.

"institutionalized care or neglect of children," and techniques of subsistence. The latter include such matters as the systems of taboo, rituals, religion, folklore (myths, legends, and the like), and forms of thinking.³⁶ The primary institutions are the basic and more stable ones. Moreover, the secondary institutions derive from the primary ones.³⁶ All the initial modifications in the individual are brought about through his contact with the primary institutions at the hands of parents, siblings, and others who surround and guide the growing child. That is, the most significant constellations of personality are the result of primary institutional effects. Moreover, the secondary institutions must "satisfy the needs and tensions created by the primary . . . ones"³⁷—and in this sense are derivative from primary institutions—or else the individual is probably headed for trouble in his later adjustments.

Kardiner clearly departs from the strict Freudian formulations. Rather than viewing the instincts as sources of demands for satiation which go through more or less fixed stages and which in this process, in some unknown way, create institutions. Kardiner views the individual as deriving from those "institutions which mold and direct his adaptation to the outer world, and his biological needs, which press for gratification." He thus places strong emphasis on the part which institutions play "in creating the adaptive systems of the individual."³⁸ If the individual as a totality is regarded as mediating between man's biological nature and social-cultural adaptation, the basic personality more particularly "stands midway between primary and secondary institutions."³⁹ That is, it represents the configuration or organization of the fundamental motives including anxieties, as they are linked to reward or punishment.

The formation of personality depends on what Kardiner terms certain "key integrational systems." These cover such matters as forms of maternal care, of affectivity or emotional-feeling tone, of early disciplines as to feeding, sex, elimination, and so on, and institutionalized attitudes toward siblings, work, and moral control. Later, adjustments at puberty and at marriage become important. There is nothing particularly original in these ideas.

Of special interest is Kardiner's theory of rational and projective systems of thinking and acting. Both are important to adequate adaptation of the individual. The rational system rests on perception and motor skills which are objective in the sense that they exploit, avoid, manipulate, or

³⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 471-483 for summary statement on two kinds of institutions.

³⁷ Kardiner makes no effort to reconstruct the social-cultural history of either the primary or secondary institutions. Yet Chap. 14, "Basic personality and history," in *Psychological Frontiers of Society*, is an essay on the interplay of historical events and changes in basic personality type during the Hebrew-Christian era.

³⁸ Kardiner, *The Individual and His Society*, p. 476.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 484-485.

destroy the external environment as a part of one's reasonable and useful adjustment. Along with such perception and skill there arises an objective attitude toward the environment which is the root of interest, curiosity, desire for mastery, knowledge, and systematic formulations of science.

The individual's adaptation is also characterized by fantasy and wishful thinking, which Kardiner calls the "projective system." The "projective systems are established under the influence of the pleasure principle, avoidance of pain, or expediency."⁴⁰ Clearly the emotions associated with one's relations to mother, father, siblings, and others are important. Moreover, the initial situations which give rise to projective reactions are usually forgotten. That is, they fall into the unconscious. In this development crises or traumatic episodes which give rise to anxieties often play an important part. "Their purpose is adaptive, to relieve the mutilating effect of painful tension."⁴¹ The function of culturalized fantasies as in folklore, religion, and the like is well indicated by Kardiner.

Kardiner holds that through the development of science and technology modern man has greatly modified and qualified his projective system in contrast to man in non-literate societies "where the projective systems have remained in their pristine purity, unmodified by too many layers of rational thought processes." Modern man "is governed by higher integrational systems—especially those connected with social goals and value systems and the like—which are more difficult to derive from basic experiences of the growing child."⁴² If this means anything, it is that Kardiner's simple formulae regarding the importance of the first years of habit-formation in relation to basic needs and rewards, as qualified by the cultural milieu, has considerable limitations, at least as applied in our own complex society. We shall return to some aspects of this problem in Chapter 12.

The shift from the instinctivist to the cultural position obliged Kardiner to redefine a good many of the traditional Freudian concepts and mechanisms. We note only a few of these reconsiderations by way of illustration.

Anxiety does not arise from an inner struggle involving id, ego, and superego as more or less separate entities. Rather the primary anxieties arise because certain "impulses are subjected to discipline."⁴³ And, "neurotic or otherwise, anxiety is always an indicator of a deficiency of resources to combat what the individual regards as a threat to his existence or safety."⁴⁴

Freud considered the Oedipus and castration complexes as "nuclear in social structure, and . . . [regarded] institutions as products of the cen-

⁴⁰ Kardiner, *Psychological Frontiers of Society*, p. 39.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁴² *Ibid.*, pp. xviii-xix.

⁴³ Kardiner, *The Individual and His Society*, p. 474.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 464.

tral struggle against incest." ⁴⁵ This view Kardiner completely rejects and, to make a Freudian pun, the Oedipus complex suffers a reversal-formation at his hands. Kardiner holds "that not the Oedipus complex creates the social organization but vice versa." ⁴⁶ It represents "a fusion of dependency and sex cravings on the same object" which object is determined by the particular society and its culture to which the child is exposed. ⁴⁷

While Kardiner uses the concepts of repression and regression, he views them as learning mechanisms in man's adaptive undertakings. He makes little or no use of the concepts *unconscious* and *id*. The ego and superego both come in for redefinition along the lines of his major re-orientation toward culture.

CRITIQUE OF PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORIES

There are rather sharp differences in theory and method between the behaviorists who stress the study of overt action and those psychologists who emphasize the importance of inner or subjective elements of personality. Any critique of psychoanalytic theories obviously falls within this larger arena of debate. Our critical comments will focus chiefly on three fundamental matters: theory, empirical fact, and method. In well-designed studies of personality, of course, these three will be coordinated. We separate them only for purposes of examination. We shall begin with the conventional Freudian psychology and follow this with a discussion of Horney, Fromm, Kardiner and others whom we have loosely termed "neo-Freudians."

Comments on Freudian School. Although most of Freud's discussion is couched in mentalistic terms, the fact remains that much of his theory is oriented to biology. Moreover, it bespeaks a biology of the last quarter of the nineteenth century, not that of the twentieth. At the time Freud was a student, the doctrine of evolution had just swept like a fresh breeze through the lecture halls and laboratories of Western Europe. Among other views—now no longer in the scientific good repute—was the firm belief, following Lamarck, in the inheritance of acquired characteristics. Another was the theory of recapitulation which held that the individual organism repeated the biological history of species by passing through certain stages of growth. In the phrase of that day "ontogeny repeats phylogeny." And, third, the concepts of evolution by stage-wise steps was applied to a re-interpretation of the history of society and its culture. Although Freud came to follow the lead of Charcot, the French psychiatrist, and depart from simple neurological explanations of neuroses, nevertheless his theory of the instincts is biologically, not psychologically, oriented. Neglecting the obviously philosophical derivation of Freud's thesis of

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 410.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 246.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 480.

the "life" and "death" instincts, Freud viewed personality development as essentially dependent on instinctual or biological impulses unfolding by more or less fixed stages, some elements of which were derived from archaic or inherited traits learned or acquired at an earlier stage of human development. This process of development, moreover, is essentially a conflict through time between the instincts (the id elements) and the environmental demands which are built into the ego and superego.

In strict Freudian theory there is only vague and implicit realization of the importance of social interaction and culture. True, these are recognized, but largely as a stage upon which the basic war between the biological organism and the hostile environment takes place. Society is viewed as a force devised to hinder or control man's instincts. Both theory and therapy appear to revolve around the assumption or postulate that "if the instinctual forces are released from their bondage in the unconscious conflict, the individual then finds for himself those pleasurable activities most suited to his potentialities."⁴⁸ Yet the Freudians never make quite clear what they mean by "potentialities" beyond a vague implication that if man were not unduly harassed by social-cultural influences, he would pass harmoniously from one to another of the various stages to satisfactory maturity.

In the light of present-day biology and psychology, it is clear that not only is the doctrine of inheritance of acquired traits no longer in good repute but that the concept of recapitulation cannot be applied to social and cultural phenomena.⁴⁹ Also it is obvious that such broad philosophical concepts as the life and death instincts cannot be adequately examined empirically. The postulate of instinctual processes, however, remains central to Freud's theory.

Although the various Freudian "mental mechanisms" have infiltrated into psychology generally, but few of them have been put to empirical test.⁵⁰ Yet there remain a large body of data the importance of which cannot be overlooked. The Freudians drew chiefly on three sources for their facts: (1) the life histories of adults and children derived from psychoanalytic interviews which make possible a reconstruction of the development of the individual. (2) "The study of regressive phenomena

⁴⁸ Ives Hendrick, *Facts and Theories of Psychoanalysis* (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1939), p. 312. By permission.

⁴⁹ In fairness to Freud it must be noted that he invokes the theory of biological inheritance of acquired characteristics rather infrequently. In contrast, Carl G. Jung, an apostate from the Freudian faith, made much of this theory in his mystic ideas about a would-be racial and collective unconscious. See Jung's *Psychology of the Unconscious*, trans. by B. M. Hinkle (New York, Moffat, Yard & Company, 1916). Also his *Two Essays on Analytical Psychology*, trans. by H. G. and C. F. Baynes (London, Baillière, Tindall & Cox, 1928).

Many rather close followers of Freud ignore both doctrines. See Ernst Kris, *op. cit.*, p. 245.

⁵⁰ See R. B. Sears, *Survey of Objective Studies of Psychoanalytic Concepts* (New York, Social Science Research Council, 1943).

in normal, but mainly in pathological behavior, largely in the study of neuroses and psychoses." ⁵¹ And (3) more or less systematic observations of child development.

Certainly the data from the first two of these sources comes largely as a by-product of therapy. And this puts plainly before us a matter of major concern: Can we build a science of personality out of therapy? Therapy is an art of handling people in trouble with a view to some form of cure. It is not designed as a scientific exercise to test hypotheses.

Many psychoanalysts increasingly feel the need to validate their assumption and hypotheses. The latter, as Kris has pointed out, are derived from interviews which he describes as "the regular and frequent association of subject and observer, patient and therapist, over long stretches of time and under special rules of procedure." ⁵² The procedure includes recording the behavior of the subject, judgments of the therapist's "own reactions to this behavior," and various actions directed toward producing changes in the patient.

Most allegedly hard-headed laboratory psychologists are very skeptical about claims that such interview techniques are adequate as a method of testing hypotheses. One behaviorist, Sears, puts the matter sharply in these words: "Psychoanalysis relies upon techniques that do not admit of repetition of observation, that have no self-evident or denotative validity, and that are tinctured to an unknown degree with the observer's own suggestion." ⁵³

The proponents of Freud, however, do not easily give ground in these matters. While most of them are appreciative of the need to validate their work, they would agree with Kris who contends: "The limit of experiments with humans rests on the fact that the laboratory cannot as a rule reproduce dangers and basic needs with which the genetic propositions of psychoanalysis deal." ⁵⁴

Although psychoanalysts have paid little or no attention to matters of sampling, or to the accumulation of repeatable and comparable data, they are not without some tools of validation. Although the demand of the laboratory man for "repetition of observations" is often meaningless in the psychoanalytic approach, there are other long-accepted ways of testing hypotheses. Certainly the use of historical reconstruction in science cannot be dismissed. Applied to personality studies it may and does need much improvement, yet it does enable the student of personality to construct models or replicas of individual growth and development and then to compare various reconstructions. So, too, observations of children and adults—using psychoanalytic methods and concepts—may be compared

⁵¹ Hartmann, Kris, and Loewenstein, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

⁵² Kris, *op. cit.*, p. 239.

⁵³ Sears, *op. cit.*, p. 133. However, in his survey, Sears cites a number of laboratory and other confirmations of some of Freud's findings.

⁵⁴ Kris, *op. cit.*, p. 252.

directly.⁵⁵ And certainly the Freudian studies of regression, both in normal and abnormal subjects, have contributed much to our understanding of the interplay of needs and the kinds of rewards which are satisfying.

In closing this rather cursory critique, let us note what seem to be some pertinent and necessary steps in bringing the contributions of psychoanalysis into line with other findings about human mind and conduct. (1) There is grave need to re-state in testable form the concepts of instinct, drive, need, or other terms for basic motives. (2) Some sound and logical bridge must be formed between behavioristic learning theory and the research with which it is associated and the whole gamut of mechanisms which are the stock in trade of various psychoanalytic schools. Laboratory tests of Freudian mechanisms must supplement the work of the clinicians interested in therapy. (3) Methods of interviewing and recording must be standardized so that the data thus collected may be analyzed independently by others than those who collect them. (4) Attention to sound sampling would afford a further check on certain generalizations about universality of psychoanalytic data. (5) Efforts should be made to check objectively on the degree of success or failure in psychoanalytic therapy despite Kris's idea that such attempts have no place in an attempt at validation of psychoanalytic hypotheses.⁵⁶

Comments on the Neo-Freudians. All the other psychoanalytically oriented students of personality whom we discussed represent some form of criticism of the strict Freudian position. It is not necessary to repeat these at this juncture.

Horney's defection from the instinctivist and developmental-stage theories marked an important step in emancipating psychoanalysis from the theories of its founder. Yet in her eagerness to undermine the instinct theory she has become something of an extreme environmentalist. Her use of the concept *culture* is loose and undefined. Nowhere does she trace out the manner in which neuroses are "caused" by culture. Also she completely confuses the concepts *society* and *culture*, which from the standpoint of the present writer is regrettable.

While therapy is not our concern, a word may be said about Horney's views on self-analysis.⁵⁷ While most intelligent lay people can learn a lot from reading psychoanalytic or other psychological literature, it should

⁵⁵ There is a rapidly growing body of reports on studies of children from the psychoanalytic standpoint. See, for example, the annual publication, *The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child*, vol. 1 f (New York, International Universities Press, 1945). While most of the papers are oriented to the clinic and the school rather than to research for its own sake, there is clear indication of the need for clarification of postulates and hypotheses and for more carefully controlled investigations.

⁵⁶ Kris, *op. cit.*, p. 246. A carefully designed study of success or failure would take into account such variables as spontaneous recovery and others which might be considered extraneous to analytic therapy proper.

⁵⁷ See Karen Horney, *Self-Analysis* (New York, W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1942).

be noted that one of the crucial foundations of the psychoanalytic interview is that it operates within a social situation. It takes on the nature of what George H. Mead called the social act, and this is basic not only to the whole therapy but indirectly to the theories of personality which have come out of psychoanalysis.

These comments on Horney apply, in part, to Fromm. On the broad sociological front he has a good grasp of the play of historical, that is, cultural factors, on man's personality. Whether he is able to trace out in detail the way in which culture affects the developing personality is not clear from his writings. Then, too, both Fromm and Horney seem to believe in some kind of mystic element which, left to its spontaneous development, would make for sound adjustment and human happiness. This suggests the strict Freudian view that society tends to cripple man's instincts in such a way as to make for maladjustment, and that it might be better if we had less rather than more society and culture.

In many ways Sullivan was less of a Freudian than either Horney or Fromm. As noted above his stress on the importance of inter-personal relations points in the direction of the interactionist standpoint to be discussed later. Certainly he showed great understanding of the manner in which the culture of a given group or society became integrated into the personality through interaction.

It is difficult to comment briefly on Murray's formulations. His theory, derived from a combination of Freud, Adler, and Jung, and his own investigations, is most suggestive, but his curious and elaborate vocabulary has not, as yet, greatly influenced the main body of personality theory. One thing is certain: while he appreciates the importance of social-cultural elements in the making of the personality, he is equally aware of the high degree of individual variation which results from the differential exposure to society and its culture as qualified by constitutional factors.

Whatever one may say in criticism of the details of Kardiner's theory, it represents a bold and thorough-going attempt to tie the postulates, findings, and methods of Freudian psychology to those of cultural anthropology. He, like Horney, seems at times to confuse the concepts of society and culture. And it remains to be seen if he can substantiate his thesis that non-literate peoples are more given to projective defenses than modern man. In this connection it is hard to understand what are meant by such expressions as "pristine purity" as applied to the former and "higher integrational systems" as applied to the latter.³⁸ Then, too, as present-day learning theory expands to include the everyday forms of learning involved in socialization and enculturation, Kardiner's somewhat curious distinction between the factors which enter into sensory-motor learning in contrast to the elements in social learning may disappear.³⁹

³⁸ See A. Kardiner, *Psychological Frontiers of Society* pp. xi-xxi.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 4, 17.

THEORIES FROM ACADEMIC PSYCHOLOGY

In this section we shall discuss some of the theories of personality which have come more directly out of academic psychology. We shall begin with those theories which stress the specificity of response and situation. This will be followed by a discussion of traits as basic components of personality. Still other theories follow the Gestaltists. The section will close with a review of the interactionist position with its emphasis on social-cultural learning within given situations. Theories which center their attention on personality types were treated in Chapter 9.

Specificity of Situation-Response Elements in Personality. Many behavioristically inclined psychologists view personality—if they use the concept at all—as a mere aggregate of stimulus-response units. According to them there are no general traits of personality, no broad and consistent patterns, but only independent stimulus-response connections.⁶⁰ This approach to learning and hence to personality formulations was a reaction to the excesses of an earlier psychology which defended formal discipline. Adherents to formal discipline believed that there was a high degree of transfer of training from one situation to another. For example, it was argued that the learning of Latin and mathematics would enable one to acquire facility in modern languages and mechanics. The specificity school held, on the contrary, that such carry-over of the effects of learning could only be true where the two situations and the learning processes had particular elements in common.

In line with the theory of specificity, Hartshorne and May conducted an elaborate research, called the Character Education Inquiry, with a view to discovering if so-called traits of personality revealed the same features as Thorndike and others had found for learning and intelligence. They gave selected tests of honesty, lying, stealing, and other alleged traits to thousands of American school children. Using then current statistical methods (but not factor analysis as since developed), they came to the conclusion that responses are highly specific. Thus "honesty or dishonesty is a function of the situation" in which the child is placed insofar as these "have common elements," as "he has learned to be honest or dishonest" under this or that particular circumstance, and as he has acquired a knowledge of the implications or consequences of such conduct. On the basis of their interpretation of the data they contend that the "common factor" is not any "inner entity" which operates independently of the conditions, but rather it is a specific function "in the sense that an individual behaves

⁶⁰ Such a view represents an extension of certain earlier forms of associationism. Regarding associationism and its revolt from faculty psychology, see E. G. Boring, *History of Experimental Psychology*, 2nd ed. (New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1950). In this country one of the leaders of this approach through specificity was E. L. Thorndike. See his *Educational Psychology II, The Psychology of Learning* (New York, Columbia University, Teachers College, Bureau of Publications, 1913).

similarly in different situations in proportion as these situations are alike," or as he has experienced like occasions or opportunities for either honest or dishonest conduct.⁶¹

They contended further that the attitude which serves to motivate such an act of honesty or dishonesty is "as specialized as the act itself" and such specific motivation will drive a person just so far and no further in terms of the particular situation.⁶²

In studying the responses of service and self-control these authors came to much the same conclusion. Thus they say:

"Goodness in the sense of socially valuable forms of conduct is highly specific. The experience through which the children measured have passed has not led to any genuine integration of behavior within the fields treated. There is no evidence of any trait of goodness or character, if what is meant by goodness or character is just what may be observed or measured by conduct. We cannot infer from the conduct tests the presence of a general factor. Any community of conduct is due to factors common to the situation represented in the test and not to an inner organization of habit systems or abilities operating independently of the inter-relations of situations."⁶³

As striking as these results seem on first glance they have not met with universal acceptance. Proponents of the theory of general traits like G. W. Allport have been highly critical. In the first place there is much evidence for general traits and attitudes. The findings of Cantril, then a student of Allport, is a case in point. Using a series of terms, statements, twelve personality sketches—of varying lengths and degrees of specificity or generality—and the Allport-Vernon test of Spranger's types, Cantril examined the responses of a sample of college students in order to see if they understood or reacted without any specific mental association. He found that, when only a few concepts were used in describing an individual, the more general the concepts the more revealing to the reader. The greatest efficiency in comprehension, however, was found when a more generalized description was illustrated by some specific detail which followed. He also found that in testing for recall the generalized narratives were better retained than the highly specific. Cantril's major conclusions were: (1) generality of some sort in mental life is independent of specific content; (2) general determining tendencies were found to be more enduring than specific factors; (3) the formation of general determining tendencies may well be due to the integration of more specific elements; (4) when a stimulus is applicable to an existing general tendency, the latter is aroused prior to any specific attitude; and (5) general attitudes appear

⁶¹ Hugh Hartshorne and M. A. May, *Studies in Deceit* (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1928), p. 380.

⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 387.

⁶³ Hugh Hartshorne, M. A. May, and F. K. Shuttleworth, *Studies in the Organization of Character* (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1930), p. 173. By permission.

to serve as directive or determinative influences upon more particularized attitudes and reactions.⁶⁴

Then, too, it must not be overlooked that the children tested by Hartshorne and May had not completed the acquirement of the moral self or superego. In fact there is some evidence that the older children in their sample revealed less specificity of response in some of the situations studied. Also, as Allport clearly points out, lying, dishonesty, stealing, cheating and the like may well be expressions of underlying general traits of a given individual. One child's stealing may derive from his trait of bravado, another may steal because of an inferiority feeling. Or a child may lie about his cheating "not because he has a general trait of dishonesty, but because he has a general trait of *timidity* (fear of consequences)."⁶⁵

It should be noted that results of such studies may be influenced not only by the general standpoint which lies behind the experimental design but also by the kind of statistical treatment. For example, Maller, who worked for Hartshorne and May on their project, applied other statistical methods and thought he saw evidence in the data for a general trait of character "c," defined as "the readiness to forgo an immediate gain for the sake of remote but greater gain."⁶⁶

Trait Theory. As indicated in Allport's and Cantril's critique of the specific stimulus-response thesis, other psychologists view the personality as made up of more or less stable traits. Some of these may be specific, some may be general. Allport, who tends to favor the concept of generality, defines a trait as "a generalized and focalized neuropsychic system [peculiar to the individual], with the capacity to render many stimuli functionally equivalent, and to initiate and guide consistent [equivalent] forms of adaptive and expressive behavior."⁶⁷ He thus ties his definition of trait to his concept of uniqueness and individual autonomy of personality.

The debate regarding specificity and generality has gone on for years, but accumulated evidence both from experimentation and clinical case studies seems to show that neither extreme will satisfy the facts. MacKinnon has stated the matter in these words:

"No longer can there be any doubt that there is both specificity and generality of behavior. Both personal consistency and inconsistency must be recognized.

"Proponents of a radical anti-trait theory who deny any generality of be-

⁶⁴ See Hadley Cantril, "General and specific attitudes," *Psychological Monographs*, 1932, Vol. 42, No. 192.

⁶⁵ For his critical analysis of the specificity theory, see G. W. Allport, *Personality: A Psychological Interpretation* (New York, Henry Holt & Company, Inc., 1937). Quotation from page 251.

⁶⁶ J. B. Maller, "General and specific factors in character," *Journal of Social Psychology*, 1934, 5:101.

⁶⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 295. By permission.

havior or any consistency of personality commit the 'situation error,' the error of assuming that all behavior is determined solely by the specific *situation*, physical and social, in which the individual finds himself. On the other hand, supporters of an extreme trait theory who deny any specificity of behavior or any inconsistency of personality commit the 'organism error,' the error of thinking of behavioral traits as fixed attributes of an *organism* as stable and as unchanging as a finger print or as a birth mark."⁶⁸

From our standpoint the two most important criticisms of personality theory based on the doctrine of specificity are (1) that it fosters a view of personality as a mere summation of discrete parts or elements, and (2) that it tends to ignore the social interactional and cultural factors as furnishing a possible framework for the emergence of generalized patterns of thought and behavior.

Factor Analysis and Traits. The study of personality with regard to specific and/or general traits has been further stimulated by certain theoretical and methodological considerations associated with factor analysis. Factor analysis grew out of the use of intercorrelations of tests of intelligence aimed at seeing if there were any general "factor" or central component which might help account for the individual's performance on such tests. Spearman was one of the first psychologists to tackle this problem and in 1904 advanced his two-factor theory. On the basis of his work he postulated one general factor and a number of specific factors to account for test performance.⁶⁹

Since this beginning not only have the methods of factor analysis been improved and extended but the technique has been applied to all sorts of tests of personality. Some have reduced Spearman's two-factor theory to a single unitary factor; others have come out with various arguments for the multiple-factor thesis. To make the matter more concrete let us note some findings:

Thurstone, one of the chief exponents of a Multiple-Factor theory, has uncovered a number of factors which he calls "primary abilities." These include the following, with their symbols:

- V:** *Verbal comprehension*—most adequately measured in vocabulary tests, evident also in reading tests, verbal reasoning, and the like.
- W:** *Word fluency*—found in ability to solve anagrams and to make rhymes.
- N:** *Number*—closely correlated with accuracy and speed in simple arithmetic computation.
- S:** *Space*—may include perception of fixed spatial relations and movement of spatial positions.
- M:** *Associative memory*—found chiefly in rote memory tests.

⁶⁸ D. W. MacKinnon, "The structure of personality," in J. McV. Hunt, ed., *Personality and the Behavior Disorders*, vol. 1, p. 43. Copyright, 1944, by The Ronald Press Company. By permission.

⁶⁹ Carl Spearman, "'General intelligence,' objectively determined and measured," *American Journal of Psychology*, 1904, 15:201-209. See also his *The Abilities of Man, Their Nature and Measurement* (London, Macmillan & Company, Ltd., 1927).

- P: *Perceptual speed*—rapid and accurate grasping of visual details, similarities, and differences.
- I (or R): *Induction (or general reasoning)*—measured by tests of syllogistic reasoning and the like. (This factor has not been clearly identified.) ⁷⁰

Obviously Thurstone's factors or abilities have to do with what is broadly called intelligence or cognition. Some sample factors from studies of social-emotional and other non-intellectual qualities reported by the Guilfords include these:

- S: *Social introversion*—found in tests reporting shyness.
- T: *Thinking introversion*—from measures of reflective, meditative disposition.
- D: *Depression*—from measures of "blue" or worrisome attitude or trait.
- C: *Cycloid tendency*—from evidence of ups and downs in mood.
- R: *Rhathymia*—the factor for carefree, happy-go-lucky trait.
- G: *General activity*—measure of tendency to overt activity.
- A: *Ascendance-submission*—measure of social leadership or dominance.
- M: *Masculinity-femininity*—factor which reveals responses said to be typical of men or of women.
- I: *Inferiority*—measures of lack of self-confidence.
- N: *Nervousness*—from measures of irritability.
- O: *Objectivity*—factor of viewing oneself and the world objectively, not from a highly subjective standpoint.
- Co: *Cooperativeness*—factor of accepting people and things as they are; tolerant.
- Ag: *Agreeableness*—factor of friendliness, not hostile or domineering.⁷¹

Clearly the discovery of all these factors has led to further discussion about generality and specificity. In a careful consideration of some of the larger systematic problems involved in this whole matter, Burt, the English psychologist, believes that the idea of common and specific factors involves at least four factors or classifications. He writes:

"The measurement of any individual for any one of a given set of traits may be regarded as a function of four kinds of components: namely, those characteristic of (i) all the traits, (ii) some of the traits, (iii) the particular trait in question whenever it is measured, (iv) the particular trait in question as measured on this particular occasion."⁷²

Aside from the highly technical aspects of factor analysis into which we do not enter, there are certain matters on which we must comment. One of the first is the conflicting views as to whether the factors are to be regarded as merely logical categories or at best descriptive classification

⁷⁰ For a convenient review, see Anne Anastasi and J. P. Foley, *Differential Psychology*, rev. ed. (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1949), p. 497. See L. L. Thurstone, "Primary mental abilities," *Psychometric Monograph*, 1938, No. 1; and his *Multiple Factor Analysis* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1947).

⁷¹ Summarized in Anastasi and Foley, *op. cit.*, p. 521. They have extensive bibliography on the Guilfords' work and that of other workers with factor analysis.

⁷² Cyril Burt, *The Factors of the Mind* (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1941), p. 103. By permission.

rather than as substantive and causal entities or components of the personality. Burt holds the former view as is clear in his statement:

"Rigorously speaking, factors cannot be regarded as substances or as parts of a substance, or even as causal attributes inhering in a substance. They are not separate 'organs' or isolated 'properties' of the mind; they are not 'primary abilities,' 'unitary traits,' 'mental powers or energies.' They are principles of classification described by selective operators."⁷³

Others contend that since the factors go back to responses and measured traits, we may assume that they do represent some kind of element in the personality. This difference of interpretation reminds one of the medieval debate between realism and nominalism. And it is, in truth, about as bootless. Certainly there can be no logical or psychological objection to assuming that the factors found may not be regarded as intervening variables helpful in constructing a model of personality structure. Here as elsewhere we deal with behavior, both symbolic and gross overt muscular response; and theories are developed from such observations and analyses.

The basic psychological problem is to discover what variables lie at the base of the kinds of responses with which factor analysis deals. In this connection a few points must be borne in mind: (1) The test items themselves are the result of some individual's or group's subjective judgment and selection. In this, as in so many other statistical studies, the results cannot rise much higher than their sources. As Vernon well says, "The factors can only cover those facets of personality which are represented in the test battery, hence their universality is limited by the comprehensiveness of the sampling of human traits."⁷⁴ (2) The degree of heterogeneity of the sample tested will influence the size of the correlation coefficients with which the factor-analyst works. (3) A set of the intercorrelations may be factorized in a wide variety of ways. This is a highly technical point but one which, we may rest assured, is a sound one. That tests can be said by one method to show a given factor or factors is not to say they *must*.

There is much work yet to be done before a sensible and systematic view will come out of these psychological studies and the theoretical arguments associated with them. However, by linking up the particular mental and motor responses with the rôle-taking of the individual in a given situation we may arrive at some concept of generality and specificity of components which can be related to the processes of generalization and differentiation so important in learning. (See Chapter 4.) Certainly there

⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 227. By permission

⁷⁴ P. E. Vernon, "The assessment of psychological qualities by verbal methods, a survey of attitude tests, rating scales, and personality questionnaires," Report No. 83, Medical Research Council, Industrial Research Board (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1935). Quoted by MacKinnon, in Hunt, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

is ample evidence from common-sense observations, from individual case studies, and from statistical analyses that people do range from highly specific responses and rôles to those which are more generalized.

Gestalt and Field Theories. In rather sharp contrast to associationism, which is fundamental to the approach just described, stand the followers of the *Gestalt* psychology, who stress, not atomistic elements linked together in mental life, but rather the unified total structures and function of mind. We have already noted this contrast in discussing learning. (See Chapter 4.) These psychologists take the position that the individual is a whole configuration of forces operating toward or away from or with reference to an environment which itself is always a particular configuration of stimuli. They contend that to break down either the individual or the situation toward which he responds into elements or parts is to destroy both as valid objects of study and analysis in psychology. To dissect the personality into small units results in the loss of the very facts we need to know about it. In this emphasis on totality they have much in common with Adlerian theory.

For years the followers of this school confined themselves almost entirely to investigations of perception and learning. But gradually some of them turned their attention more specifically to the description and analysis of child and adolescent mind and behavior. Chiefly under the leadership of Lewin a new phase of *Gestalt* psychology called *Field Theory* has been developed. The followers of this theory have set up their categories and concepts in terms of elaborate mathematical, especially geometric, analogies couched in rather strange and forbidding language. To cite only a sample of terms, there is a special jargon about "valences," "life space," "space of free movement," "social field," and "power field," which are used to characterize directionality, individual life organization, nature and patterning of interaction, and leadership or domination.

Lewin refers to his standpoint as the "Field theoretical approach," and for him a sound understanding of behavior is had when it is represented in terms of a more or less structuralized total situation (the social field) and the distribution of forces (individuals and material objects) operating therein. Thus the person may be depicted as P in Figure 10 moving through a given social field toward a given goal, G. The personality consists of a configuration of features, aspects, or forces, 1, 2, 3 . . . 7, which may be defined as physiological factors, abilities, freedom or lack of choice with reference to given actions, mental conflicts, attachments to individuals or social groupings, prejudices, or other items in the total inner "subjective" life space. The goal consists in whatever object, situation, or attainment the individual aims at, material, such as a toy or physical property, or psychological, such as a particular rôle, prestige, or status. The course of the person toward the goal may be through barriers *a*, *b*, and *c*, which may be physical, as distance to be traversed by a child to secure a toy, or

social-psychological, as taboos to be overcome or particular tasks to be performed in series before the goal is achieved.

The same spatial analogies are used to describe the internal organization of the individual as are used to depict the total personality as he reacts overtly with reference to a given social-cultural aim or an actual point in time or space. The concept of life space is particularly important as an 'over-all term to include the entire "subjective" psychological world of the individual.' During infancy and early childhood this is very sketchily and vaguely organized. There is little clear distinction as to group membership, or as to the difference between reality and irreality—that is between objective and fantasy thinking; but, as the child grows older and acquires more experience with the external world, there is a corresponding development of a complex and differentiated life space.




FIG. 10. A person, P, in a social field moving through a series of barriers, *a*, *b*, *c*, toward a goal, G. Features of the life space of the person are shown in the subdivisions of P: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7.

Murphy's Biosocial and Field Approach. In his attempt to formulate "a general psychology of personality," Gardner Murphy has dealt with various phases of motivation and learning, first, against the background of constitutional features and, then, in terms of the social context.⁷⁵ At the organic level a study of personality manifestations may be described in terms of "tissues of the body . . . making their *responses* to outer or inner stimulation." In contrast, at the level of social context, personality is viewed as responses which serve to enact "specific *rôles* assigned the individual by virtue of age, sex, race, occupational status, religion, or any other category which society emphasizes."⁷⁶ In building up one's rôles, perception, memory, and imagination have a place. Moreover, in developing adaptive patterns, rôles get organized as a part of self and not-self

⁷⁵ See Gardner Murphy, *Personality: A Biosocial Approach to Origins and Structure* (New York, Harper and Brothers, 1947). Quotations by permission.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 866. Italics in the original.

(situational) relationships. These Murphy postulates in terms of a field theory which holds that we can only understand the human organism as it operates in a given situation. He puts the matter thus: "We cannot define the situation operationally except in reference to the specific organism which is involved; we cannot define the organism operationally, in such a way as to obtain predictive power for behavior, except in reference to the situation. Each serves to define the other; they are definable operationally while in the organism-situation field."⁷⁷ Murphy covers a wide range of topics beginning with the organic foundations and moving step by step, through what he calls "the staircase of personality study," to his efforts to synthesize his views in the organism situation paradigm just cited.

One or two comments may be offered. Murphy has a better conception of culture than of society. He fails to give social interaction, as a basic process, the place in personality development and functioning which the interactionists do. (See below.) To note only one example: While he realizes that the social self emerges in a social context, he seems to believe that the self is a kind of spontaneous growth which may be frustrated or otherwise modified by other persons. As he puts it, ". . . one develops attitudes toward others in relation to the developing system of attitudes toward oneself."⁷⁸ In terms of origin, at least, George H. Mead would reverse this. One's first attitudes toward one's self come from internalizing the attitudes of others: parents, playmates, and so on. Despite such minor criticisms Murphy represents a sound step forward in his effort to tie together the contributions of biology, psychoanalysis, Field Theory, and culture-personality approaches.

The Personalistic Theories. In contrast to the study of thought and conduct by means of defining, dissecting, and examining specific elements is the standpoint represented by "personalistic psychology," with which the name of Stern has been closely associated.⁷⁹ The fundamental tenet of this school as stated by G. W. Allport, who follows Stern, is that "every mental function is embedded in a personal life." In any concrete sense there is no such thing as a sensation, a perception, a *Gestalt*, a mental image, a skill, or intelligence, or knowledge. Nor are there such things as a motive, a goal, or a cycle of activity. "There are *only* people" who may have these experiences, or perform certain acts, or strive toward some objective. The constant emphasis is on the dynamic relation of the *Person*⁸⁰ to his world. Not only is mental organization itself determined by the "personal life," but the Person occupies the central position in all motivations and conscious processes and, obviously, in all overt action.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 891.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 281.

⁷⁹ See William Stern, *General Psychology, from the Personalistic Standpoint*, trans. by H. D. Spoerl (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1938).

⁸⁰ G. W. Allport, *op. cit.* The capitalization of the word *person* serves Stern's and Allport's purpose to emphasize its special uniqueness.

In such a system motivation is interpreted entirely in terms of personal strivings and personal goals. And in his discussion Stern draws heavily upon the whole gamut of concepts relating to the dynamics of action, such as instinct, impulse, need, disposition, urge, interest, wish, desire, goal-striving, and will. He even employs such mystic principles as "entelechy" and "personal energy," whatever these may mean.

In the same vein any sensation or perception, which he recognized as taking the form of a *Gestalt*, is meaningless except in terms of the underlying Person. Even our concepts of, and experiences with, space and time have a self-reference, and memory is intimately "embedded in the substratum of personal existence." Thinking, moreover, develops and functions because of the demands of personal aim. That is, consciousness arises because of insecurities and attendant tensions within the individual. But adaptation is not merely passive; the person actually goes out to meet his world by means of anticipation.

Logical thought is decidedly limited in its significance for life; it is too rational, too impersonal, too removed from the warmth of real living to satisfy us. Such thinking does not provide us with a full understanding. This can come only when fantasy is taken into account with all it means for creativity.

The *feelings* have a special place in Stern's theory. The term is used in a very wide sense to include practically all the conscious states which have any emotional or affective quality whatsoever. They may be broad or narrow in scope, intense or weak, lasting or temporary. They have degrees of depth, may be genuine or not, serious or playful, and may take a variety of overt forms.

In this country the most important convert to the standpoint of personalism is G. W. Allport. In particular he stresses the individuality or uniqueness of life organization. For him, as for Stern, "the psychology of personality proceeds from the point of view of the person himself. . . . He himself is the datum."¹ To understand an individual fully we must examine him from within, from his own unique frame of reference or standpoint. The unity of the person does not rest upon his exposure to common and unifying situations from outside himself, but rests upon the operation of certain basic principles of growth and life. These are stated in such a static concept as "style of life," to which we have referred, and in such a dynamic concept as the "functional autonomy of motives." By this latter Allport means that out of concrete experiences are built habits, traits, interests, and desires which become themselves capable of serving as inner driving forces to thought and overt activity. He would have us never forget that each individual acquires his own particular pattern or organization of these autonomous motives. It is these which help to set him off from all his fellows. Since we have had occasion to note Allport's

¹ Allport, *op. cit.*, p. 559.

view in earlier sections, we need not extend our remarks at this point.

The personalistic theory has much to recommend it. It certainly offers a more dynamic frame of reference than does any theory which rests upon a doctrine of more or less static traits, attitudes, faculties, or primary abilities. On the other hand, it seems to neglect the dynamism of the unconscious which Freudian theory provides. Moreover, with reference to Stern we may say that, though his central concept of the Self has a good deal in common with the views expressed by G. H. Mead and in this book, he (as does his follower, Allport) ignores the place of interaction, and fails to understand the importance of culture as furnishing the content of much of the individual's motivation, thought, and action.

In this as in other theories which deal in the language of the "total personality" or the "total situation" or the "personality-as-a-whole," there is always grave danger of substituting poorly defined and general terms for more careful, detailed examination of the facts. And, with reference to method, the unchecked and unverified use of insight or intuition—inadequately defined as these usually are—must be avoided.

Despite these strictures, personalistic theory has an important contribution to make. It forces us to realize that, despite social-cultural impress, the individual represents a distinctive life organization. Social interaction and cultural training never quite control or determine all aspects of thought, word, or deed. Such a view constantly forces upon us a recognition of the individual as a distinctive self or personality among others who likewise have their distinctive and unique characteristics.

Interactional Theory. The social-interactional theory of personality has a long history, but the most important names associated with its formulation are J. Mark Baldwin, Charles H. Cooley, John Dewey, William I. Thomas, and George H. Mead.⁸² Although we cannot consider them and their present-day followers as forming a "school of thought," they all have certain related views. While the personality rests upon certain constitutional bases, they consider it to be fundamentally a social-cultural product, but one which is always in a dynamic or moving state of equilibrium or disequilibrium with reference to the particular group and its culture at a given time and place. The most distinctive contribution of Baldwin, Cooley, and G. H. Mead concerns the rise of the self in interaction, while both Dewey and Mead have pointed out the essential social-cultural nature of thinking and hence of knowledge itself. At the outset of his career Thomas gave attention chiefly to social-cultural factors in personal devel-

⁸² The student interested in tracing the history of this theory may consult the following: J. Mark Baldwin, *Social and Ethical Interpretations in Mental Development* (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1897 [rev. ed., 1906]); C. H. Cooley, *Human Nature and the Social Order* (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1902 [rev. ed., 1922]); John Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct* (New York, Henry Holt & Company, Inc., 1922); W. I. Thomas, *The Unadjusted Girl* (Boston, Little, Brown & Company, 1923); and G. H. Mead, *Mind, Self, and Society* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1934).

opment. But he is best known for his theory of the four wishes, although he later shifted his attention to what he calls "the situational approach," which stresses the constant interplay of the individual and the social situation.⁸³

Since the standpoint and treatment in this volume follows pretty largely the interactionist position, it is not necessary to go into detail as to the various points which are used to support this approach. It must be noted, however, that as the views of the earlier theorists spread, it was from sociology rather than from psychology or psychiatry that most of the proponents came.⁸⁴ Gradually, however, academic psychologists who have taken up social psychology have become increasingly convinced that the concept of interaction is highly important in working out an adequate theory of personality.⁸⁵ So, too, psychiatry has come to realize the great importance of social-cultural factors in personality development and function. Note of this has already been made in our discussion of the Neo-Freudians.

The proponents of interactional psychology, however, have not worked out in careful detail either a well-rounded theory nor a program of empirical research to test the mechanisms of social interaction and the precise manner in which the individual learns his culture. Yet we are moving in the direction of more systematic considerations. This is seen in Sullivan's approach through psychiatry and in Cottrell's theoretical as well as empirical work.⁸⁶ Also the theory of Couly is suggestive.

Couly has attempted to link up the ideas of George H. Mead with those of *Gestalt* psychology. As a basis for his interactional psychology he proposes as the basic unit-process not the stimulus-response of Hull, the attitude of Newcomb and others, or the social act of Mead, but "tendency-in-situation" or what he calls, in a new word, *tinsit*. "To name a tinsit one must name the situation of which it is a function; one thus avoids the fallacy of conceptually separating the tendency from the situation in which it occurs and of which it is a function."⁸⁷ The tinsit has five chief "prop-

⁸³ See W. I. Thomas and D. S. Thomas, *The Child in America* (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1928).

⁸⁴ For a review of developments with central attention to interactionist theory, see L. S. Cottrell, Jr. and Ruth Gallagher, *Developments in Social Psychology, 1930-1940* (New York, Beacon House, Inc., 1941).

⁸⁵ For an interesting story of how this came about in one instance, read the preface in T. M. Newcomb, *Social Psychology* (New York, The Dryden Press Inc., 1950). Newcomb sees that "psychological processes . . . take their particular form from the interactional context in which they occur," that "group memberships" provide "the *sine qua non* for specifying the interactional context of human social behavior," that "groups provide their members with shared frames of reference—particularly in the form of positions and rôles, in terms of which they perceive themselves as well as one another" (p. vii. By permission.) This is an approach long familiar to the interactionists.

⁸⁶ See Sullivan's works cited in footnote 24 above, Cottrell and Gallagher *op. cit.*, and L. S. Cottrell, Jr., "Some neglected problems in social psychology," *American Sociological Review*, 1940, 15, 705-712.

⁸⁷ Walter Couly, *Emergent Human Nature: A Symbolic Field Interpretation* (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1949), p. 18. By permission.

erties": *direction*, as in being for or against something; *magnitude* or strength and intensity; *stability* or amounts of recurrence or frequency; *commonalty* or its extent in a society or group; and *form* or types of motion and behavior. The concept *interaction* is, of course, crucial and Coutu tries to give it more precise meaning by breaking it down into four subsidiary processes: (1) *emergence* to cover the appearance of new attitudes and acts; (2) *selective-response* which is but another way of indicating the importance of what behaviorists call "discriminatory response"; (3) *rôle-taking* which is so important in building the social self; and (4) *interpersonal integration* which is largely an adaptation of Mead's concept of the social act.

However, we still lack adequate bridges between the theories and principles of motivation and learning which have been developed in general psychology and the day-by-day functioning of motivation and learning of individuals in various societies with similar or varied cultural components. Sometimes the strong emphasis put on cultural learning with its implication of conformity and commonalty has led the interactionists to overlook and neglect the factors of uniqueness and autonomy so ably defended by G. W. Allport. This latter point is so important that we must examine it somewhat further.

Universality and Uniqueness. The study of personality reveals a range of features: traits, attitudes, or rôles from those which are universal or common in all people to those which are highly unique. Kluckhohn and Murray state the matter neatly in these words:

- "Every man is in certain respects
 a. like all other men,
 b. like some other men,
 c. like no other man."⁸⁸

The sources of the universal features are organic or constitutional and common social-cultural learning. The biological foundations of universal features derive from the fact that we are all members of the same animal species, with the same basic physical and physiological features. As members of the same species we experience the same basic needs and the means of learning to satisfy these. Furthermore as a social species man is dependent on his fellows from birth to burial, and while the particular way he satisfies his needs may and does differ, the crucial ends are the same everywhere. At the cultural level this is seen in the universality of institutional patterns related to familial, economic, political, and religious aspects of survival. On the basis of such universals we must expect many common traits, attitudes, and rôles.

⁸⁸ Clyde Kluckhohn and H. A. Murray, "Personality formation: the determinants," Chap. 2 in Kluckhohn and Murray, eds., *Personality in Nature, Society, and Culture* (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1945), p. 35. By permission.

The roots of wide but not necessarily universal likeness or similarity are to be found in the nature of group differentiation along occupational, class, and other lines, or in terms of positions of dominance and submission. People in the same occupational grouping tend to develop skills, attitudes, and traits which are highly similar for no other reason than that they do the same kind of things day after day.

There may also be some constitutional foundations for similarities noted in the second category. For example, individuals of hyper-pituitary difficulty are easily detected in any society no matter how divergent the culture patterns, and individuals suffering from various illnesses may be expected to resemble each other in certain matters regardless of their cultural differences.

The unique or idiosyncratic features may likewise have some of their roots in biological variation, other roots in differences in personal-social conditioning, and still others in the differential exposure to the culture of a particular society. With respect to inheritance, we have good reason to believe that there are differences in innate intellectual capacities or learning ability and these would make for the differences in the way a person adapted himself to his physical and social-cultural world. Constitutional variability in endocrines and in the emotions would make for other individualistic reactions. Since personal-social learning takes place outside the expected patterns of culture it doubtless plays a very important part in the development of unique attitudes and traits. Nor can we overlook the fact that in terms of variations in intellectual ability and differences in the kind and amount of culture to which the individual is exposed, cultural learning must also play a part in building up idiosyncratic components of personality.

In any consideration of universal, similar, or highly specific and unique elements or patterns of the personality, we must be careful not to fall into the particularistic fallacy and try to interpret such phenomena as individual variability in terms of one dimension only, but always recall the three factors: the constitutional, the personal-social, and the cultural. These influences must be examined before the full picture of individuality can be exposed, and certainly before one may venture a guess as to which of these produced the difference or which, if all were influential, contributed most.

CHAPTER 11

The Study of Personality

As cautious students of personality we are quick to admit that systematic and objectively verifiable knowledge of human personality is far short of what a real science of personality would require. Basically we lack a standardized and generally accepted system of variables or dimensions of personality and a satisfactory classification or taxonomy of the same. As we have shown in the two previous chapters there are a large number of theories, but unfortunately they are not, for the most part, so stated as to furnish a bridge to empirical testing either in the laboratory or by other scientific devices. True, there are large quantities of facts about personality in its various manifestations. But from a strictly objective standpoint these are not enough. We still need concepts which will enable us to state general propositions and testable hypotheses. We have made some advances in the past few decades, but compared to some other fields of psychology the scientific study of personality has just begun.

One obvious handicap to more rapid advance is that we can not experiment on human beings as we may on rats and monkeys. Our value system simply does not permit it. In view of this situation, what, may we ask, are the ways in which students of personality try to study their subject-matter? Although open to many reservations the case study or life history remains one of the most fruitful ways of collecting data. Also, in recent decades various tests and other techniques have been invented. These include the so-called "personality tests," the "projective techniques," and such devices as the psychodrama—a close relative of the projectives.

The purpose of this chapter is to discuss some of the major aspects of these various ways of collecting data about personalities. We shall begin with a short section on various rating schemes and tests which have been worked out by statistical methods. This will be followed by more extended discussions of the projective techniques and of the life history. The rationale for giving more attention to the latter two than to the tests proper lies in the author's conviction that the rich materials secured from the projectives and the life history, despite their limitations as to quantification, will, at this stage of our study, prove more rewarding in the advancing of our work than any other approach now known.

RATING SCHEMES, TESTS, AND QUESTIONNAIRES

A great variety of psychological and sociological rating scales, tests, and more or less standardized questionnaires (the last-named often termed schedules or inventories) have been developed for uncovering and more adequately characterizing aspects of the overt, verbal, and inner life of individuals. This is not the place to undertake a description of these devices. However, to provide the student with some conception of the range of personality items which these instruments would measure, we shall offer a rough classification.

No effort will be made to review the various statistical methods by which these instruments of measurement are constructed nor the methods used in processing data collected by means of tests. We will, however, have some occasion to use statistical concepts and where we do an effort will be made to explain the same in non-mathematical terms.¹

Some Distinctive Features of Measuring Instruments. Without going into details, some distinctions may be drawn among the chief instruments used for measuring personality variables. (1) A *questionnaire* is a formal list of questions designed to get information about an individual's ideas, traits, attitudes, opinions, aspirations, and so on. The answers required may be a simple kind, such as "Yes" or "No," "True" or "False," or "Approve" or "Disapprove." In other questionnaires multiple choices, four or five in number, may be presented, the subject to make his judgment among these alternatives. Questionnaires may also be devised for getting at intensity of reactivity or feelings associated with ideas, attitudes, and the like. (2) A *rating scale* is a set of equivalent units arranged from high to low intensity by means of which observers may record their judgment of themselves or of others. A rating scale may be combined with a questionnaire when it is desired to discover intensity of feelings and emotions associated with ideas, attitudes, and the like. (3) A *test* is usually only a more specific and carefully prepared questionnaire calling for answers or performances which may be recorded on a scale of units of ability, attitudes, or reactivity. Those who devise tests usually employ the statistics of probability and assume that the reactions may be treated as falling along a continuous scale of variables. Many so-called personality tests are but poorly constructed rating schemes or questionnaires. The term *test*, in fact, is often loosely used. This is true of many of the projectives as we shall see later.

In the construction of scalar rating schemes and tests, it is important not only to define the variables closely and to determine the best type of

¹ The student who wishes to look into the matter of test construction will find a convenient introduction in the following: J. L. Mursell, *Psychological Testing*, 2nd ed. (New York, Longmans, Green & Company, 1949); J. P. Guilford, *Psychometric Methods* (New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1936); E. B. Greene, *Measurements of Human Behavior* (New York, Odyssey Press, 1943).

items to be rated or tested, but to take into account the reliability and validity of such instruments.²

We want to know how adequate a given instrument is to measure our sample or universe of subjects. This can be checked by what are known as measures of *reliability*. These enable us to discover the extent or degree to which a test or a rating scale is logically consistent with itself. The reliability of a scale may be discovered in three distinct ways: (1) by repeating the administration of a scale to the same group after the lapse of a certain interval of time; (2) by correlating two equivalent forms of a given test; and (3) by giving the test once to a large sample and then dividing the item scores—usually the odd-numbered against the even-numbered—so that one half may be correlated with the other (the “split-half” method). In any case satisfactory coefficients of reliability should be in the neighborhood of .90 or better. But many scales in use have shown reliabilities considerably below this figure.

Validity refers to the degree to which a scale actually measures what it is assumed to measure. An instrument may reveal a satisfactory coefficient of reliability and yet fail to measure the variable it is supposed to. The determination of validity is not easy, and all too often the makers of tests retreat to sophistry by stating that a given instrument merely measures what it measures! The usual means of checking validity will be discussed later.

Kinds of Tests. The various tests which have been developed represent serious efforts to discover and measure the dimensions of personality usually posited previously by psychiatrists, clinical psychologists, and theorists. Broad dimensions are illustrated by the introversion-extroversion dichotomy or continuum. The whole gamut of traits, for which there are thousands of names, represent small-unit dimensions of highly specific sort. A rough and ready division of tests bearing on personality dimensions is the following one:

1. The most effectively studied dimension of personality is that of intelligence. While there remain many unsolved problems connected with measures of intellectual functions, particularly that dealing with possible effects of differential cultural learning on intelligence, for the most part the carefully constructed tests of this dimension are far more reliable and valid than most of the tests of non-intellectual functions, the so-called “personality tests.”

2. Though the matter is of primary importance, scales and tests to identify and measure motivation have not yet been greatly developed. The Strong Vocational Interest Test and Kuder Preference Record get at occu-

² For a detailed description of techniques of scale-making, see S. A. Stouffer, ed., *Studies in Social Psychology in World War II*, Vol. 4 (Louis Guttman, et al.), *Measurement and Prediction* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1950).

pational motivations, in part. The Allport-Vernon study of values built around Spranger's theory of types tackles long-range motivation as does Morris' questionnaire on "paths of life." Some aspects of the Allports' Ascendance-Submission Scale relate to motivation.

3. A number of scales or questionnaires have attempted to get at emotional stability or instability, neuroticism, and related manifestations. The early free-association tests were of this order. But one of the first structured questionnaire calling for substantive answers was Woodworth's Personal Data Sheet prepared during the First World War as an aid to detecting neurotics in the army. This schedule, inadequately standardized, has served as the basis for a number of others including Thurstone's and Bernreuter's inventories.

4. Several tests or scales approach personality from what is essentially a structural point of view. Some of these get at specific traits, such as confidence, coöperativeness, and the like. Others attempt to deal with larger molar or type concepts. An early form of the latter was the Downey Will-Temperament Test. The attempts to measure introversion and extroversion are also of this kind. For example, the Guilford STDCR test consists of a combination of measures which together form the total score. The traits measured are social introversion, thinking introversion, depression, cycloid trait, and rathymia. (See Chapter 10 for a discussion of Guilford's "factors.")

5. Among the oldest devices to get at the mental mechanisms, especially those constructed by psychiatry, are the free-association tests which attempted to uncover hidden or unconscious resistances and projections. Certainly some items in the tests of neuroticism attempt to uncover various inner processes. But among the most striking functions of the projective techniques, to be described in the next section, is the exposure of dimensions of personality which lie at the heart of inner processes.

6. There are a few scales or questionnaires which are directed at discovering degrees of social participation, social maturity, and expression of masculine or feminine interests—as related to our particular cultural values. Doll's work on measures of maturity illustrates one attempt at this kind of dimension, and the work of Terman and his collaborators on masculinity-femininity dimensions is another.

7. Then, too, we need a classification for those instruments which would uncover the content rather than form and mechanism of personality. Here may be included tests of opinion (often incorrectly called "attitude" tests), designed to measure prejudice or acceptance with respect to race, nationality, topics of public discussion, and a wide range of values, such as those associated with the political and economic order, religion, and art. Many of the well known Thurstone scales fall into this category.

Some of the instruments which have been developed are of an omnibus character and aim to cover a rather wide range of dimensions. One of this

kind, widely used, is the Bernreuter Personality Inventory which attempts to provide measures of neuroticism, introversion, dominance, and self-sufficiency. Perhaps even better known and certainly attempting a wider coverage is the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory. This device, consisting of 550 questions, gets at the subjects' concern with health, degree of depression, masculinity-femininity components, and many other factors.³

An inspection of the tests assigned to these rough categories will convince one of the difficulty of attempting any sharp distinctions among some of these instruments. There are not even careful definitions of the devices. Many are really rather poorly constructed questionnaires which have been renamed inventories, schedules, or even tests. Some combine the questionnaire and the rating-scale device. Despite their inadequacies, however, they represent an earnest effort to examine more objectively what seem to be significant aspects of personality. Many of these questionnaires and tests may be used to produce a picture or profile of the individual. These have proved to be of great value not only in revealing the varied range of dimensions within the same individual, a point which has important theoretical implications, but as an aid to practical advice in regard to educational and vocational plans of the subject. By using standardized scores the person's performance on a test may be compared to the norms set up for particular groups with whom he may wish to compare his own record. These might include age-grade standards for school pupils, norms with regard to certain occupations, and so on.

PROJECTIVE TECHNIQUES

A promising development in the study of personality followed the invention of projective methods. Strictly speaking most of the projectives should not be called "tests" since we still lack adequate standardization as to units, scoring methods, and reliability. Yet because common usage in psychology tolerates their designation as "tests," we shall follow this practice.

The projective techniques are so named because the subject of the interview or observation reveals his thoughts, emotions, and feelings by his gestural, verbal, or overt responses to relatively unstructured and often ambiguous pictures, figures, inkblots, and the like. He is said to project his own inner life into his interpretation of these stimuli. As we shall see it is an easy step from the use of such devices to observation of play and free drawing as well as of the psychodrama.

Historical Foundations. The foundation for such an approach to personality was laid in Galton's use of free association as an aid to introspective

³ For a review of a wide range of personality tests and measures, see Mursell, *op. cit.*, and R. B. Cattell, *Personality: A Systematic Theoretical and Factual Study* (New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1950), Chaps. 2-4.

recall. Through this method he found differences in certain items linked to childhood in comparison to memories linked to adult life.⁴ Later other psychologists took up studies of free association. But it was Jung, under the stimulation of Freud, who developed the most important use of this approach in his Free Association Method.⁵ This latter was a scheme for using words of certain emotional connotations as stimuli to uncover hidden symptoms of anxiety, aggression, and the like.

By the end of the nineteenth century other workers had begun using inkblots and pictures as devices to study the imagination.⁶ This laid the foundation for the Rorschach and Thematic Apperception tests.

The major stimulus to the development of projective methods, however, came from psychoanalysis. For example, Jung's free association list was developed as an aid to the patient's self-revelation during the psychoanalytic interviews. While the emphasis was on therapy rather than on the reactions of normal people, Jung did work out standards or norms for replies to his word list based on responses of a sample of the general population. Thus the concept of normality could be used as a basis for judging deviant replies—considered symptomatic of neuroses or psychoses.⁷ This concept of a standard, determined from a sample of normal groups, became an important consideration in the use of projectives as they were developed.

About 1911, Rorschach began the work which resulted in the test bearing his name but he did not publish his manual on it until 1921. In the 1930's Murray and his co-workers developed and applied the Thematic Apperception Test, familiarly abbreviated as T.A.T. Since then a variety of other projective instruments have been developed. But before describing these techniques, a comment on the theoretical orientation regarding such devices will not be amiss.

As noted in Chapter 5, the concept projection derives from psychoanalysis. But the term as used in conjunction with these techniques, as elsewhere, has a broader meaning than the psychoanalytic usage.⁸ In *echt* Freudian psychology, projection is limited to interpretations of the outer world which characterize the personality but which the ego—in Freud's sense of term—cannot accept. In its broader meaning the concept covers manifestations of personality which the ego can and does admit and which manifestations may have a positive value in adjustment.

⁴ F. Galton, "Psychometric experiments," *Brain*, 1879, 2:149-162.

⁵ C. G. Jung, "The association method," *American Journal of Psychology*, 1910, 21:219-269.

⁶ See, for example, G. Dearborn, "Blots of ink in experimental psychology," *Psychological Review*, 1897, 2:390-391; H. L. Brittain, "A study in imagination," *Pedagogical Seminary*, 1907, 14:137-207; and W. Libby, "The imagination of adolescents," *American Journal of Psychology*, 1908, 19:249-252.

⁷ C. G. Jung, *Studies in Word Association*, trans. by M. D. Eder (New York, Moffat, Yard & Co., 1919).

⁸ See W. E. Henry, "The thematic apperception technique in the study of culture-personality relations," *Genetic Psychology Monographs*, 1947, 35:29-30.

As to general orientation, most workers who use the projective devices are not interested in breaking down the personality into separate, small-unit dimensions although such separate items may and do appear in the scoring and analysis. Their goal is to discover consistent trends in the personality, and, if possible, to present the personality as a unified whole in which the distinctive units are dynamically inter-related.

Within this broad framework, great variation exists in the interpretations of personality at the hands of different users of the instruments. This is to be expected in view of the variety of applications which have been made by clinicians, social workers, research psychologists, and anthropologists, and so on. It is not our purpose to go into the byways of the discussion of these devices, but rather to present an overall view. We shall begin with the Rorschach Test.

The Rorschach. The best-known and probably most widely used projective instrument is Rorschach's set of inkblots.⁹ The material consists of ten cards with white backgrounds, on which are printed figures originally made by the process of folding paper containing an inkblot so as to get a symmetrical design. Some of the figures are colored; others are only in black and grey. These cards are presented one at a time to the subject who is seated either with his back to the examiner or facing him. Instructions vary somewhat, but the subject is usually asked to tell what he sees in the picture or what it makes him think of. His oral comments are taken down verbatim by the examiner. In addition, a record is kept of his bodily movements during the test (including positions in which he holds the cards), evidence of emotion, and length of time it takes him to respond, and hesitations in his speech. After he has looked at each card or in some cases only after all ten, the examiner asks him questions in considerable detail about his responses, in order to understand exactly how he has seen each part of the blot and also to get additional reactions from him. The principal features used in scoring and interpretation are location or relative attention to large or small details, form, movement, color and shading. (See below.)

Thematic Apperception Test. While developed long after the Rorschach, Murray's Thematic Apperception Test has become increasingly important both in therapy and in research.¹⁰ The test consists of a set of 30

⁹ Herman Rorschach, *Psychodiagnostik: Methodik und Ergebnisse eines Wahrnehmungs Diagnostischen Experiments (Deutenlassen von Zufallsformen)*, 1st ed. (Bern, Ernst Bircher, 1921). Trans. by Paul Lemkau and Bernard Kronenberg as *Psychodiagnostics* (New York, Grune & Stratton, Inc., 1942).

¹⁰ Work on the T.A.T. first appeared in the following article: C. D. Morgan and H. A. Murray, "A method of investigating phantasies: the Thematic Apperception Test," *Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry*, 1935, 34:289-306. The test pictures, with instructions, are found in H. A. Murray, *Thematic Apperception Test Manual* (Cambridge, Harvard University Printing Office, 1943). See also H. A. Murray *et al.*, *Explorations in Personality* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1938), pp. 530-545. For a bibliography on T.A.T., see David Rapaport, *Diagnostic Psychological Testing*, vol. 2 (Chicago, Year Book Publishers, Inc., 1946).

pictures on cards: 10 for men, 10 for women, and 10 for both sexes. The cards were chosen to display somewhat ambiguous scenes, in most of which are human figures. The pictures were selected to arouse responses in regard to such matters as aggression, danger and fear, sexuality, depression and suicide, parent-child relations, and others. The subject is shown the cards one at a time and asked not just to describe what he sees, but to tell a story about each with emphasis on the plot, including the present, preceding events, and the future. By asking the subject to tell a story about the pictures, his attention is diverted to situations which are external to him, at the conscious level at least. This, in turn, is expected to lessen his resistances and defenses about his own reactions. He is thus unaware that he is revealing his own hidden and unconscious complexes. In this connection Murray remarks: "As a rule the subject leaves the test happily unaware that he has presented the psychologist with what amounts to an X-ray picture of his inner self."¹¹

As the subject proceeds with his remarks, the examiner may encourage him to go ahead or may ask him questions to bring out certain points which he has not mentioned. But, for the most part, the subject is left to construct his own fantasies about the pictures. What he says is taken down verbatim and his reaction times recorded. Notes are usually made of the subject's general responsiveness, including such items as hesitation, nervousness, verbal construction, and the like. The test is administered in two sessions with at least one day intervening. The subject is not told that he will be asked to have another go at the test. This prevents any tendency to "rehearsing" stories in advance of the second session.

After the test is finished, the subject is asked to state, if he can, the source of his stories. The replies may give additional clues to personality. The chief sources, according to Murray, are (1) plots of books or motion pictures, (2) actual events in which friends or relatives have taken part, (3) objective or subjective experiences of the subject, and (4) the subject's conscious or unconscious fantasies.¹² In addition certain facts are obtained from the subject, such as age, sex, his vocation and marital status, and whether or not parents are living, separated, divorced, and so on, as well as the age and sex of siblings.

The scoring systems for T.A.T. are not so rigorous nor so well-developed as they are for the Rorschach. Interpretation tends to vary in terms of the theoretical framework of those who give the tests. Murray's own idea was to uncover certain themes and motives of the individual as these were seen vis-a-vis environmental situations or "presses," to use his term. This may be regarded as a kind of content analysis and Murray notes the following items or features which should be considered:

- (1) The *hero*, or heroes, the character(s) with whom the subject has

¹¹ Murray, *Thematic Apperception Test Manual*, op. cit., p. 1

¹² Murray et al., op. cit., p. 533.

identified himself. (In some cases no hero figure appears; the subject depicts himself as a mere onlooker to the scene he describes.) (2) *Motives, trends, feelings* of the heroes: what they do, think, and feel. (3) The situations or forces in the hero's environment, both the physical and social components being considered. (4) The outcome examined in terms of how the endings of the stories affect the hero in terms of success or failure. (5) The *themes*, which are, as noted above, a central feature. They may be thought of as variation in the hero's conduct according to the interplay of the needs of the character and the environmental situation or presses. (6) Finally, the subject's own interests and sentiments as exposed by the kinds of figures or characters he introduces and the nature of the situations in which he places them.¹³

In addition to some kind of qualitative content analysis, the interpretation may take into account such matters as structure of story, language used, incoherence, queer ideas, faulty perceptions, reaction times, and the like. This more formal analysis has been regarded by some workers as having important diagnostic significance, especially with more disturbed cases.¹⁴

In the final section of this chapter we shall take up some of the problems of reliability and validity of both Rorschach and the Thematic Apperception tests. But these by no means exhaust the variety of projective devices. Let us comment briefly on a selected number of other ways in which the inner life may be exposed without the subject ordinarily being aware of this fact.

Other Tests. The Rosenzweig Picture-Frustration Study, first described in 1944, presents a series of cartoons, each showing two persons. The one on the left says something which frustrates or describes a frustrating situation to the person on the right. The space for the latter's reply is left blank and the subject is asked to fill it in. This technique is interpreted in terms of the type of response and the direction taken by aggression, whether it is turned outward on the environment or inward upon the self, or evaded.¹⁵

The Szondi test, named for its inventor, Lipot Szondi, a Hungarian psychologist, has been extensively used in Europe but less frequently in the United States. The test consists of 48 photographs of faces in six sets, each set including one of the following types of deviants: homosexual, sadistic murderer, epileptic, hysteric, catatonic, paranoic, depressive, and manic. The subject is asked to select from each set the two pictures he likes most and the two he dislikes most. The eight photographs of deviants in each set are assumed to represent or typify eight diagnostic factors or

¹³ Murray, *op. cit.*, pp. 6-13.

¹⁴ See, for example, Mary Leitch and Sarah Schafer, "A study of the thematic apperception tests of psychotic children," *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry*, 1947, 17: 337-342.

¹⁵ Saul Rosenzweig with Kate S. Kogan, *Tests in Psycho-Diagnosis* (New York, Grune & Stratton, Inc., 1949).

patterns which "correspond to eight different need-systems in the organism."¹⁶ These need-systems, moreover, according to Szondi, derive from inheritable genes, and the eight types of mental disorder follow biological laws of heredity.¹⁷ This dubious genetic interpretation aside, the test is reported to differentiate between various personality structures. They may be grouped into four broad categories as follows: (1) *Sexual*: including (a) homosexual, based on the need for "passive tenderness and yielding," and (b) sadistic murderer, based on the need for "physical activity and aggressive manipulation of objects"; (2) *paroxysmal*: divided into (a) epileptic, from the desire to deal with "aggressive, hostile emotions," and (b) hysteric, based on the need to handle "more tender emotions"; (3) *schizophrenic* (ego): which includes (a) catatonic type, resting on the inner demand "to keep up ego's narcissistic integrity and separateness from the environmental objects," and (b) paranoid, who represents "expansive needs of the ego"; and (4) *contact*: representing the (a) depressive, based on the need for "possessive 'anal' type of object relationship," and (b) manic, which depends on the "clinging 'oral' type of object relationship."¹⁸

The test is said to reveal not only quantitative distributions of need-tensions but the way in which the person manages them. The interpretations are admittedly difficult because of the wide range of potential manifestations ranging from normal to psychotic and anti-social.

There are several other projective tests all of which follow the same general pattern of providing stimuli or cues which call out hidden and unconscious motivations, ideas, and fantasies. Among others we merely mention the "Little World Test" designed to give the subject a chance to construct a variety of situations from 232 items made of wood, metal, houses, trees, people, automobiles, trains, animals, and so on. Another is the picture test devised by Symonds, somewhat along the Murray lines.¹⁹

Expressive Techniques. Let us now briefly consider ways of studying projection which are not "tests" in the sense of providing a uniform situation for the subject. The emphasis is on observation and analysis of certain areas of behavior taken from the ordinary range of conduct and not aroused by test procedures. These areas include posture, facial expres-

¹⁶ Susan K. Deri, *Introduction to the Szondi Test* (New York, Grune & Stratton, Inc., 1947), p. 26. Quotations by permission.

¹⁷ Susan K. Deri, "The Szondi Test," *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry*, 1949, 19:447-454.

¹⁸ Deri, *Introduction to the Szondi Test*, p. 58.

¹⁹ See Hedda Bulgar and Lucette K. Fischer, "Personality projection in the world test," *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry*, 1947, 17:117-125. Also P. M. Symonds, *Picture Story Test* (New York, Bureau of Publications, Teachers College, Columbia University, 1948). For a treatment of some of his studies, see P. M. Symonds, *Adolescent Fantasy, An Investigation of the Picture Story Method of Personality Study* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1949). For another projective test, see Margaret Lowenfeld, "The mosaic test," *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry*, 1949, 19:537-550.

sion, gesture and other movements, voice, handwriting, drawing, painting, modeling, and playing with toys. They are called "expressive," because as the dramatist, novelist, and the man-on-the-street have always known on a common-sense basis, they display something of the personality.

One expressive technique which has been the subject of much study is handwriting. While, in this country, graphology has usually been relegated to the pseudo-sciences—like phrenology and palmistry—in Europe, it has long been accepted as a reputable pursuit. Lack of accurate information as to the technique has added to its discredit. For example, contrary to the views of many laymen, graphologists no longer use the unit character as an indicator of a given personality attribute. It is true that members of the French school founded about 1860 by Abbé Michon did look for the specific unit character, for example, identifying an open "a" with courage. Since then, interest has shifted from the individual letter to the whole passage and from the form of the single letter to characteristics of movement displayed in many letters, that is, regularity, rhythm, harmony, speed, pressure, stroke, and slant.²⁰ To give an example, pronounced variation in slant and other irregularities reveals moodiness and emotionality.²¹ The comparison is always with an ideal "copybook" hand or the style of writing taught in the school attended by the subject. This means that the basis for departure in analysis must change as one goes from one country to another, or from finishing-school to public school graduates in this country, or from the age groups here who learned Spencian penmanship to those trained in the most recent Palmer Method or Rice. Writers whose style closely follows the copybook are regarded as submissive and unimaginative.

It should be noted that graphologists do not claim to be able to predict future personality developments. Eliasberg points out, "on the whole, graphology is no *futurama*. It is the *drama*, it is the *visual dramatization* of the present movement of the personality."²² The assumption is that handwriting readily reflects changes in the personality and so will vary with it.

Evaluations of graphology by comparing "blind analyses" of writing with other tests of personality show great differences in results. Bell summarizes these as follows, "No conclusive evidence for the validity of handwriting as a measure of personality can be drawn from the experiments described to date."²³

²⁰ See John Elderkin Bell, *Projective Techniques* (New York, Longmans, Green & Company, 1948), pp. 295-303. Bell gives an excellent summary of the criteria used today in scientific graphology.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 298.

²² W. Eliasberg, "Political graphology," *Journal of Psychiatry*, 1943, 16:181. Italics in original.

²³ Bell, *op. cit.*, p. 316. See also, Peter Castelnovo-Tedesco, "A study of the relationship between handwriting and personality variables," *Genetic Psychology Monographs*, 1948, 37:167-220.

Drawing and painting may be studied to learn about the personality. Finger painting, a technique invented by Shaw,²⁴ in which the subject paints with fingers, hands, and forearms on a damp glazed paper, has become widely used, especially with children. It has also been used with adults. The responses of the subject during the procedure is observed as well as the results of his work. No single system of analysis has been generally accepted; the most exact method has been developed by Napoli.²⁵ For an example of interpretation, a patient who always painted eyes was diagnosed as a paranoic, a conclusion borne out independently by his clinical record.

Another closely related technique, though used chiefly for therapeutic purposes, is that of observing an individual at play. For the most part, the subjects are children who are presented with a variety of dolls and play materials which they are asked to arrange so as to tell a story. The observer is interested in the rôles played by the dolls, in the arrangement of household items, vehicles, and the like, and particularly in what the child has the characters *do* in relation to each other and to the physical situation. Those who have used these devices report that the child may express his hostility to parents, to siblings, and others, to expose his death wishes and his Oedipus complexes, and to indicate a wide range of his anxieties.

Play was first used by psychoanalysts who, in dealing with child patients, sought a substitute for the free association technique which involved language and which they found difficult to use with children. Erikson states the aim of such a device in these words:

"Modern play therapy is based on the observation that a child made insecure by a secret hate against or fear of the natural protectors of his play in family or neighborhood seems able to [utilize] the protective sanction of an understanding adult to regain some play peace."²⁶

This means of uncovering the inner life has not been explored extensively from the standpoint of empirical research, but it has potential development of considerable promise.²⁷

²⁴ R. F. Shaw, *Finger Painting* (Boston, Little, Brown & Company, 1934).

²⁵ P. J. Napoli, "Finger-painting and personality diagnosis," *Genetic Psychology Monographs*, 34, 1946, 129-231. As an example of therapeutic use, see J. A. Arlow and A. Kadis, "Finger painting in the psychotherapy of children," *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry*, 1946, 16:134-146.

²⁶ E. H. Erikson, *Childhood and Society* (New York, W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1950), p. 195.

²⁷ See, for example, R. R. Sears, Pauline Sears, and M. Pintler, "Effect of father separation in pre-school children's doll play aggression," *Child Development*, 1946, 17: 219-243. For a review of play as well as other projective techniques, see R. W. White, "Interpretation of imaginative productions," Chap. 6 in Hunt, ed. *Personality and the Behavior Disorders*, Vol. 1 (New York, The Ronald Press Company, 1944). For a full review of children's drawings, including reference to their projective uses, see Florence L. Goodenough and D. B. Harris, "Studies in the psychology of children's

Closely related to both projective and expressive techniques are the psychodrama and sociodrama, invented by Moreno. Since these were explained and discussed in Chapter 7 we need not take them up here.

LIFE-HISTORY METHODS

Laboratory-trained psychologists interested in personality problems have made limited use of the life-history or case-history technique. It has, however, been the stock-in-trade of psychiatry, social psychology, and social casework. The standpoint, essentially historical, assumes that the present life organization of the person can be adequately understood chiefly in terms of its development. The fundamental aim is to get a longitudinal picture of the chief adaptive processes representing a causal sequence of events through the course of an individual's life.

Since life-history material is essentially qualitative in character, much of it does not lend itself to statistical treatment. Any satisfactory scientific use of the case-history data, however, must employ concepts and hypotheses to be tested in the course of any investigation. As a matter of fact, many of the basic problems of handling these data are not unlike those of statistics. There is, of course, a recognition of a set of specific or general factors to be studied. The scientifically sound case-history studies must recognize the problem of sampling, since the aim is to avoid the temptation to generalize from one case. In the traditional literature of life-history usage, references are frequently made to typical cases, which is a way of referring to some central tendency. Likewise, attention is given to the divergent instance which is but an informal way of stating facts about range and variability. Finally, those who use such data may compare their findings with those from other samples, and in order to expose dynamic relations they may indicate in qualitative terms co-variation or correlation between selected factors or situations.

Every competent worker in this field recognizes the complexity of the factors with which he has to deal and that many of the most significant lie within the inner life of the individual. He is concerned essentially with traits, attitudes, patterns of values, and frames of reference that are not easily broken down into simpler units of the kind required by the statistician. The combination of variables into larger wholes is a basic feature of the material with which he is concerned. For him an analysis of these complex patterns of the life organization provides the key to the meanings which events have for the individual. Thus one discovers how the subject views his thoughts and conduct as they relate to others and in relation to the deepest motivations and values within himself.

Gradually more adequate techniques for dealing with the life history are being developed, and three factors related thereto may be discussed

drawings II, 1928-1949," *Psychological Bulletin*, 1950, 47:369-433. They cite 330 references.

with profit: (1) the sources of such data; (2) the use of the interview as a special device for collecting material; and (3) attempts to state necessary criteria for analyzing and interpreting such data once they are at hand.

Sources and Collection of Life-History Data. The source material in this field is a human document usually compiled in a narrative and descriptive form. It may be put together from data already in existence, or it may be produced under deliberate stimulation as in an interview. In either instance we may for convenience distinguish between the formal and the informal type of material.

By *formal data* we refer to those which come from legal and official sources such as courts, prisons, schools, or public records, or from social service agencies. Some of these data, of course, exist in numerical form permitting tabulation and statistical treatment. Other formal material may be collected by having individuals fill out detailed questionnaires which call for facts on family, school, and other experiences, and for statements regarding events of inner life—wishes, ambitions, frustrations, daydreams, and no end of other subjective matters. Though such questionnaire material may be and has at times been treated statistically, as a rule the data thus secured serve merely as a more formalized source for analysis and interpretation by non-quantitative methods.

Informal data derive from such intimate sources as personal correspondence, diaries, memoirs, journals, autobiographies, and the records of interviews, especially of the more extended sort. The aim in using such data is to secure relatively free-flowing verbal accounts of the individual's reactions to situations and hence to get a revelation of his subjective impulses, meanings, and intentions.

The writing of an autobiographical life history may be left completely to the subject's own conception of how he should proceed. He may be told to "just let his thoughts go." In other instances it may be obtained by furnishing him a more or less specific set of questions to be answered. In still other circumstances the subject may be provided with an outline of topics to be treated. In any case, his attention is often directed to two sets of data: one which may be considered as rather objective and open to at least some degree of verification by others, the other of a subjective sort. The former material usually deals with the family history and his own experiences in the family circle; his play, congeniality-group, and recreational life; his school years, with attention to attitudes to schoolwork, teachers, and fellow students; and his relations with the church, business, industry, and agencies of civic control such as policemen, truant officers, public health nurses, and social workers. Second, the writer is usually asked to provide an account of his inner life: his aspirations and motives, his fantasies, his frustrations, his anxieties, and the various compensatory or substitutive outlets, his fundamental values and frames of reference, and so on. Third, he should be asked to describe the social situations in

which the chief events of his life have taken place. (See Appendix A for a brief outline for the preparation of an autobiography or a case study.) Such informal material as comes from the autobiography, the interview, or other intimate sources may be supplemented by data from other informants, through formal records and interviews, and from a wide variety of tests, including the projectives. Finally, careful observation of the overt conduct of the subject is highly desirable.

Attempts to Establish Criteria for Life Histories. Although many workers have used case-history materials in diagnosis and therapy or to support or illustrate theories of personality and behavior, few have tried to establish any basic standards of judgment for estimating their significance as a means of generalization. Dollard has attempted to set up certain criteria in an effort to show what particular factors must be taken into account if people using the life-history materials would make sure that their data are adequate for analysis. These are:

- (1) "The subject [of the life history] must be viewed as a specimen in a cultural series. . . . (2) The organic motors of action ascribed must be socially relevant. . . . (3) The peculiar rôle of the family group in transmitting the culture must be recognized. . . . (4) The specific method of elaboration of organic materials into social behavior must be shown. . . . (5) The continuous related character of experience from childhood through adulthood must be stressed. . . . (6) The 'social situation' must be carefully and continuously specified as a factor. (7) The life-history material itself must be organized and conceptualized." ²⁸

There is nothing particularly novel about these criteria, for students of the inter-relation of personality and culture have long stressed them, in one way or another. In fact, Dollard derived his criteria chiefly from Freud and Thomas.

While the present writer is, on the whole, in agreement with Dollard's discussion, nevertheless he believes that Dollard has neglected certain factors which may well be taken into account: Not only is the concept of culture essential, but so, too, is that of *interaction*, or the social act, because the self arises chiefly in the interplay of persons with each other. Certainly, individual variation and *personal-social* interaction must not be neglected. Differences in constitutional factors, in drives, in emotions, in sensory-perceptual sensitivity, in age, in sex, or in response patterns learned outside the framework of culture may operate to affect personality structure and function.

In the life-history treatment—as in other approaches—much depends upon the fundamental standpoint and theory lying behind the criteria and the hypotheses which are set up. For instance, Dollard's acceptance of the crucial importance of the developmental factors naturally leads him, as it leads others, to neglect the cross-sectional and situational approach.

²⁸ John Dollard, *Criteria for the Life History* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1935). By permission.

Moreover, his emphasis on cultural influences leads him to neglect the uniqueness and totality of the individual.²⁹ Scientific criteria, postulates, and hypotheses, in short, cannot be divorced from the underlying theory.

The Use of the Interview in Collecting Data. The interview is a particularly crucial technique for securing data on personality. It permits the collection of not only qualitative but certain quantitative material as well. At this point we shall examine some of its essential features; later we shall comment on its function in providing knowledge of people. The interview is a method of collecting material on personality by means of conversational interaction between two persons, one of whom acts as informant to the other—the observer. (Of course, interviews are sometimes conducted by an observer with two or more informants, but these are rather special instances.) The interview may be recorded at the time by stenographic method or by use of a mechanical recorder, or it may be reconstructed later. From such data a case record is compiled. Interview situations may be divided into the formal and the informal type.

The *formal interview* is one in which there are a more or less standardized procedure and a predetermined type of material to be requested of the interviewee. In fact, most tests devised for individual application are conducted as a highly standardized form of interview. Sometimes, when life-history data are sought by means of formal questions, the procedure is almost as inflexible as that of the traditional Binet-Simon test. As a rule, the attempt to secure data on the subjective life by means of rigidly structured question-answer technique is not too successful, but for more objective data it may be used to secure material amenable to statistical treatment.

The *informal interview* is one in which an effort is made to secure the desired information in the course of relatively unstructured conversational interaction. While the interviewer usually has topics or questions about which he wishes information, he depends on his control of the conversation as a means of eliciting the facts. Questions may be and usually are asked by the interviewer, but they follow rather naturally out of the situation itself and should never be forced on the subject. The informal method is in common use among psychiatrists, cultural anthropologists, social and clinical psychologists, social workers, and individuals engaged in personnel work and educational guidance.

There are really two types of informal interview. In one the informant is aware of the purpose or intention of the interviewer, in the other, he is not. In the latter case the informant does not know that he is revealing data about himself or his fellows. This method is sometimes employed by cultural anthropologists and social psychologists in securing data from individuals in native tribes or in primary or other groups where the ex-

²⁹ G. W. Allport, *Personality, A Psychological Interpretation* (New York, Henry Holt & Company, Inc., 1937).

posure of the actual intentions of the observer would prevent his securing the desired information. Obviously, an observer must possess some disguise as to occupation or status to be able to proceed in such a manner, and there is always danger of exposure of his genuine purpose, which would usually result in terminating the collection of information by that method and by that observer. This is the method used by the so-called "participant observer," who takes up his residence in a given community and by participating in its daily life tries to secure valid information by his observations of the speech and overt behavior of members and by subtly directing conversation to specific topics whenever he may do so without arousing resistance and suspicion.

The Psychology of the Interview. In the interview two personalities come into relation with each other, and the success or failure of the interview will rest largely upon the character and direction of the verbal and gestural contacts between the two participants. We may state the essentials in this fashion: The interviewer comes to the situation with a rôle of himself as interviewer, and with a corresponding concept of the informant as a person who will furnish him certain facts. In the same way the subject of the interview will have a conception of himself, and another of the interviewer. In order that an interview may enable the interviewer to secure the wanted information from the subject, there must, sooner or later, emerge a sympathetic identification between the two persons concerned.

In addition to the external conversational interaction between the interviewer and the informant, there will be on the part of both individuals certain internal rôle-playing. Each will experience an interplay between his concept of his own rôle and his concept of the other. From the very beginning of the session the interviewer will, in imagination, begin reacting to his image of the informant, and, likewise, the informant will begin reacting to his image of the interviewer. Throughout the entire process, therefore, not only will every exchange of words and gestures influence the internal concepts of both participants, but these latter will, in turn, qualify their verbal and overt interactions. In fact, the course of the conversation will be directed and qualified at all points in terms of this inner dramatic process.

The Interviewer as an Instrument. It should be clear from these comments that the interviewer himself may be considered as an important instrument in the collection of life-history data. Moreover, he may be, and often is, called upon to act as the interpreter of such material. (See below.)

In identifying himself with the informant the interviewer must be able to sense or "feel" the former's aims, traits, attitudes, values, and other inner states. In this understanding of the rôle of the other, the interviewer must not overdo his identification and thus lose his own integrity and his critical capacities. The successful interviewer must have

the ability to play a dual rôle—his own as manipulator of the situation and seeker of information, and also, in imagination, that of the subject or informant. Only in this way will he be able to follow the latter's answers, comments, and confessions sympathetically. In other words, he must learn to play another's rôle sympathetically in imagination, but he must not completely absorb such a rôle in his overt or verbal reactions. This is the very point which was made in Chapter 7 when we discussed the dramatic character of all rôle-taking.

The competent interviewer must possess keen perceptive faculties and an accurate memory. Not only should he hear correctly what is said to him, but he will be alert to the overtones of the informant's verbal and overt reactions, noting changes in voice, indications of feeling-emotional states from facial or other gestures, and any other possible clues to inner states which may subsequently be exposed. And, while he must know how to direct the session with skillful and revealing inquiries, he must also possess the capacity for sympathetic listening. Often in interviews, especially with persons under the emotional stress of mental conflicts, once the informant has begun to pour forth his troubles, the interviewer need but listen attentively in order to gain significant information about the fundamental inner life of his subject.

Discussions of interview technique often emphasize the importance of insight and rapport. These qualities have much in common. *Insight* refers to the capacity of one individual to identify himself sympathetically with another's inner life and verbal and overt reactions. *Rapport* means more particularly the degree of mutual sympathy and congenial inter-identification between the participants. To secure rapport, then, it is necessary for each person in the session to possess insight into the other. If an interview takes place in the emotionalized atmosphere of fear, anger, or blame, obviously little or no rapport will be established.

The Interview in Research and Therapy. Important distinctions may be drawn between the use of the interview for purposes of research and as an instrument in therapy. In keeping with the strict canons of science the research worker should not be concerned with helping out with the personal problems of his informants. He uses informants only as a source of facts and they are selected with this in mind. The researcher has no interest in giving advice. In contrast to this, the therapist deals with people in trouble who come to him for help in solving their problems. He uses the information gathered in the interview (and from other sources, too) as a basis for advice and guidance in putting the client on the way to recovery. Examples of persons engaged in therapy, broadly conceived, are psychiatrists, social workers, counselors in school, business, and industry, in religious work, and in military establishments.

The scientific student of personality, however, may well raise the question of what contribution to a systematic understanding of personality.

if any, may be had from the therapist. There are two possible kinds of contribution, one in the matter of techniques of interviewing, the other in the matter of adding to the substantive data on personality. Our major concern at this point is with the former, though we shall not omit some reference to the latter. These differences in intent and use must be reckoned with in dealing with material from both the life history and from projective tests as well.

Therapeutic interviews, like those used for research, may vary considerably in terms of purpose, degree of formal structuring, and length. One crucial matter concerns the nature and amount of direction and control which the interviewer may impose upon the interviewee. There are sharp differences of theory and operation in this. One extreme is illustrated by the so-called "dynamic" or "functional" school of social work, under the leadership of Taft.³⁰ Here the basic approach is in terms of the immediate situation. Little or no attention is paid to the history of the client. The interview is developed as a test of his capacity to meet current threats, frustrations, and other unpleasant situations, rather than as a sympathetic listening to his past troubles. The latter approach, it is held, merely serves to stimulate self-pity and to keep the client from facing present reality. The other extreme is to be found in the so-called non-directive therapy, developed and defended by Rogers.³¹ This therapy rests on the assumption that the most effective interview constitutes an educational experience for the client in which he takes the lead. It is assumed that every individual wants to be mentally healthy but that emotional blocking rather than lack of knowledge is what causes psychological difficulties. Non-directive therapy also puts little stress on past history, but rather emphasizes the immediate situation. Under this schema the interview is "client-centered" and there is no effort on the part of the interviewer to direct or control the questions or the kind of matter to be discussed.

Between these two extremes one finds the conventional psychoanalytic interview in which the patient and physician work out a pattern of narration and conversation. The main emphasis is on the patient's relating and symbolically reliving his past. The guidance and direction of the analyst is aimed only at facilitating the insight and self-assessment of the patient, but the latter is not coerced into response, as is often the case with the "dynamic" type, nor left to determine whether anything is said at all, as in the non-directive interview.³²

³⁰ See Jessie Taft, ed., *A Functional Approach to Family Case Work* (Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1944). H. H. Aptekar, *Basic Concepts in Social Case Work* (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1941).

³¹ Carl R. Rogers, *Counseling and Psychotherapy* (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1942).

³² There has been a continuous discussion over both the dynamic and the non-directive types of interview. While we shall not enter into the argument, we may quote

Those who look forward to a science of personality are concerned with what use may be made in research of various therapeutically oriented interview techniques. Those who use interviews for collecting material from informants will recognize at once that the interview, as an interactional process or "social field," must be geared to the aim of the particular study. As noted above, some interviews may be carefully prepared and more or less formalized; others may be quite unstructured and informal. It is possible that in some of the latter the interviewer may deliberately plan to stimulate the informant to emotional reactions. In other instances, he may want to play a definitely passive, listening rôle. In any case he must be alert to the implications of his part in the process and attempt to control, as far as possible, the many variables which, often inadvertently, come into operation during the interview. In most instances, certainly, some kind of planned procedure would be indicated. In this connection one is not sure just what a non-directed interview would be like, at least for research purposes.²²

The skilled therapist, however, has much to teach the less well-trained research interviewer. Without careful instruction and preliminary practice under guidance, the latter may fall into an interview situation which drifts off its main purpose into advice to the informant; he may unwittingly project some of his own unconscious attitudes and emotions upon his subject; and in various other ways be party to relations with the informant which are not in the best interests of securing the data desired. The whole art of interviewing remains to be sufficiently standardized so that the rules of procedure can be stated in simple, objective, and "one, two, three" fashion. But those who essay to use the interview, especially that form which is little structured, will do well to turn to the trained psychiatric social worker, or school or industrial counselor for advice and some preliminary training.²³

a comment of Lowrey regarding the Rogers' approach: ". . . There can hardly be such a thing as 'non-directive' therapy. It is, in fact, full of directives in the very limitations it imposes upon both client and counselor. It is apparently to be applied to any kind of case, without adequate diagnostic formulation. Every experienced therapist knows that this is impossible, since no single technique is applicable to all problems or all people. Further, technique must vary according to the trend of developments in the therapeutic situation. Although non-directive therapy is based on psychoanalytic principles, insofar as it succeeds at all, this origin is denied. It is based on inadequate theory, and is carried out in a rigid way to confused ends." See Lawson C. Lowrey, "Counseling and therapy," *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry*, 1946, 16:622. By permission.

²² However, Rogers maintains that the non-directive technique has been used successfully for research, but the careful student who bears in mind such matters as sampling, control groups, reliability, and validity may not be too well impressed by his claims. See Carl R. Rogers, "Recent research in non-directive therapy and its implications," *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry*, 1946, 16:581-588. See footnote 32 for Lowrey's critical comment on the non-directive technique for therapy.

²³ For some comments on the need for such training for social psychologists bent on research, see Kenneth Young, "Social psychology and social case work," *American Sociological Review*, 1951, 16:54-61.

In addition to the matter of techniques we may ask if the information secured in a therapeutic interview may be used in building up a body of systematic knowledge and theory about personality. What one is asking really is: Can therapy contribute to science? This is a broad topic and we shall offer only a few comments here.

To anticipate the discussion in the next section, we must say that most therapeutic interviewing pays little attention to sampling and reliability, although the effort to improve the individual implies a recognition of the problem of validation. In fact, the reports on successful cure are regarded as evidence that the therapy used has been thereby validated. Again these therapeutic interviews range all the way from the more or less traditional social-work type or that used in educational and vocational counseling to the types which have been influenced, in one way or another, by psychoanalytic practice and theory. Then, too, the projective tests, especially Rorschach and the play techniques, have been increasingly used by therapists as aids not only in diagnosis but as aids in revealing and at times directing trends toward elimination of symptoms. It is not our purpose to summarize or interpret even a sample of the many reports of the therapeutic use of the projectives and related devices,³⁵ but merely to say that we cannot overlook the vast contribution which the clinician, social worker, counselor, and other therapists have made to insight and to understanding of the processes going on within the person and between him and others in his social milieu.³⁶ Much of it is still unsystematic and carelessly organized, but its richness deserves examination if for no other reason than to give both the empirical research worker and theorist clues and stimulation to undertake more systematic and controlled investigations into the dynamics of personality.

CRITIQUE OF VARIOUS WAYS OF STUDYING PERSONALITY

Let us now turn to a critical discussion of the three ways in which social psychologists collect and interpret data on personality. We shall note both certain advantages and certain limitations.

Critique of Personality Tests. While in physics the units of measurement are simple and well-defined, this is seldom true in attempted measurement of personality. For any unit to be stable it must have a fixed point of reference or origin whose meaning is clearly indicated. When

³⁵ Some suggestive examples of the applications of projective tests are the following: G. R. Korman, "The Rorschach method as a therapeutic agent," *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry*, 1944, 14:21-27; Eda LeShan and Lawrence LeShan, "Projective technique in social case work procedure," *ibid.*, 1948, 18:73-91; David M. Levy, "Projective techniques in clinical practice," *ibid.*, 1949, 19:140-144. For a full review of various kinds of personality therapy, see W. U. Snyder, "The present status of psychotherapeutic counseling," *Psychological Bulletin*, 1947, 44:297-386. Snyder cites 426 references.

³⁶ See Susan Dori, et al., "Techniques for the diagnosis and measurement of intergroup attitudes and behavior," *Psychological Bulletin*, 1948, 45:248-271.

temperature is being measured, the zero point is definitely known, as 0° on the Centigrade scale and 32° on the Fahrenheit. Likewise, we have stable units of weight or distance, and so on. Any good scale of personality measurement must likewise provide some fixed point of origin. Ordinarily this is hard to establish.

The second point is that the units must be defined and used as of equal dimension. In rating scales which employ numbers, say 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, or corresponding units on a line, there is often a false impression of equality which is not borne out by the actualities. So, too, in tests, schedules, or standard questionnaires, it is assumed that the questions to be answered, or the tasks to be performed, may be added up as equal units to make a total score. In all such scales or tests it is important that the questions be equated as to importance, that they have social-psychological significance, that is, that they reveal the facts desired. Too often the items are either too vague, broad, and general, or too narrow, trivial, and specific to shed much, if any, light on the problems at hand.

In this connection a serious deficiency of many so-called personality scales lies in the fact that most of them completely ignore the cultural setting of behavior and especially the objects or situations which call out such traits or types of response. Frequently such terms as *tact*, *perseverance*, *neatness*, and *emotional instability* not only are poorly defined, but do not refer to the concrete situations to which they may apply. To offset these difficulties it is important to define the terms carefully, thus avoiding ambiguity and personal interpretation, to make the questions concrete rather than abstract, and to relate terms and questions to situations or determinable objects of attention. Moreover, in constructing rating scales, one should define the terms accurately, furnish the raters with concrete illustrative descriptions of persons and situations to be judged, and call for ratings on distinguishable items of overt behavior. In rating schemes, especially, it is well to provide against the personal biases of the judges and to ask them to rate only people they know well. We know, for instance, that judges do best in rating the traits of others which resemble their own. Finally, the "halo effect" is a constant handicap; that is, raters often tend to use their general impression of fitness or unfitness of the individual when judging specific features. In short, they carry over one rating to the next, whereas in theory each estimate should represent an unbiased judgment independent of every other judgment.

In the question sort of test or in the rating scheme there frequently is a doubtful assumption that the mere multiplication of questions or other items will counteract the inadequacies of careful definition of terms and concreteness of characteristics to be judged or tested. This criticism has been made of the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory. It is also wise to pay attention to the matter of weighting the items in making up the final score. While the more carefully prepared tests do make an effort

to analyze each item in reference to the total scores obtained, the inventors of tests or schedules sometimes merely guess at the proper weights to be assigned given items or clusters of items.

Standardization is important since personality measurement rests on the assumption that a given individual's test performance may be compared or related to the performance of a larger populational universe or representative sample of the same. While the better tests of intelligence have been fairly well standardized in terms of large and relatively unbiased samples of the school population, and some of adult populations, the social-emotional (or narrowly called "personality tests") have, for the most part, not been carefully standardized. There remains much to be done to equate the scales with reference to socioeconomic status and with variations in cultural opportunities.

Not only must the content and weighting of items be carefully worked out and standardized, but any test or schedule which does not comply with the statistical methods of determining reliability should be at once suspect. (See above.) As important as reliability is, validity is even more important, for unless the rating scheme, the test, or the inventory shows a statistically significant correlation with some outside criteria, preferably overt behavior, the instrument has little scientific or practical usefulness. The least satisfactory method of validation is that which employs so-called experts to state whether or not a given item or test or schedule will or will not measure what it is supposed to measure. It ill becomes a statistician to pooh-pooh the student of life-history documents if he employs such subjective and inaccurate methods of validating a would-be objective scale. More widely used, though still far from satisfactory are the following: (1) The test scores correlated with ratings by teachers, supervisors, doctors, and associates who have had a chance to observe the individual over a long period of time in situations in which certain behavior indicated in the tests has occurred. Closely akin to this is another method (2) of correlating a psychiatric diagnosis to validate tests aimed at uncovering emotional disturbances. (3) The method of "contrasted groups" has often been used. For example, occupation may be used as an outside criterion, as when tests of extroversion-introversion are compared as to frequency of respective responses among salesman and mechanic, or when neurotics are matched with normals as to loading of scores. (4) Sometimes one personality test is validated by correlating it with another as a criterion. But this presupposes that the latter test is itself valid, which may or may not be so. However, this method is sometimes used when a longer test which has been otherwise reasonably well validated is used to validate a shorter form of the same test. (5) One rather common device is that of internal consistency. Here a "validation group" is first examined in terms of their total scores, say on a preliminary form of an extroversion-introversion questionnaire. From this the 25 per cent

who get the highest extrovert scores and 25 per cent who get the highest introvert scores are segregated and an analysis is made of responses to each item or question in the test. If an assumed extrovert item occurs more often in the introvert group than in the extrovert group, it is discarded. The same method is applied to allegedly introvert items. So, too, if introvert and extrovert items appear with equal frequency in both groups, they are also discarded. To be retained in the final form of the test, an introvert item must occur with a distinctly higher frequency in the quartile showing high introversion than in the one for high extroversion, and vice versa. Obviously this measure of validity is, in part, also a measure of reliability. As a means of validation certainly it is none too satisfactory unless we have in hand adequate outside standards by which we can tell whether it taps the assumed personality characteristic or not.

(6) Another possible means of validating a test is suggested by a study by Stouffer. He gave a sample of college students a Thurstone scale on liquor and prohibition. (This was during the prohibition era.) He then asked them to write brief autobiographical accounts as to the origin and development of their opinions and attitudes toward liquor and prohibition. These accounts were then read and rated by a series of judges as to the students' views on these topics. The correlation of the scores on the Thurstone scale with the ratings of the judges was .80 or better. Although this is only another way of checking one set of verbal responses against another, the method has some possibilities. It might be used to aid in validating tests of emotionality, temperament, or other features of personality.³⁷

(7) The most satisfactory device for validation is to check the verbal responses of the individual by observation of, or measure of, his overt action in the area of conduct which the instrument is assumed to test. For instance, does a given test of prejudice regarding Negroes give a predictive indication of how the individual tested will actually react to Negroes? Or does a questionnaire or inventory of emotional instability agree with a sound and independent diagnosis of a sample of neurotics or psychotics? It is not easy to find means to check a verbal scale against overt conduct, but it should be done whenever possible. In actuality such validation is usually difficult to secure, but clinicians and others do try to check up on their test results in this way.³⁸

³⁷ S. A. Stouffer, "Experimental comparison of a statistical and a case-history technique of attitude research," *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, 1931, 25: 154-156. A later study compared clinicians' predictions as to future academic success with findings of high school and college aptitude tests and found the case-study method the less accurate. See T. R. Sirlin, "A contribution to the study of actuarial and individual methods of prediction," *American Journal of Sociology*, 1943, 48: 543-602.

³⁸ For a convenient review of the literature on validation of personality tests, see Mursell, *op. cit.* pp. 237-243, 415-423, and Ross Stagner, *Psychology of Personality*, 2nd ed. (New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1948), pp. 45-47, 61-62. A rather unique attempt at validation of Thurstone's scale on the use of liquor was made

For the most part measures of reliability and validity have been much more adequately worked out for intelligence tests than for those which deal with social-emotional and temperamental qualities. The latter kind of tests are increasingly being subjected to more careful scrutiny both as to validity and reliability.³⁹

Even when a test or scale has been well constructed as to validity and reliability on a large and representative sample, an all-too-common error is the application of such a test or scale to samples or populations for which it was not designed. College professors not infrequently devise such instruments for high-school or college students, and are then amazed to find that the tests have little or no application in the world outside the classroom.

A good example of this is found where research workers try to apply such tests or scales to adults in rural or urban communities only to discover that the content has little or no meaning for the group to be tested. If a test is to be successful, there must be coöperation and sympathetic intention to follow the instructions as honestly as possible. If such coöperation is to be secured, the subjects must have adequate motivation and interest in taking the test, in answering the questions on a schedule, or in judging themselves or others on a rating blank. Even good intentions are not enough. If the device is too abstract, if the instructions are complicated and unclear, and if the demands on discriminative ability are meaningless, the results will be invalid—no matter how statistically perfect the instrument may be.⁴⁰

Those devices which are oriented to a study of overt conduct or to traits and verbal reactions which are easily manifest to an outside observer have so far proved more adequate than those which aim at the inner life of the subject. Too often we have oversimplified our variables and have confined our studies to external manifestations to the neglect of the subjective life. Of course, some workers take the position that this internal life is inaccessible by any scientific method and that at best we must observe the given individuals in as controlled a situation as possible, leaving the worker to draw his inferences about the inner life from his statistical results. If this extreme behavioristic theory be maintained, either we must retreat to the position that the inner life can never be subjected to observation and analysis, or we shall be forced all too frequently to

by Roskelley. He found that the test was too sophisticated for his small-community sample, but that by some modifications he got a cross section of opinions on the use of alcoholic beverages. He tried to check what the respondents said on the test with their overt conduct in the matter of drinking. See R. W. Roskelley, "Attitudes and overt behavior: their relationship to each other and to selected factors," unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Wisconsin Library, 1938.

³⁹ For a short but sound discussion of standardization, reliability, and validity, see Anne Anastasi and John P. Foley, Jr., *Differential Psychology*, rev. ed. (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1949), pp. 30-56.

⁴⁰ See footnote 38 on Roskelley's study.

resort to drawing inferences from data which are oversimplified and even trivial in character. G. W. Allport somewhat caustically remarks: "More effort has been wasted in the study of personality from the use of irrelevant variables and artificial conceptualizations than from any other cause." "Not only should workers properly define their variables, use the best means of sampling, and exercise the best techniques to check reliability and validity, but they should at all times recognize the limitations of the statistical method and not employ elaborate manipulations which reach far beyond the actual significance of their materials.

It must always be remembered that statistics is a branch of mathematics which provides a language for describing and treating distributions and relationships of data. In discussing the measures of central tendency, of variability, or of correlation, we are but using certain forms of expressing logical abstract relations which are presumed to fit or portray certain empirical findings. And, though the statistical treatment of personality data may assist us to formulate generalizations about inner life and behavior, we must not fall into the error of confusing the consideration of selected variables by such methods with a more complete analysis in terms of cause-and-effect relations. The various elements of personality are complex and woven together into patterns in such a way that to tear them out of their setting is often to destroy the very inter-relationships of given variables which it is most important for us to know. In constructing and applying tests, scales, and inventories or other such measures, we must reckon not only with the logical demands of sound statistics, but with the social-psychological and cultural factors at which such instruments are directed. In interpreting statistical correlations, therefore, the student must bear in mind that correlation merely states the co-occurrence of certain sets of relations. As Ezekiel wisely remarks, correlation "can never itself provide the interpretation as to cause and effect. It can only state the *facts* of the relations."⁴¹

Critique of Projective Tests. The establishment of norms through standardization and the determination of reliability and validity for the projective tests has only begun. These problems, in fact, bring us face to face with some of the critical considerations in personality study, both at the research and theoretical level. It would carry us too far afield to enter into the various discussions between the allegedly hard-headed and somewhat unsympathetic individuals and those who defend the projectives with fervor. Moreover, there continue to be a good many family quarrels, especially among the workers with Rorschach—a situation which marks a pre-scientific stage of development and reminds one of similar controversies among psychoanalysts. Our comments will be confined chiefly to

⁴¹ G. W. Allport, *op. cit.*, p. 545.

⁴² Mordecai Ezekiel, *Methods of Correlation Analysis* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1930).

the Rorschach and Thematic Apperception tests, with some occasional reference to other techniques.

To the idea of standardization in order to regularize scoring and norms as well as to aid interpretation, the clinically oriented Rorschach himself was quite opposed. But when the Rorschach test began to be used in the United States there was soon a demand for the development of scoring standards and norms of performance based on representative samples of the population. Rorschach's own work, of course, brought out the fact that the replies to the inkblots could be divided into certain diagnostic categories. From these have been developed four major components which enter into the scoring. These are (1) *location*, essentially a matter of whether the entire figure was seen as an animal, for example, a bat, or whether attention was on particular details; (2) *determinants* which have to do with form, shape, shading, and color (for the five cards in color) and movement; (3) *content* by which is meant the people, animals, plants, artifacts, landscapes, and other concrete situations or objects suggested by the inkblots; and (4) *originality*, or inventiveness and idiosyncrasy of response. In addition to these, reaction time, total number of responses, orderliness of procedure, and indications of blocking, indecision, and self-correction are noted.

Diagnostically each of these four components had a somewhat special function. Location is related to intellectual functions, and to the fact that some persons saw things as wholes, others as varying degrees of detail. The form, color, shading, and movement determinants are thought to be most significant. Thus form had to do with control of intellectual activities. If form is sharply and accurately perceived, control is said to be in good order and, in contrast, nothing is more evident than the schizophrenic's lack of orderliness. Form, therefore, is a useful index to the split personality. For its part, color is said to give a cue to impulsiveness and emotionality. The form-color combination means control over emotion and is indicative of good social rapport, whereas color-form shows impulsive, emotional natures. The shading responses have been rather vaguely defined and their full meaning is difficult to determine. Movement, on the other hand, is interpreted as having to do with empathy for others and also to indicate creativity.

Yet the most important criterion of these elements is their relatedness.

"The balance between form on the one hand and color, shading, and movement on the other establishes the relationship between control and spontaneity. The second balance, the relative dominance of inner promptings and outer stimulus . . . is calculated from the proportion of movement and color. Undoubtedly the determinants yield the most important information about personality; on their validity the Rorschach test stands or falls."⁴²

⁴² R. W. White, "Interpretation of Imaginative Productions," Chap. 6 in W. McV. Hunt, ed., *Personality and Behavior Disorders*, Vol. 1, p. 231. Copyright, 1944, by The Ronald Press Company. By permission. See also, Saul Rosenzweig, *op. cit.*, p. 125.

Neither the Rorschach nor the T.A.T. lend themselves to the usual methods of reliability testing, although Fosberg reports that the test-retest reliability of the Rorschach is high. Mayman and Kutner have attempted a reliability check for the T.A.T.⁴⁴ One common criticism is that the responses to the Rorschach vary with one's particular mood rather than reveal deeper and more persistent temperamental features. Defenders of Rorschach do not accept this criticism but point out that the ink-blots, being unstructured and non-conventional, do serve to bring out free associations and thus tap the underlying components of the personality. The settlement of this difference is not yet at hand.

Attempts to establish the reliability and validity of the Rorschach will be affected by the scoring and interpretation. These, in turn, depend on how the workers regard the four basic elements, noted above, and their inter-relations. Little effort has been made to compare results attained by different workers' scoring and interpretation of the same test. One such check is reported of a Rorschach record analyzed independently by three experts, Beck, Klopfer, and Hertz. It is said that there was a high degree of correspondence.⁴⁵ Similarly one test of reliability of the T.A.T. is to discover the degree of consistency of conclusions from two or more examiners, and by this method high agreements have been reported.⁴⁶ But it must be noted that the problem of obtaining sound consensus on the meaning of the T.A.T. continues.

The matter of reliability and validity of both Rorschach and T.A.T. is further bound up with implicit or explicit assumptions regarding normality and deviance among personalities. We lack adequate definitions of "normal" and "deviant" which makes it difficult to compare a normal control group with psychotics and neurotics. On this point, Rapaport remarks:

"The most frequently neglected clinical consideration has been a concern with the nature of the "normal" control group: its geographical-cultural background, the different kinds of psychological adjustments its members have made, specific maladjustment tendencies in each case, recognition of the more or less

⁴⁴ I. A. Fosberg, "An experimental study of the reliability of the Rorschach psychodiagnostic technique," *Rorschach Research Exchange*, 1941, 5: 72-84. M. Mayman and B. Kutner, "Reliability in analyzing Thematic Apperception Test stories," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1947, 42: 365-368.

⁴⁵ M. R. Hertz and B. B. Rubenstein, "A comparison of three 'blind' Rorschach analyses," *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry*, 1939, 9: 295-319. For a good review of the more serious attempts at validating the Rorschach, see L. I. Schneider, "Rorschach validation: some methodological aspects," *Psychological Bulletin*, 1950, 47: 443-505. Schneider remarks, "Validity here considered to be measured by a statement of the degree of concomitant variation between two independent variables, one of which is designated as the criterion variable. . . . In describing the whole personality [which the Rorschach users say they do], what is needed is a composite law expressing the component parts and their interaction." (p. 496) By permission.

⁴⁶ Ross Harrison and Julius Rotter, "A note on the reliability of the Thematic Apperception Test," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1945, 40: 97-99.

successful adjustments with the control group and a segregation of these according to clearly stated criteria."⁴⁷

Despite this continuing difficulty, one of the commonest indicators of validity for the Rorschach has been to check its findings against psychiatric diagnoses of cases of organic lesions, schizophrenia, manic-depressive psychoses, post-encephalitis, and epilepsy. The literature reports a great deal of evidence that the test does serve to differentiate among these varied forms of mental disorder. So, too, differences in intelligence between normal and feeble-minded persons as revealed in the usual intelligence tests compare favorably with what the Rorschachs show for the same cases. Other checks of the Rorschach and the T.A.T. have been made in comparing them with each other and with other projective tests and with life-history accounts.⁴⁸

Perhaps the most telling validation of the Rorschach to date has been its application to peoples outside Euro-American culture areas. The Bleulers gave the tests to a sample of Moroccan peasants and found, compared to typical European responses, a number of suggestive differences. The former revealed great attention to petty details but a lack of abstract generalizations of large form and meaning. In matters relating to shape, color, animal responses, kinesthetic responses, and reaction times there were no sharp distinctions.⁴⁹

Du Bois' study of the Alorese, a native group of the East Indies, provides some confirmation of the validity of this test. Du Bois gave Rorschachs to 38 natives and also collected life-history material of this group from interviews. Later the Rorschachs were given a "blind analysis," that is, they were scored by an expert who knew nothing of their origin. The interpretation of the latter compared with that derived from the interview data is, on the whole, remarkably similar, although some criticism has been made of these results.⁵⁰

⁴⁷ David Rapaport, *Diagnostic Psychological Testing*, Vol. 2, pp. 86-87 (Chicago, Year Book Publishers, Inc., 1946). By permission.

⁴⁸ For a review on this matter, see White, *op. cit.* For a comparison of the T.A.T. and the Rorschach, see Ross Harrison, "The Thematic Apperception and Rorschach methods of personality investigation in clinical practice," *Journal of Psychology*, 1943, 15:49-74. See, also, the report on a number of validating studies in Julian B. Rotter and Ross Harrison, "Studies in the use and validity of the Thematic Apperception Test with mentally disordered patients," *Character and Personality*, 1940, 9:18-34, 122-133, 134-135. In his study of Hopi and Navaho children, Henry found substantial agreement between his T.A.T. results and judgments obtained from life histories, Rorschach, free drawings, and the "Battery" analysis. See W. E. Henry, "The Thematic Apperception technique in the study of culture-personality relations," *Genetic Psychology Monographs*, 1947, 35:3-135.

⁴⁹ M. Bleuler and R. Bleuler, "Rorschach inkblot test and racial psychology," *Character and Personality*, 1935, 4:97-114.

⁵⁰ Cora Du Bois, *The People of Alor* (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1941), pp. 588-640 for Oberholzer's analyses. See also Abram Kardiner, *Psychological Frontiers of Society* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1945), Chaps. 5-9.

While the norms, reliability, and validity of the Rorschach remain somewhat uncertain, we may agree with Stagner's comment "that the Rorschach is perhaps the best single item in the field of personality testing today, but that it is by no means perfect, that it should always be checked against independent data."⁵¹ Additional critical work needs to be done, especially by those who do not accept the cultish, worshipful attitude toward the test. As to the T.A.T. and allied projectives, they too, will require a lot of additional refinement before they will be widely accepted by research workers and therapists in the field of personality. But in combination with other tests and life histories, the Rorschach and the T.A.T. should prove increasingly significant as methods of studying personality.

Critique of Life-History Methods. The defense of the life history device has usually taken the form of pointing out that it provides a more or less continuous picture through time of the individual's narration and interpretation of his own experiences and often of that of others around him. It is said to be peculiarly valuable in providing a view of the inner life. It furnishes an account of past situations which gave rise to new meanings and new habits; that is, it gives information on the origins of subjective life as well as of overt conduct. In particular it indicates the place which crises have had in the development of new traits, attitudes, meanings, and habits. When prolonged interviews are used, such as are found in psychoanalysis, or other extensive clinical contacts, the method yields rich data respecting the operation of unconscious motivations, mental processes, and the specific effects of repression. It also helps to frame questions and hypotheses to be tested by further life-history analysis or by the application of experimental or statistical methods.

More than this, this technique has possibilities for interpreting personality which the other methods, so far, have not given us; that is, it furnishes a framework for compiling relevant data about one individual, keeping attention upon both his common and his unique qualities. Within the context of the single person's life story, specific events in relation to other events and to external situations take on significant meaning. And, if we compare a series of such analyses of individuals, we may formulate some generalizations about both subjective life and overt conduct.

The lack of standard procedures constitutes one major limitation of most of the work in this field to date. Failure to select acceptable variables, to determine carefully their nature, and to formulate hypotheses makes it difficult for the results from one study to be compared or correlated with like data from other investigations. The scientific criterion of dupli-

For one critique, among others, see Herman Lantz, "Rorschach testing in pre-literate cultures," *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry*, 1948, 18:287-291.

⁵¹ From *Psychology of Personality*, 2nd ed., p. 53, by Ross Stagner. Copyright, 1948. McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc.

cation and verification of studies is all too often ignored. Since there is too frequent neglect of sampling procedures, the worker with case histories is under constant temptation to generalize from too few and often atypical instances.

On the other hand, the ambition to introduce a high degree of standardization in method may itself destroy some of the virtues of the life-history technique. This danger is especially great if the variables are so torn out of their larger contexts as to become only meaningless concepts. Yet by the matching of life histories and by the use of statistical methods, doubtless some of the case materials could be put into convenient form for comparisons and for determining significance in terms of probability. Workers with this material frequently fail to recognize the need to compare and contrast variables in a representative sample. They should welcome any statistical help in treating their material more adequately which will not at the same time destroy its significance in relation to total personality structure and function. They are properly wary of those who would apply quantitative methods in such a manner as would reduce the treatment to unimportant details.

In this connection Stouffer's combination of autobiographical sketches and testing by a Thurstone Scale in his study of opinions and attitudes toward liquor traffic is suggestive. (See above.) So, too, a study by Glick and the present writer on religious beliefs of college students has shown that the interview may reveal highly valuable data in uncovering the sources of beliefs and the meaning of test scores.⁵² In fact, there should be a constant interplay between the experimenters and statisticians, on the one hand, and the workers with life histories, on the other. The latter constantly expose problems which the former might well investigate, and the former, in turn, must constantly be able to undertake (or give over to others who are qualified) the more prolonged analysis of case materials which may be secured from selected members of the particular samples with which they worked in order to get at the subjective factors so essential to more complete understanding.

The reliability of case materials cannot be checked up by the application of the usual statistical devices, but must be tested with reference to the accuracy of the account, from the determination of the logical sequence of events in the life course of the subject, and from other internal evidences. In the same vein, validity is hard to establish in a quantitative manner. But relatively satisfactory validity may be obtained by comparing the verbal responses with overt conduct, by verifying the individual's own story against the accounts of others—say parents, teachers, pastors, social workers, or others who know the individual—and by detecting inconsistencies or inconsistencies between thought, word, and action.

⁵² P. C. Glick and Kimball Young, "Justification of religious attitudes and habits," *Journal of Social Psychology*, 1943, 17:45-68.

In the interpretation of case histories the accuracy of the observer and of the informant is highly important. Certain psychological limitations in both must be recognized. Among other matters it is important to realize and detect, if possible, errors in perception, especially as to what is seen or heard. Possible falsification of memory is also a difficulty which must always be taken into account. Likewise, both informant and observer could easily make unconscious omissions, distort recollections, tend to dramatize what is remembered, and, as is very common, they may repress unpleasant details. Moreover interviewers must always guard against the temptation to read into, or project upon the subjects their own ideas, traits, attitudes, and frames of reference.

Any knowledge of the practice of interviewing for purposes of either research or therapy makes it evident that there are striking differences in the capacities of individuals to set up and maintain a successful interview. The worker not only must have flexibility in rôle-taking but must possess self-insight and self-knowledge. He not only must know the mechanics of interaction, but must be aware of the influence of his own biases, of his own inclinations to over-identify himself with another, and of the likelihood that certain reactions of the subject may arouse in him certain antagonistic, moralizing, or other responses which may block the free flow of the session itself.

It is easy for both informant and observer to emphasize items which fit into their own preconceived mental patterns and to neglect others which may be equally or even more important. The social worker may stress data which the vocational counselor might overlook, or the psychiatrist may emphasize material bearing on frustrations and fantasies, and omit reference to important social-cultural counterparts. Then, too, there is the constant inclination of most persons to pay attention to the unusual and striking event to the neglect of small details which may be loaded with important meaning.

Inference and Intuition. In analyzing data from the life history, especially elements of subjective life, we are obliged to raise the question once more of the rôle of the observer or scientist as an instrument of interpretation. In line with the usual canons of experimental science and logic, the research worker is assumed to be impersonal and to test his hypotheses and draw his conclusions and generalizations through the logic of inference. *Inference* is a mental process in which the individual is conscious of the logical steps in deductive and inductive logic which he applies to the data at hand. In contrast to this method stands that process of drawing conclusions which employs sympathetic identification and insight. These are usually strictly avoided by the logician. Some writers rather sharply distinguish between the method of inference and this other procedure, often termed *intuition*. As a matter of fact, such a sharp dichotomy is unnecessary since it has been shown that even in alleged logical thought

processes unconscious bias and insight may and often do play a part.⁵³

Rather than draw too sharp and distinct a line between logical inference and intuition we must indicate the place of the latter in the interpretation of case-history materials. We may define *intuition* as a method of formulating beliefs, postulates, and hypotheses, or of drawing conclusions or generalizations, in which not all the steps in the mental processes are known to the individual. It involves, in short, a considerable amount of unconscious inference.

Let us examine the function of intuition in the treatment of life histories. Unfortunately intuition has been used to mean all sorts of mysterious capacities and is eschewed by hard-headed logicians and scientists who would depend on the conscious processes of deduction and induction. But in the field of personality investigation many workers have come to realize that the intimate and personal nature of many of their data, especially those deriving from the inner life, cannot be comprehended or interpreted adequately by the use of these deliberate logical devices alone.

As a capacity, intuition is based in part on sympathetic insight into others.⁵⁴ The use of intuition does not preclude the employment of rational inference, but, as Murray remarks, in understanding his fellows a man may use not only perception and logic but his feelings and emotions as well. People do this in everyday life as does the artist in his work, but the hard-headed scientist, on the whole, has no use for the employment of the intuitive method, although he often does use it unwittingly in setting up preliminary hypotheses or problems and in drawing deductions from his data. But, since he apparently cannot accept it consciously, he denies it to anyone else.⁵⁵ Moreover, the training of the scientist leads him to rely on rational or logical inference and to suppress his feelings, emo-

⁵³ See Gardner Murphy, *Personality, A Biosocial Approach to Origins and Structure* (New York, Harper and Brothers, 1947) and G. W. Allport, *op. cit.*, Chap. 19.

⁵⁴ Here as elsewhere I have used the term *insight* to refer to the capacity of one individual to identify himself sympathetically with another—that is, to assume his rôle with all its attendant ideas, traits, attitudes, values, frames of reference, and the like. In contrast, G. W. Allport uses the term *insight* to mean what I call *self insight*—that is, the ability to describe, analyze, and interpret one's own subjective life and overt conduct. See Allport, *op. cit.*

⁵⁵ This unwillingness and even inability of the so-called tough-minded scientist or logician to grant any place to insight and intuition as aids to science or logic poses a neat psychological problem of its own. What is the personality structure and function of such individuals? It would be interesting to know, for example, if they are basically compulsive or obsessive in life organization and interest, given over, to a high degree, to organizing their world logically both as a protective and as an expressive device. Is it possible that they have deep repressions of the more sympathetic libidinous feature of personality which seem to lie at the roots of a certain flexibility and appreciation of emotions and feelings, and at the roots of sympathetic insight into others? Or it may be that they have dissociated their sympathetic and intuitive capacities from their logic in such a way as to prevent any flow between the two. Certainly the rigidity of some of these individuals would suggest that they are not so much tough as brittle in mental structure. They seem to take up such a highly ordered frame of reference because they would not dare to live in a more flexible world of thought, emotion, and action.

tions, and sympathetic identification with his materials. This may be feasible and correct when he is dealing with material objects, but, when he is dealing with the life of man it can hardly apply. In the analysis of personality there should be an empathy or sympathetic identification on the part of the observer with the situation and with the behavior, words, gestures, and other manifestations of the subject. In fact, in drawing logical inferences we all operate on the assumption that the bodily movements, gestures, and verbal reactions of another are indicative of subjective experience such as we have when we behave or gesture or speak in the same or a similar manner. Thus, to neglect the evidences of inner life which we get from an autobiography or extensive interviewing or from other sources of life history is actually to reduce the quantity of the evidence from which we may draw inferences or make interpretations. There are many confirmatory data on this matter of intuitive identification. As already noted, people rate others most accurately in regard to traits which they themselves have and least well in regard to those they do not have. Also ratings are much affected by the degree of familiarity with the individuals rated.⁵⁶

Yet, as we indicated in describing the interactional process in the interview, the interpreter of the life-history document not only must possess sympathetic identification, but must also retain his own rôle as critic, as one apart or separate from the events to be interpreted. In short, there must be a double rôle: one of empathy and intimate imagination; the other of critical judgment, which depends upon general knowledge of the relation of the subject in question to his past and present social-cultural milieu, and upon the acceptable principles of psychological functioning.

In turn, this all calls for a degree of self-insight not found in many persons, which raises questions as to individual variation in this intuitive capacity and as to whether such capacities may be acquired by formal training. In this connection Blumer makes this incisive comment:

"The person who has a broad acquaintance with human beings, who, as we say popularly, understands human nature, and who has an intimate familiarity with the area of experience that he is studying should make a more able analysis than one who is less well equipped in these aspects."⁵⁷

In this connection one may ask whether it is possible to train individuals to be successful interviewers. There is no adequate answer to this query, but we do know that in training for social work, personnel work, educational guidance, clinical psychology, and work in psychiatry and psychoanalysis these and other qualities are usually recognized, and a

⁵⁶ G. W. Allport, *The Use of Personal Documents in Psychological Science*, Bulletin No. 49 (New York, Social Science Research Council, 1942).

⁵⁷ Herbert Blumer, *Critiques of Research in the Social Sciences: I, The Polish Peasant in Europe and America*, Bulletin No. 44 (New York, Social Science Research Council, 1939), p. 77.

certain percentage of people seem to lack the ability which makes possible their learning the techniques of successful interviewing. But, so far, no objective tests or measures of such ability have been devised, and, since this sort of capacity involves the art of handling people, it may be that some of its more subtle features will long escape careful determination and measurement. Despite the lack of specific formulae and of pedagogical materials and methods for instructing others in such skills, one must agree with Murray when he says that "critical emotional participation . . . may be cultivated to advantage and, when corrected by all other means at our disposal, is the best instrument that we possess for exploring the 'depths' of personality."⁵⁸

Generalization from the Case History. There has been much discussion about possible sound generalization from life-history materials. Those who are aware of the deficient definitions of factors to be investigated, of sampling, reliability, and validity, contend that no verifiable general and systematic principles can ever be had from such data. They are particularly critical of the inclination to generalize from one life history. On the other hand, many people would agree with those workers who take the position that the single case is not fortuitous and scientifically unimportant, and that general laws of development may also be applicable to individuals. Murray remarks that "case histories are the proof of the pudding" in the study of personality.⁵⁹

In spite of this, it is all too evident that life-history documents have not served to order and determine the conclusions and interpretations so much as to amplify and illustrate theories which seem to stem out of the observer's own rich experience in life. Whereas generalization should develop from the data, we frequently find that theories derived elsewhere intrude themselves upon the data at hand. It has been pointed out that no serious effort has ever been made to check and verify the psychoanalytic method by submitting individuals to the usual scientific controls. All too often, as Blumer says, "Theories seem to order the data," and "the deficiency of human documents as a test of interpretation is due in large part to the nature of the act of interpretation" itself; in many instances the human "document has value only in terms of the theory with which it is interpreted, but . . . the validity of the theory usually can not be determined by the document."⁶⁰

In this connection it is well to note that Murray and his co-workers attempted to avoid some of this difficulty by the use of frequent staff conferences in which, through interaction, they hammered out their variables, a set of hypotheses to be tested, and a general theory of inter-

⁵⁸ H. A. Murray, *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 249. By permission.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.* See, also, Ernst Kris, "The nature of psychoanalytic propositions and their validation," in Sidney Hook and M. R. Konvitz, eds., *Freedom and Experience* (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1947).

⁶⁰ Blumer, *op. cit.*, pp. 77, 78, 79.

pretation. We need more of this sort of investigation, just as we should have duplications of field work by cultural anthropologists, and repetition of case studies in schools, industry, business, prisons, mental hospitals, and other public institutions.⁶¹ Yet, despite the strictures of Blumer noted above, we cannot proceed in science, without first having concepts, hypotheses, and theories. What we want, of course, is to keep our theories tentative, to use all the varied methods which we can in order to check one technique against another, and to submit both our theory and our findings to others for their critical analysis. Thus we might break up the life-history materials into smaller units and attempt to check some of the findings by experimental or projective devices. In this connection the life history may provide clues to significant elements in personality which might be studied by quasi-experimental and statistical methods.

Finally, the theoretical and scientific use of the material from life histories must be related to the levels of description and interpretation which are to be employed. If we take a large, overall (molar) view of the subject of personality, we are certain to get different results than if we take a molecular, highly specific view. Or, if we concern ourselves chiefly with what G. W. Allport calls "common" traits—derived chiefly from our culture—and neglect the individualistic features of personality, we come out with interpretations quite different from those of workers who follow Stern and G. W. Allport in their emphasis upon the unique and autonomous character of life organization. (See Chapter 10.)

Again, we may approach our study of the person from a simple descriptive level, in which case perceptible overt responses, gestures, and verbal reactions such as opinions and beliefs would be the most obvious data. At another level we may attempt to get at the inner, subjective life of the person. And it is at this point that the life history becomes important. Will it, if at all properly safeguarded by the canons of science, enable us to get at the subjective life more adequately than other methods? Obviously a case history is couched in verbal or other symbolic form; it is no direct photograph of the workings of the inner life of man. But it may be that this sort of symbolic material will yield richer sources for meaningful analysis than will precise experimental reports or test scores treated by complicated statistical logic. Surely there are many serious difficulties involved in this approach; at some points it appears to lack any objective validity, and at others it seems to be more properly a

⁶¹ See H. A. Murray, *op. cit.* There is, however, an obvious difficulty in such duplication, especially if the same informants be used. No person who has been through a prolonged psychoanalysis, or served as a subject of an extensive study such as Murray's, or has acted as informant for an anthropologist or social psychologist, could ever enter into a similar situation with another interviewer or observer in the same psychological state in which he approached the first one. Thus in the very process of collecting human data, the data are altered. Man does not duplicate himself in his reactions in the way in which physical elements do.

matter of art than of science. In particular, there are serious problems regarding the determination of significant factors and the use of the research worker himself as an instrument of interpretation and generalization.

THE PREDICTIVE AND PRACTICAL USE OF SCIENCE AND THEORY

In time our scientific findings and accompanying theories should become available for application to particular groups and individuals. Here we enter the field of prediction and control. But in dealing with people practically we are confronted with the fact that at present our theory and science are not sufficiently advanced to give us the tools of re-education and therapy which we desire. We have made advances in the statistical field, especially in the application of intelligence tests and pedagogical tests in predicting with some assurance the school success of pupils, but this remains only a section of the larger problem of personality adaptation. As tests or rating scales of emotionality, traits, attitudes, and personality types become standardized and improved as to content and treatment of results, we may look for their increased use not only in schools, but with reference to marital problems, to criminal and neurotic behavior, to business and industry, and to other fields. Yet prediction of personal action from statistical treatment of mass data will long remain a difficult task. Certainly students of personality lack the assurance of prediction which is so evident in chemistry and physics. In equal measure, we must be cautious of generalizing and hence of predicting from projective and other tests and from life histories until we know much more about them in terms of processes and mechanisms and adequate sampling. Still, the matter is not entirely without some promise.

No matter which scientific technique is used for describing and analyzing personality, it must not be forgotten that the essential aim in every instance is the same: a clearer and more objective understanding of human beings in interaction with each other, with a view to being able to predict and control their thought and behavior toward a more satisfactory adaptation to others and to themselves. However, at this juncture in our studies, it may be better to use less exact methods than to neglect facts or data which are significant. In a sense it is the meaningful rather than the highly precise detail which is most important at this stage of our investigations into personality.

Art of Handling People. Despite this rather negative, not to say pessimistic, view, I do not take the stand that we may not or should not attempt to re-educate persons to better adaptation to themselves and to society. This means developing an *art* of handling people. Art, in this sense, is a practical technique or method of changing attitudes and behavior. It may and does draw upon various theories and various scientific facts, but the purpose is always reformation or re-education of the individual. The diag-

nosis and prognosis of the physician afford us something of a parallel situation. The medical man gets facts and uses theories in attempting to help his patient. But over and above that he frequently uses insight and intuitive inferences in making his judgment as to how to proceed in laying out the patient's future course of action. Applying this to personality problems, we may say that the psychiatrist, the psychologist, the social worker, the vocational or educational counselor or guidance expert, the personnel director in a plant or business house, the pastor or teacher or other specialist in education, must be more than a collector of obvious information. He must show sympathy and understanding of the person's problems. He must identify himself, in short, with the other sufficiently to get the latter's meanings into his own mind. That is, he must enter into an interactional relation with the self or selves of the other, thus modifying his own self as well as that of the person whom he tries to assist.

In this the interviewer may use the biographical method in part and also employ various sorts of records, tests, and observations; yet he must go beyond this to the dynamic interplay of personality on personality. Under his direction two persons together (forming thus for the first time a social group) attempt to develop a plan of activity which will result in a more adequate adjustment (as defined by the norms of the culture) of the patient, the student in trouble, the parishioner who has lost his faith in God or in himself, the applicant for relief or a job, the unhappy spouse or discouraged spinster, or the worker who has difficulties with his fellows or boss, and so on. In these situations hunch, guess, insight, intuition—call it what you will—comes into play. I suspect that the ablest workers with problem children in schools, with maladjusted college students, with delinquents and foster children, with criminals and neurotics, and with normal adults in personnel situations in the economic world, or with normal adults who seek help from their religious advisors, are persons who develop a number of unconscious patterns of activity and attitudes that make for success in somewhat the same way that the great artists possess techniques which they cannot verbalize or describe to others. Such persons are often not the best research workers in fields of experimentation and statistical testing because these approaches force them to a conscious level of activity and thought and perhaps block or recast their unconscious manifestations—something which does not necessarily happen in that sympathetic interaction of which we have spoken. In such counseling with others there may be something truly creative in human thought and action.

In Part II, to which we now turn, we shall have many occasions to note how both science and art come into play in dealing with various problems of personal adjustment.

PART II

SELECTED PROBLEMS OF
PERSONAL ADJUSTMENT

CHAPTER 12

Infancy and Childhood

The basic factors which enter into the development and functioning of the personality have already been covered in our discussions of motivation, social learning, rise of the self, and the development of language. The purpose of this chapter and the next two is to discuss some of the particular problems associated with infancy, childhood, and adolescence. Since the adult is the historical product of changes occurring through pre-adult periods, some of our discussion will be oriented toward the developmental or longitudinal viewpoint. Also, since most of the studies on children and adolescents, until recently, at least, have derived from our own society, there has been a tendency to generalize on matters of growth and development without taking into account possible variations found in the cultures of other societies. As a corrective against such psychological ethnocentrism and in keeping with the basic standpoint of this book, we shall pay some attention to cross-cultural comparisons. After an introductory review of the function of the family in child development, the present chapter will take up the interplay of discipline and indulgence with particular reference to problems of feeding, toilet training, sleep, self-care, and other fundamental aspects of child training.

THE INDUCTION OF THE CHILD INTO THE FAMILY

The family is the basic primary group in all societies. It is the universal cultural workshop wherein the child gets his first training in becoming a human being and a member of society. It is in the family that the biological and the social-psychological forces converge to form the foundations of the personality. Biological heredity and prenatal growth together produce the new-born infant, and it is upon this individual that society in the form of mother, father, and others begin to impress the accepted ways of living. The drives and mechanisms of learning with which the child is born can operate only within the framework laid down by the older and more experienced individuals around him.

Cultural and Personal-Social Learning. As a basic transmitter of the culture of a given society or group, the family trains the infant and child in the skills, knowledge, and social-emotional patterns of getting on with others which will enable him to become an active member of his family.

neighborhood, and, later, associations of other people. But the cultural training varies in terms of the larger society and of one's class or other grouping. In addition to this kind of learning, we find that the child acquires a number of highly personal, private, or idiosyncratic characteristics. These depend, in the first instance, on his biological differences, for, as we know, physical inheritance does not result in complete uniformity among the offspring, even in identical twins, but in degrees of variation. As to basic biologic functions we are, of course, all pretty much alike, but in type of body-build and learning capacity, we all show variability. Such differences serve to lay the basis for other, acquired divergences. An important kind of learned variation is denoted in personal-social learning, already described. (See Chapter 4.) The essential point of this kind of learning is that it arises outside the strictly cultural framework, from emotional idiosyncracies in parent-child relations, from the physical and psychological characteristics in children of differing ages at play, and so on. In fact, there may even be a kind of continuity in the interactional patterns which apparently arise from just such non-cultural contacts which are social, nevertheless. This is neatly illustrated in a case cited by Jackson.¹

The girl in question had been subjected to forced feedings from earliest infancy by a mother, who, in turn, had not outgrown the domination of her own mother. The child showed strong resistance to be fed, both in the literal sense of refusing food, and in a symbolic way by resisting the mother's instructions. With the help of the clinician, the mother gained certain insights into her own continuing identification with her own critical and punishing mother. As a result of this understanding, she subsequently decreased the excessive demands on her child.

This case neatly illustrates how temperamental qualities may be picked up from one's parent, retained in one's own self, only later to be projected or imposed on one's own child. It is a neat instance of idiosyncratic pattern kept alive from childhood and foisted on a member of the next generation. This kind of action falls outside the range of the culturally expected, but it is certainly within the range of social learning and transmittal. Were such a pattern of forced feeding, however, to become widely accepted by a group, it would then become culturalized. In this case it remained within a narrow range, operating on a close inter personal basis only.

Parent-Child Relations: General Orientation. The basic relationship of parents and children represents a reciprocity from which, if satisfactory, both gain something rewarding. If the relations prove satisfying we have a kind of complementing of needs which Winch contends is a fundamental feature of this type of reciprocal contact.² Within the social situation of any

¹ Edith B. Jackson, "Clinical sidelights on learning and discipline," *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry*, 1947, 17: 580-583.

² Winch has applied his theory of "complementary needs" to an analysis of courtship and marriage and of parent-child relationships. See Robert F. Winch, *Courtship and Marriage* (New York, Henry Holt & Company, Inc., 1952).

given family the first learning takes place, and the development from original nature to human, socialized nature will be marked by certain stages or sign posts of advancement. One of the most important considerations is that this development does not proceed too rapidly or too slowly. The learning, as we know, must at all times keep pace with the bodily maturation itself. (See next section.)

Then, too, within the potential cultural framework variabilities will appear, some from biological sources, some from differential rates and content of learning. In any case what is acquired initially will lay a groundwork for the later superstructure of personality. However, as to the relative importance of what is learned in the first months and years, in comparison to the importance of the acquirements of later years, we do not yet have the complete answer. In fact this topic of the relative significance of the earliest period of learning is still to be hotly debated by pediatricians, child psychologists, and anthropologists.¹ We shall have something to say regarding this controversy later. Certainly the learning of the earliest period must be regarded as providing the foundation for development, although this is not to gainsay the place of later modification. No matter how one views this debate, there remain many basic problems of infant and child training which bother parents and systematic students of personality alike. Some of the most important of these we propose to examine in the sections which follow.

SOME SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS

After a brief review of the essential features of maturation, learning, and drive reduction, we shall take up the perennial topic of how to balance discipline with indulgence in child training, and within that broad framework examine such problems as feeding, weaning, toilet training, and other initial aspects of basic training.

The imperious nature of the basic drives of the infant has long been the subject of comment and study. Although admittedly a member of a social species, and hence dependent upon others for survival, the wants of the new-born are strong and yet pliable. It is as if mother nature had arranged to see to it that the human being would indicate his needs in no uncertain manner and yet be able to make many changes, at the demands of others, to get his wants gratified. Certainly the young of *homo sapiens* are remarkably flexible and man's relatively longer period of infancy and dependency—as compared to other mammalian species—means that he has a chance to acquire a wide range of skills and knowledge—a response repertoire—which will enable him in time to take part in human social life along with his fellows.

Maturation and Learning within the Family. At birth the child is precipitated into a social situation involving two adults, the parents, and


¹For a good review of the various positions on this problem, see Harold Orlansky, "Infant care and personality," *Psychological Bulletin*, 1933, 40: 1-45.

usually siblings or other relatives. It is within this social matrix that maturation and learning take place. It is clear, as we pointed out in Chapter 4, that learning, especially in the infant and child, is qualified by the level of bodily maturation. Many fundamental activities such as the emergence of visual-manual manipulation, walking, and other acts of co-ordination are dependent on maturation as well as tuition. With respect to the place of maturation, we may summarize the following aspects of the stages of growth through which the child must pass: (1) Age for age there is always a certain amount of overlapping among children; some advance more rapidly than others. (2) Different bodily structures and functions develop at varying rates; hence a given stage with reference to the learning of one thing may not indicate a like development in another. (3) Growth is often marked by irregularities; there may be acceleration at one period and retardation at another. (4) Development in one dimension or item may serve to inhibit growth in another. For example, learning to walk may block linguistic advancement for a time. (5) The retention of learned reactions varies in terms of the degree of maturation at the time of the practice and in terms of the attitudes and emotional accompaniments. (6) The persistence of modifications, in fact, is related to the degree of integration and to the extent and generalization of the effects of learning and maturation in the organism.⁴

It is evident that in studying child development we have to reckon with a certain broad sequence of neuromuscular growth, affected by factors of both maturation and learning, and by the emergence of control and integration by the cortical centers in particular; but it must never be forgotten that infants do not grow up in a vacuum. Within given organic limitation to learning capacity and within the limits of maturational states, the new-born child is inducted into a physical and social-cultural world toward which he must make certain adjustments. The interplay of bodily maturation and certain sequences of learning are neatly set forth in Figure 11 from Gesell.

From Drives to Rewards. Here as elsewhere we follow the general theory that successful learning takes place through a process or cycle of activity from need-incited drive through cue to response and reward. That is, learning and adjustment consist essentially in the reduction of a drive, whether it be set in motion by original or acquired needs. The initial needs may be satisfied largely in a reflexive manner, but very shortly the cues and responses become modified through the impact of the physical and social environment upon the infant. Moreover new wants and motives and new rewards are learned, and to get from motive to reward all sorts of

⁴ On the importance of maturation, see Arnold Gesell and Francis L. Ilg, *Child Development: An Introduction to the Study of Human Growth* (New York: Harcourt and Brothers, 1949). This is a reprint in one volume of two earlier books, *Infant and Child in the Culture of Today* (1943) and *The Child from Five to Ten* (1946).



ONTOGENETIC TRENDS AND SEQUENCES

FIG. 11 Sequences in maturation and learned responses from conception to the fifth year of life. From Arnold Gesell and C. S. Amatruda, *Developmental Diagnosis. Normal and Abnormal Child Development* (New York, Harper and Brothers, 1941), p. 9. By permission.

novel and learned cues and responses are introduced into the baby's repertoire of behavior.

But the progress from drive to satisfying reward is often blocked by all sorts of obstacles, such as the wishes of others or impediments in learning to overcome difficulties, by counter-impulses, and by deprivations of satisfying goals. Such inhibitions lead to the development of substitutive and indirect means of getting what we wish, or to our learning to get on with something that replaces the originally wanted object. Since the drive-cue-response-reward system operates largely within the definitions set down by society and culture, it is usually at the hands of other persons that the child experiences his first frustrations. In other words, social interaction furnishes the framework of our striving and provides us with the direction and meaning of our adaptation to our material and social environment.

The reduction of the basic physiological tensions of the organism results in a pleasurable state. It was upon this fact that Freud posited his *pleasure principle*. He pointed out that at the outset the infant operates upon this level entirely. The young child seeks pleasant stimuli and responses and avoids unpleasant, painful ones. In this connection the infant is not different from his animal relatives. But, as he grows up, he learns to conform to cultural standards at considerable expense to his pleasant emotions and feelings. And it is with reference to his most rudimentary physiological cycles of action, the very ones which afford him the most pleasure, that the mother, the nurse, or other adults begin almost from birth on to lay down certain prescribed forms of behavior for him to follow if he would secure the fulfillment of these wants. For instance, the natural hunger-feeding rhythm is about two hours, but babies are often put onto three- or four-hour schedules as soon as they begin nursing. These social-cultural definitions of the manner in which the child might attain his wishes Freud called the *reality principle*, backed by the *authority*, that is, the power and wisdom of the older and more mature persons who surround the child.

The entire course of personality development is qualified by this shift from the hedonistic pattern to one which satisfies more conventional and utilitarian purposes. Nevertheless, throughout life individuals more or less constantly seek by one means or another—in actuality or fantasy—to squeeze at least a modicum of pleasure from their activities.

Thus, while the child possesses basic and powerful wants, he can satisfy these only through activities which are accepted as a part of the world of those around him—a world largely determined for him in terms of personal-social and cultural training. The child is surrounded on every hand by others who set the stage for his activities and, during the formative years at least, fix his rôle and status for him. In short, from the very outset the child's survival is chiefly dependent upon the *social act*. Although the first habits which the child acquires have to do with the regulation of his

physiological urges, this training takes place in interaction with others, especially in the family.

The Interplay of Discipline and Indulgence. Practically all present-day students of personality as well as the practical counselors on child training recognize that the most satisfactory induction of the infant and child into his social world must take place through the use of discipline, otherwise called authority, deprivation, or restraint, on the one hand, and indulgence and love, on the other. While there is some divergence of view as to just how the balance is to be struck, few, if any, would hold that sound tuition is to be had by the use of one or the other only.

While the rudimentary, biological needs of the infant are imperative, it is also evident that he is relatively helpless to gratify them himself. Without the intercession of others who provide at least a minimum of sustenance and security he would not survive long. In the history of child care in our western society, the views and practices as to how much indulgence and affection and how much strictness and authority to use have varied considerably.⁵ During the early days of Watsonian behaviorism, particularly the 1920's, a school of thought arose that believed and put into practice the idea that a rather rigid regimen of feeding and other child care, with a modicum of personal sentimentality on the part of mothers and nurses, would be best for the child. However, later, under the stimulation of Margaret Ribble, Margaret Fries, and subsequently, Therese Benedek, there emerged a strongly argued opposition to this view and practice.⁶ Dr. Ribble's book, *The Rights of Infants*, in fact, became a kind of bible for those who took up her views.

Ribble rests her case on alleged physiological and psychological grounds. She contends that the new-born infant has an unstable circulatory system, that it is inadequately prepared to manage the oxygen-carbon dioxide exchange, that the gastrointestina¹ functions are easily upset, that the central nervous system is not sufficiently matured to handle the job of communication and integration, and that, on the psychologi-

⁵ See Celia B. Stendler, "Sixty years of child training practices; revolution in the nursery," *Journal of Pediatrics*, 1950, 36:122-134.

⁶ For the basic standpoint of Ribble, see her *The Rights of Infants. Early Psychological Needs and their Satisfaction* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1943). For more details, see her articles, "The significance of infantile sucking for the psychic development of the individual" *Journal of Nervous and Mental Diseases*, 1939, 90:455-465, and "Disorganizing factors in infant personality," *American Journal of Psychiatry*, 1941, 98:454-463. (These are reprinted in S. S. Tomkins, ed., *Contemporary Psychopathology* [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1943].) For another and later statement, see her, "Infantile experience in relation to personality development," Chap. 20 in J. McV. Hunt, ed., *Personality and the Behavior Disorders*, Vol. 2 (New York, The Ronald Press Company, 1944).

Dr. Fries has also published a wide variety of papers. Her work is reviewed, with a listing of her publications, in Lillian Malcoe, "Margaret E. Fries' research in problems of infancy and childhood," in *Psychoanalytic Study of the Child*, 1946, 1:405-414.

To get Dr. Benedek's views see her "The psychosomatic implications of the primary unit mother-child," *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry*, 1949, 19:642-654.

cal side, that a baby has a deep need for "mothering." In short, this demand for mother love has its roots both in organic and psychological deficiencies evident at birth and for some time thereafter. Ribble further supports her case by noting that children with the best of physical care—as in upper- and middle-class homes—often suffer for want of affection and waste away into a condition once called infantile debility, atrophy, or marasmus. In contrast, from poverty-stricken, unhygienic homes wherein there is a wealth of mother love come "bouncing babies."

The standpoint of Fries is much the same. She holds that the three chief contributors to the child's psychological development are (1) the constitutional factors, including both biological inheritance and maturation, (2) habit-training, and (3) the emotional stability of the mother. The last is intimately related to the interactions of the mother and child and these, in turn, may vary with the constitution of both.⁷

Benedek's theory of the "primary-unit: mother-child" has much in common with the viewpoint of Ribble and Fries. These child psychiatrists have been much influenced by Freud. For example, both Fries and Benedek describe and interpret child-mother relations as occurring through time within the psychoanalytic framework of more or less fixed stages of psychic development, oral, anal, and so on. All three, but particularly Ribble and Benedek, make much of the physiological factors. Whereas Ribble builds her case on physiological and psychological unpreparedness of the infant, Benedek constructs a theory resting, essentially, on three assumptions: first, that there is an instinctively based demand for a continuation after childbirth of the symbiosis said to exist between the mother and foetus prior to delivery; second, that every mother has an instinct to fulfill the needs of motherliness; and, third, she makes certain assumptions regarding the immaturity of the nervous system at birth.

"Not only the infant has the need for the mother's readiness to nurse, to take care of him; not the baby alone thrives on the closeness of the mother, by her warmth and tenderness; but the mother also has an instinctual need to fulfill the physiological and emotional preparedness for her motherliness."⁸

The blocking of the two instincts produce all sorts of dire effects, particularly hormonal in character, which, in turn, affect production of milk, digestion, and so on. Under these circumstances both mother and child suffer frustration and attendant anxiety with serious effects on both of them.

In brief, the general thesis of Ribble and her collaborators is that mothering and affection have a central and crucial place in the mental development of the infant and child. Moreover, in line with the Freudian orientation, the effects of the early months and years on subsequent per-

⁷ See Malecove, *op cit.*, and full bibliography there cited

⁸ Benedek, *op cit.*, p. 648. By permission

sonality are believed to be of prime importance. In Ribble's words, "The capacity for mature emotional relationship in adult life" derive from parental care, especially the mother love bestowed upon the growing child. The latter's "emotional hunger is an urge as definite and compelling as the need for food."⁹ And, to this, Benedek would add that the mother's own mental health depends on the fulfillment of her biologically determined mothering rôle.

There has been a wide acceptance of the Ribble thesis by pediatricians, child psychologists, social welfare workers, nursery school teachers, and many others. Their favorable reaction to Ribble was, in part, a counter-reaction to the somewhat cold and rigorous views of the Watsonian behaviorism.¹⁰ Some supporting evidence for the views of the Ribble school, beyond that of the clinical cases, is found in the contrasts in the personality manifestations of children brought up in institutions in comparison to those reared in their own or foster families. For example, Goldfarb has reported that children brought up in institutions have a strong hunger for affection, but show less anxieties about immediate day-by-day frustrations than did a sample of children from foster homes. However, there was no significant difference in intelligence test performance.¹¹ So, too, studies of infant-training in the upper and middle classes as contrasted to that in lower-class families have shown rather striking differences in amounts of rigidity and compulsiveness as against permissiveness. Yet, as we shall note later on, we find a wide mixture of permissiveness and severity in child training, both in our own society and in others.

In contrast to the strong views of the Ribble school are those who point out first of all Ribble's incorrect and quite misleading contention that the infant is somehow a puny and passive creature scarcely capable of withstanding grave dangers to life and limb. It is true, of course, that the survival of the infant depends on the intercession of the mother or mother-surrogate, but within this biosocial matrix, the infant is an active "energy system with high capacity for self repair and selectivity."¹² Certainly Ribble's arguments which are said to rest on anatomical and physiological grounds do not seem to stand up under careful scrutiny. Pinneau's critical

⁹ Paraphrased, with brief quotations, from Ribble, *The Rights of Infants*, pp. 13-14. See also, Benedek, *op. cit.*

¹⁰ See J. B. Watson, *Psychological Care of Infant and Child* (New York, W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1928).

¹¹ See William Goldfarb, "Psychological privation in infancy and subsequent adjustment," *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry*, 1945, 15:247-255; and his, "Rorschach test differences between family-reared, institution-reared, and schizophrenic children," *ibid.*, 1949, 19:624-633. For a Frenchman interpretation of a wide range of literature on the effects of institutional care on children, see Susan Isaacs, *Childhood and After, Some Essays and Clinical Studies* (New York, International Universities Press, 1949), Chap. 13.

¹² John E. Anderson, "Personality organization in children," *The American Psychologist*, 1948, 3:406-416. Quotation from page 410. This is an excellent and balanced discussion by a man who has spent a lifetime in research and study of child development

review of her thesis in terms of current physiology and anatomy shows that there is little or no basis for her contentions on the physiological inadequacy of the young infant.¹³

In keeping with the *echt* Freudian view, both Ribble and Benedek assume that certain instincts dominate the behavior of the individual although they may be redirected, blocked, or otherwise modified by society and culture. Thus Benedek feels that the conditions of modern urban life "interfere with the continuation of the symbiosis between mother and infant during lactation," and Ribble takes a similar view in saying that "our impersonal civilization has insidiously damaged woman's instinctual nature" which, if left to itself, would provide the kind of maternal love required by the child "through the period of helpless infancy."¹⁴

No serious student of child behavior denies the importance of mother love and affectionate care in the training of the infant and child. These develop from the close intimacy of mother and baby in feeding and in dozens of other daily contacts of the two. But to assume that "mothering" is the result of some unique and special instinct and represents a need for an interaction which is a verisimilitude of life in the womb is to ignore a wealth of evidence to the contrary. Data on child-rearing in other societies shows that the human infant is capable of surviving under widely divergent conditions. In some societies, as among the Marquesans, the infant is not breast-fed, and from our middle-class viewpoint is soon rejected and neglected by the mother, being left to the care of older siblings and the father. In Bali, on the contrary, the infant is first given a great deal of loving care only to become the object of a combination of rejection and severe teasing by the parents at the age of two or so.¹⁵ In our society we try to approximate for the baby the sheltered condition which the foetus had in the mother's womb. Yet Skinner has shown that such conditions are not necessary for satisfactory growth of a baby. Skinner and his wife kept their baby, Debby, in a soundproof, dirtproof box for an entire year. The child was removed for feeding and care, but wore nothing but a diaper when in the box. It was found that regulating the temperature affected feeding demands, sleeping, and the incidence of crying. The child had plenty of social and other stimulation but was freed of restraints imposed by clothing and blankets.¹⁶

Certainly no one knows precisely the importance of tactile stimulation, of restraint or free movement, and of practice and learning as against that

¹³ S. R. Pinneau, "A critique of the articles by Margaret Ribble," *Child Development*, 1950, 21: 203-228.

¹⁴ Benedek, *op. cit.*, p. 647, and Ribble, *The Rights of Infants*, p. 14.

¹⁵ For a convenient summary of various forms of child care, see Kimball Young, *Social Psychology*, 2nd ed. (New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1944), pp. 50-55.

¹⁶ See B. F. Skinner, "Baby in a box," *Ladies Home Journal* 1945 62: 36-37, 135-138.

of maturation in child development. Dennis's report of a pair of twin girls who were reared with a minimum of stimulation and under limited opportunities for motor practice is pertinent here. There were no demonstrations of affection, no social rewards, and only the basic essential attention to insure good physical care. Yet, under these conditions, the twins did well, and while they lacked practice in such things as learning to sit up alone or balance on their feet, they quickly acquired these skills later. In fact, as Dennis has shown from his observations of the effect of placing babies on cradle boards, deprivation of practice in movement seems to have only a limited bearing on later ability to sit erect or to walk.¹⁷

The divergences in infant care and training are clear evidence that babies are capable of adapting themselves to a wide variety of cultural demands. No one denies the importance of affectionate care, but good food, sunshine, and freedom from infection are not to be overlooked. So, too, the infant and child must acquire some direction and control over impulses and responses.

In short, the process of socialization takes place within the social act into which the intercession of mother or other person enters. In this process two basic considerations enter: affection and protective care and discipline, which often means deprivation and frustration. The mixture of love and control, however, must be examined against the background of age, maturation, and cultural expectancy. We tolerate conduct on the part of a one-year-old or a two-year-old that we would not in a child of four or five years. The fulfillment of our expectancies depend on bodily maturation, improvement in learning ability (growth of intelligence), and on the kind and amount of exposure to social-cultural and physical environment. Into this combination of elements which bring about change and development, the factors of persistence and consistency of habit and attitude enter.

Consistency and Persistence in Habit-formation. Surely the attitudes, traits, and patterning of rôles which characterize the adult have their beginning in infancy and childhood. We need not accept the extreme views of the Freudians and others that the basic personality structure is laid down in the first weeks and months of life, to realize there is no doubt that habits and attitudes persist over long periods of time. Certainly it is in keeping with sound learning theory to state that what the child acquires in his early years is the foundation upon which later learning takes place, and one thing basic to sound adjustments later, is the degree of consistency and **stability in the early training.**

One of the developing needs of the infant and young child is that of security. At the outset this is obtained pretty much in terms of good bodily

¹⁷ Wayne Dennis, "Infant development under conditions of restricted practice and minimum social stimulation," *Genetic Psychology Monographs*, 1941, 23: 143-189, also *has The Hope Child* (New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, Inc., 1940).

care mingled with affection. As the child grows up the balance between permissiveness and control may vary. For example, as we shall note more fully below, feeding practices range from complete compliance of the mother to the child's feeding demands to the imposition of a rigid time schedule. The same is true of the management of evacuative and other habits. Probably the most satisfactory procedure lies at some point between the two extremes of complete indulgence and permissiveness and severe regulation. Certainly as the child works out, with the guidance of others, some kind of more or less stable and consistent routine in relation to his constitutional needs, he has thereby provided himself and others a foundation for the prediction and hence management of his future needs in the same field of action. As we have indicated earlier, the anticipation of certain sorts of conduct and not of other sorts plays an important part in developing workable interactional patterns. We live in a world of some degree of order and our reliable patterns of expectancy have their roots in the initial habits of the child.

An infant brought up without some discipline of its demands and emotions is not being prepared to meet the social requirements of regularity and recurrence of conduct necessary to an orderly world. Sometimes unwise parents, under the stress of their own idiosyncrasy or because they have an inadequate understanding of the place of affection, fluctuate between rigid demands for conformity to a schedule at some times and places and an almost anarchic indulgence at others. This *playing fast and loose with the child's habits and emotions* may have damaging effects. Out of recurrent situations of this kind neither parent nor child can develop adequate means of communication and cooperation. Later we shall illustrate and discuss some specific problems in child-rearing which, in part at least, grow out of inconsistent training and ineffective parent-child relations. At this point let us review some aspects of feeding, weaning, toilet training, and other basic instruction of the infant, since what happens in these early situations usually has a great deal to do with various later difficulties. The variation in early training as it is related to parent-child interactions and child development is neatly brought out in the story of two pre-school boys, Andrew Dennis and Victor Cassidy reported by Shirley.¹⁴

The analysis of these cases centers around three basic hypotheses regarding the development of personality in children: (1) that the attitudes and acts of the parents contribute more to the child's personality development than do the external aspects of the environment; (2) that the personality of the mother enters into all the responses she makes toward her baby and determines the way in which she administers all phases of child care, and (3) that the infant has sufficiently tough and resistant constitutional

¹⁴ Mary M. Shirley, "The impact of the mother's personality on the young child. Two parallel case studies," *Smith College Studies in Social Work*, 1941, 12: 15-64. Quotations are by permission.

or "temperamental qualities" to prevent his "ever becoming the complete puppet" of the social forces which impinge upon him. While all three of these hypotheses are demonstrated in the accounts, the second is the most evident.

Cases of Andrew D. and Victor C. Andrew and Victor were two children of a large group undergoing periodic and systematic observation in a research project on child development. The observations were made both at home and at the Research Center. The two boys were reasonably well-matched in a number of particulars. They were of the same age; were both the first born of parents who had been married at the time for about two years. The two sets of parents were similar in nationality origin, in religion, in age, in occupational status, and in being apparently happily mated.

The health histories of the boys were also rather similar. The boys were alike in intelligence. Andrew had an I.Q. of 112; Victor, one of 114.

In spite of these external similarities, their personalities differ rather sharply. Andrew "is self-contained and reticent," talks little but is informative and alert; plays contentedly with a few things; is not very demanding of others. Victor "is socially outgoing," uses many toys and shifts rapidly from one activity to another; he is talkative and asks many questions. These contrasts show that the particular personality is the product not only of social impact and physical environment but of the way in which the individual orders and remakes these forces into his own image. Let us review some of the important features in the early training of these two boys.

Andrew was born 12 days beyond the normal time while Victor was born five weeks ahead of schedule. Labor was rather long for both mothers and slight use of forceps was necessary at the end. Both babies were in good condition, and, though "immature," Victor spent only his first 24 hours in the "premature nursery."

The care of the babies reflected the divergences in the maternal personalities. Mrs. Dennis carried out her duties with meticulous attention to details; but she was uncertain and self-conscious. Since she wanted everything to go well with the baby so that she could get back to work, she organized the routine of feeding, bathing, and the like as carefully as she could. She was unable to nurse her baby very long and the task of putting Andrew on the bottle was a bit difficult. In the care of the baby she had some help from her mother who lived with the family. Mrs. Cassidy, in contrast, approached her duties in a matter-of-fact, nonchalant manner. After a few weeks, she too put her baby on the bottle. She handled his feeding, bathing, and other care with considerable dispatch. In contrast, Mrs. Dennis, though operating a careful routine, was never able seriously to thwart Andrew. For example, he dawdled over his food; he enjoyed the feeding period as one of playful attention from others. As he

moved on to solid foods this habit continued; but because of certain nutritional deficiencies 18 months later the doctor insisted on more strict supervision. The mother resisted this at first, but finally consented. And, since she returned to work at about this time, the feeding was left to the grandmother. Within a year Andrew's nutritional troubles had disappeared.

The daily routine of these babies varied considerably. Both were allowed naps, but the Dennis baby was put down and not bothered at all till necessary to feed, change, or otherwise care for him. The Cassidy routine was a hit and miss one. Mrs. Cassidy often went to visit friends or relatives and took the baby along and he learned to take a nap almost anywhere. The parents even took him out nights when they went visiting. Almost from the first Victor was exposed to a wide range of people of all ages and in varying situations. Andrew was taken for occasional visits to relatives but otherwise had few social contacts outside the home and the Research Center. He developed into a shy, reticent boy. Victor, in the meantime, was showing his out-going characteristics.

The bowel training of the two children was quite different. Mrs. Dennis began putting her baby on a toilet when he was three months old with no success; later she became more insistent and a kind of battle began between her and the baby. As in the feeding situation, she tended to give way and let the baby dominate the situation. As a result of this playing fast and loose with the routine, at 13 months Andrew had to be given mineral oil as a corrective to constipation. Mrs. Dennis paid little attention to bladder training during the first year; after that the father was given the responsibility of training the child. By two years Andrew had attained day control and by three, night control also.

For her part, Mrs. Cassidy did not begin bowel training till Victor was six months old and within a month he was doing reasonably well, and by the time he was a year old his training was completed. However, the mother did very little about bladder control and it was not till Victor was two years of age that such training was complete.

In motor learning Andrew was left pretty much to his own devices; at one year he could toddle about while holding on to chairs; at thirteen and a half months he walked alone. Victor's parents, on the other hand, took great delight in his developing motor skills. He walked at 53 weeks, but before this had learned "to beat the drum" (slap the table), to do flip-flops with the aid of his mother, and so on.

As to thumbsucking, Andrew began before he was three months old, and for the rest of the first year every effort to stop him failed. But by year's end he had stopped of his own accord. Victor, in contrast, began sucking his fingers at 20 months and resisted any attempts to stop him. But when he was some months beyond his third birthday he gave up the habit himself.

Other differences may be noted briefly. Andrew began temper tantrums

at nine months and they continued till he was beyond two and a half years. Victor never had tantrums; he might be cranky from fatigue or illness; and occasionally, around two years of age, cried at night. "Perhaps the differences herein lie in the mothers' different attitudes toward discipline." (p. 39) Mrs. Dennis tried a fixed routine but was too weak in discipline to make it stick. Andrew learned how to take advantage of this. Also, the mother apparently used the technique of "Don't do that" lest it "break mother's heart"—an egocentric response which often induces difficult counter-responses from the growing child. Mrs. Cassidy, however, had definite ideas about discipline; she said she did not intend to spoil Victor. "She began to give commands early and firmly." (p. 40) If verbal demands were not carried out she resorted to mild physical punishments such as, slapping hands or making the child sit in his own room alone. In commenting on the effects of discipline, Shirley remarks: "If Andrew's super-ego was too weak, Victor's has been too strong. Mrs. Cassidy in her determination to have an obedient, unspoiled child has disciplined her son to the point where he really fears her." (p. 41)

Divergences in attitude and action are also seen in the mothers' choice of clothes, equipment, toys, and pets. As might be expected from what has already been said, Mrs. Dennis was meticulous and somewhat over-concerned about these matters while Mrs. Cassidy was much more easy-going and casual.

The rôle of the fathers in these households was relatively secondary. Like his wife, Mr. Dennis was a rather quiet person with few outside contacts, except for a few cronies from his bachelor club, in which he retained membership. He was ten years older than his wife. Mr. Cassidy, on the other hand, was about the same age as his wife, whom he had known since adolescence. He represented the stereotype of the jovial, hearty Irishman. He and his wife had many friends, were constantly on the go. Yet neither of these fathers took a very active part in the training of their sons. Here we have instances of urban matriarchy, so far as child care is concerned.

Something should be said about the background of the two mothers since they produce the continuity of attitude and action from one generation to the next—an important item in both personal-social and cultural conditioning. As nearly as the investigators could discover—and this chiefly from her own mother—Mrs. Dennis was "surrounded by taboos and admonitions from infancy, and . . . she grew up a lonely, isolated little girl in a fine home where nothing belonged to her and everything was untouchable." (p. 45) (Her parents were the caretakers of what to the child must have seemed a fabulous mansion.) In contrast, Mrs. Cassidy's father was a traveling salesman whose wife insisted on going about the country with him. As a result, by the time she was ten years old Victor's mother had been in every state in the union but two. She, like her mother and brother,

seemed to thrive on the excitement of high residential mobility and the constant meeting and making of new friends. She developed a sense of nonchalance and casualness rather than one of fixed order and meticulous routine. These differences in attitude and habit were carried over into the teaching of their respective sons. While the objective conditions of their lives were similar—age, social status, religion, and so on, their personalities varied sharply. Shirley has summarized the impact of their personalities on the children in these words:

"Each wanted the baby and at the same time rejected it, an ambivalent attitude that probably is very common in young mothers. . . . Each wanted the baby, but wanted also to maintain the pre-conception marital status and personal freedom. . . .

"Every single feature of each child's care bore the imprint of his mother's personality. Thus the pervasive influence of maternal personality can best be described not as an impact—a single decisive blow—but as a consistent, never-ceasing pressure. In bathing, feeding and toilet training her baby and even in providing clothes and equipment for his care, Mrs. Dennis expressed indecision, meticulousness, reticence, and a nostalgic longing for the pleasures of a care-free childhood that she had been denied. Mrs. Cassidy's administration of baths, food, toilet care, and her choice of clothes and equipment were indicative of her decisiveness, her nonchalance, her forth-rightness, and her restlessness, the pattern of which was established in her roaming childhood.

"Mrs. Dennis, handicapped by her own personality pattern, and by certain environmental factors that she could not change, was unable to achieve the goal of rearing a baby that met her own specifications. Mrs. Cassidy, free from environmental obstacles, did tailor her son to her pattern during babyhood. One feels that because of her willfulness and determination she would have achieved her goal even if she had been faced with the environmental handicaps that faced Mrs. Dennis. . . .

"It is apparent that neither of these mothers had any insight into the underlying motives that determined her behavior toward her child. Each sincerely believed that she was doing the utmost to further his wholesome growth and development, and believed herself prompted entirely by love and desire for his well being. It is doubtful whether any guidance, short of prolonged treatment, would have given these mothers insight or would have enabled them to change their manner of giving child care—if, indeed, any changes were desirable. If therapy had been offered it is doubtful that either mother would have availed herself of it, for each seemed to be unaware of any needs or lacks in her own personality makeup. . . .

"Though reticent and self-contained, Mrs. Dennis had a deep sense of personal responsibility for all the members of her family, and a willingness to work for their welfare and for family unity and integration. She accepted within her home a bereaved sister-in-law, she considered it her filial duty to take the responsibility for her mother in the elderly woman's declining years, and she made the best of this crowded and assorted household.

"These evidences of Mrs. Dennis's unselfishness are quite in contrast with the many evidences of Mrs. Cassidy's self-centeredness. Mrs. Cassidy paid appropriate lip service to her duties as a wife and mother and as an older sister to her semi-orphaned siblings. But the steps she took toward meeting her obligations were always those that served her own ends—that of discharging them in such

a way as to give herself the utmost freedom both from family tasks and from unconscious guilt. This, of course, served to nourish her own high opinion of herself, since it was obvious to her not only that she was doing her duty but that she was doing it efficiently. When the duties piled up, however, she did show some tendency to retreat to ill health and thereby to avoid them."¹⁹

Finally, we must return to discover how the two boys responded to their training. The most striking fact which emerges from the details of the month-by-month and year-by-year account of their development is that at the outset it might have been predicted that Andrew would become a sissy, a dependent, and retiring individual whereas Victor would be quite the opposite. In actuality this did not happen. Although Andrew at six years of age was a somewhat quiet little chap, he had developed a considerable amount of self-confidence, he was bright in school, and emotionally secure. As Shirley puts it, "Andrew's mother did not help him grow up; he grew up in spite of her." (p. 63) On the other hand, Victor came "nearer to being his mother's puppet." He was constantly pushed ahead, a bit more than his physical maturation called for; up to three he fitted into her pattern of obedience and docility. From that time on, however, he began to show symptoms of rather serious anxiety; his sleep was even more restless than it had been in his earliest years. While his personal development was by no means complete at six years, it was clear by that time that he was not so self-composed nor so sure of himself as one might have anticipated from his earlier reactions and particularly from the pattern laid before him by his mother. Whether, later, he will openly rebel against her or retreat into neurotic behavior remains to be seen.

Certainly both these cases clearly illustrate Anderson's wise remark that "Children have an amazing capacity to survive in the face of the various demands made upon them."²⁰ And they survive, in part at least, in terms of their own biopsychic strength and inclination, factors which make for unique adaptive patterns built on top of the demanded conformities and uniformities.

Against the background of these two contrasted cases, let us examine some of the basic features of infant training. While our chief interest is in the patterns found in our own culture, we shall draw on cross-cultural materials wherever we feel that such comparison will help us to understand our own ways of handling young children. It is not our purpose to afford advice but rather to review child training as it relates to the systematic aspects of personality development and function.

Feeding, Weaning, and Thumb-sucking. Along with the need for oxygen and warmth the demand of the infant for sustenance is biologically imperative "Nature"—in the form of membership in a mammalian species—provided a social source of food in the mother. Nursing is a universal,

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 50-51, 52. By permission.

²⁰ J. E. Anderson, *op. cit.*, p. 412.

and necessary requirement for survival. Without the intercession of the mother or mother-surrogate to give sustenance the infant would soon die. Yet the way mothers have satisfied this basic need varies both as to method and goal as laid down in the culture and in personal uniqueness.

In our own society there have been and are varied practices as to feeding schedules. In the 1920's and 1930's many pediatricians, who dealt chiefly with upper- and middle-class families, insisted on regularity of nursing schedules, both on hygienic and psychological grounds. Then followed a theory and practice stimulated in part by the Ribble School, noted above, of permissive or child-demand feeding. The rationale for the latter is that "self-demand feeding in which nursing always rewards the child's crying is better calculated to produce a confident and unneurotic personality than is rigidly calculated feeding in which the clock rather than the infant sets the nursing time."²¹ An examination of the evidence, however, both from our own and other societies does not support either viewpoint completely. We need much more carefully controlled observations in these matters. All too frequently adults have projected on to infants the particular thesis about child-rearing which appealed to them at the moment. It is clear enough that infants rather quickly learn to adjust their feeding and sleeping habits to whatever demands the mother or others lay down. This is as true after the baby takes to solid foods as it is during nursing. It is quite possible that difficulties in feeding may reflect ineffectiveness or anxiety of the mother quite as much as result from either regular schedules or permissiveness.²² One recalls the classic advice to a mother attributed to Dr. Isaac A. Abt, long one of America's leading pediatricians. " 'My baby won't eat his baked potato,' came the distraught voice over the telephone. 'What shall I do?' Dr. Abt: 'Eat it yourself, Madam.' " ²³

A second important question about feeding has to do with the debate about the advisability of breast as against bottle feeding. This topic, like that of mothering and of time scheduling, has been more the subject of emotion than reason, as Aldrich has pointed out.²⁴ Various studies give us rather contradictory results and interpretations. There are doubtless great individual differences in mothers and babies in regard to this matter. True, in most nonliterate and rural societies, mothers nurse their own babies. Today urban living and class demands have altered conditions; and in

²¹ Orlansky, *op. cit.*, p. 7. By permission.

²² For example, see Olga R. Lurie, "Psychological factors associated with eating difficulties in children," *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry*, 1941, 11: 452-466, Sibylle K. Escalone, "Feeding disturbances in very young children," *ibid.*, 1945, 15: 76-80, and L. S. Selling, "Behavior problems of eating," *ibid.*, 1946, 16: 163-169.

²³ Quoted in news story, " 'Baby Doctor' Abt sums up first 80 years," *Chicago Daily Tribune*, Dec. 18, 1947.

²⁴ C. A. Aldrich, "The advisability of breast feeding," *Journal of the American Medical Association*, 1947, 135: 915-916.

many cases bottle feeding seems to be indicated and when accompanied by affection and comfort no serious effects arise. Once more the social context is highly important.

Practices as to time and nature of weaning also vary. In some families it takes place gradually, in others suddenly and sometimes with considerable emotional disturbance. There is little doubt that weaning represents a kind of deprivation but the important thing is that this frustration be counterbalanced by care and indulgence. Certainly we lack sufficient evidence to support the thesis that severe early weaning helps to develop either a strong ego, or, per contra, an insecure and anxiety-ridden individual.

The sucking of fingers or thumb has been variously interpreted. Some clinicians and theorists believe it represents a compensation for inadequate food. Others believe it more a matter of sense of insecurity arising from anxiety such as comes from a feeling of parental rejection. Again the causes may be quite varied. There is some evidence that babies with a large intake but a rapid digestion of food turn to thumb-sucking more than do those with smaller intake and slower digestion. Certainly there seems to be little serious relation of teething and sucking. On the other hand, lack of love and comfort may induce a child to take to sucking fingers or thumb even after he has been weaned, as was the case with Victor, cited above. That is, a habit that may, at one age-stage, have its roots in feeding, may at another age arise as a means of solace and comfort.²⁵ As to whether self-demand or scheduled feeding plays any part in thumb-sucking, the evidence one way or the other is not conclusive. In one study of 26 babies who were "self-demand" feeders, five were thumb-suckers. The author concludes, "The facts presented leave one no alternative but to conclude that whatever the cause or cure of thumb-sucking, self-regulated feedings without limitation in nursing time are no complete panacea."²⁶

Aside from the details in the debate about the meaning of thumb-sucking, or of breast versus bottle feeding or of self-demand as against fixed times of nursing, is the larger importance of the mouth in the development of the self. The oral cavity is, as the Freudians long ago pointed out, one of the first, if not the first, seat of pleasure for the infant. It is the means by which he receives the necessary sustenance for survival. It is also doubtless the source of pleasant tactile experiences from sucking as such. The mouth and other closely related vocal apparatus is the basic means of crying or cooing or otherwise letting those around him know something of his demands or state of being. Moreover, the mouth of the

²⁵ See Mary S. Kunst, "A study of thumb- and finger-sucking in infants," *Psychological Monographs*, 1948, 62, Whole no. 290 1-71.

²⁶ Francis P. Smitsman, "Case histories of five thumb-sucking children breast-fed on unscheduled regimes, without limitation of nursing time," *Child Development*, 1947, 18, 180-184. Quotation from page 184, by permission.

mother or others is the source of important sounds, which in time become increasingly more significant and meaningful as the child learns language. And when one learns to talk, the mouth is the obvious basis of communication.

Is it any wonder, then, that the oral fixations—to use the Freudian term—are considered important in the development of attitudes, habits, and values. As a source of gratification it continues into adult life, not only as witnessed in the delights of eating and drinking, but in smoking and chewing gum. As an important phase of speech, it becomes the symbol of an instrument which may be whining, cajoling, scolding, commanding, threatening or other ways to get the child what he wants. And certainly in our own and many other societies the mouth is an important adjunct to love-making. The cupid-bow design for lipstick represents a socially accepted symbol of this fact.

Toilet Training. While the sustenance needs of the infant can only be gratified by the coöperation of another human being, defecation and urination are purely reflex ways of ridding the body of certain waste matter. In the course of evolution into mammalian species, nature may have arranged it that infant feeding depended on another but she did nothing to make evacuational processes social at the outset. But living in a group demands some kind of socially determined regulation of these biological functions. Cross-cultural materials show that the methods of training the infant and child range from early to late in time, and from highly permissive to rigid and severe controls.

Many students of behavior regard toilet training, along with feeding, as highly important in laying down certain basic features of personality. The "compulsive character," described by the Freudians, is said to derive, in large part, from too early and severe coercive training in sphincter controls. In the face of pressure from mother or other adult a child may refuse to defecate or urinate at the expected time and place. In this conflict of wills, the child focuses undue attention on these processes, and the parental insistence on regular scheduling of these reactions before the individual is physiologically ready for such control induces defensive attitudes and habits on the part of the child. In time these diffuse and generalize into attitudes and traits of stinginess, hoarding, meticulous and compulsive attention to details, over-concern with cleanliness and orderliness, and other petty self-restraints. We all know adults whose "basic personality," to use Kardiner's term, is marked by such traits.

While many case studies tend to support the Freudian theory regarding the relation of toilet training to "character formation," to use psychoanalytic terminology, we lack validation of the theory by carefully controlled investigations of representative samples of the general population. However, the Davis and Havighurst study of child-rearing practices with regard to class and color-caste differences marks a forward step in pro-

viding us statistical data on the variations in such matters as feeding, sphincter control, and others.²⁷

They interviewed a large sample of mothers of young children from the middle and lower classes, both white and Negro, in Chicago. In general they report more leniency and permissiveness in child training in the lower than in the middle classes. We shall note only a few of the more striking contrasts. (1) More lower-class than middle-class children are breast-fed only and for longer than three months; also more are fed on demand; more are weaned later and show less thumb-sucking. It is worth noting, however, that among lower-class Negro families weaning takes place "sharply" and the proportion of cases so reporting is about the same for this group as for middle-class whites. In contrast, middle-class Negroes are much more lenient in this matter than are the lower-class whites. (2) Among white and Negro families alike bowel training begins earlier, on the average, in the middle than in the lower class. Among the Negro middle class, of this sample, 87 per cent of the mothers report beginning bowel regulation at six months or earlier, the proportion being nearly double that for the white middle-class group. Bladder training is begun at six months or earlier in 18 per cent of the middle white families and 14 per cent of the lower white families. The comparable percentage for Negro middle class is 40. Apparently lower-class white families and middle-class Negro families put more stress on early bladder control than do either middle-class whites or lower-class Negroes. (3) Slightly more than one-half of the middle-class mothers admitted that their children masturbated in comparison to only a little more than a quarter of Negro middle-class mothers. On this question the lower-class white and colored mothers reported only 17 and 15 per cent respectively. However, frank admission of masturbation among their children may be more likely from middle-class mothers than from lower-class ones who often retain a good deal of traditional anxiety as to just what this practice may mean for the child later and hence would be loath to admit the facts.

Walking and Sleeping. Learning to walk depends first of all on the necessary maturation of the leg bones and of the neuromuscular system. However, social encouragement and guided practice in standing may help this process along. But with walking come other problems for the mother. Urban homes and apartments are often small and access to safe play spaces outdoors decidedly limited. Therefore when the child learns to walk his movements may well be restricted, lest he break dishes, bric-a-brac, furniture, and other household things. Once again there are differences between lower- and middle-class families. In general the former

²⁷ Allison Davis and R. J. Havighurst, "Social class and color differences in child-rearing," *American Sociological Review*, 1946, 11, 685-710. Reprinted as Chap. 18 in Clyde Kluckhohn and H. A. Murray, eds., *Personality in Nature, Society, and Culture* (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1948).

have fewer "nice things" which might be broken or destroyed and also there is usually a good deal less worry about the play of the young child.

Sleep, too, is a natural process which can only be partially modified by learning. On the physical side there may be too much bundling and covering for comfortable rest, and difficulties of slumber may derive from this. Also associated with the habit of going to bed are all sorts of accessory patterns. For instance, a child may quickly learn to demand that he hear a bedtime story, that he have his doll or other toy with him in bed, that the light be left burning in his room or his door left ajar into the room where his elders are. If and when conflicts arise regarding such habits, they must be understood and handled with regard to the total familial situation. Some of these things may be symbolic of attention-getting or anxiety, the sources of which have little or nothing to do with going to bed or sleeping.

Other Early Habits. Dozens of other habits have to be acquired in the first years and there is no doubt that some of the resistance which a child may show is but a protective response to being forced to learn too rapidly and too much. In our society, among other matters considered important, are learning to dress and undress, to care for one's clothes, and to wash and bathe. The care of toys and the development of the sense of personal belongings are other habits which are rewarded, and as we shall note later the child's play is an important opportunity to acquire a wide variety of important attitudes and habits.

The acquisition of language is obviously of great importance, but the chief features of this learning were covered in Chapter 6 and need not be repeated here. However, it is wise to note that with the coming of speech the child is provided with an increasing number of symbolic tools which are helpful in all sorts of other learning, both motor and mental. For example, many have contended that much better results are to be had in toilet training if this is delayed until the child begins to comprehend instructions and advice.

Basic Learning in Its Larger Setting. An important cue to the understanding of parent-child relations can be had by discovering the nature of the image which each has of the other as well as the image of self as related to the other. The mother's self-image as parent will vary, of course, with her own upbringing, including her class status. In American middle-class families we often find a good deal of material striving for perfection accompanied by a good deal of frustration and anxiety at falling short of this ideal. Mothers with more book-learning than hard-headed experience often become unnecessarily anxious about feeding schedules and toilet-training. By the same token parents of older children worry too much about the possible ill effects of comic books, movies, radio and television. The fear of failing to be an adequate parent may itself set the stage for just such failure; the over-protection of the growing child may

be born of one's own guilt feeling arising from an unconscious desire to reject the child. Or an overzealous pushing of the child in school may reflect the mother's own inferiority and unconscious projection on the child. The wise mother will be one who can check her self-image as parent against the conception her children and others have of her.

The father's self-image will also play a part in determining his rôle in the family. In the middle class, at least, there is a vague image of the father as a good provider and family man, but beyond that many men do not have any very specific self-images. In general, American men seldom develop any such idealization of themselves as fathers as is so common among middle-class mothers regarding motherhood.

The parental images of the child will help determine how he is treated by the parents. In our society parents often have idealized images of their child against which they measure the child's conduct. This may be a factor in determining the form of discipline as well as of affection which the parents employ in dealing with the child. There are probably differences in this ideal according to class status. Davis and Havighurst, for example, found that middle-class children were more often expected to go to college than lower-class children. On the other hand they found that lower-class children were expected to be more self-reliant in all sorts of things like crossing streets alone, being out at night, and the like.²⁸ Of course there are many other variations. The parental image of an unwanted child will be very different than that of one greatly loved.

The child's image of the parent very often takes on an ambivalent character. Anderson found evidence that the child's image of the parent was more often one of a frustrating than of a lovable person.²⁹ As to the reality basis of such imagery, Bach's comparison of children's fantasies of their fathers when the latter were at home as contrasted with fantasies of fathers who were absent at war, is instructive. "Father-separated children produce an idealistic fantasy picture of the father who has a good time with his family and who is enjoyed by them. He gives and receives much affection and has little marital discord. The fantasy-father shows very little hostility and does not exert his authority."³⁰ In the group of children whose fathers were at home, Bach found much more aggressive imagery although affectionate fantasy was not absent. Some of the children in the father-separated group had ambivalent aggressive-affectionate father fantasies.

The inter-relations of the child and parent are obviously not entirely or always pleasant to either. The introduction of the child into the world of cultural norms produces in him certain stresses and strains, certain

²⁸ Davis and Havighurst, *op. cit.*

²⁹ John E. Anderson, "Parents' attitudes on child behavior: a report of three studies," *Child Development*, 1946 17: 91-97.

³⁰ George R. Bach, "Father-fantasies and father-typing in father-separated children," *Child Development*, 1946 17: 63-80. Quotation from page 71, by permission.

conflicts between his own wishes and the requirements of those around him. The discipline of the mother or other person usually frustrates the child. Such control may lead the child to rage or fear or even hatred of the parental authority. This tends to split the child's image of the parents into two phases. One image is associated with pleasant responses, with the fulfillment of many needs. The opposite is linked with unpleasantness, with a blocking or failure to fulfill the wish or demand. In one, the social act of the child and parent proves satisfying. In the other, the social interaction tends to produce strain and emotions of fear or anger or both. Such inhibition of full response may lead to aggressive or withdrawal behavior. Nevertheless, many acts which the child finds unpleasant and unwanted the parent labels "good," "proper," "nice," or otherwise worthy. They verbally define an approved rôle for him. In contrast, many of the would-be pleasant acts of the child which are inhibited by the parent are termed "bad," "improper," "naughty," "nasty," or otherwise unworthy. To continue, or take up, a rôle so defined might lead to avoidance, punishment, or other negativistic reactions on the part of the parent or other person. This split between wishes and responses continues as new situations arise in the course of growing up. The child's rivalrous and envious attitudes toward his brothers or sisters in regard to toys, attention from parent, dominance, and the like may lead to disapproval from others and the consequent suppression of his overt acts. It often happens that the most pleasant feelings and emotions are connected with wishes and incompleting acts called "evil" by others, while unpleasant states are linked to wishes and acts that are called "good" or "wise" by others.

Yet, in order to fulfill still other wishes, in order to secure pleasantly toned attention from parents, in order to complete many required social acts, the child learns to inhibit or block some of his strongest urges. That is, he learns to fulfill social demands which, though not at first wanted, bring various rewards, frequently at the expense of other powerful desires. This illustrates again the principle of ambivalence of wishes and fulfillment so common to many of our social activities.

This division of wishes and responses indicates that in the end the child is prepared to segregate his activities and hence his world into two parts—one suppressed or inhibited, the other socially approved and rewarded. In terms of the rôles which the developing self comes to play, this means that some will be expected and stimulated by parents, teachers, and others, and some prevented from full expression. As we shall see in the next chapter, the child who goes in for temper tantrums or for fantasy is in any case seeking some sort of rôle, overt or imaginary, which will satisfy him in the face of exterior demands. Moreover, what he learns in the family and in other primary groups will furnish the basis for his adaptation to the wide range of secondary groups in which he will participate still later.

In societies where the culture, unlike ours, imposes no duality of feelings and response on the growing child, the split image of the parent may not arise. For example, if one parent, say the mother, has the chief disciplining function, the child's image of her will be quite different from his image of the indifferent or indulgent father.

On the basis of early social training, the child gradually internalizes the rôles he plays with all their accompanying ideas and attitudes. In Freudian terms this is a phase of introjection. One part of this internalization has to do with discipline and the authority figures who impose it. This is the source of what G. H. Mead called the "moral self" or what Freud termed the "superego." As noted earlier we call this one's *conscience*. It is definitely a social product.

From the standpoint of behavioristic learning theory internalization may be viewed essentially as a phase in the modification and elaboration of the basic patterns of needs and their gratification. In getting substitute motives and new cues and responses, the law of effect comes into play through the use of punishment and reward, or reinforcement. Some of the crucial changes in the behavior of the infant and child may be summarized as follows: (1) The timing and extension of the period between need and reward, as in training to a feeding schedule which does not correspond to natural gastrointestinal rhythms. (2) The imposition of controls, as in regulation of bowel and bladder movements which bring these activities into the field of social interaction. (3) Emergence of learned cues in relation to needs, for example, the sight of the mother and demand for attention. (4) Addition of rewards besides the "natural" or basic ones, such as, mothering and social approval. On the foundation of these early modifications most subsequent habits will be built. Those acquired in later childhood, in turn, are fundamental to those learned in adolescence and maturity.

CHAPTER 13

Some Other Aspects of Child Training

In this chapter we shall discuss, first, some special aspects of child training in the home. This will include, among others, such topics as over-attachment, rejection, sibling rivalry, negativism, fantasy, anxiety, and inferiority feelings. Brief attention will be given to the roots of leadership, as a phase of personality development. This section will be followed by a review of play life and other features of childhood experience in which other than family members have a part in the child's basic socialization.

SOME SPECIAL PROBLEMS

While it is not our intention to provide a handbook to guide parents in dealing with their children, certain important aspects of child adjustment may be examined. In discussing various topics we shall see the importance of both physical and emotional security, how the growth of responsibility and independence are related to rejection, inferiority, and other matters, how long-range and morally approved goals and ideals are built up, and how the child's relations with his parents, siblings, and others in the home bear on his later contacts with individuals outside the family circle.

Over-attachment and Over-solicitude. In the normal course of growing up the initial *all-or-none* character of responses toward parents, especially toward the mother, disappears, and the child takes on rôles and attitudes with reference to other persons and groups. Moreover, this spread outward from the parental contacts to relations with others is a mark of maturity, of developing self-confidence, and of a sense of responsibility. We often find, however, that in many areas of interaction with parents, children retain their dependence long after it has ceased being essential to sound development.

In a society whose culture emphasizes love and affection, it is understandable that many parents little realize that they are not providing adequate training for their children when they foster such over-attachment, especially in later years. Despite real efforts to teach the child independence and responsibility, the parent may find that the child persists in his babyish dependence. It is also true that some parents, feeling that

as children they were too early denied expected parental affection, reinforce habits of dependency of their own children upon them. In any case over-attachment is a product of interplay of parent and child; and all too often the former does little or nothing to break down the intense dependence of the child because it enhances his own self-satisfaction.

Some over-dependent personalities never completely separate themselves from maternal influences. They are the so-called "tied-to-mother's-apron-strings" individuals. But the father as well as the mother may be the object of such undue fixation. Clearly a certain type of desire for security may have its roots in these infantile fixations of dependence upon parents and other members of intimate groups. And we should realize that such persons seldom want to break the bonds that bind them to their earlier objects of fixation. They come to fear any anticipation of becoming attached to any other person so closely. Later this sense of dependence may spread to various groups. Sometimes these dependent persons are petty and spoiled in all their reactions. They always want their own way, and, if they do not get it, they resort to whining, crying, temper tantrums, or other power devices to gain attention. Later their technique for securing attention may change, but the sense of dependence remains unaltered.

Although closely related to over-dependence, over-solicitude about the child has some distinctive features. The former may depend chiefly upon the child's demands or upon a mutual interdependence of child and parent, while the latter seems to arise more particularly when the parent secures an excessive emotional satisfaction from his care of the child. Some parents resent seeing their children grow up, move away from domination and control, and learn to make up their own minds. In these cases the child may want to get away from undue care and domination by the parent, but the parent uses many devices to counteract or prevent this. The ill effects of such over-attention sometimes are more apparent in the early years than are those of over-dependence. Often, when the child breaks away from the home to go to school, over-attachment or over-solicitude produces a crisis. The following illustration shows the manner in which the schoolteacher may help to break down these patterns, and so aid the child to grow up and learn to participate in the school and other groups.

Case of Michael M., 6 years old. On the first day of the new term at Public School No. 10 Mrs. M. appeared, along with many other parents, with her child, who was about to enter the first grade. The day was dreary, and, because it was raining, Michael was wearing a raincoat, a sou'wester, and heavy rubbers. The mother helped him off with his outer garments, placed them properly on the hooks, and turned him over to the teacher. Just before the class was dismissed for the noon recess the mother reappeared, helped Michael on with his clothes, and took him home under an umbrella. She was back with him at 1:30 p. m. when school reconvened. She was also on hand at the end of the school day to

accompany Michael home. This procedure went on for several days. At noon of the fourth day the mother was delayed in getting away from the house. (The family lived but three short blocks from the schoolhouse.) She looked out the window just as she was about to depart and saw the lad coming down the street in the rain with his rubbers in one hand, his raincoat over his other arm, and his sou'wester askew on his head. It was raining hard, and the child was thoroughly drenched. The mother rushed him into the bathroom, disrobed him, gave him a warm bath, and dressed him in fresh and dry clothes. After luncheon she repaired to the school in high dudgeon to see why the teacher had permitted "such an outrage" as allowing Michael to start for home without being properly dressed for the storm.

The teacher met the situation coolly and sensibly. She called Mrs. A's attention to the fact that she had not done so intentionally, that she had thirty-five pupils under her charge, and that, although she tried to oversee their getting on their topcoats, hats, and rubbers, she could not personally supervise each child. Moreover Michael had slipped out without her seeing him. The mother was not satisfied with the teacher's explanation. The teacher then called attention to the fact that the other parents did not accompany their children to school every day and that a child of six should be able to put on his own rubbers, hat, and raincoat without the assistance of adults. Moreover, the other children had already begun to ridicule Michael; he in turn wanted to be like the others and evidently resented somewhat the mother's solicitude. The teacher tactfully suggested, therefore, that the mother discontinue accompanying her son to and from school and promised to help Michael learn to manage his clothes until he gained confidence in handling them himself. The mother did not agree, but the teacher reported that Mrs. M. began to let the boy go home to luncheon alone and then later stopped coming in the morning and at the end of the day. In a few weeks the mother gave up the whole habit entirely. Michael responded to the new demands readily and made genuine progress in becoming self-reliant.

This instance is one of hundreds that might be cited. Mrs. M. imagined she was doing the proper thing. She was not entirely foolish, but rather misconceived her rôle in the situation. The teacher's tact, in turn, avoided a conflict between the mother and herself, and in the end the boy benefited from this little experience. All too often over-attachment and its related over-solicitude remain even after the child has passed physically into adolescence or even adulthood.

Attention-getting. In our society where having children is considered a high value—although the birth rate is falling—it is easy to understand how many children develop patterns designed to secure attention, first, from parents, and, later, from teachers and others. The first born very easily becomes the focus of parental concern and it is natural that the child soon expects care, not when it is hungry or wet but at other times. Whole sets of socially derived but actually accessory habits are built up. For example, along with nursing the baby the mother may caress the child, pat it on the cheek, rock it, carry it about the room, and pour "sweet nothings" into its ears. It does not take long for the child to generalize this additional comfort into something valuable in itself, so that in a few months he may cry not because he wants food but desires to restate and

thus reinforce the attention which has been showered on him before. Also when such attention has been given an only child for a year or so, the arrival of another baby in the home may considerably upset the child. (See the case cited below on sibling rivalry.) Attention-getting is one of many *power devices* which the child acquires. When he goes to school and gets into social groups outside the home, many of his habits of attention-getting may disappear from lack of reinforcement, but he may, in turn, learn some new tricks so as to hold the limelight.

One form of this is exhibitionism, which obviously has its roots in parent-child relations. Telling young children how "cute" or "pretty" or "wonderful" or "smart" they are, and rewarding the child for particularly pleasing actions—that is, pleasing to the parents—reinforces the motive for ever more attention. When the child's accomplishments are further paraded before friends and others, the child may come to believe he is unsurpassable.

James A. illustrates the exhibitionist. This child, who is in the third grade, must take the lead in everything. If he is not first in line of march, not first in some little school performance, if he does not have a part on every room program, he has an emotional storm. He talks about it to the teacher, to his fellow pupils, and to all who will listen to him. He has been made so much of at home that, as a school psychologist remarked, he imagines he should be "head man in every show." Because of lack of parental coöperation he is proving a very difficult school problem.

We have all seen insufferable children develop from being informed by teachers and parents that they had very superior mental ability as determined by intelligence tests. Some families induce in their children attitudes of superior performance, so that later the children meet competition emotionally and ineffectively, as happened in the case just cited. Not infrequently one sees the results of such early training in college students. A girl or a boy has been made so much of by the family, neighbors, and school authorities in a small town that in college the orientation to a new world of competition without parental and other support produces maladjustment.

Exhibitionism is both a status-securing and a power-giving device. There is often a combination of identification of the parent with the child's performance and a projection of the parent on the child in pre-determining the direction which this public demonstration will take.

Rejection. As serious as over-dependence or over-solicitude—perhaps even more serious—may be those instances in which the parent rejects the child, casting him too early or too fully upon others for emotional social support and affection. Sometimes the mother does not want the child, either because of a strong emotional conditioning from the period of pregnancy and childbirth, or perhaps because the child symbolizes for her unwanted but moral and legal obligations to the child's father. Or a woman

who has given up a business or professional career to enter marriage may find child-bearing and child-rearing irksome, involving a loss of money, of independence, of a certain status which she once enjoyed. Therefore, while such rejections may result in varied effects upon the child, the motivations for such conduct on the part of the mother may also differ widely.

Sloman has reported some interesting data on rejected children who had been definitely "planned for" by one or both of the parents.¹ Out of a group of 500 children presenting emotional problems, 62, or 12.4 per cent, were "planned-for" children who had directly or indirectly been rejected by their mothers. The author notes three main categories into which the cases fell: (1) There were children of compulsive perfectionistic mothers whose children did not live up to parental high standards. Of the 62 cases, 38 of them came in this group. (2) Other children were planned for in the hope of salvaging a marriage that was going to pieces. Fifteen of the children fell in this class. And (3) nine of the children were disappointments in terms of the desired sex of the offspring.

While these children were from a disturbed group and hence do not provide a basis for generalization beyond that particular sample, the study does reveal some of the factors which doubtless enter into rejection of children in more normal situations.

Sometimes, too, a father may reject a child; and this again may influence both the child's and the mother's response, not only to the father but also toward each other. It may be that the rejection of the child by one parent may lead the other parent to pay more than the usual attention to the child. This, in turn, may set up over-attachment and other difficulties. Thus we see that one sort of maladjusted interaction frequently leads to other problems.

There are also instances in which both parents reject a child. In these cases, if it does not lead to desertion or such neglect as to warrant interference by some outside agency, such as the juvenile court or some social-work agency, there often results an attempt on the part of the child to get affection and intimate response from teachers, friends, or other outsiders. One finds some children who react rather well to such treatment, while others develop various forms of maladjustment. Little adequate research has been done on this problem, but doubtless the age and experience of the child will greatly affect his response to such treatment. I have seen cases in which the rejection did not come about until the son or daughter in college had done something which the parent or parents disapproved so violently that they turned him out. It sometimes happens that a parent who was over-solicitous about a child when the latter was young later

¹ Sophie S. Sloman, "Emotional problems in 'planned for' children," *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry*, 1948, 18, 523-528.

turns against him when he makes an honest and natural effort to stand on his own feet, say in the years of adolescence.

Sibling Relations. The relations of the children of a family to one another may range from deep affection to deep rivalry and even hatred. It is not to be supposed that sibling rivalry is universal or that it is not mixed with ambivalent good feeling and love. As Lois B. Murphy has pointed out, children often show both strong opposition and affection toward the same person.² This is neatly illustrated in the interplay of Earl, aged four years, and his mother regarding Earl's reaction to his brother John, aged two years. The latter had been very annoying to Earl, who finally growled: "I just won't remember John in my prayers tonight and that will serve him right. I won't let him pray for himself either!" On hearing this, the mother asked: "Why will you do that?" and Earl replied: "Well, it's just the worst thing I can think of, that's all. Poor John—he won't get to heaven." "But," as the mother's account continued, "by night-fall they were affectionately engaged in bunny hugs and Earl later prayed loudly and included John."

The striving for status goes on among siblings as it will later go on among members of almost any other group. Rivalry for the highest esteem in the eyes both of the parents and of the other children is a common occurrence. In a society like our own, which emphasizes competitive attitudes and praises individual effort and success, even at the expense of kinsfolk, this outcropping of oppositional reactions gets a good deal of support, even in the family circle. Competition in the family group may, of course, not be unfortunate in its effects if it is counterbalanced by love and mutual aid among the family members. Apparently we all have within us the ambivalent trends of opposition and coöperation. If the latter is overstimulated in the family, it may well be that the oppositional expression may be projected upon some out-group or upon some individual outside the family circle. But if the ethos of a society emphasizes the measure of status and success in terms of competitive effort, the coöperative attitudes and habits may not develop as they might, or they may find their expression only in the publicly avowed but verbal form of acquiescence in the golden rule and love for others—often quite in contrast to the overt competitive struggle for power.

It sometimes happens that favoritism toward one child leads the other children to show intense rivalry toward this child and to resent greatly the parental attention to one child at the emotional expense of the others. The following account illustrates this situation:

In the N. family are two girls and three boys. The daughters are 20 months apart in age, the boys are much younger. The mother is a dominating type

² Lois B. Murphy, *Social Behavior and Child Personality: An Exploratory Study of Some Roots of Sympathy* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1937).

of woman. The father is relatively indifferent to the more intimate relations of the children to one another. Z., the older girl, made a very brilliant record in high school and college. Her mother talked a great deal about this, both in the home and out. She spoke of her professional promise, of how proud they all were of her. It was "Z. did this," and "Look at your sister, Z." She identified herself very distinctly with her older daughter. A., the younger girl, who was two years behind her sister in school, was a mediocre student. She was not interested in books. Her mother was constantly comparing her unfavorably with her abler sister.

The older girl was rather well integrated to the family life. She got along well with the neighbors, and was generally popular. The younger daughter, in contrast, developed into a quick-tempered, rebellious person. She defied her mother about hours of recreation. She sulked at home or was sharp-tongued when she did talk. She could not be aroused to do better work by being compared with her brighter sister. In fact, this unfavorable comparison only made her angry.

Both girls graduated from college. A. conformed outwardly to the family scheme so long as she was in school. Soon after she completed her course, she left home. She married after a few months in a large city, where she went to work. She says she will have absolutely nothing more to do with her family in any intimate way.

Intersibling competition may take the form of *jealousy*. The roots of this reaction may be neglect of parent or something else. But in any case, as Vollmer well says, it is "evidently an uneasiness of the ego [self] through fear that the affection of a beloved person has been or may be diverted to someone else."³ For example, the first child may develop a sense that he has been rejected when another baby appears in the family. Both jealousy and envy may arise in the early years and sometimes are never lost. The manner in which rivalry and jealousy may emerge is shown in the following case:

Jane B., a bright and attractive child of three, will have nothing whatever to do with her mother or little brother if she can avoid it. When Jane was 26 months old, her mother went to the hospital to have her second child. Jane had seen the mother sewing baby clothes and had been told, in answer to questions, that the family was hoping for another child. But a child of such immature years naturally could not know just what it meant to hear her mother say she might have a little baby sister or brother. A day or so after the birth of the second child, a boy, Jane was taken by the father to the hospital to see the new baby. Jane showed considerable interest in the new member of the family and was affectionate toward the mother. During the ten days that the mother was in the hospital, the father and Jane became really acquainted for the first time. The father was called upon for many things that formerly had been done by the mother. Jane saw the baby frequently at the hospital and apparently was not emotionally disturbed in the least. Neither did she seem anything but affectionate toward the mother, who told her that she would soon be home again.

At the end of the ten days Jane was considerably taken aback to find not only the mother at home, but the baby as well. Within a few days Jane realized that a new life had opened for her. The mother gave so much of her time to the baby

³ Hermann Vollmer, "Jealousy in children," *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry*, 1946, 16:660-671. Quotation from p. 660.

and so little to her, compared with the past! Jane asked why the baby was not left at the hospital and was told that he would always be with them at home. She was upset and became antagonistic to both mother and baby. She turned more and more toward her father. When the baby was a few weeks old, Jane one day discovered him lying on the davenport wrapped up ready to be taken out, and she unceremoniously pushed him onto the floor. The mother rushed in at the first cry of the infant, who was not injured, to find Jane standing over him in a somewhat deliberate manner, and saying, "Don't like baby."

As time went on, the dislike for the child and the avoidance of the mother grew. The father became more and more the center of Jane's affection. She waited for the father to come home at night to show him things she had made during the day. On one occasion she had a serious temper tantrum when her mother unwittingly showed the father some little drawing Jane had made and saved, before the child herself had had the opportunity to display her accomplishment.

Jane in time became a serious disciplinary problem in the home. She avoided relations with the baby brother and took an increasingly negativistic attitude toward the mother. Toward the father she continued to be deeply affectionate and obedient. Such a situation may easily tend to condition the child toward the mother, father, and brother in a form upon which the whole subsequent structure of family relations may be built.

Jealousy may be handled in various ways: by direct aggression as in Jane's case, by withdrawal, by developing a sense of inferiority, repression, sublimation, or otherwise.⁴ Yet rivalry in the home and outside may later be the source of other reaction patterns. When overcharged with emotions, when associated closely with the craving for status and power, when marked by intensity of hatred in the face of defeat or failure, rivalry may become a driving force to competition for status elsewhere or may lead to the growth of permanent attitudes of bitterness and even violence toward a sibling. When rivalry is kept within the moral bounds of culture, when it is permitted sublimation or substitute outlets in occupational, political, or other public activities, it may and often does become the source of ascendance and accomplishment. Rivalry in the family may obviously stimulate the development of ideal goals or aims of achievement which otherwise might not arise. But the permissibilities in any given culture will set the limits of this rivalry and competition, especially as to their outlet in the wider community. In the same way, emphasis upon competition may mean an open suppression of sympathetic and coöperative habits and attitudes, leading to the youngster's remaining childish, at best, or to his finding outlets in compensatory acts such as traditional pity and charity for the poor. Often such kindly, coöperative activities—despite our Christian ideology—are quite dissociated from the main currents of intense personal struggle for economic and political power in our Christian but nevertheless competitive capitalistic society.

Favoritism of one child over others is another frequent habit of par-

⁴ *Ibid.*

ents which influences sibling relations. If undue preference for one is shown, it may amount to rejection of another child or other children. There is a sort of implied scale of status or prestige among the children in such acts by parents. Often, too, the favorite reflects the parent's wishes, or typifies for the parent his own secret ideal. Moreover, the favored boy or girl quickly seizes this excessive show of affection as a means to fulfill his own wishes. The "spoiled child" of popular psychology is usually an instance of favoritism. The important point in all this is the extent and intensity of this training. Sometimes favoritism passes from one child to another, as when a younger child takes the center of attention formerly held by an older brother or sister. If the favoritism continues, it may permanently mark the individual, and many difficulties of adjustment in school and in marriage may be traced back to the fact that the individual as a youngster had his own way too often, and was the favored and protected member of the family. Particularly unfortunate are those instances in which a favorite child of one parent is used as a foil in the conflict with the other parent. It sometimes happens that each spouse may unconsciously or consciously choose one of the children as his protégé and pit his emotional hold on him against the other spouse and his favorite. Or each parent may strive for the affection of one child, attempting by wiles and favors to make him his ally against the other. Such exploitation by the parents often results in negative attitudes of the child toward marriage. (See Chapter 17.)

Negativism and Temper Tantrums. One way to meet frustration is through a form of resistant behavior called *negativism*. This may be regarded as a tension-reducing device which takes the form of responses the opposite of those demanded by the situation, physical or social. Sometimes this consists in withdrawal and refusal to react in expected ways, thus filling the narrower definition of negativism. Sometimes it takes the form of emotional and motor outbursts which we call temper tantrums. In our society, at least, the impact of an increasingly large number of situations to which the child is expected to adjust induces what is sometimes called the "age of resistance," usually arising in the period from two to four years.² Sometimes temper tantrums begin by the end of the first year, and, as a rule, reach their peak during the fourth year when their frequency tends to subside, unless circumstances act to reinforce the habit.

The temper tantrum is an example of direct aggression in the face of some failure to have a need satisfied. It takes the form of excessive outbursts of energy. The young child who is denied some object, such as a piece of candy or a toy, or some wish, such as to go out of the house, or who has been asked to pick up his toys, may throw himself to the floor

² Norman Cameron, *The Psychology of Behavior Disorders* (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1947), pp. 17-18.

screaming and kicking in rage, holding his breath, and struggling against any person who attempts to force him to stand up and cease his outburst. Sometimes he vomits or plays ill.

Such behavior is culturally defined for the child by the parents or others as "bad" or "silly" or with some other term. Moreover, the child learns quickly to use the tantrum as a power device to have his own way. The interaction between the child and the other person must always be considered when we deal with such problems. Frequently, as soon as the child begins his tantrum, the mother commands him sharply to desist. This is perhaps followed by more kicking and screaming, which, in turn, are followed by the mother's raising her voice even louder, until we have really two persons in the heat of emotionality in which sound sense and rational behavior are out of the question. On one occasion a mother—a woman prominent in her community as a leader in parent-teacher and like organizations—asked the writer how to deal with her little girl, who had developed the habit of flying into temper tantrums. It was apparent that the woman was inclined to react to any disturbance of her own expected reactions from others with an intense response of her own. On my inquiring of her what she did when her child had a temper tantrum she replied, "Why, I can scarcely keep from having a temper tantrum myself." She went on to admit that she had had temper tantrums on occasion until she was nineteen years of age. (No questions were asked, however, as to just what devices she used on others to get her way now that she had given up this kind of power device!)

Parents have invented various ways of dealing with temper tantrums. They include threatening and denying, scolding, spanking, throwing cold water on the face, locking in dark closets, and attempting to talk and "reason" with the youngster. In keeping with what we know about the ineffectiveness of punishment in learning, the application of force or a threat of it would seem to have limited usefulness. On the other hand, some consistency and mild firmness of treatment coupled with verbal explanations is frequently reasonably effective. However, the parent must realize that pushing the child's socialization too rapidly, which is seldom done consciously, may be a causative factor. Hence one may expect occasional outbursts from children, who otherwise, behave relatively calmly.

Negativistic or stubborn reactions are also common. Here the child does not fly into a temper but sulks, refuses to talk, and in extreme cases runs away to avoid further contact with parents or others. The child's resort to this kind of passive resistance is often more effective than outbursts of anger. It is a weapon of revenge on the parent who, unable to communicate with the child, may feel guilty and make "amends" to the child in the form of giving way to its wishes.

Both temper tantrums and passive resistance are common enough in young children at least in our society. As power devices they may con-

tinue to be reinforced throughout childhood, or may reappear during adolescence when conflicts between parents and children often become intense. In any case we all know individuals who use these methods of controlling others in order to get their own way. Certain kinds of deviant conduct found among delinquents, criminals, and psychopathic persons often reveal a deep-laid pattern of negativism, such as resistance to all symbols of authority or avoidant reactions against all social contacts. (See Chapters 22 and 23.) Whether such reaction systems become a fixed element in one's life organization or not depends, in part, on how parents, teachers, and others treat the child. Usually these habits will disappear, in part through lack of reward or practice ("experimental extinction") and, in part, by becoming sublimated and redirected into other forms of hostility.

Withdrawal by Fear and Anxiety. Fear is a strong emotional response directed to avoidance or escape from a stimulus or situation seen as threatening or otherwise unpleasant. Fear has an important function in acquiring adjustive responses. As the child grows up he learns to avoid certain stimuli the reactions to which might lead to tissue injury and pain. The hot stove, the sharp knife, the icy sidewalk, the heavy traffic in a street one wants to cross, are common stimuli which the child learns to avoid or to respond to in a safe way. In these situations fear responses are natural and give us cues to guide action. So, too, although we probably do not originally have many specific readiness mechanisms for fear reactions, we may be quickly conditioned to a wide variety of situations. Moreover, stimulus generalization often occurs as illustrated in the classic case of Albert cited in Chapter 4. The childhood patterns of fear, moreover, lay the groundwork of habit for handling threatening situations in later life.⁶

Like other responses, fear, in time, acquires internal components. The residue of prior reactions, known as memory, functions to give us cues as to what to avoid. Sometimes these take verbal form and the individual carries with him a lot of labels "to avoid this," "keep away from that," and "the other is dangerous." Internalized fear we may call anxiety. In normal individuals this constitutes certain covert or inner response patterns that become a cue or create a certain readiness to flight but which may be prevented from passing into the overt response of flight. The anxiety itself thus produces tension. Often anxiety reactions are not verbalized and hence are socially unshared and unsharable. In fact, some therapy calls for verbalization of anxieties as an aid to tension-reduction.

Fear responses are not limited to such external objects as hot stoves or swarms of automobiles in a given street. It gets linked to a large range

⁶ For a behavioristic analysis of fear and anxiety, see John D. Ford and N. E. Miller, *Personality and Psychotherapy: An Analysis in Terms of Learning, Thinking, and Culture* (New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1950).

of social situations: sexuality, aggressiveness, fear of parental rejection, fear of punishment, and many other things. The child acquires his anxieties in the social context. There is much evidence that a child's fear of thunder, aerial bombs, of snakes, and no end of other physical situations arise from the subtle but nonetheless important cues which the child picks up from association with the mother. The latter's tone of voice, the words she uses—her own shuddering at loud sounds or in anticipation of them—these and hundreds of other maternal responses become stimuli to the child to react in similar fashion. Observations made in London in 1940 during the heavy air raids showed that parental anxieties—difficult to disguise—were more important in arousing anxiety in the children than the noise from bombing and fire.⁷

In time, fear and normal anxiety become motivating forces in their own right. There is nothing serious in this. But if the anxiety becomes excessive and chronic it may serve to induce a wide variety of unpleasant and difficult symptoms. The core of neurotic anxiety, as we call excessive anxiety, is the fear of fear; a condition in which anxiety itself is a threat. The child often tries to unload his inner fears only to find that they are reinforced by parental mismanagement. Or the child using his anxiety as an attention-getting device may find later that it does not get rewarded by actions of others. Then, too, fear and anxiety play important parts in repression. Intense anxiety acts to block out memories of previous events. For example, the sources of phobias about high places or open spaces or any number of other situations are usually quite unknown to us at the level of conscious recall. Ordinarily only by the use of various devices of the therapist or research worker may one uncover the origin of such unwelcome and obsessive fears.

Not only do children and adults vary in the ease with which they are conditioned to fear of objects, but there are individual differences in capacity to learn to overcome these emotional reactions. There are also many variations in the means by which one may recondition a person in regard to fear. Mary Cover Jones has neatly described the variety of ways in which fear in young children may be overcome. To quote only one case from many observed in a nursery school:

"Bobby G. (age 30 months) was playing in the pen with Mary and Laurel. The rabbit was introduced in a basket. Bobby cried, 'No, no,' and motioned for the experimenter to remove it. The two girls, however, ran up readily enough, looked in at the rabbit and talked excitedly. Bobby became promptly interested, said, 'What? Me see,' and ran forward, his curiosity and assertiveness in the social situation over-mastering other impulses."⁸

⁷ Dorothy Burlingham and Anna Freud, *Young Children in War-Time* (London, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1942).

⁸ Mary Cover Jones, "The elimination of children's fears," *Journal of Experimental Psychology*, 1924, 7, 32-390. Quotation from page 389 by permission of The American Psychological Association.

Children may learn to overcome fears and anxieties by reconditioning through use of strong original drives, such as hunger, or through self-demands or social pressures and in many other ways. Fear may also disappear from lack of reinforcement, that is, from "experimental extinction." While the wise parent will try to avoid inducing excessive anxiety in a child, it should not be forgotten that fear and anxiety in sound amounts do have an important adjustive function.

Dominance and Leadership. One important aspect of aggressiveness is found in the building up of habits and attitudes of dominance.⁹ The development of dominance or leadership derives, in a large part, from childhood training. However, in some cases leadership represents a compensatory reaction to felt inferiority. In others, it is a more or less direct result of parental and class instruction in taking a dominant rôle.

Though domination by one person always implies submission by another, at the subjective level there is an ambivalence in the attitudes of the ascendant and subordinate persons concerned. The leader not only takes a dominant attitude toward others, but also in imagination takes toward this ascendant segment of himself the submissive rôle which he expects of the followers. In turn, the followers imaginatively assume the ascendant attitude of the leader toward themselves while expressing overtly their subordination. The child or adult whose aggressiveness does not permit this sort of counterpart within himself—that is, who cannot take over the followers' submissive attitudes in his own thinking—often fails to develop effective leadership. What is called over-aggressiveness in children is not always a sound structure for later leadership, unless, of course, in the process of interaction such a youngster learns the importance of considering the other fellow, the prospective follower.

In describing dominance we should take into account three factors: (1) the constitutional factors; (2) the social situation; and (3) the cultural framework of the society in which the ascendant individual operates.

(1) *Constitutional factors.* Organic qualifications of dominant behavior, which must always express themselves in a social-cultural context, include sheer physical strength and differences in drive, in age, in intelligence, and in energy intake and output. Although endocrine influences may well enter into energy output and into physical prowess, thus furnishing a certain groundwork for dominance, any high positive correlation between hyper-energy and ascendancy has not as yet been definitely shown.

Though superior muscular strength has little or no place in many forms of leadership, in many play situations, a sound physique is not only a prerequisite of participation, but superiority in physical capacity brings

⁹ For a discussion of dominance and leadership in their larger and adult manifestations in public life, see Kimball Young, *Social Psychology*, 2nd ed. (New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1944), Chap. 10.

high rewards of prestige. In children's groups, age and physical strength are highly correlated, which gives the older child a distinct advantage in ascendance over the younger one, as anyone must realize who has watched a group of school children at play.

Differences in intelligence—that is, in capacity to learn—doubtless have a tremendous, if not the most significant, part in determining leadership. In her study of leadership among pre-school children, for example, Parten found that leaders somewhat exceeded non-leaders in intelligence and that individual differences in directing others, in following others, or in carrying on play activities alone outweighed differences attributable to age.¹⁰

(2) *The social situation and dominance.* Closely related to the development of dominance or submission is the social configuration of the time and place. The beginnings of one or the other of these forms of interaction lie within the primary-group experience of the child. In the home the parents usually exercise the functions of dominance, and from them the child takes over many attitudes and ideas associated with such a social rôle. Parents may openly encourage children to be assertive. Not only the personal-social conditioning of children by parents and relatives, but also such cultural patterns as the traditions of leadership in a family and the picture of long generations of successful men and women in a family, affect the development of dominance.

On the other hand, a leader may arise from a family despite repressive influences. A person may develop impulses or drives so strong that they offset the inferiority arising from the felt repression by parent, brother, sister, or others. When, for example, a second child appears in a family, the first may sense that he is being left out of things because of the over-attention now showered by the mother, father, relatives, and friends on the new baby. So far as his own life organization is concerned, a child may deal with such a situation in one of two ways. He may retire into the background, ignoring the competitor, or develop a sense of inferiority, and perhaps daydream of being important. Or he may assume an aggressive attitude to gain attention and maintain his place as the center of the family. This, of course, is often but the carrying out of his own fantasy of his continued importance.

Various studies have tried to discover if age position in the family has any bearing on the development of dominant attitudes and habits. One study of nearly 300 kindergarten children reported that the oldest children tended to be submissive, that the "middle child" tended to lack aggression also but in not so marked a degree as the eldest. As for the youngest child he revealed no consistent tendencies to be either dominant or submissive. In contrast, "The only children . . . are rated as more aggressive and more

¹⁰ Mildred B. Parten, "Leadership among pre-school children," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1933, 27, 430-440.

self-confident than any of the other groups."¹¹ Yet this latter group was also the most demanding in wanting fond attention from others; they were the most gregarious; and they were more excitable and the most given to variations in mood. Other studies have tended to confirm the idea that only children tend to be more dominant.¹²

The inception and growth of dominance patterns should always be studied in terms of the whole composite of social-cultural-constitutional factors. Every child, no matter what his age position in the family may be, is exposed to various and changing situations which require some sort of readaptation to himself and to his fellows. It is a mistake to assume that children brought up in the same family necessarily live in identical or even similar social-cultural environments. Many studies of child behavior have been made in which all the siblings have been considered as living in the same social-psychological world in the family. The results of such research are open to criticism because of the failure to realize that the psychological situation is unique for every member of the household. The oldest child does not experience the same social configuration as the middle or youngest child. Parental preference for one or rejection of another certainly represents a variation in the social milieu for each.

So, too, the practice which one child gets in dominance in the family or play group will set him upon a course of control of others that may characterize him throughout life. To study leadership and followership in adults we need to know the whole range of their experience in ascendance and submission in all the groups to which they were exposed in their early years.

(3) *The effect of culture on leadership.* The culture of a particular society produces another dimension of domination and leadership. Headship and leadership will vary with the nature of the class structure and the division of labor in a given society. In some societies, as among the ancient Chinese, quiet scholarship had a high prestige value and became the ideal for the ambitious boy of those times. In our American life we have coined such phrases as "go-getter," "he-man," and a host of other popular shibboleths, as expression of our complete faith in the importance of individual aggressiveness, especially in making money. These values, being a part of our culture, are projected upon children from the earliest age. Masterful success is held up as an ideal. Our magazines herald it; preachers, public speakers, and teachers proclaim the necessity of ag-

¹¹ Florence L. Goodenough and A. M. Leahy, "The effect of certain family relationships upon the development of personality," *Pedagogical Seminary and Journal of Genetic Psychology*, 1927, 34: 45-71.

¹² See P. Eisenberg, "Factors related to feeling of dominance," *Journal of Consulting Psychology*, 1937, 1: 80-92. Eisenberg found the differences in domination between first children and younger ones to be statistically insignificant for the women in his sample. (This study was based on questionnaires given to 216 college men and 218 college women.)

gressive ambitions. Families and individuals who do not conform to this norm are looked upon askance. The very nature of much of our play life and classroom instruction is built around the value of personal competitiveness, which in turn provides the dominant direction for and quality of leadership. This in turn carries over into public life.¹³

Illness and Regression. Illness, both acute and chronic, may be used by children for attention-getting and as a way of controlling others. Such devices are not unknown among adults as we shall note in discussing psychosomatic disorders in Chapter 23. Illness, in the child, adolescent, or adult alike, represents psychologically a reversion to certain dependencies upon those in one's immediate circle. A youngster who is sick for any length of time, especially if he is put to bed, may and often does return to expectations of personal comfort and care which he is supposed to have outgrown. Parents, nurses, and teachers are often quite aware that on recovery it takes some time to get children back to their previous level of social adaptation.

Such reversion arising during illness may be viewed as an instance of regression. Just as an individual may become fixated in his habits and attitudes at a certain phase of his development, so, too, he may, under crisis, real or imaginary, regress to a type of activity which was more or less normal for an earlier period. It is not that the regressed behavior is necessarily identical with that of the previous period. It probably is not, but it takes on the features of such earlier conduct, and, as such, becomes a means of maintaining social contacts which are, for the moment at least, considered gratifying.

Reactions to Sense of Inferiority. Reference has already been made to the mechanism of compensation and its relation to inferiority feelings. (Chapter 5.) Also we noted that Adler built up his entire theory of personality development around the concepts of compensation and sense of inferiority. (Chapter 10.) At this point we shall examine into its origin and function in relation to childhood.

Feelings of inadequacy, like other attitudes, are learned early in life by virtue of our social experience. Although the child possesses unusually strong physiological demands, these must always find their expression within the cultural and social framework laid down by parents, nurses, and others older and stronger.

From these contacts with others the child may come to view himself as insufficient—that is, his self-image and his rôles may become those of the ineffective or the inadequate individual. But the genesis of strong feelings of inadequacy and of the goals and means of compensation depends very much upon the manner in which the parents and others direct

¹³ On the relation of childhood experience and later development of leadership, see H. D. Lasswell, *Psychopathology and Politics* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1930).

the learning of the child. Though parents and others are wiser and more powerful than the little child, there is no rational reason for them to foster his feelings of inferiority. Rather, sound training should aim to protect the child against this contingency. In these matters as in others, personal-social and cultural influences set the stage for the development of the individual's attitudes and habits, just as they also provide acceptable means of offsetting or overcoming the consciousness of difference and inferiority.

Although the awareness of inadequacy may arise in any situation—on the basis of how it is defined and the sense of capacity to meet it—we may classify three general aspects of personality in relation to which these attitudes most commonly arise: (1) constitutional defects, (2) intellectual ability and performance, and (3) social-emotional adjustments to other persons.


Constitutional defects of any sort—a crippled limb, deafness, blindness, or a facial or bodily divergence from the cultural norm of beauty—easily and quickly give rise to a sense of being different from those around one. Then, too, such deficiencies serve as an obvious social stimulus to others, and their comments and actions furnish the interactional foundation for an individual so handicapped to develop a view of himself as inferior. Any child who has any constitutional make-up which so digresses from the acceptable or permissible norms of his society is largely predestined to develop such a rôle and status, a conception of himself as so different from others, as not to be thoroughly capable of normal life. (See Chapter 21.)

The lack of expected intelligence or of special talent may serve as the original stimulus for the development of a sense of inadequacy. When a child does not measure up in intellectual performance to the aspirations or ideal aims laid down for him by his parents or teachers, he may easily acquire—and largely from their attitudes and comments about him—an abiding sense of inferiority. The child who is labeled "dumb" or "stupid" in contrast to a brighter and more alert brother or sister furnishes an instance in point. As we shall see, the discrepancy between aspiration and achievement in this field is a distinct factor in children's maladjustments in school.

A sense of inferiority may also develop in otherwise competent children in the course of their social and emotional training within the home and in other primary groups. If a child is the object of ridicule, of sarcasm, or of violent abuse in the home, he may easily acquire the belief that he is unwanted. We have already commented on the effects of parental rejection on the child. Also, over-solicitous parents who pamper their children may produce such a sense of dependency in the child that he is incapable of meeting new situations in the home and later outside, and from such experiences there may later arise a sense of inadequacy.

Not only do the social situation and the culture have much to do with producing the sense of inadequacy in the individual, but society and culture provide various acceptable outlets or means for overcoming these felt handicaps, several of which we have already described.

For convenience of graphic presentation one may imagine a scale of compensatory responses to feelings of inferiority. At one extreme would be found the complete acceptance of inferiority and at the other over-compensation. Between these would be "normal" compensation and sublimation. The former perhaps falls at a point toward over-compensation, though of less aggressive sort. The latter tends toward docility as an emotionally milder and more moralized form of substitution, thus:



HYPOTHETICAL SCALE OF REACTIONS TO INFERIORITY

The emotional components of the reactions to inferiority are worthy of comment. Aggression is often a marked feature of compensation, especially of over-compensation. Thwarted in his efforts to get his own way or to secure his greatly desired goals, the over-compensating person is aggressive and even sadistic toward his world. He will get his wishes even at the cost of riding roughshod over his opponents. The more usual compensation, in contrast, though it carries with it hostility and resentment, apparently holds the emotions in check—perhaps by directing them into energizing the activity. But it may well be that the degree of intense emotion is itself evidence of the grip which the original motivation had upon the individual. In other words, over-compensation may reveal the depth of the original sense of inferiority. And a constant drive for achievement may be the only means by which the inner tension is reduced. In sublimation, however, there may be a still milder emotional toning of the activity—at least it seems to me that this is the manner in which we tend to interpret this form of substitution. And at the other extreme stands the individual who docilely accepts the implications of inferiority, in which apparently fear is the dominant emotional accompaniment. In contrast to the strong over-compensatory reaction, there is something of a masochistic acceptance of defeat. The individual retires from all situations which would require aggressive handling. He may become neurotic, full of worry or anxiety, or he may retreat into the inner citadel of his daydreams. His adaptation to his fellows is thus reduced to the minima of contact. It may well be that the schizophrenic patient represents the extreme of such retreat from cultural reality into a world of his own making, in contrast may stand the true paranoiac, who is so anxious to make himself important in the world that he attributes all his difficulties to the world of things and people outside himself, and often, in the end,

resorts to sadistic attacks upon those of whom he is suspicious. (See Chapter 23.)

The Function of Fantasy. In Chapter 8 we discussed some phases of fantasy thinking in relation to symbolic reactions and language. Here we shall consider it as it illustrates indirect adaptation of the individual to his social-cultural world. Although some people meet felt difficulties by overt substitutive reactions of one sort or another, these may at best be half measures, leaving a residue of unsatisfied desire. This may furnish the starting point—the energy and interest—for fantasy. Very early in life many children discover that they get considerable satisfaction and pleasure from building air castles, from believing themselves in possession of wealth, power, clothes, and talents which they may not possess but nevertheless wish they had. In the face of unresolved tensions the child may compensate in this subjective fashion. The child who lacks companions may fill his days with imaginary playmates. Make-believe play is rather common, as when a child may rehearse the activities of an entire baseball team pitted against another, and take the various players' rôles in turn. Or a child may imagine that he is some animal. One child insisted for some weeks on playing that he was a bird and went through a repertoire of acts which he believed those of a bird. Another played at being a horse, prancing about the house or garden, wanting to eat as a horse does, and generally acting out what he believed to be the life of this animal.

A rather common type of childhood daydream, though not universal (as some Freudian psychologists have contended), is the foster child fantasy. In such cases the child imagines that he is the son or daughter of persons other than his own parents. The motivation for such fantasies—at least at the conscious level—appear to be chiefly actual or imagined mistreatment, resentment at being slighted, and desire for higher social position than that of the family he knows.

Conklin made a study of the extent of foster-child daydreams in a sample of 904 high-school and college students. Some of the pertinent findings are these: (1) Twenty-eight per cent of the subjects could immediately recall having had such a fantasy. Of those who reported foster-child daydreams: (2) One quarter believed them to correspond to the actual facts. (3) Slightly more than half of them said it took no definite form, 15 per cent of them thought they were orphans or foundlings, and slightly less than one fifth had developed ideas of descent from superior classes. (4) Forty-five per cent attributed it vaguely to "suggestion," one quarter of them to mistreatment at home, 13 per cent to precocious thinking, 7 and 5 per cent respectively to "lack of physical or mental resemblance" and "dissatisfaction with home conditions." (5) About half of them reported that the fantasy lasted more than a year. (6) Most of them also noted that this daydream tended to alienate them from "parental

influence and authority." And (7) the development of intelligence and the coming of maturity are the most frequently noted "reasons" for the disappearance of this fantasy.¹⁴

In fantasy there is usually strong self-involvement. The child is often the hero, or identifies himself closely with his make-believe ideal. Or he may be the aggressor who would injure or even destroy in imagination those who would harm or inhibit him. For the child, the difference between his imaginary rôles played within himself and his overt playing at being fireman, air pilot, soldier, and the like is often not very sharp. That is, there is little or no distinction between building up his external rôles and the reconstruction and elaboration of these rôles within himself. But, if social restrictions, such as ridicule, prevents the overt expression of his imagined activity, or if the imagined form of expression does not correspond with the external social and material actualities, the child may elaborate his inner rôle-taking enormously. Such mental dissociation cuts him off for the time being from ordinary overt social contact. This is not serious in the child unless it comes to dominate his entire life.

The study of fantasy is one of the best ways of uncovering the inner world of the child or adult. Various projective techniques, some of which we discussed in Chapter 11, have been widely used for this purpose. One of the most successful of the projectives for children is the doll-play type. By giving the child a chance to manipulate dolls, representing to him father, mother, siblings, and others, in the form of a drama, we can discover his parental preferences, his hostilities and anxieties, and a number of other important aspects of his life. To cite one study, as an example, the fantasies of doll-play were used to discover possible relationships between the severity of maternal punishment and the child's aggressiveness. A group of 42 pre-school children were observed during their free play and also when given the doll-play test. An investigation of the home background enabled the investigator to put the youngsters in three categories: those who were subjected to severe punishment at home, those who experienced medium, and those who got little punishment. The mean frequency of aggressive acts in the doll-play was twice as high among the children in the high punishment group as in the low. In actual play the "severely punished group was inhibited in overt inter-personal aggression" but "it was the most aggressive in fantasy."¹⁵

Although the schizophrenic patient typifies the extreme deviation in fantasy, there is no reason for assuming, as some writers have done, that

¹⁴ E. S. Conklin, "The foster-child fantasy," *American Journal of Psychology*, 1920, 31:59-76.

¹⁵ R. R. Sears, "Maternal punitiveness and children's aggression" (also "Relation of fantasy expression to inter-personal aggression"), *Child Development*, 1950, 21:5-6. As an example of what can be done to study the inner life of children through such techniques see G. R. Bach, "Young children's play fantasies," *Psychological Monographs*, 1945, 59: No 2.

daydreaming is useless and even dangerous to the personality. It is a perfectly natural phenomenon. And, when parents, teachers, and others make fun of the child for expression of his daydreams, when they use various social pressures on him to give it up, they may but drive the process inside and thus cut it off from its possible useful relation to incipient creative invention and to artistic or scientific productivity.

An adequate procedure with daydreamers is to recapture or redirect their fantasy life into forms acceptable to others, that is, to help them to accommodate it to the society and culture of the time and place. Parents and teachers should encourage its overt expression—in words, painting, sculpture, mechanical invention, or science, or in some other manner of communication—so that one's fellows may take it up into their lives and thus give it meaning. In other words, the proper handling of the fantasy is to bring it around to some form of overt action, some form of communicable expression that will socialize it for the daydreamer himself as well as make it available to others. The following story illustrates a healthy use of daydreaming.

Case of Dorothy G. Dorothy, an only child, began early to develop a rich imagination. She did not lack for playmates and soon showed capacity for making use of her fantasies. For example—and to illustrate differences in children even at these early years—at the age of four she and two other children were observed playing at housekeeping on the lawn. There was the usual assortment of toy dishes, discarded china from the kitchen, and the like, but in preparing a play dinner for the numerous dolls there were far too few plates, knives, forks, and spoons to set each place. Dorothy thereupon began tearing up strips of available brown and colored wrapping paper and laying out the table with them as plates, spoons, and so on. Betty Brown, a playmate of about the same age, objected to this, and urged Dorothy to go into the house to fetch real dishes and utensils. This Dorothy refused to do, and, when Betty continued her requests with added determination, Dorothy explained that it was as much fun just to "play they were dishes anyway," whereupon Betty picked up her own toys and departed for home, saying that she would not play in such a "silly" manner. The other two were not disturbed at this and continued at their imaginary make-believe activity undisturbed.

Later Dorothy began making up plays, and, when she learned to write, she enjoyed working them out in great detail and then directing their production in coöperation with her friends. The child projected her fantasies into social interaction and made a joint enterprise out of it.

A little later she began to go occasionally to a motion picture, but more important for her was reading about motion-picture actresses and actors, chiefly the former, and cutting out from all available sources in periodicals, handbills, and newspapers the pictures of her favorites. At that time Clara Bow was at the height of her career, and Dorothy reports having accumulated hundreds of pictures of Miss Bow. Just as children traded stamps in the days when stamp collecting was popular, other children in the neighborhood were also accumulating photographs of motion-picture stars, and there was much bartering of such pictures back and forth among them—a practice which kept the fantasy interest tied to certain socialized situations.

As she passed into high school, her interest in dramatics led to her participation in school plays, and in college she showed some ability on the stage. Subsequently as a married woman, Dorothy was for a time active in community sponsored plays, but now her chief attention is the care and observation of her three children, whose play life also reveals a wealth of fantasy.

The distinction between the creative fantasy of the artist or inventor and the fantasy of the schizophrenic patient depends on socialization and the consensus of, or acceptance by, society. Creative work rests specifically upon disciplining of the fantasies in the process of their elaboration toward overt construction and communication.

What we need in the home, the school, and elsewhere is the recognition of the importance of fantasy as one device for developing novelty in art or science or in the practical affairs of men. Unfortunately, Western culture has been so impressed with the applications of science and discovery that we have tended to neglect the importance of fantasy thinking directed into socially productive channels—and by “socially productive” I mean in art as well as science!

The topics which have been discussed in this section by no means exhaust those which bear upon child personality. Of particular importance are those having to do with psychosexual development, parental projection, and growth of responsibility. But since these three are so important during adolescence we shall treat them in the next chapter. We turn now to the final section of this chapter to take up briefly certain aspects of basic training which are related to contacts outside the family.

SOME IMPORTANT CONTACTS OUTSIDE THE FAMILY

Among the significant features of interactions with others outside the family are the following: (1) At play a child usually meets children more or less of his own age, permitting a form of interaction not likely in his own home. (2) Also, especially in these days of small families, he may meet children of the opposite sex for the first time, which affords him a broadening of the basis for later heterosexual attachments. (3) These primary associations of children usually operate relatively free from direct parental control, or, if relatives interfere, the other children may give a different interpretation to such interference than would the child in his own home, a process which helps the latter to redefine his rôle both in his family and elsewhere. (4) New patterns of interaction arise, such as those depending definitely on individual differences in physical strength, in mental alertness, and in the social capacities of coöperation, competition, and conflict. (5) Of all the personality alterations arising from membership in other primary groups perhaps the most striking come as a result of freeing the child from strong, emotionally-toned, and close identification with the mother or other family members. The social maturation of the individual, his learning to “stand on his own feet,” to give and take with

others, and his new-found ideals and heroes in other children and other adults, are important in spreading the child's affections and fixations to a wider range of individuals than are found in his family and thus in preparing him to move on later to membership in secondary groups.

Many of the fundamental patterns of behavior exhibited in these other primary groups derive from habits and attitudes originating in the family circle. Thus the dominant or the resistant behavior of the child on the playground may reflect his home training, or the intensity of a comradeship with another child or some other adult may be regarded as a substitute for a strong desire to remain in intimate and close contact with a parent. So, too, the inferiority feelings arising in the competitive household may find compensatory outlets in play or gang life. Or the fantasies incited in the home situation may be the source of compensatory make-believe play and later of creativity.

Play Life of Children. Play may be described as the more or less spontaneous unhampered reactions of the child to the material and social objects of his environment. Along with some other social activities, it seems to grow up out of the random movements of the child and his exploration of the material and social world around him.

But the manifestations of play life, and of recreation, amusement, and entertainment which grow out of it, depend upon the society and culture of a particular time and place.

Unlike our traditional family relationships, which presuppose certain vertical dominance-submission patterns of relation between parent and child, or between an older sibling and a younger, the social configuration in spontaneous play of children tends to be of a horizontal, equalitarian character. True, differences in age, experience, and dominance may result in the expression of authority and leadership on the part of some children over the others, but, unless interfered with by adults, such vertical configurations arise out of the give and take of the children with each other. Although cultural forms of play life are passed on to younger children by adults and older children, for the most part the play relations of children to one another tend to be determined by the more natural personal-social interactions.

Certainly play serves as an important item in socialization and in this sense is preparatory to later behavior. Children learn the attitudes of fair play, of rivalry and emulation, of group loyalty and group antagonism. They not only identify themselves with each other, but assume adult rôles in their play. They act out first one rôle and then another as their interest fluctuates. This identification process is highly important because it means that new patterns other than those of the family emerge and serve to widen the range of the child's attention and thus of his activities. But play is preparatory for later life only as the reactions of today lay the foundation for those of tomorrow.

Child play does go through certain "stages." At first the young child plays that he is himself, but within a few years he moves into various kinds of "social" play. These include the twosome activity and later play in larger groups where the child may retain a good deal of individual motivation, as in taking turns going down a slide or throwing a ball. The most significant phase of play comes when there is real cooperation, as in building something, and in team play in organized games.

It should not be forgotten, however, that in play, as in other childhood activities, the influence of the home may continue for a long time. The child who has already learned aggressiveness at home may carry this habit over into his play. In contrast the child who has shown introverted, shy traits may with difficulty acquire the habits of give and take with other children as is usually expected in play.

There are wide individual variations in the type of play indulged in due to differences in intelligence and in general social development. In the first place, a highly intelligent child may be so advanced in mentality that the play of children of the same age offers him nothing of interest. Second, these bright children are stimulated by adults to take up reading intensely, and they often find much of their pleasure and recreation in these more intellectual activities. But it does not follow that this is unsocial. Rather it represents advancement toward internalization and verbalization of rôles and interests, something of the conservatism and maturity of play and recreation among adults. It must be borne in mind that in our culture reading is one of the expected activities of mature and bright people, and the highly intelligent child in our society follows the pattern.

Also, much has been made of sex differences in play interests in the traditional literature on the psychology of play. For example, K. M. B. Bridges reports for a group of ten three-year-old children in a nursery school certain differences between the boys and girls: the former preferred more vigorous play involving the larger muscle groups, the latter those involving finer coordinations such as finger manipulations; the former showed a certain inventiveness in building block houses, while the latter more readily followed routine activities such as fitting Montessori cylinders and matching colored papers. But we dare not attribute these variations to inherent sex differences. Rather they demonstrate how very early in the child's life the cultural expectancies for each sex are fixed. Little girls are taught to play quietly with dolls, to sew, to go through the household routines in play, and to be docile, polite, and tidy. Little boys are expected to be more vigorous and are often allowed to continue forms of muscular activity which would be denied their sisters. So, too, freedom to choose and to try various play activities is permitted the boy. Certainly there is no good evidence that innately the male sex is more inventive than the female, any more than there is that the former is given to better

muscular coördinations. Any sex differences in the play life of either children or adults is fairly certain to be the result rather of culture and society than of innate abilities or interests.¹⁸

The Congeniality Group. Another important form of social participation is found in the congeniality group. Such groups are to be distinguished from the more or less spontaneous play groups, on the one hand, and from formalized clubs and organizations for recreation or serious purpose, on the other. The essential characteristics of the congeniality group may be stated as follows: It has a limited membership based upon common interests and kindred tastes and is dependent upon face-to-face contact for its rise and survival. There may be some inter-member rivalry, but it tends to be submerged in the friendly interactions of members. There are no formal organization, no rituals, no codes, and only occasionally a name. When a name does arise, it is often a nickname, sometimes spontaneously derived. Such groups are usually formed for purposes of recreation and pleasure, but sometimes they combine leisure-time interests with serious discussions. They are more consciously formed than the play group, and there is usually a strong in-group loyalty. An examination of a large number of congeniality groups made by the writer demonstrates that one of the most important features of such groups is the possibility of free conversational expression of ideas and activities. Inhibitions demanded by more formal associations were released in "gab fests," in uncensored talk, and occasionally in freedom of overt action.

Such groups often arise within the setting of the larger play groups, from contact in the schoolroom, or from living in dormitories or being associated together in a business office or factory. They often cut across sex, economic, and religious lines, and, among older groupings, even across age differences.

The congeniality group is particularly important for mental balance because it provides the individual with a release from the taboos and inhibitions produced by the folkways and conventions of the other groups out of which it arises. It cuts across the institutionalized patterns of behavior and throws one back upon his freer, more spontaneous wishes and desires. It affords an outlet, largely in verbal form, for expressions of hostility to superiors, on the one hand, and affection for peers, on the other, which are otherwise repressed. In a society marked by conventionalized, controlled secondary-group patterns of interaction, the congeniality group—like the comradeship—affords an important area of release of culturally imposed tensions within the individual. It is important for the child and especially for the adolescent, in the face of our over-attention to formal clubs and to institutionalized aspects of schooling. But it is perhaps even more important for the adult whose impersonal, touch-and-go contacts in

¹⁸ K. M. B. Bridges, "Occupational interests of three-year-old children," *Pedagogical Seminary & Journal of Genetic Psychology*, 1927, 34: 415-423.

special-interest groups prevent this warmer, more intimate form of interaction.

The Comradeship. Another type of primary association is the comradeship, which we may define as a friendly, face-to-face relationship of two people of any age. It is verbalized by expressions like "bosom friend" and "having a pal." The pairing off may be among members of the same sex, or it may cut across sex lines, although, because of our taboos, the cross-sex comradeship among adults is none too frequent. It was a recognition of the place of this sort of interaction, perhaps, which led W. I. Thomas to list the *need for intimacy* as one in his schema of wishes. If the gang is much concerned with the desire for new experience (see below), the comrade group even more than the congeniality group arises out of the desire for intimate response.

Unrestricted, untrammelled expression of ideas and the feeling of ease are perhaps of greatest importance in comradeship. They give one a chance to share one's innermost thoughts, one's impulses, which might otherwise be repressed into the so-called unconscious, but which in this situation may have rather full swing. Doubtless even the mere verbal response is more gratifying than unexpressed impulses thrown back into the subjective system.

The craving for attention from another person and for intimate friendship begins in childhood and continues throughout life. Like the congeniality group, the comradeship seems to arise first during what Freud calls the latency period (see Chapter 10), and it may well serve the function of providing new and extended outlets for social-emotional attachments whose origin lies in the intimate relations of the child and his family. Even more than the congeniality group it affords spontaneous expression and release of the inhibitions resulting from other social contacts. And in our culture we strongly disapprove of the person who betrays a friend's confidences.

The Gang. Another group which appears on the social horizon during pre-adolescence and adolescence is the gang. In origin, at least, the gang has much in common with the congeniality group, but the two are easily distinguished. The gang tends to become more formalized; it is likely to construct and perpetuate legends and codes, and in most cases it bespeaks much more distinctly the conflict type of behavior seen in the in-group versus out-group relations which arise out of crises. Nowhere is the close correlation between culture pattern, social interaction, and individual shown more clearly than in the life of the gang. The gang really represents an important step in socialization, even though, as in the case of criminal gangs, some of its results may be disastrous to the larger community.

In our society gang groups are largely made up of boys though some have both sexes, and a few are made up only of girls. This sex differentiation is largely the result of cultural definitions of the respective rôles

of boys and girls. There is no inherent reason why girls should not form gangs or join one already organized. The gang age ranges from ten to sixteen, though one will find both younger and older boys in gangs. The exact functional delimitation of the gang from clubs and other organized boys' associations is often difficult, for many gangs operate athletic clubs composed of the boys themselves, while others, in contrast, are inclined to criminal purposes. Yet the gang must be thought of as different from the carefully organized boys' clubs sponsored by adults. As Thrasher puts it,

"The gang is . . . characterized by the following types of behavior: meeting face to face, milling, movement through space as a unit, conflict and planning. The result of this collective behavior is the development of tradition, unreflective internal structure, *esprit de corps*, solidarity, morale, group awareness, and attachment to a local territory."¹⁷

Gang conduct is often an overt expression of fantasy life. It is an escape from the humdrum existence laid down by adult demands and from intolerable conditions due to lack of adequate recreational facilities of a socially approved kind. The fantasies, moreover, are fed by stories of older boys and men of exciting adventure, by cheap novels, comic books, movies, television, and pictures. These provide a cultural base for gang organization and function. Gangs find their peak, however, in the period of adolescence; but the pre-pubertal manifestations of congeniality, comradeship, and gangdom symbolize important emancipation from the earlier influences of home and family.

¹⁷ F. M. Thrasher, *The Gang* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1927), p. 57. By permission.

CHAPTER 14

Adolescence and Problems of Physical and Social Maturation

The definitions of adolescence vary considerably. Some writers have dealt with the subject chiefly in terms of the biological changes associated with the coming of puberty or sexual maturity. Others have equated it with the period of high-school attendance. Still others consider it to range from the onset of puberty to the end of the teen age. But no matter how we delimit adolescence as to time span, two major factors must be taken into account: the biological changes of pubescence and the associated modifications in personality which follow. In fact, the interplay of social-cultural and biological forces during adolescence, especially in the earlier years, must always be recognized. Moreover, in analyzing these factors the matter of timing and of multiple causation are two important considerations. For example, as we shall see, there are not only variations in the inception of sexual competence but there are cultural differences in defining when an individual reaches adult responsibility. The arrival at maturity is usually marked in our society by at least three features: (1) acceptance of economic self-responsibility and acquisition of the necessary skills; (2) readiness to enter into marriage; and (3) acceptance by older individuals as a full participant in civic or community life.

Our chapter will begin with a review of some pertinent facts about physical growth and the organic foundations of puberty. This will be followed by a discussion of the interplay of social-cultural and psychological factors. The final section will take up some of the more pertinent problems of adolescence in our society, especially sexual development, emancipation from the home, the development of responsibility, and the maturation of self-control.

Before discussing the constitutional changes at puberty, a comment must be made on standpoint and method in the study and interpretation of adolescence. Taking a dual approach which recognizes both biological and social-cultural factors, we may note that the structural and physiological changes during adolescence influence the individual's behavior in at

least the following ways: ¹ (1) Modifications in the physiological balance, derived from variability in growth of some organs in comparison to others and from the onset of puberty itself, act to induce a readiness to fluctuations in mood and social-emotional responsiveness. (2) Alterations in the intraorganic patterns, especially as affected by sexual maturations, affect social-sexual motives particularly. (3) Growth in abilities, motor and mental, provide a foundation for modifications in interests and activities. (4) Changes in body build and in physiological processes, in turn, force the individual into new social contacts. These constitutionally derived changes, however, take on meaning only in terms of (5) the social-cultural setting in which they occur. The assumption of the universality of a "storm and stress" period of moodiness and conflict turns out, on inspection, to be largely culturally determined in a certain historic period. Given an enhancement of sexual drive, how the individual will handle this will depend on his social-cultural training. The nature and direction in which new motor and mental abilities are expressed will also depend on the opportunities provided by a given society and its culture. What will be demanded in terms of new values, attainment, responsibility, and actions with the coming of puberty will vary in terms of culture and sub-culture, including in the latter age, sex, and class status.

Moreover in channeling the effects of such biological changes within the social order, the individual may resort to a variety of techniques of adjustment. This may and often does include (1) a frank recognition on the part of the adolescent, the parents, teachers, and others of a struggle for adjustment; (2) the extent to which such efforts may lead to repression and conflict at an un verbalized and unconscious level; and (3) the degree to which substitute or compensatory and other mechanisms come into play, such as fantasy, projection, displacement, and so on. In interpreting the biosocial events of adolescence we must furthermore reckon with the basic principles of growth and adaptation. Among other factors we are dealing with constitutional relationships within the individual and hence the study of particular segments of the total organism must always be seen in the larger pattern of inter-relations. Facts about growth in height, weight, and motor ability may have important bearing on sexual development itself. Moreover, "the adaptations effected by an individual are multiple in form and also multi-causal" ²

Unfortunately the study of adolescence, as that of the infant and young child, has been marked by the tendency in some quarters to particularistic or single-cause explanations of growth and change. Therefore if we combine the concept of inter-relationship with the principle of multiple causes, we are more certain of the inferences and generalizations which

¹ Some of the points here are drawn from H. E. Jones, "The adolescent growth study. I. Principles and methods," *Journal of Consulting Psychology*, 1941, 3: 157-159.
² *Ibid.*, p. 155.

may be drawn from the data. And, in addition, we must not overlook "individuality in growth." That is, we cannot infer individual growth from group trends but must study it in terms of continuity of structures of the individual as such. For this reason the longitudinal studies made by Jones and his colleagues at the Institute of Child Welfare, University of California, and somewhat similar studies elsewhere, are particularly revealing.³ Many current generalizations about the behavior of adolescence do not rest on such careful investigations since individual activity at a given period is described and analyzed against an assumed group norm of the given class or society in which the individual lived. It is not that we should neglect these data and their interpretations but, on the whole, the longitudinal studies of individuals give us a more substantial foundation for generalizations to be made at this juncture in our studies of adolescence.

BIOLOGICAL CHANGES AND ADOLESCENCE

The inception of adolescence rests on the coming of puberty, that is, the attainment of the capacity to participate in reproduction. The general landmark of this change in girls is, of course, the beginning of menstrual periodicity or the menarche. There are no such clear-cut evidences of sexual maturity in the boy though Crampton's criterion of the appearance of pigmented pubic hair has been widely accepted.⁴ Associated bodily changes in the girl are the growth of the breasts and certain changes in other body contours. In the boy the appearance of hair on the face and the deepening of the voice are also regarded as indicators of pubertal changes.

Individual and Sex Differences in Maturation. The cycle of change associated with the coming of puberty were described by Crampton as: (1) pre-pubescence, marked by the absence of any obvious signs of puberty; (2) pubescence, characterized by the changes noted above; and (3) post-pubescence, marked by the stabilization of bodily form, the end of the period of noticeable modification. For boys he found that between twelve and a half and thirteen years 69 per cent were still pre-pubescent; twelve and a half and thirteen years 69 per cent were still pre-pubescent; a year later 41 per cent had not gone beyond that stage; a year later, however, all but 16 per cent had passed into puberty; and between the ages of fifteen and a half and sixteen only 5 per cent had not matured into or beyond the pubertal stage.

Bodily growth is a continuous process from conception to the attainment of full maturity, hence the changes which occur in connection with puberty rest on the foundation of prior modifications in size and propor-

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ C. W. Crampton, "Anatomical or physiological age versus chronological age," *Pedagogical Seminary*, 1908, 15: 230-237; also, his "Physiological age—a fundamental principle," *American Physical Education Review*, 1908, 13: 144-154, 213-227, 268-283, 315-358. This latter has been reprinted in *Child Development*, 1944, 15: 3-52.

Crampton, "Anatomical or physiological age versus chronological age," *op. cit.*

tions on the fundamental organ systems. A few illustrative facts will make this clear.

At birth the musculature makes up 23 per cent of the total weight, on the average; at eight years, 27 per cent; at fifteen years, 32 per cent; at sixteen years, 44 per cent; and at twenty years, 45 per cent. Landois has shown that at birth the ratio of heart size to the size of the arteries is 25 to 20. At the beginning of puberty this ratio is 140 to 50, and at maturity it is 290 to 61.

Variations in body form and proportions are shown in Figure 2, p. 35. The approach to adult maturity in the average thirteen-year-old boy (in our society) is neatly shown by the fact that such a lad, on the average, has attained seven eighths of his adult height, two thirds of his adult weight, four fifths of his adult chest girth, four fifths of his adult speed of motor reaction, and half of the muscular strength of the average adult at twenty-five years.⁶ Then, too, there are sex differences in physical maturation. Girls advance more rapidly than boys in their physical growth throughout the period of infancy, childhood, and early adolescence. A scale of anatomical differences in boys and girls of given chronological ages—based upon X-ray studies of the ossification of the carpal bones in the wrist—has been developed. As measured by this sort of physical criterion, the girl of one and a half years is anatomically as old as the boy of two years. Moreover, this difference continues for some time. At the age of four the girl is anatomically equal to the boy of five. By the age of seven and a half years, she is on a par with the lad of nine. And at the coming of puberty, say at twelve and a half years, the girl is anatomically as old as the boy of fifteen.⁷

These physical evidences of more rapid maturity are reflected in the fact that, on the average, for our society, girls arrive at puberty from one and a half to two years in advance of boys. This may have important implications for the social adjustment of both.

What has often been called the pre-pubertal "spurt" in growth has been the topic of many investigations.⁸ On the average, girls at about eight or nine years of age and boys, on the average, about two years later, begin to show an acceleration in the rate of physical growth, especially in height and weight. Not only are there sex differences, but there is considerable individual variation. In some children the increase in height and weight begins much earlier than in others. However, most of this growth in girls

⁶ See R. W. Pringle, *Adolescence and High-School Problems* (Boston, D. C. Heath & Company, 1922), pp. 46-47. Facts are chiefly from I. Landois, *Textbook of Human Physiology*, 10th ed. (Philadelphia, Blakiston Company, 1904).

⁷ Luella Cole, *Psychology of Adolescence*, 3rd ed. (New York, Farrar & Rinehart, Inc., 1946), Chap. 2.

⁸ For a good review of the important literature, with bibliography, on this and other topics on biological changes in adolescence, see Wayne Dennis, "The adolescent," in L. Carmichael, ed., *Manual of Child Psychology* (New York, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1946), Chap. 12.

takes place before the onset of the menses. There are also changes in the growth of muscles and the accumulation of fat. Just as girls begin this "spurt" before boys, the maximum phase of their growth, on the average, is reached at 12.5 years in contrast to boys, who reach the maximum phase, on the average, at 14.8 years.⁹

The pubescent period itself, of course, is the most important biological event in adolescence. While the foundations of sexuality are laid down by heredity and find their first development in the fetal and infancy periods, full maturation is the basic criterion of puberty. It is well known that changes in the endocrine system have a great deal to do with the attainment of full sexual capacity, although basal metabolism, diet, and other things may have something to do with the particular onset of the same. Certainly the pituitary plays an important part in setting in more active operation the hormones of the gonads and other sexual organs which have so much to do with sexual functioning. (See Chapter 2.)

As noted above it is much easier to detect this stage among girls than among boys. One well-grounded fact is the striking variation in the age at which particular girls reach puberty. There are extreme cases where menstruation began at birth. On the other hand, there are cases on record of women who did not menstruate until in the thirties or forties. But these deviations probably represent pathological conditions. For females in good health the range is between the ninth and twentieth year.

Differentials in the timing of the menarche have been attributed to racial, climatological, and cultural factors. When factors of health and diet are held constant, there seems little or no evidence of significant racial differences in the onset of puberty. One study reported the average age for Negro girls in Cincinnati and Richmond to be 13.6 years which is about what other studies give for white girls. For the latter the reported averages range from 13 years and one month in Jones' California group to Engelmann's study of over 5,000 American women, made in 1901, which gave the average as 14.2 years. There has long been a popular superstition that women in the tropics came into puberty sooner than women in the temperate zones and that the females of the arctic were the most retarded. The available evidence does not bear this out. Rather, while there are some reported differences from studies of nationality groups, it seems reasonably certain that women in the temperate zones, on the average, come into puberty before their sisters in either the tropics or the arctic.

Alleged racial and climatological factors are probably complicated by such matters as levels of living (including diet) which, in turn, are related to class status and availability of good health conditions. However, we lack adequate evidence to substantiate fully the place of such social-

⁹ F. K. Shuttleworth, "The physical and mental growth of girls and boys age six to nineteen in relation to age at maximum growth," *Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development*, 1939, Nos. 3, 4, Serial No. 22.

cultural and health matters. There is some evidence that the average pubertal age of several west and north-western European countries has become lower in the past century or so. This may be due, in part, to the rising standards of living which have accompanied industrialization. Comparable evidence for the United States is scanty. Certainly improvement of diet, the elimination of diseases like rickets and other childhood disorders may have helped to alter the timing of puberty in girls.¹⁰

Compared to the data on girls, that on the onset of puberty in boys is scanty indeed. This is partly due to the obvious fact that the coming of sexual maturity is neither so precipitous or so memorable as it is with girls. Moreover, the determination of the time when these changes take place is difficult. The detection of sperm in the morning urine and the occurrence of emissions have not been fully accepted as adequate criteria. Certainly the development of the pubic hair to its final color and kinky character in the post-pubescent phase has long been thought a reasonable indicator. Changes in voice and the appearance of axillary hair have also been used. What seem to be the most reliable figures for studies done in the United States give average ages from 13.08 to 14.4 (urban subjects). The range of onset given by Crampton was from 12 to 17.5 years; another study (Dimock), on more recent data, gives the range as from 10 to 15 years.¹¹

If the criterion of pigmentation of pubic hair is a sound one for marking the entry into puberty among boys—and most of the studies cited used this standard—then the two sexes seem to reach biological adolescence at about the same age. Perhaps the common belief that girls come into puberty sooner than boys derives from the fact, that as a rule, they are ahead of boys of the same chronological age in height and weight. Finally, we must not forget that we have as yet no definite proof that pigmentation of pubic hair means that the male adolescent is actually fertile. Certainly emissions occur before the sperm are present.¹² Moreover, some doubt has even been raised as to whether girls are actually fertile immediately after their first menses.¹³ Again we must look to biochemistry to help us clear up these questions.

The effect of age variability in pubertal changes on the social-emotional adjustment of boys and girls differs greatly. Jones has reported a comparison of a sample of normal girls who experienced the menarche early with those who passed through the period late. The two groups were

¹⁰ For a review of the chief data on these matters, see Dennis, *op. cit.*, pp. 641-643. See also H. E. Jones, "Adolescence in our society," in *The Family in a Democratic Society: Anniversary Papers of the Community Service of New York* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1949).

¹¹ Dennis, *op. cit.*, p. 643.

¹² Winifred V. Richmond, *The Adolescent Boy* (New York: Farrar & Rinehart, Inc., 1933), p. 39.

¹³ Dennis, *op. cit.*, p. 645. See also A. C. Koss, W. B. Pomeroy, and C. E. Martin, *Sexual Behavior in the Human Male* (Philadelphia, W. B. Saunders Company, 1948).

matched as to intelligence, socio-economic status, race, and in childhood health records. When compared as to a number of important social traits it was found that the "early-maturing were below the average" in prestige, popularity, sociability, leadership, poise, cheerfulness, and expressiveness. As judged by their classmates they seemed rather withdrawn, submissive, and lacking in assurance. In contrast, the late-maturing girls were superior both to the early-maturing girls and to the average ones as well in the characteristics noted above. The early-maturing girl has special problems of adjusting to her age-peers, who psychologically, at least, are less developed. She may not be able to join in with older girls who are in puberty; and her relations to boys and to her family also may be difficult. In contrast the late-maturing girls do not seem to have such troubles.

The situation with boys is quite different. The early-maturing lad "enters adolescence at a time when girls in his age group are appreciative of male acquaintances who no longer insist on being children."¹⁴ He also develops physical strength and skills which afford him prestige from his own sex. The late-maturing boy, like the late-maturing girl, is also out of step with the others in his peer-group. A lad who at 15 or 16 years is still a little boy is likely to be rejected by both boys and girls of his own age and by his parents, too, who may expect him to act in a manner for which he is not yet prepared.

SOME BASIC PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SOCIAL-CULTURAL CONSIDERATIONS

Against the background of our discussion of the physical changes associated with puberty, we shall now consider certain psychological and social-cultural factors which must be reckoned with if we are to understand the conduct of adolescents. These include, among others, such matters as the growth of intelligence and its relation to learning; emotional development, especially as it relates to aggressiveness, anxiety, fantasy, and the place of group contacts, particularly among those of the same age. The material of this section will serve as an introduction to the more detailed treatment of special problems which follows in the final section.

The period of adolescence is clearly one of transition, yet how this is dealt with will vary with the culture to which one is exposed. Among our upward-striving middle classes, the teens are often characterized by a series of recurrent conflicts, interspersed with occasional calm. This is especially true of the relations of children and their parents. External difficulties of adjustment are, of course, reflected in internal distress and change of self image and the conception of one's rôle and status. Yet what occurs in our culture or sub-culture is not universal, as cultural anthropologists have amply demonstrated. While our concern is largely with problems of adolescence in our own society, some examples of

¹⁴ Jones, "Adolescence in our society," *op. cit.*, p. 79

variability in the handling of puberty will not be amiss. They will serve to lend caution to any tendency to generalize beyond the data of a particular time and place.

Cultural Variations in Defining Puberty. Among the Dobuans of New Guinea, the sexual life of girls begins long before puberty, there is no fear of menstruation, and there are no special observances to mark arrival at sexual maturity. So, too, in Samoa the pre-pubescent girl has already learned much about sex and childbirth, and the coming of puberty means nothing very important to her. A few years after puberty she may enter into a series of liaisons with the young men of her village, and still later settle down to be some one man's wife. M. Mead has consistently maintained that there is no mental conflict associated with this shifting from childhood to full womanhood. A different system is followed among the Manus of New Guinea. Here the central theme of life—the ethos—centers around wealth, especially the exchange of property. So far as the females of the society go, the distinction is not between those who are pre-pubertal and those who have passed into maturity; it is between the betrothed and the unbetrothed. And, since betrothal involves considerable exchange of property, the girl of ten who has been promised to a young swain talks of “us married women” and must demean herself sedately, go about very little, and remain at home demurely veiled. Girls not yet engaged run about freely. When puberty arrives, there are, true enough, elaborate rituals, all centering in gifts and festivals of the community, not in the girl, however, as one going through a physical and mental crisis. Sexual life is regarded among the Manus with what even the mid-Victorian of the last century would regard as extreme puritanism. There is no romance between young people. There is no word in the Manus language for love, or for affection, or for caress. Extramarital relations are regarded with horror and severely punished by the “spirits” or by illness. Such sex life might be regarded by the Samoans or even Europeans as distinctly dreary and uneventful. It is clear that whether the adolescent experiences an emotional disturbance or not depends upon how the particular society defines pubertal events. As M. Mead puts it:

“ . . . The pattern of social institutions alone is not sufficient to produce or eradicate conflict; it is rather in the far less tangible balancing of cultural forces that the seeds of conflict lie. In Samoa there is no conflict, because the adolescent girl is faced by neither revelation, restriction, nor choice, and because the society expects her to grow up slowly and quietly like a well behaved flower. In Manus the insistence upon the shamefulness of sex, the repression of all freedom of action that the taboos of betrothal may be observed, the low standard of relations between the sexes, all serve to produce conflict irrespective of the period of adolescence or its elaborate ceremonial.”¹⁵

¹⁵ Margaret Mead, “Adolescence in primitive and modern society,” *The New Generation*, ed. by V. F. Calverton and S. D. Schmalhausen (New York, The Macaulay Company, 1930), p. 179. By permission.

In still other societies, notably among some of the Californian and British Columbian Indians, puberty in the girl is regarded as having possible magical influences upon the community, and elaborate rituals are in vogue. In some cases these ceremonials are directed to production of good crops; sometimes they are also concerned with developing the girl's capacity to take her place in the society, not as a reproductive member, but as an economic asset as measured by her skill in making clothes and moccasins or in performing other household duties.

There is almost the same wide divergence in the treatment of adolescent boys. Among the Australian natives, for instance, there are severe ordeals in early adolescence which indicate the boy's entrance into the male adult society. Such painful inflictions as circumcision, subincision, and violent knocking out of certain teeth mark the rituals. There are frequently certain periods of isolation from the tribe under severe restrictions as to food and activity. So, too, many African tribes have elaborate ceremonials connected with circumcision of the boys of the tribes. In some tribes girls also are circumcised. In still others there are infibulation and other severe treatment.¹⁶

Differences in Intelligence. For many years it was believed, on the basis of work with intelligence tests, that at sixteen years or thereabouts the individual had reached the point of his highest possible intellectual capacity, though knowledge and skill continue to be accumulated for a long time after that. Since then we have come to realize that the potentiality of individuals varies greatly and that many people actually increase in ability after this age.¹⁷ But the best work in the field of measurement of intelligence indicates that it is during middle adolescence that the majority of individuals reach the point of maximum mental capacity, using the term *capacity* as different from knowledge and motor skill.

There have been many definitions of intellectual ability but most of them may be reduced to organic capacity or power to learn. Thus ability varies tremendously among individuals, and these deviations begin to be evident in the early years of life, as we know from results of intelligence testing and from studies in all sorts of learning situations. The importance of learning in adjustment is summarized by Arlitt in these words:

"Learning in adolescence will also proceed in proportion as the individual's nervous system is plastic and therefore modifiable. We may extend the number of needs felt, but the organism will respond more or less in terms of the variability of response which enables the individual to meet each new situation with a series of activities leading to its solution. He will retain the activities leading to the solution in proportion to the degree of modifiability which he possesses.

¹⁶ See W. I. Thomas, *Primitive Behavior* (New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1936).

¹⁷ E. L. Thorndike, et al., *Adult Learning* (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1928).

This is in part a matter of individual difference in equipment, and in part a matter of age . . .

"In ability to learn, the curve shows an increase from age ten to between ages twenty and thirty and a gradual decrease from approximately thirty on. It would appear that the adolescent has much greater ability to learn than has the pre-school child and that the degree of modifiability in adolescence is higher than it will be at any later period."¹⁸

These variations in learning ability are reflected in the investigation of the relation of intelligence to school success and to adaptability to the demands of society. Aside from any problem as to possible constitutional predetermination of these differing degrees of ability, they do represent certain broadly defined capacities for social-cultural maturity. The most commonly accepted classification of grades of mentality is (1) idiot, (2) imbecile, (3) moron, (4) normal, and (5) supernormal or "superior."

The *idiot* has only the most rudimentary learning capacity; he remains throughout life unsocialized and incapable of caring for himself. The *imbecile* may acquire simple motor skills, modest speech facility, and certain elementary social habits, but he is not able to manage his own affairs or participate in normal society. The *moron*, on the other hand, is capable of a good deal of motor learning and of mental training through the elementary grades. Moreover, he may become sufficiently socialized as to take a minor and unobtrusive place in the social order. There are thousands of persons of this grade of ability who are law-abiding and highly useful members of society. The *normal* person, measured by our standard tests, is one who is capable of elementary and high-school education as it is at present organized. But we have much evidence to indicate that a person with a mental age of about 14 or 15 years will have difficulty managing the courses given in a well-equipped college. To succeed in getting a bachelor's degree most people ought to have capacity beyond that of the mean or average of mentality. The *supernormal* persons are those of still higher intellectual capacity, say beyond the 120 or 130 I.Q., as measured by Terman's standards. Since it is during adolescence that these differences become most evident, it should be obvious that social and emotional adjustment will be qualified, in part, by such differences in intelligence.

Intellectual ability is basic to the attainment of the skills and knowledge necessary to personal and social adjustment. However, the measures of intelligence do not show any significant correlation with the usual measures of social-emotional adjustment, the so-called "personality tests" in the narrower sense. This does not mean that intelligence is of no importance in emotional life. In fact we cannot separate the intellectual and the emotional except for purposes of description and analysis. Conrad, Freeman,

¹⁸ Ada H. Ariati, *Adolescent Psychology* (New York, American Book Company, 1933), pp. 119, 120. By permission.

and Jones have noted at least five important factors which must be considered in the relation between intelligence and adjustment:

"These are the child's absolute level of intelligence: the level of intelligence required in the activities toward which he is being pointed, through the ambitions of his family and friends; the social pressures which arise from such ambitions; his own 'felt needs' and level of aspiration; and his actual achievement. These factors are interconnected in a variety of ways and a great variety of complex patterns may result."¹⁹

Note has already been taken of the importance of the absolute level of intelligence. But in addition parents may demand of their adolescent children achievements which they may not be able to reach or for emotional reasons may resist. So, too, there are demands of accomplishment in terms of the occupation one takes up just as one may set up his own goals in terms of his needs. Certainly the emphasis on competition and success in our society makes heavy demands on both emotion and intelligence. (See below on anxiety.)

Emotional Development in Adolescence. While we have reasonably reliable and valid measures of intellectual development, we still lack adequate and satisfactory standards of emotional maturity. Moreover, the standards of normality in relation to social-emotional adjustments in adolescence vary with the culture of given societies. So, too, societies differ in the degree of cultural continuity, gradualness, and consistency which mark the course of growing up from early childhood to puberty and adolescence and then to adult status.²⁰ For example, in our society, especially in the middle classes, we impose severe sanctions on the child with regard to sexuality which may act to inhibit the development of the expected heterosexuality in later adolescence and adulthood. Also the imposition of the Judaistic-Christian code of ethics stands in sharp contrast to our heavy stress on the need for inter-personal competition connected with our intense striving for higher status.

For our purposes we may note some of the important standards of social-emotional maturation in American society, and particularly in the middle classes. One basic norm is the arrival at heterosexuality so important for satisfactory mate-selection and marriage. Secondly, we expect the individual to emancipate himself from his parents and home background and in so doing to develop a sense of personal responsibility and to modify his self-image and to extend his capacity for self-control. Closely

¹⁹ H. S. Conrad, F. N. Freeman, and H. E. Jones, "Differential mental growth," in *Forty-third Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education, Part I, Adolescence*, ed. by Henry C. Chicago, The Department of Education, University of Chicago, 1944. Chap. 9. Quoted by permission of the Society.

²⁰ Ruth Benedict, "Continuities and discontinuities in cultural conditioning," *Psychiatry*, 1938, 1: 161-167. Reprinted in Clyde Kluckhohn and H. A. Murray, eds., *Personality in Nature, Society, and Culture* (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1948), pp. 414-423.

linked with these will be the attainment of economic independence, political and civic attitudes and practices, and the use of leisure which approximate the norms of one's group. Some aspects of these will be examined in the next section, others in later chapters. Within the framework of our social norms, we should find evidences of intellectual and emotional maturity. Among other things we should expect good work habits, willingness to give and take in social relations, desire for knowledge, and for self-criticism. Also we should anticipate habits of reacting to emotional situations objectively and with a minimum of self-pity, of sublimating emotional outbursts, of getting rid of childish fears and anxieties, and of working out a balance between the demands of society, as introjected into one's conscience, and various deep personal desires.

Anxiety and Aggression. In this connection there are some particularly difficult problems for the adolescent with respect to anxiety and aggression. We have already noted that anxiety has its roots in frustrations, including the demands for conformity and security at the hands of parents, teachers, and others. We have also noted that anxiety may be perfectly natural in the sense of its developing around objective dangers in the environment. But anxiety may become excessive if it has little or no foundation in real dangers. It may come to act as a self-perpetuating motive in which the goals may be nonadaptive and even harmful for the personality. Some aspects of such neurotic anxieties will be examined in Chapter 23. Here we shall discuss briefly the function of anxiety as it plays a part in our middle-class stress on upward mobility. Some relations of anxiety to the superego will be noted later in discussing psychosexual development.

Davis has made out a good case for the function of what he calls "normal anxiety" as a learned motivation, especially in our middle classes. The middle-class adolescent is rewarded for going with the right social cliques, for example, for dating other adolescents of one's own "social set," and the boy for showing evidences of planning and working toward the "proper" vocation which will yield success and wealth. Failure to live up to these expectations leads to punishment in the form of ridicule, blame, sense of guilt, and, in the more severe cases, to ostracism. The lower-class adolescent, on the contrary, may come to sense his social inferiority, but this, in some cases, becomes the spur to struggle to escape one's economic and socially low status and get ahead. The ideal of rising from poverty to riches is still potent in our society. Youth develop motives to attain the rewards of successful upward striving and anxieties to avoid the social punishment which comes if they fail. Davis puts the matter aptly in these words:

"... Anxiety is mobilized not only by the anticipation of punishment if the required behavior is not learned, but by the desire not to be deprived of reward. It is this striving for reward, for status, this uneasiness lest the reward be not attained, which constitutes the adaptive social function of anxiety.

Adolescents with a strongly developed social anxiety, therefore, usually strive for the approved social goals most eagerly and learn most successfully.

"... With regard to upward status-mobility, in the sense of climbing the 'democratic ladder,' furthermore, this anxiety motivation is entirely realistic and rational in our kind of a society. It is experienced both as an urge to flee from the deprivations of low status and as a pull toward the greater biological and social security of high-status persons."²¹

The school and the community supplement the family in stimulating such upward striving. The middle-class adolescent who does not easily accept this pattern has many difficulties. He may escape into overt resistance, as in delinquency, or he may seek refuge behind the curtain of his inner fantasies. The lower-class adolescent who assays to get up the social ladder may face great odds, but he is likely to be rewarded not only by improved economic and social returns, but by approval and envy of those of his own class who fail or do not try. For those of the lower class who do not strive upward, there may be acceptance of subordinate position in the society or compensatory patterns of drinking, fantasy, adherence to revolutionary theories or parties, and other outlets.

Closely related to the problems of anxiety are those centering around aggression. The socialization of the young child involves many restrictions, as we know, which are met in such various ways as direct or indirect hostility, avoidance or escape, and fantasy. Adolescence, at least in our society, is marked by many situations into which aggression may and does enter. Some aspects of these will be treated later, but we note four features of aggressiveness. (1) Hostility may be directed against the parent figure. The growing adolescent does not want to be treated as a child. He resents the continuance of a show of authority on the part of the mother and/or father. This may involve the matter of his friends, his clothes, and a wide variety of other situations. (2) Likewise authority figures such as teachers may also be the objects of considerable hostile affect. The teacher may be regarded as a thinly disguised surrogate for a parent who interferes with one's wishes.

(3) Aggression may also be deflected onto a convenient scapegoat such as an out-group. Here we find that the culture itself may provide an approved way of displacing hostility on the lower classes and on minority groups. For example, as a part of the California study already mentioned, the subjects were given certain tests to show degrees of prejudice against Negroes, Jews, and other minorities. The most prejudiced were those who idealized strong and dominating figures of authority and who despised the weak. They also had a sense of living in a world of evil

²¹ Allison Davis, "Socialization and adolescent personality," Chap. 11 in *Forty-third Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education*, op. cit., pp. 208, 213. Quoted by permission of the Society. This paper is reprinted in T. M. Newcomb and E. L. Hartley, eds., *Readings in Social Psychology* (New York, Henry Holt & Company, Inc., 1947), pp. 139-150.

people and of many physical dangers. Fears and hostilities were displaced on members of outgroups who served as scapegoats. It seems that the most prejudiced young people usually grew up in homes marked by more rigid discipline and less warmth of affection than was true of families from which the non-prejudiced youngsters came.²²

Finally (4) the individual may turn his aggression upon himself. This is evidenced in the further extension of the superego or conscience. The inculcation of further taboos on sexuality, in particular, at a time when the individual faces the maturation of his urgent sexual needs imposes a big burden on the adolescent. In order to deal with this added load of responsibility to conform, the boy or girl, of the middle classes especially, and the girl, at least, of the lower class, must redouble the effort to control the sexual impulses. On the one hand, there is the struggle to free oneself from the control of parents and, on the other, the emphasis upon conformity to the sex mores. In this situation the individual's threat of self-punishment, that is, intra-psychic aggression, becomes an important means of inhibiting the impulses to depart from the social and class norms.

The fantasy life of the adolescent is usually an extension of habits begun in the childhood years. The new problems of the period may incite fantasies of somewhat different kind, especially those involving sex, aggression, punishment, conflict with parents, and anxieties. A study by Symonds gives a cross-section of high-school boys and girls living in a suburban community.²³ While the results need further corroboration both by enlarging the sample and studying children of different localities and social classification, the findings are suggestive. Forty boys and girls, in equal numbers and in ages ranging from 12 to 18 years, were shown a series of pictures, mounted on cards, and asked to tell the story for each one. Altogether 1,680 stories were collected. Other data came from autobiographies of the subjects, interviews with and ratings by teachers, and interviews with the parents. The stories were classified as to theme and divided into the "psychological" or those where the characters in the stories do something to another person, and the "environmental" or those where another person does something to the given character. The division is frankly arbitrary and depends, obviously, on which character in a story is taken as the point of reference. A few interesting findings may be mentioned. Of the psychological themes the six leading ones, making up 62 per cent of the total of 5,499, were aggression, eroticism, altruism, negative emotion, excitement, and anxiety. Aggression alone accounts for 28 per cent of all the psychological themes. The six leading environmental

²² A full discussion of this topic is found in T. W. Adorno, et al., *The Authoritarian Personality* (New York, Harper and Brothers, 1950). See also N. W. Ackerman and Marie Jahoda, *Anti-Semitism and Functional Disorder* (New York, Harper and Brothers, 1950).

²³ P. M. Symonds, *Adolescent Fantasy: An Investigation of the Picture Story Method of Personality Study* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1941).

themes were family relationships, economic, punishment, separation and rejection, accidents and illness, and school. These made up 79 per cent of the total 4,804 themes in this group.

A reading of the sketches of the 40 cases brings out an interesting demonstration of ambivalence between the actuality of conduct and the fantasies. In nearly one half of the cases, the stories matched reasonably well the real life situation, or at least could be regarded as a reasonable extension of them. (Two cases were difficult to classify.) In the other half of the cases the stories clearly revealed motives and traits which were quite unlike those that might have been inferred from purely objective observation of conduct and conversation. This difference seems to me at least to make clear that the content of fantasies range all the way from a somewhat obvious extension of everyday life to the exposure of opposite and deep underlying wishes. Just what these differences mean should be carefully studied as a basis of useful guidance and advice to youth and adults alike.

***New Social Contacts in Adolescence.** In our society an important aid in attaining independence and heterosexuality is found in the new social contacts which the adolescent makes. Child-parent conflicts often ensue because the parents do not approve the friends of the children. This conflict is symbolic of freedom from parental controls. The adolescent must work out his own solutions as far as possible and in so doing association with one's age-peers is important. As Caroline M. Tryon puts it: "Next to the family in childhood, and probably equally with the family during adolescence, the peer group provides satisfactions to the basic urges for security in the warmth of friendship and the sense of adequacy that come from belonging."²⁴

Modifications in the values of adolescents is a good clue to the changes which take place during this period. The California study, already mentioned, provides some interesting data. About 320 boys and girls, roughly in equal numbers, were given a reputation, or "Guess who" test as a means of discovering the characteristics and qualities which boys and girls admire or respect in each other. This test was given at the beginning of their junior high school, when over 90 per cent of them were 11 or 12 years old. The test was administered again three years later when the group was completing the ninth grade. The results may be summarized as follows:

(1) "The most admired qualities in the boys at eleven- and twelve-year level were competence in group games and ability to lead or direct or keep a game going, together with fearlessness and readiness to take a chance."²⁵

²⁴ Caroline M. Tryon, "The adolescent peer culture," *Forty-third Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education*, op. cit., p. 236. This and following quoted by permission of the Society.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 227.

Also being boisterous, aggressive, and untidy were regarded more favorably than being quiet, submissive, and too clean. Also it was thought desirable for a boy of this age to be enthusiastic and happy and even to have some modicum of such "feminine" traits as friendliness, gentleness, and quiet sense of humor so long as these qualities were associated with the more "masculine" skills just noted. (2) In contrast to this, for the earlier age group, aggressive, restless, and boisterous conduct on the part of girls was disapproved. The most important qualities in getting a high rating were "being friendly, pretty, tidy, and quietly gracious. Other qualities which were considered important included enthusiasm, quiet good humor, and docility. To be a tomboy was acceptable, but not a rôle to be sought or emulated."²⁶ (3) In three years the value-scheme for boys had not altered very much. The emphasis was still on "physical skill and daring, and leadership in games." So, too, traits such as "social ease and poise, personableness, likeableness, and grooming" were thought important.²⁷ These qualities definitely indicated a recognition of emerging heterosexuality as well as of physical competence. Restlessness, attention-getting, and boisterousness had far less importance than formerly.

(4) In these years more fundamental changes had occurred in the value system of the girls. The former sedate "little lady" type had given way to a person who was buoyant, amiable, and somewhat aggressive "who showed good sportsmanship with both boys and girls in large groups." Also the "glamor girl" type became important, especially to the boys, even though this quality might not appeal to the girls' sex peers.²⁸

The most striking aspect of this study is that adolescents in this group had difficulty in maintaining their high status throughout the period from the beginning of puberty to the attainment of middle adolescence. As a result there was much anxiety and struggle. When the larger group prestige or status broke down some found satisfactions in close and intimate friendships. As a matter of fact this study clearly shows that the adolescent swings between two poles. On the one hand, there is the strong pull of "friendship-belonging"; on the other, there is a pressure to attain and keep a high status. There is little doubt that similar situations are to be found in other adolescent peer-groups, but it is particularly apparent in those who come from the middle classes where the emphasis on status-striving is so prevalent.

Finally the differentiation in sex rôles is an important event in these years. One must reintegrate his past experiences and values with his new physical impulses, with his new fantasies about his impending adult rôles, and with his impending heterosexuality. (See below.) Then, too, as Tryon aptly remarks:

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 228.

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ *Ibid.*

"Boys and girls during adolescence must learn rôles that complement each other. This is very different learning from that of late childhood where social learning seems to disregard the rôle of the other sex. . . . To complete his learning he must learn about the rôle of the other sex:²⁹ [Yet in American society the anticipations of each sex are somewhat different.] The boy is expected to become independent and self-reliant and to develop capacities for competition and achievement in our society, while the girl is not. . . . American society still conceives of woman's life objectives as primarily concerned with marriage, family, and affectional relationships."³⁰

In contrast the boy must repress his earlier dependence and submission by acquiring facility in competition in school and in games—considered precursors to his economic struggles to come later.

However, these distinctions between male and female rôles are not so clear today as they were in earlier generations. The movement of many women into the workaday world is altering this pattern as is the growing assumption of controls on the part of the wife and mother in urban homes. Some aspects of these changes will be discussed in Chapters 17 and 19.

Despite the demands on the boy to grow into mature manhood with the qualities of heterosexuality and economic and civic independence and responsibility, in some ways he would seem to have some advantages over the middle-class girl of his same age group. In the California sample, at least the girls retained a good deal more of the timidity and modesty about their physical changes which mark adolescence than did the boys. For instance, "in their frantic effort to cover up or be screened off in the dressing room and in their resistance to the examinations by women physicians, they seemed to be trying to deny the physical aspects of their sex rôle."³¹ Such attitudes and actions were unknown among the boys who had no anxiety about parading in the nude among their peers or with older boys and men in like condition or in talking in "gutter" parlance about the structure and function of their bodies.

We may close this section with the wise words of Tryon who has spent many years trying to understand the problems of the youth in our society.

"It is a long, complex, and often confusing learning task to achieve manhood or womanhood in our society with the skills and behaviors, the attitudes and values appropriate to the rôle which a given individual must take. For the most part boys and girls work at these tasks in a stumbling, groping fashion, blindly reaching for the next step without much or any adult assistance. Many lose their way. It seems probable that our adult failure to give assistance derives as much from ignorance about this developmental process as it does from the extensive taboos on sex which characterize our culture."³²

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 232.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 232.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 234.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 234.

SOME SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF ADOLESCENCE

In this section we shall take up certain problems of adolescence which seem especially important for both personal and social adjustment. These are psychosexual development, emancipation from home ties and arrival at freedom and independence, development of sense of personal responsibility, and changes in self-image and the emergence of mature self-control. Later other problems of this age period will be discussed, particularly those associated with education, in Chapters 15 and 16, and those having to do with delinquency in Chapter 22.

Psychosexual Development. One writer has defined adolescence "as the series of changes in personality adaptation impelled by sexual differentiation and maturation, which, in turn, are conditioned by the surrounding cultural pattern."²² Certainly such things as breaking the family ties and the growth of independence, responsibility, and mature selfhood derive in large part from this central factor of sexuality.

Man's sexual development does not begin at puberty; it merely comes to its approximate biological completion at that time. Moreover, how such biologic changes are dealt with depends, in part, on what has happened to the individual before adolescence. Let us, therefore, trace out the principal features of psychosexual development from infancy on. This will give us a firm basis for understanding what occurs in adolescence itself.

The course of sexual development from birth to maturity takes place within the framework of the social act, and the social act, in turn, is controlled, in large measure, by cultural norms and expectancies. It is the partial if not full neglect of this fact which limits the adequacy of the psychoanalytic theory of sexual stages. As noted in Chapter 10, Freud's orientation was distinctly biological—not social-psychological and cultural. He viewed the course from oral, anal, and early genital phases through the latency period to the final pubertal stage as taking place by stagewise steps which were themselves more or less fixed in the heredity of the human organism itself. True, he recognized that the individual's passing through these stages might be interrupted or interfered with by parents and others. But *social* influences were likely to be deleterious unless they followed the fixed pattern. Certainly this view presumes a biological rather than a psychological and social-cultural determinism.

While there is much evidence that infants and young children, at least in our middle classes, do have strong fixations on the mouth or oral zone and later in relation to the anal and genital organs, there is no uniformity as to timing or order of appearance, beyond the oral stage at least. Cross-cultural materials simply do not bear out the thesis of fixed stages. Nor does the Oedipus fare any better. Early and late there are strong emo-

²² N. W. Ackerman, "The adaptive problems of the adolescent personality," in *Family in a Democratic Society*, op. cit., p. 88.

tional identifications with members of one's family, but the particular sexual aspects of such will vary considerably with the family form. Freud seems to have generalized for all mankind on the basis of the middle-class, patriarchal family of the Vienna he knew. While I, like most contemporary social psychologists, have been influenced by psychoanalytic theory, the present discussion will discuss psychosexual development within the framework of social interaction.

(1) In our society the child's first social learning is in his feeding interaction with the mother. But other powerful drives having to do with elimination, avoidance of pain, vocalization, and sleep soon find their satisfaction highly qualified by social contacts with the mother or other persons. And while the reproductive processes are not matured till early adolescence, there is no doubt about infantile sexual manifestations. The direction of the child's attention to his mouth, to his evacuative functions, and to his genitalia is perfectly natural in view of their place in the repertoire of basic drives. The potency of the emotions and feelings, moreover, first becomes evident in relation to these physiological functions and the bodily organs associated therewith. The interest in and manipulation of the sexual organs may be observed rather early. Moreover, this concern may soon spread to curiosity about the sexual functions of others. But, as we have insisted throughout this book, these interests and actions have no meaning in and of themselves. *They take on significance as impulses or acts only in a social-cultural setting.*

In order to get on at all the child must learn to direct his needs to the ends more or less laid down by others. Hence, as powerful as this attention to, and satisfaction with, his own body are, they are always conditioned, as to expression and meaning, upon reactions of another, especially the mother. The earliest rôles, though rudimentary in character, are nevertheless built up in the mechanism of the social act by the child's taking over the attitude of the other person and directing it to his own impulses and activity. For example, the mother's words and overt acts which serve to punish the young child's handling of his sex organs become introjected and, in the future, he comes to talk to himself about his sex impulses and responses thereto as she talked to him. This lays the foundation of anxiety and associated self-punishing attitudes and mechanisms. If he follows the drive to bodily pleasure he will be both punished physically and suffer withdrawal of love of the mother.

Even in this initial stage the child is not entirely body-centered. The potent biological drives do not long continue as completely independent factors to which some alleged social-cultural elements are later appended. Constitutional patterns become so culturally conditioned as to lose their original purely physiological nature. The Freudian concept that the sex instinct persists as a constant quantum to be repressed, shunted here and there, or sublimated, does not seem to me valid for those who would

describe and analyze behavior and thought at the social-psychological level.²⁴

Despite our heavy social taboos in our society regarding overt sexual expression, there is much evidence that children indulge in a great deal of sexual play and sexual fantasy. In the middle classes this is likely to be sharply controlled; in the lower class much less so.

The larger meaning of this early play and training differs somewhat for each sex. The attachment of the girl child to her mother represents essentially a homosexual one, using this term broadly to mean affection for, and dependence on, a member of one's own sex. For the boy it is a primary heterosexual pattern. But in either case, as the child in our society develops, the more elementary expressions of this interest in his own body are repressed, redirected, and qualified on all sides.

(2) The so-called "latency" period opens up as the child extends his rôle-taking and contacts to his father, siblings, playmates, schoolfellows, teachers, and ideal heroes. Primary bodily and sexual interests are not so apparent. The period is marked by enhancement and spread of play interests and growing intellectual and manipulatory concern with the external world. The child has a variety of strong identifications with those who satisfy his wishes. In terms of rôles, the child is really multi-centered, for he has not yet learned to take a generalized attitude or rôle toward himself or toward those around him.

Intersex attachments are present, but—probably because of our middle-class taboos—the individual is without consciousness of their possible significance. For the girl the attachment to the father, brothers, or masculine playmates indicates her initial heterosexual interest, but this can only operate in highly disguised form in our society because of the cultural inhibitions. Toward the end of this period, we find increasing preference for companions of one's own sex. For the boy it is a time for close comradeship, for participation in gang life, for indulgence in the hero worship of older men. For the girl the pre-pubertal stage is marked by identification with other girls and often with older women, teachers, club counselors, and recreational directors. On the whole it is a period of a certain idealization in which the child comes to identify himself with characteristics embodied in persons outside the home and family circle. With us, at least, these objects of idealism tend to be members of the same sex. This whole process is clearly an instance of the emerging ideal aims which are so important in later adolescence.

(3) The final stage in love life in our society is reached with the attainment, not of mere physiological maturation, but of culturally accept-

²⁴ It is worth noting, however, that Kinsey seems to have a quantum theory of sexuality in somewhat the same way as Freud. For Kinsey, *libido* at the peak of sexuality, at least for the male, would seem to come in childhood. See A. C. Kinsey *et al.*, *op. cit.*

able attachment to the opposite sex. That is, emotional maturity in love is marked by the arrival at adult heterosexuality and its associated attitudes and habits. Individual differences in psychosexual development are clearly evident, however. Some persons, though they may mature intellectually and possess many admirable social traits, in their deeper love life may and do remain fixed at certain earlier points. The boy or girl who remains over-attached to a parent at an infantile level may never be able to sever the ties of dependence on the latter. A girl who passes from attachment to the mother to a strong fixation on the father or uncle may not get beyond this stage; when she should normally become mature in her love interests, she still clings to the ideals carried over from her childish love for a father or uncle.³⁵

Psychiatrists agree that, if normal heterosexuality is not attained by the end of adolescence, it is not likely ever to be attained, even though marriage and a family may come later. There must be a release from infantile and childish attitudes, ideas, and identifications. Although parents may instruct their children on sex by talking or by giving them books on sex education, the child may still not have freed himself from over-attachment to his mother or father or to someone else. Merely reading books on the subject of normal sex life is no substitute for day-by-day experience in meeting members of the other sex and in learning to adapt oneself to the wide variety of demands of intelligent and mature social participation. Not that reading and verbal information have no place, but such knowledge must be accompanied by the development of capacity to control one's own emotions and to take the responsibility for one's own acts.

When boys and girls begin to show an interest in each other after puberty, middle-class parents especially often suffer grave fears that something untoward may happen to them which will spoil their future. Instead of handling the matter emotionally, the parent must be willing to identify himself with his son or daughter and enter into his confidence as guide and helpmeet, not as an ogre of authority with "don't-do-this" and "don't-do-that" attitudes. Our culture norms, which call for a segregation of the sexes during early and late adolescence in the schools, in recreational activities, and elsewhere, are founded in part upon an older tradition of the sinfulness of sex contact, associated with the fear that young people will abuse any opportunities for learning to get on with each other. When adolescent boys and girls are surrounded with ideas and practices that keep them separated from each other, more emotional tensions are likely to be set up than when through the normal contacts of the school-room, of well-supervised and healthy-minded recreation, and through

³⁵ To get over the infantile and childhood attachments to the parent of the opposite sex is what the Freudians call the resolution of the Oedipus. While there is clinical evidence that the Oedipus complex in many cases, it may be less common in modern Western society than has been assumed.

other community opportunities for getting acquainted, we give our young people a chance to assume new rôles of mutual respect and mutual interest.

Among other false ideals which middle-class parents continue to set before young folks is the old notion that there are two kinds of women in this world: the good and pure woman, idealized in the mother and sister; and the "bad" and "evil" woman who is likely to lead the young man into sin. And the fear that "something" unfortunate will happen to our boys and our girls is predicated, in part, upon the very ideals of motherhood and womanhood which tend to inhibit rather than to help them in their arrival at normal love life. Williams, who had great insight in these matters, emphasized the difficulty in these words: ³⁶

"Some very unhealthy ideals have grown up in the world around this matter of sex, based largely on fears coming from a lack of understanding and philosophies of life constructed out of ignorance. One of the worst is this—the idealization of women themselves, the placing of women upon pedestals as something too fine, too sacred, too fragile to be handled in anything but the most genteel, considerate way.

"A boy is taught, in the first place, that matters of sex are degrading, wrong and sinful (at least for him and probably a little bit for everybody), but this teaching being not altogether successful, we further try to 'protect' him by creating in him an attitude towards women that we think will make him 'safe.' We teach him that in his consideration of women, he must keep in mind his mother and sister; that he must not say or think or act in any way with another woman that he would not say, think, or act with his mother or sister, or want them to know about.

"These are frightfully unhealthy ideas. . . . Nobody knows as does the psychiatrist how devastating [the] damage has been to thousands of men and women, through this utterly false ideal. Women are not the fragile, delicate, sacred little things that they have been pictured. Women are human, vigorous individuals who can pretty well handle themselves.

"While it is perfectly right to point out to boys that under certain circumstances women must be carefully guarded and protected, it is wrong to put into their adolescent minds at the critical time when they are normally, healthfully approaching the development of their heterosexuality that women must not be thought of in any way except as they would think of their mothers and sisters."

It is well recognized by every student of these problems that such false idealization is often one reason for the failure to arrive at normal heterosexuality. Equally unhealthful ideas about the brutality and depravity of the male sex are foisted on young girls, they are constantly warned to resist any untoward "advances" from men. As we shall note in Chapter 17, such attitudes and fears make for unsatisfactory marital adjustment later.

³⁶ Frankwood E. Williams, "Confronting the world: the adjustments of later adolescence," in B. Gais, ed., *Concerning Parents* (New York: New Republic, Inc., 1928), pp. 153-154. This and subsequent quotations by permission.

This is not to advocate license "or unlimited freedom among adolescents or any other group."

All too frequently parents have little sympathy with the fumbling and awkward attempts of adolescents to understand each other within the general framework of an emerging love life. Yet in these youthful reactions direct sexual drive is not nearly so dominant as many highly suspicious parents imagine. Frequently the desire for emancipation from parental ties generally and for some freedom of choice is far more significant to youth than immediate love interest. But, of course, all these trends toward maturity are related; it is just because they are bound up together that the overemphasis on sexuality is so likely to distort the parent-child relations during these years.

The gap between puritan ideals and the actualities in regard to sex has often been discussed. For the United States as it concerns the male population, the much talked-of Kinsey report shows that sexual behavior in one form or another is prevalent almost from infancy on. This is not the place to review Kinsey's vast array of data, but a few of his pertinent facts may be summarized. (1) Erotic activities are found at early ages but "pre-adolescent stimulation is much more common among younger boys than it is among younger girls."²⁷ (2) What Kinsey calls "pre-adolescent sex play," which he regards as derived biologically, is fundamental to adult sex behavior. (3) Such play may be autoerotic, homosexual, or heterosexual. Sometimes all three forms are indulged in by the same individual. (4) There are, however, clear-cut differences. For his sample at least, three-quarters of the boys who will never go beyond the eighth grade in school try "pre-adolescent coitus." In contrast only one-quarter of the boys of like age who will go on to college have such experience. Moreover, once such practice is begun "the chances are three to one" that the boys in the first group will continue such activities "without any major break" in their "adolescent and adult years." On the other hand, of those who will go on to college the chances "are more than four to one" that they will not continue the activity during adolescence. (5) Kinsey states that once begun, men continue sexual activity in some form or other until "old age stops all response." With women there are often long periods of discontinuity sometimes lasting for years. (6) Kinsey is convinced that the sublimation of sexuality is more likely to do harm than good to a person. This contention will continue to be regarded with disfavor by psychoanalysts, teachers, preachers, and, above all, by parents. His views on this topic again reflect his own strong biological rather than social-psychological and cultural orientation.²⁸ (7) His data show that males who come into

²⁷ Kinsey, *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 157. This and other quotations here are by permission of the publisher, W. B. Saunders Co.

²⁸ See *ibid.*, pp. 205-213, particularly page 211 where he has some comments to make on the psychologists and psychiatrists who were among his subjects

full sexual maturity at early ages retain their sexual activity at higher frequency for more years than do males whose sexuality maturity is delayed.

Importance of Emancipation from the Home. The significance of arriving at maturity and independence is not always recognized by those who would advise and direct adolescents, either in the home or outside. In place of previous coöperation, docility, and obedience the parent often finds that his son or daughter has become irritable, disobedient, and resistant. The mother or father may become unduly anxious over these new manifestations and, lacking any adequate definitions of the situation, may resort to unwise and foolish devices to keep the young person in line.

The emancipation from the home, of course, should normally begin in the pre-adolescent years through contact with playmates, the school, and other groups. The more independence the boy or girl between six and twelve has developed, the simpler will be the inevitable break from the home in later adolescence. The initial efforts of the child to free himself from the overprotection of and over-attachment to the parents may be feeble and incomplete, but, as he advances in the adolescent years to an ever wider range of friends and acquaintances with new interests, the healthy-minded boy or girl will make an even greater effort to emancipate himself. These efforts at freedom may be met by resistance on the part of the parents, matched by similar resistance on the part of the child. This procedure causes misunderstanding, anger, and sorrow between parents and children. Frequently the parents take to blaming the child for his behavior. They begin to invoke their traditional authority, often after years of letting the child more or less have his own way in minor matters during the pre-adolescent period. This, in turn, may lead to dishonesty on the part of the boy or girl to escape censure. The boy may lie about having taken the family car. The parents talk about having raised a "gentleman" only to discover to their sorrow that the son is turning out to be a "rough-neck." The girl may falsify about her companions on a previous night's dancing party, or may deny that liquor was served at a dinner, not only in order to protect herself from blame, but to avoid accusations from parents about the "kind of company" she keeps. Parents often reveal their own emotional immaturity when they weep or rage at such behavior of adolescents. They not only make themselves unhappy but also display a form of childishness which their son or daughter either despises or learns to exploit for his own end. Moreover, if the parental repression is temporarily successful, the child either fails to develop freedom with responsibility (see below) or may break out later in more violent revolt or find an outlet in neurotic reactions. As we shall see when we discuss mental conflicts and neurotic behavior, it often happens that emotional maladjustment is rooted in the child or youth who is considered a model of deportment, kindness, and obedience. (See Chapter 23.)

Perhaps the silliest and most unfair weapon which distraught parents use in these conflict situations is to demand love and respect from their adolescent children, to comment in season and out on how they have slaved and worked for their children only to find them ingrates. As Williams put it:

"With a lack of logic unworthy of a school-child—and the point is not missed by the adolescent boy or girl—they demand love in payment for sacrifices assumed voluntarily and for their own pleasure, and they demand respect as though that were a right that came with accidental parenthood."³⁹

These youths still love their parents, but they are trying desperately in the face of our confused standards and forms of activity to find themselves. In order to take their place in the adult world they must become emancipated from their previous emotional attachments to their family. In order to accomplish this task, confidence, adult leadership, and sound counsel, not blame and ridicule, are required. Too often the request that the son behave according to parental patterns in terms of his love of his mother and the fear that his interest in girls may lead him into difficulties prove an inadequate way to help him grow up.

When the mother, in particular, uses the appeal of her love as a device for keeping the son under her control, she is employing a means which is powerful but unhealthful for both persons. It is just this infantile and childish love for the mother which must be broken down.

Nevertheless this appeal is powerful, and the boy resents it at a time when he is moving toward another love object—someone outside the family circle. To quote Williams again:

"Love of mother is an instrument of terrible potentiality. Because by its use we can so easily cow individuals into a semblance of proper conduct, we use it recklessly. We go further and extol the man who shows great devotion to his mother and to the man who can weep at the name of 'mother' we ascribe special virtue. The love of mother is too valuable an asset in the life of any man to run the risk of turning it into a liability through reckless use.

"A man who is 'so good' to his mother is not always so good to his wife or so successful in his relationships with others; and a man's life is more concerned with his wife and with others than with his mother. A wise mother should realize this and not demand too much. She should find her happiness, even though it be a bit wistful, in helping her boy to launch his life from her own and in seeing him strong and able because of her."⁴⁰

In this type of behavior we see again the effect of our culture. Affection for the mother and sentiment for the family have high emotional values for us, and most parents are quite unconscious of the larger significance of their attitudes. The following case brings some of the effects of persistence of undue affection for a mother.

³⁹ Williams, *op. cit.*, p. 141.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 146-147.

Case of Karl J. The father of this family died when Karl was ten years old and his only brother, Clyde, was twelve. There was a quite sufficient inheritance to provide economic security, and for one reason or another Mrs. J. never remarried. Instead she put her affection and attention upon her two boys, though Karl was the somewhat more favored of the two. Both boys were given good educations, but were sent to college in the home community so that they might live at home. The mother managed all their affairs, advised them on details of their schoolwork, regulated their leisure-time activities, and was always with them during their vacations.

When the older son died at the age of twenty-three, the entire affection was focused with increased intensity upon Karl. The latter had just completed his college training, and with his mother's aid he secured a position in one of the city's best high schools. He continued to live at home; his recreation was usually dominated by his mother; she managed his finances and altogether treated him as she had done during his childhood. For instance, although she had ample funds of her own, she insisted on having a joint account at the bank where her son deposited his salary. (She had her own personal account in another bank.) Karl could never draw even a small check of five or ten dollars for current expenses without having to explain to his mother, when the canceled checks were returned, exactly what he had done with the money. She objected to most of his women acquaintances, and, every time he became at all seriously interested in a young woman eligible for matrimony, she devised ways and means of breaking up the relation. Of course, in discussing the matter, she always said she wanted her son to marry "when the right girl came along," but it was increasingly evident that she wanted to determine who was the "right girl."

She also objected to many of his men friends, considering them too rowdy, and, when her son, then at the age of thirty, proposed that he join with a fellow man teacher in taking a small apartment near his school (the family home was seven miles from his work), she raised a rumpus and suggested all sorts of horrible things that might happen to him, expressing the fear that his friend might get him to smoking or drinking, or might even invite women friends to the apartment. The mother always dressed up her remarks in properly conventional and acceptable language; she always subtly appealed to her son in terms of his own good—when she really was thinking of herself. When Karl was thirty-two years old, he went away to a neighboring state university for a long summer session—the first time in his life he had ever been away from his mother for more than a fortnight. (He had as a youngster occasionally been sent for two weeks to a camp for boys, but never for longer.) Here for the first time he met other young men and women without the constant intrusion of his mother into the situation. He reacted somewhat like a boy in late adolescence who leaves home for the first time to go to college. This was at least an initial step in a delayed emancipation, but even three years later he was still living at home, though he had asserted more independence, at least in minor matters. The likelihood of his marrying is slight indeed.

A common illustration of the manner in which parents interfere in the emancipation and growth of their children is their projection upon them of their own thwarted and incomplete professional, marital, or other ambitions. Because our cultural stress for personal success is so great many parents who have failed to secure their desired vocational aims for themselves foist these aims upon their adolescents. This process is often linked up with over-attachment and over-solicitude. It frequently happens that

the child, unfamiliar in his early years with the potential interests and capacities which will develop as he comes into contact with the culture of his society, follows docilely the plan of his parents to carry out their predetermined goal or ambition. Later, as the child's interest lags, or as his talents, especially in the arts, do not seem to measure up to the parental hopes, or as he comes to discriminative choice of his own, he often resents the parental interference, and open revolt may ensue.⁴¹

Yet, if a family has developed through several generations a tradition and custom for the sons to follow in the vocational footsteps of their fathers, such a projection of an ideal goal may be taken as a matter of course. It becomes a familial culture pattern. And, when a son fails to live up to such an expectation, a real tragedy may occur—both for the parents and for the son. But in our open-class society this sort of familial practice is less likely to receive constant and unquestioned community support.

In fact, our culture has little class or family predetermination of rôles but tends rather to emphasize individualistic aims and ideals, and the patterns in which these are worked out are largely those of competition and conflict. While coöperation between parents and children, and among the children, may develop in relation to particular matters, in the usual American family there is from the very outset much emphasis upon individual achievement and upon the securing of material evidences of success. The family, the school, and, much later, the business world all stimulate personal competitiveness and individualistic aims.

Development of Responsibility. Responsibility means the ability and willingness to take the consequences of one's acts. It implies that the person is a free moral agent, capable of being deterred or controlled by consideration of social sanctions, legal and moral. In these days of decline of traditional parental control over young people, in the midst of talk about "emancipation," "liberty," and "self-determination of one's life," in this period of emphasis upon freedom from restraint, and of fear on the part of parents, influenced in part by some so-called progressive educators, there is grave danger that young people may fail to realize that in human life we cannot escape the facts of cause and effect, that in society as in nature there is a determinism which we cannot gainsay or ignore.

Freedom on the negative side means the absence of, or exemption from, restraint by the power or control of another. In the more positive sense freedom means unlimited choice of ends and means in action. In our society this implies self-determination of marriage, vocation, religion, and politics. It is closely bound up with our doctrine of rights. But it is not to be confused with license or absence of responsibility. Freedom from parents is therefore not merely a matter of getting away from home

⁴¹ Kitchell Young, "Parent-child relationship: projection of ambition," *The Family*, 1927, 8:67-73.

ties through uncontrolled indulgence of emotions and appetites. The young person who sets out upon this course sooner or later discovers that in the end his "freedom" enmeshes him in difficulties and problems of which he did not dream. Nor can the matter be considered merely one of age or locality. The process of growing up in adolescence is predicated upon what happens in the earlier years. The problem of attitudes and habits in adolescence and puberty cannot be dissociated from what has gone on before.

The sense of security must in time move out from the framework of dependence on intimate family associates. As the child develops, there must be a growth toward independence, discrimination, and a sense of responsibility for his choices and acts. That is, freedom to grow must also be provided. Too often the childish dependence continues into adolescence or early maturity, and then the individual, when confronted with problems demanding his own decisions, meets them with failures or half measures.

The following case illustrates a continuing dependence and failure to develop adult sense of responsibility.

Case of Fred A., aged 25 years. Despite his age Fred's actions still are marked by much infantile and adolescent behavior. He has an over-solicitous mother who completely dominates him at every turn. He has no initiative or interest in or curiosity about the world outside the neighborhood in which he lives. The little desire he did possess to get out and meet the world has been completely repressed by the mother.

Mrs. A., Fred's mother, is considerably older than her husband. Their marriage was one of convenience rather than of love. Fred is their only child. Fred's father is a quiet person who does not voice his opinions or demands because of the feeling instilled by his wife that he is not competent. His only activities consist of going to work, gardening, and reading. He never goes out socially, and his neighbors scarcely know what he looks like. He was never very close to his son but left his rearing to the mother.

Fred was born when his mother was about 30. The mother had feared that she would never have any children. The boy was a sickly child, and the mother was over-solicitous. She feared that he would not live. His frailty continued until the coming of puberty; but he has been in excellent health since.

The marital relations of the husband and wife were apparently not satisfactory. Because of this fact and because she felt that her husband was below her social level, Mrs. A. turned more and more to her son and began to center her whole affection upon him. She tried to make his pattern of life for him.

From early infancy she gave him everything he wished. She skimped on household expenditures, denied herself and the father in order to buy for the son. She put most of the money into annuities and insurance policies for him, so that he would not have to be dependent on his father if she died. She was constantly degrading the father to the boy so that the boy built up no bond of companionship with or understanding of the father. The fact that the father was well into middle age during Fred's formative years doubtless contributed to the lack of closer contact between them.

For many years the mother was the boy's constant companion. He was

about four or five years old when she first let him play with the other children, but even then she dominated his every action; no new playmates could be acquired without her permission, and whenever possible she supervised the play. She did everything at her command to prevent his growing up. He was not permitted to do many things the other boys did, but always acted according to his mother's wishes.

He was not very successful in school, but his mother blamed the teachers for his poor work. She laid no responsibility on the boy himself. She praised him and defended him against his instructors. She had him change schools several times because she felt that the teachers did not understand him or treat him fairly.

By the time he graduated from high school, he was completely integrated into this way of life. He let his mother shift any blame to others. He heard himself praised for not being like other youth. On one or two occasions, when he tried to assert himself, to break away from her domination, she promptly shut him up in the house or punished him in some other way.

She has often said that her son is not going to marry "just any girl," but that she will find the right one for him when it is time for him to marry. He has never had any companionship with either sex.

When he graduated from high school, he had no ambition to go to college or to work. He has not worked one day since graduation; in fact, he has never even bothered to look for a job. His mother does not want him to leave his home; she is afraid that he might be overworked or mistreated. He stays home because it is what she wants. If he goes out, it is to a motion picture by himself in the afternoon. He never goes out at night, except perhaps to the neighbors, but then he always leaves promptly at eight o'clock and is in bed by nine because that is the time his mother retires.

Fred has never possessed any strong masculine traits or attitudes. His actions are infantile and tend to be increasingly feminine. He identifies himself entirely with his mother, imitating her actions and attitudes in all situations. He is what she made and demanded of him. His mother is the glass through which he sees the world. The attachment to his mother is complete, and he makes no effort to break away from these close ties.

The important factor in providing early training in independence and responsibility is the early induction of the child into social situations in such a way that his behavior is conditioned by the *essential*, not the extraneous, factors. It is not that accessory social habits and attitudes may not or should not be built up. *It is rather the quality of these habits and attitudes which is important.* Too often the associated patterns of behavior emphasize impulsiveness, childish power devices, and other poorly organized social-emotional acts which later may prove a handicap to adequate social adaptation. In like vein, if the growing child avoids any assumption of a moral rôle or tends to retreat to the parent in the face of any crisis in the long run he will not develop the adequate discrimination and choice so necessary to maturation. Even the revolt from parental domination, when carried out in an emotional fashion, may not mean mature responsibility or intelligent self-direction. We have all known instances of persons who, thinking to free themselves from what they believed to be intolerable circumstances by some rather drastic action, found themselves

an instance of the ancient proverb of being "out of the frying pan into the fire."

Independence, freedom, and responsibility are closely related. If their roots are not laid down early, it may be difficult for the individual to acquire their integration later. Failure to direct the child's handling of his drives and the situations related to the cycles of activity which normally follow from them may result in the retention of various devices for handling material and social situations which should belong only to the earliest years.

It is worth noting that the integration of independence with responsibility does not always take place with equal force in the varied areas of social interaction. We often become responsible in some matters and remain childish in others. Our rôle and status in different groups reflect this. The customs, laws, and traditions of various groups in which one participates will largely determine both the rôle and status of any given individual. In business and professional circles, for example, there is one set of standards and expectancies; another in the relations of parents to children, and in sex and marital life, in one's club or religious life, still others. One's responsibility likewise is related to group demands, and these will influence the levels of maturity and responsibility which one attains.

"There are various degrees or areas of maturity and responsibility. The person develops these qualities only in response to social demands and the influence of other people upon him. We remain impulsive, emotional, unstable, given to fear, anger, or uncontrolled affection, unless we have been trained otherwise. In short, maturation is for most persons a matter of levels or segments of their total personality. In some relations the individual may be hard-headed, able to direct his own affairs efficiently, while in others he may have continued at infantile and childhood levels of reaction, depending upon wheedling, tears, threats of violence, and numerous other methods which are common to children, but which by the general opinion of mature and well-balanced adults would be considered undesirable. As a matter of fact, we have actually come to accept as normal a great deal of this infantile and childish behavior. This is exemplified in the continued use by women of sexual appeal in order to win success in business, by the continued use of violence on the part of fathers in disciplining their children, by the emotional appeals of politics and religion. It is nowhere better illustrated than in the unchecked power which persons of wealth or of culturally inherited class status exercise over those around them. It is not uncommon to discover that a man who has followed all the expected patterns of our economic culture of consistency, responsibility, and objectivity in acquiring wealth uses his money and its prestige in exploiting his domestic help, his family, his children, and his friends." ⁴²

Changes in Self-image and Self-control. The progress toward heterosexuality, sense of responsibility, and independence from family ties means a change in the adolescent's concept of self and others. The former self-

⁴² Kimball Young, "Freedom, responsibility, and self-control," *Mental Hygiene*, 1937, 21:183. By permission.

images and more or less specific rôles as a dependent child will begin to be rejected. A feeling of adequacy and self-confidence will begin to appear. Frequently countered by crises in which the old world of security seems fallen apart, the adolescent feels rather helpless in the presence of newly evolving rôles and statuses. In such situations he may deny his growing up and revert to earlier dependency attitudes. One important feature of this period is the clarification of the masculine or feminine rôle. As a rule, in our society at least, the child identifies himself with each parent with the result that he shows some degree of bisexuality. The boy has some feminine tendencies, the girl some masculine ones. The period of adolescence usually sees a sharpening of the expected sex rôles with a consequent repression of certain inclinations to retain the older bisexual identity. Sometimes the boy or girl resists the cultural stress on assuming the adult rôle and status. The function of attachment of girls to some mother surrogate, as in relation to a camp supervisor or a teacher, is to avoid in part, the shift toward heterosexuality. So, too, the boy may be attached to a strong masculine figure, as a scout master or youth leader, or to his own group of sex-peers for a similar protective purpose. Although at times marked by "strain, conflict, confusion, and insecurity" ⁴⁸ the process, if successful, means, in time, an enlarged and different self-image. An important step is the further development of the generalized other or larger rôle. For the girl the core of this will be the dominant sex rôle which centers in marriage, child-bearing, and child-rearing. For the boy it will represent a fusion of his masculine rôle as sex-partner, carrier of economic responsibility, and status as head of a family. Moreover, as was pointed out above, this shift to a central and widely accepted rôle seems now to be simpler for the boy than for the girl. The reason for this lies in the shifting cultural image regarding the rôle of women in our society. Where the expectancies point toward a career for women, where there is an effort to escape the old pattern of wife and mother, the growing girl may have difficulty in handling the changing rôles and merging them into one. Some aspects of this will be discussed in Chapter 18.

Another important change in the self relates to the conscience or superego. The moral features of the childhood self are probably based largely on fear of parental punishment and fear of the loss of parental love. When strong and insistent sexual urges appear in puberty and thereafter, and as the boy or girl tries to get out from under parental domination, these earlier controls of the conscience are weakened. The shift to a new and more mature moral self, however, is not always easy. There is often conflict between sexual urges and conscience and between aggressiveness and anxiety. The loosening of the affectional and disciplinary bonds between parent and child may be helped by the shift to the importance of the latter's peers, by the attachment to other adult figures,

⁴⁸ Ackerman, *op. cit.*, p. 93.

as noted above, and by the attachment of the adolescent to "something larger than himself," such as, religious ideals or political-economic philosophies of a more perfect social order. Then, too, the shift in the function of the conscience may be aided by its externalization, as Ackerman terms it. For example, the youth may deny "personal responsibility for impulsive actions" only to find a strong need to be restrained from such actions by some external punitive force, usually some substitute for the former parental authority figure.⁴⁴

Certainly the parents may help a great deal in this whole process. As Bernard says: "Just as the adolescent must revise his image of himself in relation to others, especially his parents, so parents need to revise their picture of him and their rôle in the relation, as mother, father, and child evolve a changed, new basis of attachment."⁴⁵ It is not always easy for either adolescent or parent to make this shift. The parent of today is the adolescent of yesteryear and the adolescent of now will be the parent of tomorrow. The continuity of interactional patterns—already mentioned in many other connections—is apparent. To note only one further instance, again from Bernard: ". . . A son's normal assertion of independence may touch off the father's repressed hatred of his own father, inducing irrational terror and counter-attack against the boy."⁴⁶ It takes insight and emotional maturity on the part of a parent to hold in check such a response, yet if it is not inhibited it may but be another link in the chain of parent-adolescent conflict which may continue to mark one generation after another.

Such alterations in self-image and conscience necessarily bring us face to face with the problem of self-control. Self-control implies the predirection and coordination of one's impulses and acts, particularly as this direction and coordination center in some goal, ideal, or plan. It is characterized by foresight and control, determined by socialized consideration of the self in relation to others. It is closely linked up with freedom and responsibility and the idea that we can plan our lives in advance. Yet any plan must be coordinated with our deeper unconscious impulses, motives, and requirements of morality outside. The inadequacy of many of the older views lies in the assumption that the unconscious impulses and motives were animal, base, unworthy, and dangerous: it was up to us as individuals to repress them completely. Much of Christian and Judaistic morality was concerned with devices to negate and deny these biological urges which are fundamental to man's living. And, when later we discovered the truer meaning of these urges, there arose in the land a philosophy which said, in effect, "This is the way nature made us. One cannot do anything about these impulses; therefore follow them, since there is nothing else

⁴⁴ Ackerman, *op. cit.*, pp. 100-101.

⁴⁵ Viola W. Bernard, "Adolescence—its implications for family and community," *Family in a Democratic Society*, *op. cit.*, p. 140. By permission.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 137. By permission.

to do." Or "Nature 'intended' us to follow our impulses." This attitude is an admission that we have not yet learned how to manage and sublimate these so-called "baser" impulses.

Some of the specific factors to be taken into consideration in effecting a reunion of logic and intelligence with the deeper biological urges and emotions are the following:

"(1) We recognize that, although interests and wishes determine the aims or ends of living, these may be moralized and socialized in terms of the demands of our fellows. Recognition of the fact that the self arises from building up rôles and the status which others require of us should convince us that a full life can be had only when we recognize the anticipations or claims of others upon us.

"(2) The sacrifice of urges can be satisfactorily accomplished only by putting in their place socially accepted and tamer emotional outlets. It is important to remember that the more lasting, more permanent satisfactions arise not when we live in a world of highly emotionalized and impulsive ups and downs like a spoiled child or pampered adult, but when the emotions are less intense, perhaps, and more continuous, and correlated with intellectual interests and activities of a creative and artistic sort.

"(3) In love life itself, maturity is marked by mutual responsiveness, appreciation of and recognition of the sacredness of personality, that is, of the *self* of others. The mature individual will have cut himself loose from the mother's apron strings or broken his childish father fixation. He will show no traces of infantile temper tantrums in the face of denials or crises. He will show no projection of blame upon others when he cannot have his own way at every turn.

"(4) Strong hedonistic, pleasure-seeking impulses will be sublimated into self-expression in creative art which may bring prestige, although perhaps only from one's intimate friends and family. Or they may find their outlet in a deep and abiding love of righteousness, in allegiance to some high cause which aims at improving the conditions of living for all.

"(5) The remodeling of the major social situations in which we operate will assist in bringing about maturity. So long as large masses of men, women, and children remain in a condition of economic insecurity, they will be the victims of their emotions and urges for security, which will be played upon by every demagogue or would-be dictator who alleges that he will be their savior if they will only follow him and do his bidding. So long as we do not provide a culturally acceptable and sound outlet for fantasy thinking in children, so long as we deal impulsively with the child's emotions and fundamental habit training, so long as we ourselves as adults control children and adolescents as if they had only emotions and no intelligence, so long shall we continue to foster the difficulties of personal maturity which confront us on every hand." 47

If we consider the first few years as basic in the formulation of habits, attitudes, and ideas as they relate to rôle and status in various groups and as they relate to the conception of the self which one has, we must also recognize that the years of adolescence constitute a second most significant period of one's life in predetermining what one will do thereafter. As important as the earliest habits are in laying the foundation for the adolescent and adult adjustments, we must not neglect the fact that consti-

47 From Kimball Young, *op. cit.*, with slight changes from the original

tutional changes in the individual—especially those connected with sexual maturation—furnish one an organic basis for a reorganization of behavior which nobody could have predicted fully from the earlier years. So, too, new social contacts arising in these years may lead to a good deal of reconditioning of the boy or girl in attitudes toward themselves or in the choice of mates, occupation, religion, or politics; and, though these modifications are doubtless affected by infantile and pre-pubertal experiences, we cannot deny that the combination of an organic reorientation following puberty and exposure to new social contacts may lead to rather striking alterations in the life organization of an individual. Therefore, as important as the early years are, we must not neglect the fact that throughout life, but particularly until physical maturity is reached and occupational and marital adjustments are made, the individual may, under sufficient crisis from outside or sufficient alteration of internal and organic patterns, make considerable shifts in his major values and habits. It is a bit naïve to assume that the adult is completely unable to change his life or to redirect his energy and attention. Flexibility itself may become an ideal aim or goal, along with others, and the history of many great men and many unsung heroes of everyday life gives testimony to the fact that people do and may alter the course of their lives even after they have reached their socially accepted status as adults. All this is but a caution against too bold an assumption that infantile and adolescent experience furnishes the last word in human learning. Such a view ignores the dynamic nature of the human constitution and the ability of human society to modify its culture patterns and thus to influence its members, including adults.

CHAPTER 15

Pupil Adjustment in School

Next to the home stands the school in its profound effects upon the child. As Sumner put the matter, "Popular education and certain faiths about popular education are in the *mores* of our time."¹ The acceptance of formal education as a necessary part of man's adjustive equipment is a distinctive feature of our democratic ethos. The high values attributed to education are kept alive, in fact, by the social belief in progress and by legends of successful persons who account for their attainments in terms of education. The reverence for book learning has a long cultural history, and in our technological age, there is a strong conviction that personal achievement is greatly enhanced by virtue of having gone to school.

Yet the reverence for book-learning and high skill is giving way to a growing belief that the school should concern itself with the whole development of the individual and not remain merely a means of formal instruction. There is a trend toward centering the work of the school more on the child as a growing personality and less on the specific subject matter. More and more attention is given to the mental health of the child and adolescent with a view, as Thorpe says, "to better personality adjustments, more harmonious inter-personal relationships, socially acceptable recreational pursuits, and creative productivity."²

After a brief review of the essential aims and functions of education, the present chapter will take up some problems of personal adjustment as related to the learning process, the interactional patterns as they concern pupil-pupil and pupil-teacher contacts, the important matter of the personality of the teacher, and finally the rôle and status of the teacher in the community.

The formal aims of education may be summarized as follows: (1) Intellectual instruction is expected to pass on to the child and youth selected parts of accumulated knowledge. The school, as a carrier of culture, permits the individual to short-cut the acquisition of those parts of this vast storehouse of knowledge which he is expected to have on hand. With the coming of mass education it has become increasingly clear that

¹ W. G. Sumner, *Folkways* (Boston, Ginn and Company, 1906), p. 628.

² I. P. Thorpe, *The Psychology of Mental Health*, p. 558. Copyright 1950, by The Ronald Press Company. By permission.

individual differences in learning capacity have a bearing on the rate and amount of knowledge which a given child can acquire. (2) The child and youth must be trained in the skills and techniques which more or less have bearing on their future vocations, whether they will be hand-workers, white-collared clerks, salesmen, or executives. (3) Modern education has to do with the realization of the importance of good health and the acquisition of habits to maintain one's physical and mental well-being. (4) The school, both directly and indirectly, continues and elaborates the socializing and especially the moralizing processes already begun in the family and other primary groups. The rituals of flag-raising and singing the national anthem, the hearing of stories of national greatness, and the taking on of values of our democratic society serve to indoctrinate the rising generation in certain fundamental values. So, too, the Judaistic-Christian moral code is taught and practiced as additional components of our moral system. (5) Finally, the school provides forms of recreation and limited opportunity for esthetic expression as well as some instruction in esthetic taste and judgment.

The modern school, however, is by no means restricted to these formal functions. In truth, the informal and less standardized aspects of education are often the more important. The class as a group provides a type of social experience not obtainable elsewhere, with certain patterning of pupil-pupil and teacher-pupil relations. In their play life the children are further socialized in matters of status, rôle-taking, and certain values. And since the school is indebted to the community for its very existence the relations of the parents to the teachers and other school personnel are not without their effects upon the children. As a matter of fact we may express the basic interactional pattern of the educational system as a triangle. The child may be considered at the apex, and the parent and the teacher at the two angles along the base. What happens in any combination of two members may well be influenced by the concomitant relations of the two to the other members of this three-way relationship.

FACTORS IN THE LEARNING PROCESS

Assuming for the moment that the age of six marks his induction into formal education, we may well ask what such a child brings to the school. The importance of the familial and primary-group culture in this matter is still little recognized. It is too often believed that the child of ordinary health brings to the school a relatively untutored mind and a rudimentary set of skills and that upon these foundations the teachers must set to work to induct him into the world of formal learning. But the child is a dynamic personality loaded with all sorts of attitudes, habits, and ideas touching every aspect of his life—health, social, emotional adjustments, and intellectual matters. Obviously, differences in intellectual ability among the

entrants to school make problems of intellectual training; but, as we know, the learning process itself is not entirely a matter of intelligence as narrowly defined, but involves emotional and social qualities of all sorts. Thus, if the child is a pampered one suffering from overprotection at the hands of his parents, he may present a quite different problem in training than with a child who has already acquired a good deal of responsibility and independence of action, who has learned many important habits of self-reliance, who can handle his clothes, his personal needs, and the like in an intelligent fashion. Or a young child already loaded down with the projections of his parents' wishes upon him may find many features of the learning process too difficult. Or the shy, retiring, and introspective youngster may present to the teacher and to his fellow-pupils still another constellation of habits and attitudes toward which they will react. In other words, the child comes not merely as a potential learner of knowledge, skill, and moral and other socialized habits and attitudes, but as a personality already widely conditioned to a large number of aspects of life.

The teacher must begin with goals or aspirations learned from the child's home. But she must go on, of course, to change, enlarge, and add to these aims or goals. These added aims are related to cultural and social norms. The demands of good health, sound knowledge, adequate motor and mental skills, and morality represent some of the cultural acquisitions of the ages which help to short-cut the individual's entire adjustment to life. The child does not have to begin where ancient man began, but he begins instead with the cultural storehouse of his particular society.

Preparation for School and Early Contacts. Going to school for the first time is often something of a major crisis for the child. This is particularly true in one-child families or in small families whose child-members have never had any contact with the school. Moreover, some mothers view with anxiety, if not alarm, the sending of the young child to school. "He won't be my baby any more," as one mother put it. Mothers may fear possible accidents to the child as he goes to and from school. In many families, however, the child is gradually and favorably led to look forward to school. In others, on the other hand, a last-minute round of buying clothes, getting teeth fixed, being inoculated against certain diseases, and having a general health examination produce fuss and flurry that may enhance the sense of impending difficulties.

A study of Stendler and Young throws some light on how children and parents regard the initiation into school and how the first contact with the school influences attitudes. They interviewed 212 mothers in a medium-sized city of the Midwest regarding the first contacts of their children to school. The great bulk of the mothers reported that their children looked forward to attending school. The first two or three months—the period

*Celia B. Stendler and Norman Young, "The impact of beginning first grade upon socialization as reported by mothers," *Child Development*, 1950, 21:241-260

studied by Stendler and Young—showed that the “greatest task of adjustment is in the area of social relationships,” including “the problem of aggressiveness in other children,” and other aspects of their conduct which do not fit what the child had been taught at home to expect. As to socialization the mothers reported that the child’s sense of “responsibility, helpfulness, good humor, and independence” were improved. On the other hand, in learning to take directions, in self-control, and with respect to the mother’s authority and importance there was little, if any, change.

Going to school shifts the child’s attention away from the home to the teacher who is a mother-surrogate, at least in part, and to the child’s age-peers. The study by Stendler and Young also confirms a common observation that the child’s self-concept expands in the sense of “feelings of bigness and importance.” They found this to be true even of those youngsters who had previously gone to nursery school or kindergarten.

While the first grade of the traditional elementary school provides most children with their first contact with formal education, many middle-class parents do send their children to nursery schools or kindergartens. From an institutional point of view kindergartens symbolize a lessening of the traditional socializing function of the family. They are especially important for children from small families. They are helpful in that they provide contact with other children of the same age as well as help break the strong emotional bonds with the mother.

Individual Differences in Learning Capacity. We have already noted that the capacity to learn rests on both constitutional and social-cultural factors. The former concern the potentialities for acquiring new associations of stimuli and response, for improving the kind and quality of new reactions, and for differentiating and generalizing the various features of adaptation. Learning might, in this sense, be stated in terms of *power* and *speed*, and there are obviously marked individual differences in these matters. The sociocultural influences upon the learning process have to do with how intellectual ability is qualified or influenced by the level of culture and the nature of social interaction. One of the crucial problems in this connection has to do with individual variations in intelligence among pupils. No one doubts that there are measurable deviations in the mental abilities of children or adults in a given community or society or within an entire race. But we must not be misled by the contention that these differences are entirely the result of heredity or that, contrariwise, we may neglect the importance of social and cultural influences. (On the mechanisms of learning, see Chapter 4, on levels of intelligence and learning, see Chapter 14.)

Moreover, we must not forget that motivation and interest—though these are qualified by feelings and emotions—are also highly influenced by learning. We shall note below some instances in which emotional indifference is mistaken for lack of intellectual ability. Furthermore, we

shall see that such indifference is often the outgrowth of social factors both within the school and outside.

Mention of social factors leads at once to another significant feature of the learning process. There is a long-standing faulty belief that learning is entirely an individual matter, that it essentially concerns only the direct contact of the child with the material and social world. Among traditional psychologists only occasionally has adequate recognition been given to the essentially social, that is, *interactional*, nature of all learning. As a matter of fact, the *social act* is the framework in which all learning takes place, at least that which is fundamental to reflective and higher thought processes. As we noted in Chapters 7 and 8, reflection itself rests upon the development of the capacity to take the attitude of others toward oneself, or the attitude or characteristic of the material object toward the self, or the attitude of relationship of one material object to another. In truth, *reflection is self-reflection, and self-reflection is the outcome of social interaction*. Finally, symbolic reactions—chiefly those of language—permit an enormous range of anticipatory rôle-taking, of anticipatory manipulation of the material world around one—all in advance of direct and overt contact with persons or material things or both.

Applied to the school situation, this means not only that the overt interaction of pupils, of pupils and teachers, and of parents and pupils is a factor in learning, but that the internal image of such contact as well as of previous interactions is fundamental. Of course, this is not to deny or gainsay the place of constitutional differences in ability to perceive, to remember, to imagine, and to reorganize and conceptualize our experiences. But it does restate the learning process in terms of the larger social-cultural configuration in which it takes place.

Motivation and Control of the Learning Process. Motivation is as fundamental in school learning as in any other, and it becomes increasingly a special problem because traditionally many school authorities have assumed that it was of little or no consequence, or else they imagined that the high intellectual motivation of the trained scholar existed in the elementary and secondary pupil and certainly in the college student. Obviously, motive is closely linked to the goal toward which the individual strives. Failure to secure the end or goal means that the person experiences a gap between his aspirations and his achievements. In a society marked by strong social stimulation for upward social mobility the discrepancy between aspiration and achievement may induce many disturbances of personality.

The goals set before the child in school reflect those of the society outside, and the teacher stimulates the child to set an aim or task and to develop a plan or method of attaining it. Both intellectual and emotional factors come into play in deciding on the aim and in working out a plan for reaching it. The school gives, through the curriculum, the institutional

framework for both the goal and the plan. These are superimposed upon the child. And the discipline in connection with the carrying out of the plan is likely to take on external forms of ordering and forbidding or of direct interference with the child's way of learning. But freedom of choice is important. When properly associated with responsibility, it becomes a most important aspect of maturation. But two limitations of freedom of choice must be noted: (1) those of the curriculum, representing the accumulation which society believes should be transmitted to the rising generation, and (2) those rules and practices of pedagogy and school administration which have been developed in connection with this transmission. Such items as classroom arrangements, laboratory and library regulations, and methods of procedure are illustrative. These latter make up the formal culture of the school.

Within whatever broad limits the school permits, freedom of choice as to task and plan is fundamental. When the child is motivated from within, when his interest is aroused, there are set in motion responses which normally lead to a rewarding completion of a given task. Yet there must also be some control in these matters.

In the school, as outside, the most fundamental control and discipline arise (1) from activity in a situation in which the individual learns the limits of his own ability, (2) from the limiting effects of the material or medium with which he is working, and (3) from holding to his plan—that is, disciplining himself—until it is completed. The rewards should come out of the successful completion of a task through planned procedure. Not that external rewards may not have their place, but maturity is marked by the internalization of the reward in the sense of satisfaction from completion, the realization of having fulfilled our own as well as others' expectations of our rôle and goal. In short, success is one of the bases upon which maturation rests.

Place of Competition and Coöperation. The manner in which the pupil is supposed to achieve his aims or goals is through competition with his classmates. The rewards for success are expressed in school marks, promotion, graduation, special prizes, awards, and various honors. This struggle takes on various social configurations. It may be among pupils in a given classroom. But in addition, the children may be organized into somewhat artificial groups, as when the teacher, to "motivate" the pupils, as she puts it, pits one row of pupils against another, or segregates the girls of the class from the boys in some contest of learning. Or one grade may be put into competition with another in a neighboring school, or an entire school unit is deliberately obliged to compete with another.

Most often, of course, this last sort of struggle is confined to interscholastic athletics, debating, declamation contests, and drama and music festivals, but such interschool rivalry may and does touch the more strictly academic matters. Foreign observers who come from school systems where

this competitive pattern is not so highly developed are often amazed at the amount of attention given to the mere mechanics and social rituals associated with this competitive pattern of our American education.

In our schools excessive competition seems to have the following influences on various pupils: (1) there are usually discouragement and despair for the slow learners; (2) for the average pupil there tend to be either excessive emotional stress and worry or the development of a "get by" attitude; (3) often a superlative, unwarranted opinion and optimism regarding their abilities develops among the fast learners, especially those who have a capacity to manage the types of more or less rote learning which characterizes so much of our traditional course of study; and (4) there arises pretty generally an "attitude of aggressive non-coöperation" marked by a striking indifference to the fate and welfare of other pupils and a strong fear or anxiety of losing caste if one fails to maintain his expected position in the class grading scheme.

In contrast, when the pupils are in a situation which calls for genuine coöperation among them in the accomplishment of some goal, aim, or project, their behavior tends to be featured by the following: (1) there is a common determination by the pupils to attack the problems to be investigated; (2) on the basis of a given project the pupils coöperate in the planning of work necessary to solve the problem; (3) there are shared effort and responsibility for an adequate solution of the task; (4) there is a common credit or blame for the success or failure of a given project.

The competitive pattern, therefore, stimulates intensive person-to-person struggle for rôle, status, and reward. It throws into play emotional reactions of aggressiveness, fear, and anger if the activity is frustrated at any point. It tends to overstress the narrowly egoistic element at the expense of the sympathetic. The coöperative pattern, in contrast, puts its emphasis upon that form of interaction which calls out mutual aid and sympathetic understanding of others, and which stimulates identification of the self with the symbols and reward of the group rather than of the individual. It is not that competition does not enhance effective effort—it does, and it is not necessarily absent in coöperative activities where each may rival another in making a worthwhile contribution to the total product anticipated. But the major limitation of intensive competition is that it tends to dissolve the lines of free give-and-take interaction and throw the *social act* back to the level of person-to-person antagonism, which dries up the springs of sympathy and the sharing of experience that is so important in the process of socialization.

Clearly those children who, from constitutional handicaps, intellectual inferiorities, or previous cultural and social conditioning, or for other reasons, fail to make good in this competitive activity lose status, are reduced to less acceptable rôles, and otherwise suffer at the hands of their fellows, their teachers, their parents, and others in the community. The terrific

pressure of the school for success in terms of the competitive pattern often produces serious maladjustments in children, in adolescents, and even in young adults.⁴

The Effects of Failure. Although the motivation for high achievement is constantly stimulated in the classroom, failure may not always have serious effects on the child. Sometimes the child has abilities beyond his belief, and a failure, if properly interpreted to him, may serve to stimulate greater effort to gain his goal. In the second place, failure at a task may produce a sense of reality regarding one's limitations, and again with adequate guidance a child may direct his activities into other fields where he has potential competence. But all too frequently these qualifications of advice and personal sense of reality on the part of the pupil are not recognized. It all depends on how the sense of failure is integrated into the pupil's life organization. If it produces a strong sense of inferiority and loss of status, a retreat into non-communicative fantasy, or overt misbehavior, it may have decidedly negative effect. As a rule, knowledge of previous failures, associated as it is with self-esteem and status, leads the student to enter a new learning situation in an emotional state less favorable to effective performance than would knowledge of success.

In this connection the emotional as well as other waste involved in school retardation must be tremendous. The backward child in school is an indictment of the educational institution and, in part, of our entire culture. All too often it means that the retarded children are intellectually and in terms of interest incapable of handling the work laid down in the standard curriculum. In the face of repeated failure inner emotional distress or escape into truancy and delinquency is common.

It is difficult to know precisely the extent of school retardation, but estimates indicate that it is high as 15 to 20 per cent of the total number of children in school.⁵ Not all of these children are emotionally disturbed but various studies do show that symptoms of maladjustment are often acute among those who are retarded. The Miami Valley Mental Health Survey, directed by Mangus, reported that in a sample of 1,232 children from the third and sixth grades respectively, one in eight were retarded. An interesting sex difference was revealed. One in thirteen of the girls in these classes were retarded as compared to one in six of the boys. Of the misfits, over one-half were rated as "poorly adjusted." As to intelligence, 42 per cent "were within the range of normal intelligence with I.Q.'s of 90 and above," and only 3 or 4 per cent were "in the category of mental deficiency." Yet all needed some special instruction and help, among other things in learning to read in overcoming a deep sense of inferiority, and in avoid-

⁴ For a critical review, with bibliography, on the whole topic of competition and cooperation, see M. A. May and L. W. Doob, *Competition and Cooperation*, Bulletin No. 25 (New York, Social Science Research Council, 1937).

⁵ A. R. Mangus, "Effect of mental and educational retardation on personality development of children," *American Journal of Mental Deficiency*, 1950, 55: 208-212.

ing the drift toward delinquency. Mangus summarizes the findings in these words:

"As a group they were notably lacking in self-confidence, self-esteem, and a sense of personal worth. . . . Also they showed lack of security in their social relations and tended to feel that they did not belong in the groups in which they were placed. . . . They were considerably below par with respect to withdrawing tendencies, neurotic symptoms, family relations, and school relations."⁶

The implications of such experiences for later life are hard to state, but studies of juvenile delinquency have repeatedly shown that many of these offenders were children who did not get along well in school. So, too, many manifestations of neuroticism among adults may stem, in part, from earlier maladjustment in school. What we need, of course, is a type of curriculum from which the slow learners can benefit. This may mean a lowering of the levels of aspiration for such individuals but certainly it is unwise to try to force children to learn subjects that are definitely beyond their intellectual capacity. Unfortunately our emphasis on competitiveness and personal achievement tends to foster the practice of obliging such children to tackle materials which will never have any meaning for them while they neglect the acquiring of knowledge, skill, and moral values which will help them to grow up to be useful citizens.

The whole relation of goal to success or failure may be stated in terms of the nature of the ideal or image toward which we strive. First, the ideal may be too trivial, too simple, or too low in the scale of intellectual or moral appeal to catch the interest or arouse a motive. Second, the goal may be too complex, too difficult, for the capacity. Third, a goal may be entirely lacking; there is nothing to catch the pupil's interest. In any one of these the incongruity of the task, the plan, and freedom may give rise to indifference, retreat, rebellion, or disintegration through mental-emotional conflict within the person, and these in their turn will influence self-esteem, status, rôle, and conduct generally.

SOME PROBLEMS OF PUPIL ADJUSTMENT

The gradual shift from the school centered on subject-matter to the one focused on the child has brought with it a growing recognition of the need not only to improve teaching as it bears on social-emotional learning, but also to furnish special means of helping pupils to face their personal problems. Various programs of guidance and counseling have been developed. Some of these are integral parts of the school system itself; others are privately supported but work closely with the schools. This is not the place to discuss the many facets of school counseling, but the chief aims, areas, and techniques may be briefly noted.⁷

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 210. By permission.

⁷ For an excellent overview and extensive bibliography of the entire field of counseling, not only in educational institutions, but in industry and elsewhere, see A. H. Bray-

The aim of educational counseling is to help individuals to make better adjustments to themselves and to others. Its chief areas include efforts to improve the mental health of pupils, to advise them in regard to their educational programs, and to offer guidance in the matter of vocational training and choice. Our concern here is with the first of these, and particularly with problems involving social-emotional difficulties, such as anxiety, hostility, sense of inferiority, loss of status, and the like. Most counseling consists of a person-to-person conversation and discussion. To be successful there must be good rapport between counselor and pupil and, if there are repeated sessions, a certain amount of transference. The wise counselor usually begins with the specific difficulty which brought the pupil to him in the first place, but anything beyond the most superficial interview usually leads to attempts to get at the inner and deeper sources of trouble as well as more complete examination of the situations in which the difficulties are most acute.

The rôle of the counselor has been the topic of much discussion. Counseling techniques range all the way from direct instruction and advice—"telling the client what's the matter with him and what to do about it"—to more or less passive or so-called non-directive therapy. Most systems of counseling use an eclectic approach and try to use the techniques which seem to fit the particular case best. (Some aspects of interviewing techniques are discussed in Chapter 11; we need not repeat the discussion here.)

What Constitutes a Personality Problem in School. In the face of a poorly organized frame of reference for his education, the child or adolescent may develop varied attitudes. Among other types of response and attitudes are these: (1) one of resistance and rebelliousness, which may be either attitudinal or more directly overt; (2) one of indifference and lack of effort—the simple schizoid symptom; (3) one of complete conformity and passive docility, marked by loss of individual initiative; and (4) removal by means of fantasy, which usually takes covert form, but may in extreme instances find overt outlet. Any one of these four or a combination of them, means that the student is not making an adequate adaptation to the educational situation as demanded by our cultural norms. These attitudes do not demonstrate anything particularly abnormal so much as they indicate failure to reach a goal which approaches maximum effectiveness. As in other life situations, of course, individuals vary greatly among themselves in the level of adaptation and in the degree to which they fulfill their potentialities. "Just getting by" in school perhaps is after all a pre-pattern for that same attitude and level of performance later in

life. But, measured against the expected norms of education and personality adaptation, this is not enough.

How traditional teachers and experts in child development regard these responses and attitudes may diverge sharply. While it is to be hoped that the standpoint of mental hygiene has gradually infiltrated the handling of classroom problems, the findings of Wickman undoubtedly still apply to many of our school systems.⁶ He secured extensive listings and ratings by teachers in Minneapolis and in Cleveland as to what they considered the kinds and seriousness of behavior problems among their pupils. Certain rating scales of pupil personality were also used. He then asked 30 experts in mental hygiene to list and qualify the conduct manifestations of children which they thought to be evidence of poor adjustment and which, in turn, might be regarded as indicative of future personality maladjustments. The listings and ratings of teachers and mental hygienists were then compared. Some rather striking divergences were evident.

The teachers, on the whole, considered dishonesty, immorality, and transgressions against authority as the most serious behavior traits and recessive, withdrawing characteristics the least serious. Between these extremes they rated violations of orderliness in the classroom and failure to apply oneself to schoolwork as somewhat more serious than extravagant and aggressive behavior. The mental hygienists practically reversed the teachers' ratings. They regarded withdrawing, recessive personality traits as the most serious and violations of authority and lack of orderliness in the classroom as least serious. In the middle range they rated dishonesty, cruelty, temper tantrums, and truancy as more serious than immoralities, extravagant conduct, and violations of the requirements of schoolwork.

The differences in interpretation of personality traits and conduct represent divergences in professional interest and understanding. Teachers emphasize

"the importance of problems relating to sex, dishonesty, disobedience, disorderliness and failure to learn. For them, the problems that indicate withdrawing, recessive characteristics in children are of comparatively little significance. Mental hygienists, on the other hand, consider these unsocial forms of behavior most serious and discount the stress which teachers lay on anti-social conduct. . . ."

In evaluating these findings we must bear in mind divergences in both standpoint and rôle. As Wickman says:

"In interpreting these findings it is essential to bear in mind that the clinicians, unlike teachers, were not laboring under pressure for educating children according to prevailing curricula and thus were not especially sensitized to those prob-

⁶ F. K. Wickman, *Children's Behavior and Teachers' Attitudes* (New York, Commonwealth Fund, 1928). Subsequent quotations by permission.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 129-130.

lems in behavior which disturb or frustrate the teachers' interests in the educational achievement of pupils. Moreover, in making their ratings, the clinicians were influenced, both by their particular professional interests and by specific instructions, to consider (1) the effect produced on the future development and on the social, emotional adjustment of the child by the possession of any behavior problem which is allowed to run its usual course; and (2) the need for remedial work, and the nature of remedial efforts, in treating the behavior disorders in questions."¹⁰

In their reactions to pupil conduct the teachers are still reflecting pretty largely the traditional parental attitudes toward young children. It is questionable how far the teachers are prepared to go in diverging from the traditionally expected standpoint regarding behavior problems among their pupils. At any rate, combined with their heavy teaching load, this customary view furnishes an understandable rationalization for not making much effort to change the old-established schemes of teaching. (See below.)

The Extent of Maladjustment in the Schools. There is no precise information on the extent of maladjustment in the elementary and secondary schools of the United States. Not only do we lack any adequate survey of the country as a whole, but the criteria by which we would determine sound mental health are not at hand. However, the studies by Mangus and his collaborators, noted above, do give us some suggestive information from the area which they investigated. For example, they gave an inventory of nervous traits, eight in number, to 543 children in the first grade of the Butler County public schools in Ohio. Only county school-children were studied. For this sample, "nail biting, frequent colds, undue tiredness, and bad dreams top the list of nervous traits."¹¹ It was found further that boys showed more nervous traits than girls. Those with I.Q.s above 120 had fewer nervous traits than did those who rated below 120 on intelligence tests. Retarded children showed a higher incidence of nervousness than the others. In another study of 1,638 children in the fourth, fifth, and sixth grades in the public schools of the same county more complete data on self-adjustment and social adjustment were obtained. Among other findings, the following are most noteworthy: (1) Intelligence or learning capacity was found to be more closely correlated with personality adjustment, as measured by the inventory used, than any other factor used to divide the group, such as sex, urban-rural residence, sibling position, or marital status of parents. (2) On the whole the girls revealed less maladjustment than the boys. "Only in freedom from nervous symptoms did boys excel girls" (3). There were no consistent differences among the rural farm, non farm rural, and urban children

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 129.

¹¹ R. H. Woodward and A. B. Mangus, "Nervous traits among first-grade children in Butler County schools," [Hamilton, Ohio, The Butler County Mental Hygiene Association, July, 1949]. (A pamphlet.)

Farm children excelled in sense of personal worth, in freedom from withdrawing tendencies and from nervous symptoms, but "they rated lowest in a sense of personal freedom." (4) As to sibling position in the family, the results showed some advantage for oldest children and for only children, especially if the latter were girls. (5) Children from homes broken by death, desertion, or divorce had lower mental health ratings than those from unbroken homes. But the differences are significant only for the girls. "Boys from broken homes were as well adjusted as were those from unbroken homes except in cases of boys whose parents were divorced." (6) Retardation in school is significantly correlated with maladjustment.¹²

For high-school students this survey brought out still other contrasts. By comparing the scores of the top 20 per cent with those of the bottom 20 per cent, some striking differences are revealed: (1) Girls did better than boys in items dealing with emotional maturity, sense of personal security, social skills, social participation, and in outlook and life goals. Boys did better on items on emotional stability and in freedom from concern with real or imagined physical defects. (2) Rural boys and girls had higher scores than their city cousins "in emotional maturity, sense of personal security, emotional stability, freedom from nervous mannerisms, and in social participation." (3) Retarded students revealed less satisfactory adjustment scores than did the nonretarded; also those with higher-than-average I.Q.s had higher scores than those with lower intelligence ratings. (4) As with elementary pupils, only and oldest children did better on the inventory than youngest and middle siblings.¹³

Some Illustrative Cases. Statistical findings give us information as to the extent of such difficulties, but they tell us nothing about the interpersonal and other circumstances that helped induce them. To put meaning, therefore, on the bare bones of averages and percentages, we have selected three cases to illustrate some rather common problems among elementary and high-school pupils.

(1) The first example is one in which a combination of felt inferiority, social inadequacy, and poor teaching operated to produce some temporary troubles which, if not corrected, might have become more serious.

Case of Grace W., thirteen years old. Grace had been sent to a "Special B Class" (a so-called "opportunity room" for a variety of scholastically maladjusted children). A notation on the Binet-Simon test which accompanied her transfer stated that she was feeble-minded. "She was blank," stated the teacher from

¹² A. R. Mangus and R. H. Woodward, "An analysis of the mental health of elementary school children" (Hamilton, Ohio, The Butler County Mental Hygiene Association, July, 1949) (A pamphlet.)

¹³ A. R. Mangus and R. H. Woodward, "An analysis of the mental health of high-school students" (Hamilton, Ohio, The Butler County Mental Health Association, July, 1949) (A pamphlet.) See also, A. R. Mangus and J. R. Seeley, "Mental health needs in a rural and semi-rural area of Ohio" (Hamilton, Ohio, The Butler County Mental Health Association, Feb. 1950) (A pamphlet.)

whose class Grace had been sent. Grace had failed in every school subject in this grade except spelling and penmanship. The girl was in evident good health and had passed into puberty nearly a year previously.

The family record was meager. The father was an engineer whose work had taken him over widely separated sections of the United States, and Grace had been enrolled in many schools in her few years of education. The family was in good economic condition. There was no evidence of any marital conflict.

Grace was an only child, and the mother spent much time in caring for her. Even at the age of thirteen years, the mother did many things for the child which other girls of the same age would have resented. The girl was untramed in any household duties, although the mother did all the housework. Grace was allowed to do about as she pleased, but she had few friends and apparently indulged in a good deal of daydreaming, though she would never admit it. She went about "in a daze," as her study-room teacher put it. If asked a question, she was likely to answer not that particular query, but one asked some moments previously. She never saw the point of any joke. Her attention was apparently distracted by her inner thoughts.

At the outset the teacher of the "special" class left Grace pretty much to tasks of spelling, penmanship, copying simple drawings, and the like. But her uniformly good work in spelling and penmanship made the teacher wonder in time if the child really were feeble-minded. On the other hand, the child became literally panic-stricken whenever anything suggesting arithmetic was mentioned to her. She was likewise negativistic to other academic subjects. The precipitating as well as predisposing causes of Grace's difficulties were more or less accidentally uncovered.

Several months after Grace had been in the special room, the teacher was on occasion demonstrating to a small group of children, which did not include Grace, various ways of handling fractions. Grace became interested from overhearing the teacher's explanation, and became greatly excited when the teacher remarked, "Here is another arrangement, an old-fashioned one, but good nevertheless." The teacher added: "I will leave these methods in sight. Take any one you want. I will be satisfied so long as you know what and why you do anything. Stick to the one you like until you can do the work without mistake, and never mind the stepladder arrangement in the textbook, unless you like it." On hearing this, Grace got to her feet, went to the blackboard, and somewhat shyly pointed to the "old-fashioned method," saying, "Can I do that?" "Certainly," replied the teacher, though, when she handed the child a piece of crayon and told her to go over the problem step by step, Grace was so agitated that she could not hold the chalk. The teacher then put her arm round the girl's shoulder and said they should try it together. After the two had gone over the method, and later when Grace had gone over the problem alone, the girl broke down and cried in the teacher's arms. Like a little child she remarked through her tears: "I did it that way. Daddy showed me. But Miss Jones (the 6A teacher) said it was crazy."

The basic factors in Grace's difficulties were soon exposed. She had been ill with spinal meningitis when she was just learning to add. When she was well enough to return to school, she was promoted with her grade and was never taught how to borrow and carry. Now in the sixth grade, faced with applying her previous knowledge, she had resorted to a method which had been hastily taught her by her father, only to have the teacher tell her not to do it, and send her back to her seat in disgrace. Being a sensitive child and exceedingly at ease, she responded in a negative manner to such treatment and soon gave the teacher the impression that she was stupid. Later, faced with a mental test situation, the girl had re-

treated into herself and had remained uncoöperative. The result was that the psychologist who tested Grace in her report tended to confirm Miss Jones's judgment about the child's inherent stupidity.

Within a week following the dénouement, Grace was participating in the review class in arithmetic, became interested in doing additional homework so as to return to her proper grade of work, and, above all, began to participate with the other children in their social life. Altogether she remained for two years in the special class.

However, in this time, not only did she learn to master the essentials of arithmetic and other scholastic subjects, but, having shown real aptitude in domestic science, she was prepared, when she finished the eighth grade, to enter a technical high school. Although her father and mother objected to a vocational course for their daughter, they came to realize that it fitted her interest and ability better than the regular academic course. Grace made a good record throughout her four years and upon graduation went into a supervisory position at a good salary.

(2) The second example is one in which poor schoolwork, inadequate ability, fantasy, and the inception of minor delinquency might, if uncorrected have led to more serious difficulties. The excellent coöperation of the school authorities with the parent and child made possible a real beginning for vocational and other success for this girl.

Case of Esther N., twelve and a half years old. This girl, who was in the sixth grade, was brought to the psychological clinic by the visiting teacher, who had been asked to help the juvenile judge of the community to decide what to do about the child. Esther had been brought to the judge's attention informally on the ground that she had admitted taking small amounts of money from her employers. It was felt that perhaps the school authorities and the juvenile judge together might work out a plan to prevent the development of more serious delinquencies.

Esther was failing in her schoolwork. She was inattentive, came to school poorly prepared, and found increasing difficulty, especially with fractions. She spent three or four afternoons a week in the motion-picture houses, sometimes remaining through two full shows. This often caused her to arrive home at a late hour, where after a bit of supper she went off to bed. She had little or no spending money from home, and often went out in the afternoons or evenings to tend children for other families in order to earn small amounts of money. It was her desire to get more money for admission tickets that led her to short-change some of her employers or to lift petty sums from the homes where she worked. She had never taken anything beyond small change, although she had had on occasion the opportunity to take rather substantial sums.

Esther was one of a large family. The father, although not ill-natured, was shiftless and indifferent to the traditional rôle of provider. He worked spasmodically and chiefly only during the seasonal peak of employment. He spent most of his spare time loafing about in pool-halls. As a result, the mother had been forced to seek work outside the home. One older girl had a small job in a downtown office and contributed in part to her own keep. The children were frequently left to shift for themselves. Although Esther took over some responsibility for the care of her younger brothers and sisters, such responsibility was never planned or organized, so that she had much free time for her own amusement.

The girl got along with others very well. Her success in handling smaller children, in fact, provided employment from various families who wished her

to look after their youngsters while they were out in the afternoons or evenings. She enjoyed telling stories, making doll clothes, and otherwise entertaining the children. In fact, she had a real talent in sewing.

But, as indicated, Esther was failing in school; she had begun to lose her reputation with her friendly employers because of her petty stealing; and she was not developing any adequate responsibility toward her family. The psychological examination showed that she had a dull-normal rating on the Stanford-Binet test (86 I.Q.); but the girl was certainly not feeble-minded. She not only spent much of her leisure time at motion pictures, but was increasingly engaged in elaborate daydreams of her future. She pictured herself as a movie actress. She lived so completely in the fantasy world that she was beginning to lose some of her sense of actuality.

An interesting detail regarding the stimulation of the daydreaming about motion pictures came out in the interview with the psychologist. She told him that some four years previously she and some other children had put on a "song and dance act" during an evening's entertainment at one of the local picture houses, on which occasion the central attraction had been the personal appearance of Baby Peggy, a child actress of that period. Esther had talked briefly to Baby Peggy and from this minor contact had got the idea that she might become a child actress and then go on to adult success.

It was apparent that this domination of a daydream which had no chance of being fulfilled might in time lead to complete school failure and to serious delinquencies. It was also evident that the child did not possess sufficient intelligence to go on to the usual academic high-school course. But she did have skill in sewing and handwork. Although she was by age and grade not yet eligible for vocational training, it was arranged that she was to spend her afternoons in the city's vocational school, doing only a portion of her classes at the other school. (She was in a parochial school, and the priest in charge had cooperated very well in the new plan.) The visiting teacher talked to the mother, as did the priest, and the mother agreed with Esther that she should attend not more than one motion picture a week. In addition, she was given some definite responsibilities at home. And some of her previous employers were quietly reassured that they need not fear her repeating her indiscretions with money, so she was again able to earn some spending money.

Esther entered wholeheartedly into the new program. She liked her work in sewing and millinery at the vocational school. She got a genuine sense of success from making dresses and hats. Three years later the visiting teacher reported excellent progress. Already, at the age of sixteen years, Esther was being employed outside school hours as a seamstress, and, moreover, she "loved her work."

(3) In this next instance, loss of family and of the supporting high social status produced a sense of inadequacy and a loss of self-confidence. The case indicates the close relationship between external support and attitudes, traits, and rôles. John, despite his excellent home training, was in no way prepared to meet the crisis which faced him at the coming of puberty. Within the orbit of his family, church, and small community he had been well adjusted. With the loss of social prestige, he had difficulty in reorientating himself. But high intellectual ability and congenial treatment from his teachers did much to bring about a change in his conception of his rôle and status and put him again on the road to an adequate adjustment.

Case of John B., seventeen years old. In his third year in high school, John began having difficulty with his speech. Although his stammering was first apparent in a speech class when he was obliged to make a formal oral presentation of certain materials, in time his recitation in other classes began to be affected by a like hesitation. But this difficulty was clearly linked to a definite sense of difference and inadequacy. There was no evidence of any organic vocal defect.

John was the oldest of three sons of a popular and well-paid minister in a town of 3,000 inhabitants. There were no daughters. The mother was also active in church work, and the family enjoyed high social standing in the community. As John grew up, he was given certain responsibilities, such as answering the door, receiving guests or callers, and helping to see that all visitors, formal and otherwise, were made comfortable. He was even permitted to drive the family carnage in order to take guests home. He learned to play the piano with tolerable success, and was good at giving oral readings at church festivals. He was always tidy and well-dressed, was given a fixed allowance, and altogether—within the framework of his home and community—was a well-adjusted and mature chap for his age.

But tragedy reached into the family. The father died very unexpectedly after an illness of short duration, and within a few months the mother also passed away. The three boys had practically no resources, and they were thrown upon the good will and charity of an uncle and aunt who lived on a farm some distance away.

These relatives were none too well off financially, and, though they took good care of the boys, the latter had to work hard on the farm. Moreover, the family had no particular community status, a change which John, in particular, felt most keenly. He was no longer a minister's son, and people did not put themselves out to be nice to him. He began to feel sorry for himself, to imagine that people looked down upon him. He was lonely and unhappy, and after three years of this he grew rebellious and ran away to a nearby city. He secured a job as an elevator boy and entered high school as soon as he had sufficient funds for the books and small fees.

He made good grades in all his work but speech. He could not face the class, and his stammering began to affect his success in other classes. He had lost his former self-confidence.

His speech teacher and the clinical psychologist both interviewed him. It was indicated to him that he had superior intellectual ability (as measured by a group intelligence test), that he had moderately good looks, and that despite his reticence he made friends rather easily. His bitterness toward his uncle and aunt were shown to be largely of his own imagination. It was pointed out to him that they had done the best they could. It was stressed that a boy of such excellent abilities and with sufficient drive to seek further education on his own responsibility had no reason to feel ashamed of his need to work his way through school, or for his lowly social status. This interest in him and the confidential relationship built up between the clinical psychologist and the boy helped restore his self-esteem. Both the clinician and the speech teacher helped him to overcome his stammering and stage fright. And, while they were offering technical advice regarding his speech, they reiterated his assets in the way of ability and pointed out that his reorientation was largely a matter of his own determination.

Within a few weeks he had shown considerable improvement. He made more friends, joined a debating society, and in his senior year was the leading debater in the school. When he graduated from high school, his prospects were good for going on to college, even though he would have to support himself. He had re-

gained his self-reliance and had developed an aspiration in keeping with his superior ability.

From such cases as those just presented, as from many others, it is clear that both home and school contribute to the success or failure of the child's educational performance. Schoolwork in the past centered chiefly in the intellectual acquirements of knowledge and special skills, but it is becoming increasingly evident that the social-emotional training will have more stress in the future. Though written many years ago the comment of Van Waters is most pertinent:

"The school is not responsible for the emotional attitudes with which the pupils enter, but the school should frankly realize that success, or failure, will be determined, not by intelligence of students, nor by richness of the course of study, but in the degree of skill with which it develops the emotional life of children. In each student crises arise, seemingly without adequate basis, the everyday matters of the first school success, or failure, first punishment, humiliation, reward, criticism, ridicule, undetected cheating, or unmerited approval will serve as the core around which a cluster of emotional habits will cling."¹⁴

There is everywhere a growing conviction that the school as an institution should be designed not only to transmit the culture of the past but to serve as a basic center, along with the home, for the fundamental training of the whole personality. This means that the teacher as well as the subject-matter becomes increasingly significant. In the next section we shall discuss some of the problems of the teacher as a personality.

THE RÔLE AND STATUS OF THE TEACHER

Elementary school teaching is largely in the hands of women, the ratio to men being something on the order of 15 or 20 to 1. As an occupational group the great bulk of them have rural or small-town backgrounds and typify lower middle-class and Protestant culture.¹⁵

The teacher, especially at the level of the nursery school, kindergarten, and elementary grades, is in large measure a mother-surrogate. In our society she takes over from the culture of the family and home the patterns of authority, discipline, advice, love, and sympathy for the child. At the very time in our society when the child is in the process of emancipating himself from the maternal hold on him, we provide him with an institution which precipitates him at once into the care of another woman.¹⁶ This

¹⁴ Miriam Van Waters, *Youth in Conflict* (New York, New Republic Publishing Co., 1925), p. 97. By permission.

¹⁵ L. A. Cook and Elmer F. Cook, *A Sociological Approach to Education* (New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1950), Chap. 18.

¹⁶ Since such a large fraction of the teachers in the American elementary and secondary schools are women, the common practice of referring to them, as the feminine gender will be followed, likewise, to avoid awkward phrasing the problem for the child will be more acute, though it is apparent that the problem of the woman teacher is somewhat different for the girl than it is for the boy. For in other instances the child is kept more

practice, of course, reflects two of our somewhat contrasted cultural values; first, the dominant place of women and especially the mother in the whole field of child training, and, second, the low social status which we give to elementary teaching. Precisely what this feminine rôle means for the child's training no one really knows, but that it does effect the growing self of the boy or girl no one can deny. The well-known sentimentality of American men regarding women, for instance, must have some of its origin not only in the home but in the classroom as well. Moreover, the matter is complicated by the fact that an overwhelming percentage of our women teachers are unmarried. This means that many problems of their own social sexual adjustment affect their reactions to their pupils.

While there are more men teachers at the high school level, the predominance of women is clear, the ratio being 5 or 6 to 1.¹⁷ This means that feminine controls carry into the period of puberty and early adolescence, a fact which may complicate the personal adjustment of pupils in that age group.

Personality Problems of Teachers. Young children pick up the verbal and visual stereotypes about teachers from their parents, neighbors, and playmates. These images vary somewhat: some are of the firm, dignified, stern spinster.¹⁸ Quite another kind is that of the "self-sacrificing, gentle, kindly, self-effacing creature, overworked, underpaid, but never out of patience."¹⁹ In a sense the images of the teacher may be thought of as lying along a continuum. At one end is the severe, authoritarian figure, at the other the kindly, coöperative, and democratic type. Under certain circumstances the parents and even the children expect the teacher to assume a rôle similar to the former. At other times and in other situations she is expected to take the opposite rôle. Some of the implications of this dual rôle will be discussed below when we take up pupil-teacher relations. Certainly there is no evidence that teachers have a special and unique type of personality. This is not to say, however, that they do not reveal certain personality difficulties. They do. But whether the incidence of neurotic symptoms among them as a group is higher than in other occupational groupings is not known. Certainly teachers are faced with many of the same psychological problems as other adults and we know that these are connected with family relations, sex and love life, physical health, and sense of inferiority. These, in turn, are linked up with frustration, aggression, and anxiety. In meeting these problems, teachers, like others,

or less within a social-cultural configuration which carries on the maternal, feminine controls and influences.

¹⁷ L. A. and E. F. Cook, *op. cit.*

¹⁸ For a suggestive study in identification of teacher stereotype, see Kenneth McGill, "The school-teacher stereotype," *Journal of Educational Psychology*, 1931, 9:642-651.

¹⁹ Willard Waller, *The Sociology of Teaching* (New York, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1932), p. 419.

resort to various mechanisms of identification, projection, displacement, and so on.

There have been a number of surveys of mental adjustment of teachers, but none of them is very adequate. Sometimes the measuring instrument was not entirely valid, and seldom, if ever, were any adequate control groups used for comparative purposes. As to prevalence of maladjustment, Fenton's study of 241 teachers in the California schools reported that 78 per cent could be considered in reasonably good mental health, the other 22 per cent, or 54 in number, could be rated as in maladjusted. Of these latter, 17, or 7 per cent, were judged as capable of carrying on their teaching successfully, since their neurotic tendencies were not apparent in the classroom. The other 37, or 15 per cent of the total sample, were considered to be definitely handicapped in their teaching by reason of their maladjustment, and in serious need of mental-hygiene therapy.²⁰

Other studies give other percentage differences. Hicks, for example, from a sample of 600 men and women teachers from all parts of the United States, states that 44 per cent were unusually stable, and 17 per cent neurotic. There were striking sex differences here: 61 per cent of the men and only 39 per cent of the women were reported as stable; 8 per cent of the men were neurotic, as compared to 20 per cent of the women.²¹

Peck administered the Thurstone Personality Schedule to 100 women teachers. He also got a measure of their intelligence and certain additional data. As a control group he used 52 women normal-school students and 26 men teachers or prospective teachers. Among other things he found that women teachers showed less normal responses than men teachers, one-third of the former being rated as maladjusted. One-sixth were considered to be in need of psychiatric service and only one-fifth as really well adjusted. The most common neurotic symptoms were undue shyness, frequency of "low spirits," self-pity about their lot in life, and high frequency of a "state of excitement." Those who reported unhappy childhood and/or adolescence reported more symptoms of maladjustment than did those who said they felt happy and secure in their earlier years. The older and more experienced teachers got better adjustment scores than younger and less experienced ones. For both women and men teachers, the married were better adjusted than the unmarried. Of the women teachers those in the primary grades fared worst on the inventory, the high-school instructors, best. A comparison of the Thurstone scores with self estimates of adjustment showed that the subjects were "unable to judge their own mental health."²² Peckstein found a sample of 113 women teachers to be more

²⁰ Norman Fenton, *Mental Hygiene in School Practice* (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1943), p. 289.

²¹ Francis R. Hicks, "The mental health of teachers," *Contributions to Education*, George Peabody College for Teachers, 1934, No. 125.

²² Leona Peck, "A study of the adjustment difficulties of a group of women teachers," *Journal of Educational Psychology*, 1935, 27: 401-416.

introverted than a control group of college sophomore women.²³ All these women were unmarried, and the author suggests that perhaps the more extroverted teachers get married and leave the profession.

While these studies are by no means adequate, they do suggest that the teaching profession in our society draws to it individuals of varying degrees of personality imbalance or tends to induce maladjustments as a price for remaining in that vocation. There is no statistical evidence showing which of these possibilities as to cause should be given the more weight. In keeping with our general standpoint, we may assume that both sets of factors are operative. It may well be that the somewhat insulated and protected environment of the classroom attracts individuals who tend to be shy, introverted, and unwilling to face the tougher competition of the business world. It may be, also, that there is some correlation between the large number of unmarried women teachers in our schools and certain maladjustments. Certainly the many taboos which many communities tend to lay upon the teachers, to say nothing of the heavy demands of teaching itself, may serve to enhance and stimulate neurotic tendencies already present in the personality of prospective teachers.²⁴

Influence of the Teacher's Personality on Her Rôle. Just as the problems of parent-child relationship are qualified by the hangover of the parents' own early training, so the contact of the teacher with her pupils will be qualified at every point by her own habits, attitudes, and ideas. One of the most important of these qualifications may be due to the fact that the thwarted love life of a teacher affects her responses to her educational charges. This may take varied forms, of course. In some instances the unmarried woman teacher finds in the pupils a sublimated outlet for her own deep desire for children of her own. The teacher's pet—a common rôle in some schoolrooms—is a case in point. Frequently this is a child who flatters the teacher by docility, obedience, conformity, helpfulness, or other traits. On the other hand, there are instances aplenty of teachers who develop a good deal of hostility toward the children or toward a particular child, which is often but an ambivalent outlet for their own repressed love interest. A pretty girl pupil may unconsciously irritate a fading schoolmistress who has missed her chances at love; or a dominant

²³ L. A. Pechstein, "Introversion as a factor in the vocational selection of teachers," *Psychological Bulletin*, 1928, 25:196-197.

²⁴ In this connection Mason's study of mental hospital records is suggestive. While statistically her study is open to grave criticism, she did find that the age of commitment in the state of New York was younger for teachers than that of the average patient. Slightly more than one-third of these teacher-patients were diagnosed as schizophrenic, slightly less than one-fourth as manic-depressive, and six per cent as paranoia. These percentages are all above the average of the total hospital population. (The balance percentages are all above the average of the total hospital population.) However, in but a small number of these cases was the mental breakdown said to be directly due to teaching as an occupation. See Frances V. Mason, "A study of seven hundred maladjusted school teachers," *Mental Hygiene*, 1931, 15:578-599.

lad may irritate her, she knows not why, because she sees in him some prototype of a man she admires but cannot capture.

When pupils are discovered in minor or major sexual escapades of a more overt sort, teachers—men or women—who have suppressed their instincts may expose (at least to keen observers) considerable emotional distress of their own regarding love and sex. This may take the direction of shaming, ridiculing, or severely punishing the child or adolescent for such an infraction of our mores. In the well-adjusted teacher the same sort of conduct would not arouse strong emotional reactions so much as an interest in guiding the pupil to a more healthy adjustment in regard to sex.

Another typical response is over-emphasis upon obedience to authority. The teacher's own frustration at her inferior social status, for example, may cause her unconsciously to find some compensation in strict rules and constant demands for obedience from her pupils. The prevalence of the parental pattern, anticipated by the community itself, supports the teacher in many of these personal forms of substitute satisfactions.

Closely related to this authoritarian pattern is the teacher who is insistent upon conformity to a wide range of external details, or who is petty, who resorts to continual nagging, and whose discipline is constantly to the fore. Again, there is the teacher who is given over to repeated and almost continual moralizing, not only in regard to the school subjects, but respecting the behavior and attitudes of the children before her. Finally (not to make the list too long) there is the teacher suffering from anxiety who frequently projects her fears and worries upon her pupils.

It should be self-evident that, if the teacher herself is not socially and emotionally well-balanced, she must sooner or later have some effect upon her pupils. This point has been admirably stated by Taft in these words:

"In the teacher the child finds the parent, and if his relationship to his real parents is infantile or antagonistic or fearful, he will often tend to set up the same pattern with the teacher, perhaps taking out on her feelings that he has to restrain with his own father and mother. This means that the teacher has here not only the need for understanding the mechanism involved, but the opportunity for altering it. If the child can work out with an adult whom he respects a satisfactory and successful relationship, it is bound to affect favorably his entire adjustment. Not only does this demand tact and wisdom on the part of the teacher, it also requires a good personal adjustment. She must be free enough of her own complexes not to let them determine her reaction to the child. She must be kind, but not sentimental, friendly, but impersonal, not using the child to satisfy her own emotional needs or relieve her personal feelings, and above all she must be patient and always interested. The teacher who is interested in her children in an objective way and is able to give them a sense of freedom and self-confidence in her presence will be as potent a factor in improving mental health as any the school can contribute."³³

³³ Jesse Taft, "The relation of the school to the mental health of the average child," *Mental Hygiene*, 1: 23, 7, 67, 687.

Social Rôles of Teachers in the Classroom. No adequate studies have been made of teacher rôles in the classroom. Yet the variations in manner and procedure are obvious. Some teachers use an authoritarian "ordering and forbidding" technique; others might be designated as "saccharine" and over-nice. Some are very formal; some are easy-going. A few thumb-nail sketches written by an experienced teacher, supervisor, and superintendent show something of the range of rôles assumed by teachers. The particular "type" characterizations are his.²⁸

(1) "The Poised Teacher": "Miss Manning, attractive because of her delicate features, a ready, quiet smile, and ever-kindly eyes, meets her classes daily with a calm poise which at once creates the impression that the class has come prepared and expecting to fulfill definite requirements. Pupils know from her manner as well as from past experience that she is prepared to present the subject matter in an interesting way and that she is able to help them with any difficulties that may arise. It is never necessary for pupils to ask for a repetition of the assignment. Pupils seldom, if ever, indulge in such distracting enterprises as the study of other subjects, note writing, or cartooning, because they are too busy with the work in hand. They understand what their teacher expects of them but they are not afraid of her. They have seen her firm but never angry. No pupil of hers has ever been sent to 'interview the principal.'"

Such a teacher impresses the casual observer as highly successful. Although even Miss Manning does not reach all her pupils with equal success, on the whole, this case may serve as something of a standard against which to compare the others. She is well balanced emotionally, keeps the proper control of the school situation without offense, and sees to it that the tasks of the schoolchild are carried through, as far as she can do so.

(2) "The Formal Teacher": "A German background had given Miss Kohler an appreciation for schooling as a means to an end. Her education had enabled her to do more and better work, and she had every intention of systematically grinding her pupils through educational processes, painlessly if possible, painfully if necessary, to equip them to master the mental and manual problems they should face in their afterschool life. She was generally good-natured, but all her pupils understood that she would stand for no 'monkey business.' Her assignments were regularly made at the beginning of each class hour, and woe to the pupil who arrived a minute late or appeared without paper or with an unsharpened pencil. She was herself a tremendous worker. Her pupils knew that their test papers would be returned to them the day following the test just as they knew their homework was due on the day designated.

"Results of Miss Kohler's influence were gratifying to teachers who later received her pupils because they were 'well prepared' for the next grade. They knew how to work, they respected the authority of the new teacher until they had reason to do otherwise.

"Was this teacher popular? Ambitious students sought her classes. Dull, plodding pupils felt safe with her and trusted her fairness. Lazy ones avoided her. Cheaters knew that they could not 'get by' her. The 'discipline problems' of the school either respected her as they did no other teachers, or hated her

²⁸ From a seminar paper prepared by Guy Hoover. Used by permission.

because she had no mercy for those who deserved punishment. Perhaps the only pupils for whom she was not 'good medicine' in the pedagogical sense were those timid souls who had a guilty feeling when others erred and so were emotionally stirred even when her criticisms did not concern them personally.

(3) "The 'Male' Hero": "The so-called 'discipline problems' were solved for Mr. Johnson by 'Mother Nature' when she endowed him with all the external features of a modern Apollo and then enabled him to develop a rounded personality that commands both respect and love. His work is entirely with boys in the manual-training department of a large school. These boys feel a personal interest in his golf score, his social life, and his economic welfare. They work for his approbation because he is as he is. He never meets with unnecessary tardiness, lying, defiance, temper tantrums, and the like. The boys copy his gentlemanly habits of dress, hygiene, and manner. He engenders in them enthusiasm for classroom activities and cooperation with the school regime. Yet he is consistently firm. When the boys are asked in their English class to write a character sketch, Mr. Johnson is very often the subject. He is the ideal; their great inspiration."

The teacher capitalizes on the myth of the popular hero in our American society. His rôle both in the classroom and outside is determined largely by the fact that he fulfills the wishes of his pupils for someone to worship and imitate. Mr. Johnson is a leader of a sort and furnishes, perhaps somewhat unconsciously, certain patterns for his boys to copy. Perhaps his technique of handling his pupils is more fitted to his school subject, manual training, than to English rhetoric or mathematics; but, in any case, he has made a good adjustment to his particular professional obligation.

(4) "The Possessive Teacher of Starved Emotions": "Miss Bracken, a university graduate, is reasonably wealthy. She has been spoiled by her family and friends in many ways. She seems to have everything that a woman could desire. But she lacks affection from children, with the result that she tends to be indulgent of her pupils, she goes to endless bother and expense with them and for them, and engenders in many of them a feeling that they are indebted to her. Some of them parasitize her shamelessly, others accept her kindness with genuine appreciation, but a third group repeatedly hurt her by their blatant indifference. They build up a selfishness which youthfully refuses to be obligated, being rather resentful at her possessive attitude."

Miss Bracken reveals a poorly sublimated emotional life finding its outlet in "buying" affection and attention from the pupils. But the tragedy, of course, consists in the fact that many pupils callously exploit her services, giving little or nothing of an affectional nature in return.

Pupils' Reactions to Teachers. Over against the various social rôles which teachers play in the classroom may be placed the attitudes and ideas of the pupils with respect to their teachers. The respective rôles of pupil and teacher are qualified by the attitudes, opinions, and responses of each to the other. With one or two exceptions, no really statistically adequate studies of pupils' views of teachers at the elementary level have been made. Witty has analyzed samples of approximately 82,000 essays

submitted to a certain radio contest on the topic "The Teacher Who Has Helped Me Most." There is no indication of the childrens' ages, but evidently they came from both elementary and secondary schools. Also nothing is known of how representative the sample is. But the results definitely suggest that for this sample, at least, the coöperative, democratic attitude, accompanied by kindness, patience, impartiality, and wide interests—to cite the most prized traits—are much preferred to the dictatorial, bad-tempered, and unreasonable attitudes.²⁷

Further confirmation of the importance of friendly and democratic interaction between teachers and pupils is found in an exhaustive study by Anderson and collaborators on elementary school children.²⁸ They worked out a scheme for classifying teacher behavior in relation to pupils, as follows: (1) Domination with evidence of conflict; (2) domination with no evidence of conflict; (3) domination with evidence of working together; (4) integration with no evidence of working together; and (5) integration with evidence of working together. The first three could be grouped together as basically dominative behavior, characterized by the teacher's making the decisions for the child without the latter having any part in the same. The other two categories may be grouped together as integrative behavior, marked by consideration of the child's wishes and interests and by encouragement of him to participate in the decision-making. The behavior of the children was noted and classified into such categories as "nervous habits," "playing with foreign objects," "conforming," "non-conforming to teacher domination," "domination of other children," "response in recitation," "problem solving," and "social contribution by the child."

The most important findings of this large study are: (1) Teachers of the dominative type more often call out non-coöperating and conflictive responses from their pupils than do the integrative ones. (2) Dominative teachers tend to induce dominating rôles among the children in their relations with other children. (3) Teachers whose behavior toward their pupils is of the integrative, coöperative kind call out coöperative conduct in the latter. And, finally, (4) the integrative type of teacher induces her pupils to take coöperative and helpful rôles in their relations to other children.

A number of suggestive studies have also been made of high-school students. Hart obtained data from 3,725 high school seniors as to the traits which characterized the best-liked and the least-liked teachers. The qual-

²⁷ Paul Witty "Some characteristics of the effective teacher," *Educational Administration and Supervision*, 1950, 36: 193-208.

²⁸ H. H. Anderson and Helen M. Brewer, "Studies of teachers' classroom personalities, I," *Applied Psychology Monographs*, No. 6 (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1945); H. H. Anderson and J. E. Brewer, "Studies of teachers' classroom personalities, II," *ibid.*, No. 8, 1946; H. H. Anderson, J. E. Brewer, and Mary F. Reed, "Studies of teachers' classroom personalities, III," *ibid.*, No. 11, 1946.

ities or features noted were arranged in a rank order. The leading five characterizations of the *best-liked* teacher were:

(1) "Is helpful with school work, explains lessons and assignments clearly and thoroughly, and uses examples in teaching; (2) Cheerful, happy, good natured, jolly, has a sense of humor, can take a joke; (3) Human, friendly, companionable, 'one of us'; (4) Interested in and understanding of pupils; (5) Makes work interesting, creates a desire to work, makes class work a pleasure.

The first five items regarding the *least-liked* teacher were:

(1) "Too cross, grouchy, crabby, never smiles, nagging, sarcastic, loses temper, 'flies off the handle'; (2) Not helpful with school work, does not explain lessons and assignments, not clear, work not planned; (3) Partial, has 'pets,' or favored students, and 'picks on certain students'; (4) Superior, aloof, haughty, 'snooty,' overbearing, does not know you out of class; (5) Mean, unreasonable, 'hard-boiled,' intolerant, ill-mannered, too strict, makes life miserable."

Hart found that about 20 per cent of his subjects did not identify the best-liked teacher with the *best* teacher so far as instruction went. For them the best teacher differed from the best-liked in being stricter, more exacting, knowing her materials better, planning and carrying out the instruction more efficiently and in making the work more interesting.²⁹

Brookover has designed a scale to measure the degree of friendly person-to-person interaction between pupils and teachers. In one study he got the ratings of 1,139 high-school students on 37 of their teachers. The students also rated these same teachers on a scale constructed to measure quality or effectiveness of instruction. The Pearsonian correlation coefficient between the mean scores on the two scales was .64.

This indicates, for this sample at least, that teachers who are rated as possessing a high quality of person-to-person interaction, in terms of sympathetic and friendly reactions, absence of fear and of sense of inferiority in the teacher's presence, and belief in their essential fairness, also tend to be rated high as classroom instructors. No differences were found with regard to age, sex, or school classification of the pupils. Younger women teachers got slightly higher ratings than older ones. There is evidence, too, that teachers "in smaller rural schools have a higher degree of person-to-person interaction with their students" than is true in larger urban schools. In the latter, on the other hand, the pupils rated their teachers slightly higher on the scale of instructional ability.³⁰

Another study by Brookover suggests strongly that the most effective teachers are those who maintain a certain social distance from their pupils. He found negative, though low, correlations between certain measures

²⁹ Quotations from F. W. Hart, *Teachers and Teaching by Ten Thousand High School Seniors* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1934), pp. 131, 250. By permission.

³⁰ W. B. Brookover, "Person-person interaction between teachers and pupils and teaching effectiveness," *Journal of Educational Research*, 1946, 33, 272-287.

of friendliness and congeniality and improvement in knowledge of American history.³¹

These various studies suggest that we might think of teachers as falling along a continuum from highly authoritarian, dominative type at one extreme to a congenial, coöperative, and democratic kind at the other. In our society, however, there is either subtle or open assumption that the latter kind of teacher is to be preferred to the former. Yet there is some slight evidence that the best teachers are not necessarily the most congenial and friendly ones.³² Furthermore it must be noted that the so-called "authoritarian pattern" is very widespread in the homes of this country. This important fact is probably one reason why so many parents prefer the teachers to be good disciplinarians and to use authority where necessary to keep the pupils in hand. After all, the schools are but a part of the larger culture of a given society and cannot depart very far from its basic values. In the next and concluding section we shall examine some aspects of the larger cultural and community base of our educational system.

THE TEACHER IN THE COMMUNITY

While the school is deeply embedded in our value system, adults are not always clear as to just what they want the schools to accomplish. A country-wide opinion survey made in 1950 brought out some interesting views and contradictions. For example, while two-thirds of those polled believed the schools were teaching children more worthwhile things than was true 20 years earlier, only one-third said, in answer to another question, that they were "very satisfied" with the public schools of their own community. As to the desirable course of study at the high-school level, slightly more than 40 per cent voted for vocational training, over 45 per cent for "discipline, responsibilities, tolerance, personality" building. Only 13 per cent thought the traditional academic background was the most important. Yet more than three-fourths of these same people said they wished they had studied more of certain formal subjects in high school, and when asked further what these subjects were, three of them said they wished they had had more mathematics, English, history, and the like to every one who voted for more vocational courses.

Regarding the growth of democratic practices in the schools, 41 per cent thought that children of all races and colors should go to school to-

³¹ W. B. Brookover, "The relation of social factors to teaching ability," *Journal of Experimental Education*, 1945, 13: 191-205; and "The social rôles of teachers and pupil achievement," *American Sociological Review*, 1943, 8: 389-393.

³² It must be noted that the widely heralded Iowa study of democratic versus authoritarian "climate" as related to learning and group behavior, showed that the children under the domination of the teacher turned out a lot of work so long as the latter continued to give directions. See Ronald Lippitt, "The morale of youth groups," in C. Watson, ed., *Crisis Morale* (New York, Revnal & Hitchcock, 1942), pp. 119-142.

gether, but 35 per cent were for segregation. As might be expected the white respondents from the South were rather heavily for segregation, though a sizeable fraction were against it in principle or, at least, thought that segregation would sooner or later have to go.

As to the teachers, it was believed that they were better trained and more capable than they were 20 years previously, that they were underpaid, but that they ranked above the clergymen, public officials, merchants, and lawyers "in order of importance to the community." Regarding high school teachers, 38 per cent of the respondents thought that handling of the pupils was the teachers' most important qualification; 29 per cent said her "education," 16 per cent, her "teaching experience," and 11 per cent, "her morals and family background." In regard to this topic the higher the level of education of respondents, the higher the vote for capacity to handle the children. As to the right of school boards to inquire as to a prospective teacher's political views, one-fourth said they had such a right, and two-thirds that this was a matter of the teacher's "personal business."³³

As the Cooks say, "Teachers touch community life at its most sensitive point, its children."³⁴ It is but natural that parents and other citizens are concerned with the ideas, attitudes, and conduct of the teachers outside as well as inside the school. From the standpoint of rather rigid application of the traditional devices of social control, teaching, at least at the elementary and secondary levels, might be called a "captive" profession. In many colleges and universities this has also been true. The rôle and status of the teacher in terms of community expectancies are often confused and inconsistent. One reason for this is that the demands on the teacher for conformity are often at variance with the accepted and actual conduct of parents and even, at times, of the children.

All this puts the teacher at a distinct disadvantage. It induces a sense of inferiority, lack of sense of belonging, and possibly makes for friction, at times, among the teachers themselves and between them and their pupils. Let us look a little more closely into some of these matters.

Standards Demanded for Employability. While community standards as to what is expected of the teacher in the way of background vary with the size of the community and with its cultural composition, Greenhoe's nation-wide survey made it clear that the chances of getting a job as a teacher in the public schools are qualified by a number of conditions. On the basis of the replies to 15 questions concerning employment of potential applicants, she worked out an "employability quotient," the scores of which could be stated in positive (approving) or negative (disapproving) terms. The basic agreement among the different components of her

³³ Data selected from "What U.S. thinks about its schools: Reper survey finds both complacency and direct criticism," *Life*, Oct. 16, 1950, 29, 11, 12, 14, 16, 18.

³⁴ L. A. Cook and Elaine F. Cook, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

sample was striking. These included 356 members of the school board, 2,095 lay persons, 9,122 public school teachers, and 3,054 students in training to be teachers. All agreed, with varying emphasis, that it was most important for the applicant to be: native-born with a non-foreign name, a non-local resident, city reared, from out-of-state, and of a known Protestant faith. An applicant who was known to be a married woman, a Catholic, a pacifist, a militarist, a Jew, a Negro, a Communist, a radical, or in bad health got negative ratings from members of the school board. The lay persons agreed with this, in general, except that they were slightly favorable to Catholics, pacifists, and Jews. The teachers and teacher-trainees were negative only to militarists, Negroes, radicals, communists, and persons in bad health.³⁵

These data were further analyzed as reflecting degrees of liberalism-conservatism along a continuum. By assigning certain weights to the replies, one to most liberal, and four to least, a composite measure of liberalism was derived. The students were most liberal (average score of 19), teachers next (average score of 27), lay people next (score of 44), and board members least (score of 59).

Teachers and the Mores. Teachers have long been aware that communities often lay down rather strict rules regarding their conduct. An extensive review of a number of earlier studies lists nine major areas of community control over their conduct. These are: (1) Frequent indication as to preference of the kind and location of residence; (2) prescription of appropriate dress, facial make-up, and use of cosmetics; (3) close definition of the leisure-time activities; drinking alcoholic beverages, smoking, dancing, and card-playing are especially taboo in most communities; (4) restrictions of association between teachers and members of the opposite sex who may be students, townspeople, or other teachers; (5) considerable pressure to take part in religious and other community-approved activities; (6) expectation that the teachers will give strong support to any extracurricular functions which the community likes, such as competitive sports and musical festivals; (7) restrictions in many communities of the frequency of trips to other localities during weekends; (8) taboos against joining labor unions and running for political office or otherwise participating in local politics; and (9) considerable pressure to get teachers to attend special institutes and summer schools; (increases in pay and status are often made contingent on such additional schooling).³⁶

While changes are taking place in such demands, Greenhoe's study referred to above, tends to confirm these earlier qualitative reports. She

³⁵ Florence Greenhoe, *Community Contacts and Participation of Teachers. An analysis of the community relationships of 9,122 public school teachers selected as a national sample* (Washington, D.C., American Council on Public Affairs, 1941), pp. 29-33.

³⁶ H. K. Beale, *Are American Teachers Free?* (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936).

worked out a list of 23 behavior items and got ratings on them from 356 school-board members, 9,122 public school teachers, and 1,363 students. By combining the ratings which indicated approval or disapproval she worked out a scoring system which could be stated in positive (approving) or negative (disapproving) terms. As might be expected there were sharp differences. Members of the school board approved only three items: owning an automobile, dating a town person, dating another teacher. They strongly disapproved dating a student, drinking alcoholic beverages, running for political office, making a political speech, playing cards for fun, smoking in public, teaching controversial subjects, and living outside the community. They also opposed, but to a less extent, playing pool or billiards, dancing at a public dance, joining a teachers' union and playing cards for money. There was a kind of twilight zone of slightly negative items, including not attending church, buying clothes outside the community, and living alone in an apartment.

The teachers had a much longer list of approved items; they approved not only the three things approved by the school-board members, but had no objection to single teachers living alone in an apartment, being allowed to use make-up (female ratings only), being allowed to make extra money coaching or speaking, and playing cards, either for money or fun. Yet the teachers strongly disapproved participating in politics, drinking alcoholic liquors, and dating a student. The students-in-training were more liberal than the teacher group with regard to membership in a teachers' union, teaching controversial issues (which the teachers showed as an indifference rating), but on most of the items they agreed reasonably well with the teachers.²⁷

The pressure of the larger community on the teachers for conformity, of course, is not confined to their personal lives. As indicated above it is generally expected that teachers will keep off controversial subjects in the classroom, will not participate in politics, and in general remain aloof from affairs which other professionals take as a part of their civic responsibilities. Nevertheless the United States has been reasonably free of direct legislation about teaching. When biological evolution began to be taught in the schools, some states passed laws forbidding the teaching of this theory. Also during wartime or other critical periods radical movements may be made legally taboo. After both the First and Second world wars this country witnessed a growing demand to pass and enforce laws requiring teachers to take loyalty oaths to state and federal governments.

On the whole, however, we have been free of this kind of formal and widespread political pressure which was a hallmark of Fascism, Nazism, and of Russian Communism. Teachers in Nazi Germany were subjected, as were others, to scrutiny of their ancestry and were required to take certain oaths about it. In Soviet Russia the Communist Party completely

²⁷ Florence Greenhoe, *op. cit.*, pp. 49-51.

dominates the government, including the schools. Not only are teachers carefully trained along party lines; but the subject-matter at every level, from primary school to university is made to fit into the Marxist-Stalinist theories. Under such severe authoritarian systems the schools can hardly be regarded as one of the bulwarks of political and personal freedom as they are with us.

In our society political and economic pressure groups may from time to time try to interfere with teachers and teaching, but on the whole these efforts are seldom very intense or prolonged. And, aside from the periodic flurries over subversive movements, the schools are kept reasonably free from direct political pressure from the government.

Teacher Participation in the Community. Despite the expectancies of parents and school boards regarding teachers as to background and conduct, teachers do take part in many community affairs. In a survey made of Ohio teachers Cook found that 95 per cent of his sample were members of one or more groups in the community, exclusive of school clubs and activities. Four-fifths of the teachers also contributed money to such organizations; about the same number attended meetings, and four out of ten of them were officers or sponsors of such community groups. The greatest teacher participation was in church work and in professional organizations. It is worth noting, too, that the teachers serve more often as officers or sponsors of religious groups than of any others. On the whole, however, teachers do not seem to carry as much leadership function as one might imagine. This may reflect again the subsidiary status of the teachers. The Greenhoe survey also gives some information on community participation. In her sample, two-thirds reported being regular members of a church and about one-half of parent-teacher associations. Also high-school teachers had a considerably higher ratio in membership, money contributions, and office-holding than did grade-school teachers. In general, the smaller the community the more participation by the teachers.

On the other hand, this survey showed that there was little direct contact of teachers and parents in the homes in the smaller community. One-third of her group said they never visited pupils' homes; the others reported visiting, ranging from a few times a month to high infrequency. Some contributed to local meetings by making talks, others wrote for the local newspaper; but the general impression one gets from this study is that, aside from church and professional groups, the isolation of the teachers from the community was clearly evident.³⁸

Isolation and Social Status. For the most part teachers are in but not part of the community. While they are expected to give much time and energy to certain extra-school activities, there is a barrier between them and the local residents. This makes for sense of isolation not unlike that experienced by the stranger. Teachers are seldom accepted into the heart

³⁸ See Cook and Cook, *op. cit.*, pp. 442-445, and Greenhoe, *op. cit.*, pp. 62-74.

of the local ethos. They seldom operate on an equalitarian footing with other adult citizens. This is often as true in small as in large localities. As one teacher put it, the sense of "apartness" from the community life induces loneliness, emotional distress, and feelings of social inadequacy.

One factor which no doubt contributes to this sense of isolation is the high rate of labor turnover among teachers. Frequently, especially in smaller communities, teachers remain only a year or so and then move on to other and often larger school systems. Then, too, many women teachers continue their school careers only till they can marry, and since legal restrictions on teaching by married women continue to be in vogue in our public schools, this drift out of the profession tends to lessen the likelihood of extensive participation in community life. These two matters—turnover and residential mobility—contribute definitely to a sense of inferiority. But, in addition, the relatively low status accorded the teaching profession in this country is notorious and may itself serve to stimulate the great amount of shifting from one teaching position to another. For example, today, in contrast to 40 years ago, there are relatively few men in the elementary field, and there appears to be a decline in the proportion of men in secondary teaching.

Concomitant with this low cultural status, teachers tend to develop distinct feelings of inferiority in the presence of persons successful in business or in one of the professions. This may not be true of men famous for research or writing or educational administration, but it is not to be denied that the usual run of instructors, from elementary school to university, possess a sense of personal inferiority in the face of cultural standards which emphasize monetary success, business acumen, and "go-getting" attitudes and habits. Some teachers, it is true, may compensate by flight into the alleged superiorities of learning, but at heart a very high percentage of them doubtless feel themselves outside the pale of the primarily successful of this world.

As teaching becomes more highly respected in our society, as the professionalization of teachers goes forward, and as the older puritanic mores are displaced by more liberal ones, the rôle and status of the teacher in this country had gradually improved. There remain, however, many inconsistencies and confusions. Let us note again only one or two of the most striking. While we are, as a people, trying to operate in terms of a representative democracy, and while the school pays lip service to the philosophy of equal opportunity for all, none the less much of our procedure in education continues along authoritarian lines. Moreover, in terms of the age and experiential differentials between pupils and adult teachers it does not seem possible to eliminate completely some of the directing and controlling functions which are so deeply rooted in society. That the ordering and forbidding techniques may be replaced by developing a sense of joint effort and participation even in the earliest years of

schooling, has been reasonably well demonstrated. Moreover, progressive programs that have had the support of private funds have often pioneered the way in improvements that gradually infiltrated into the public school systems. But this is a slow process and in the meantime children and teachers alike are often caught up in school work which seems tedious, uselessly routine, and not very rewarding.

In short, the mass of our boys and girls go through much the same educational regimen that their parents did. And, despite all that is said of the strain and ineffectiveness of the traditional school system, despite the accumulation of evidence as to the incidence of personality maladjustment among elementary and secondary pupils, when one looks at the whole system and its results in the large, against the background of our American culture, one must see that the picture is not too dark or discouraging. The resistance of children and youth to an overdose of routine instruction is itself healthy. Young children and adolescents in our society are far too dynamic to be completely subdued by the more formalistic and deadening features of our traditional schools. The young personality has an amazing resilience and initiative, stimulated in part by the very extreme individualism which is often under criticism. Moreover, training in school does not consist alone in book or laboratory work. The extracurricular activities offer pupils much opportunity for growth in self-expression and for finding an outlet for their potential talents in leadership and creativeness.

CHAPTER 16

Mental Health of College Students

The great faith in education in the United States was gradually extended in practice to include universal provision for elementary and secondary education. And in recent decades there has been a growing belief that public funds should be used to give college training for all those capable of benefiting therefrom. For example, a public opinion poll made in 1950 showed that 57 per cent of the respondents approved the idea of extending free schooling to "include some college education." Moreover, the lower the economic level—as measured by occupation—the higher the proportion voting for more college education.¹ What the parents expect their sons and daughters to get out of college is shown in another poll, made in 1949. When asked: "Why would you like to have a son (daughter) of yours go to college? What would you want him (her) to get out of it?" the majority said: "Preparation for a better job, a trade or profession, greater earning power." Two-thirds of the respondents indicated this for their sons and nearly one-half for their daughters. Other high values anticipated from a college education included "better fitness to lead a full life, a broader view of the world," "learning to get along with all sorts of people," and improved intellectual fitness.²

The astounding increase in college and university enrollment in the last half-century is clear evidence of the growing importance attached to advanced education. At no time in human history has any society had the combination of wealth and cultural expectancy which enabled it to keep such a high proportion of its adolescents and young adults in school and hence out of the productive labor force. There does not seem to be any indication of a reversal of this practice in the foreseeable future. The demand for collegiate training is growing apace. And while we may expect a temporary decline in the 1950's due to low birth rate in the 1930's, we may anticipate more, not less, enrollments in our colleges and universities.

When the high-school graduate enters college he faces problems which

¹ "What U.S. thinks about its schools. Roper survey finds both complacency and dissatisfaction," *Life*, Oct. 16, 1950, 25-32.

² "Higher Education," *The Fortune Survey*, *Fortune*, 1949, 40 (supplement for Sept., 1949, p. 6).

he might not if he went to work. In our society the period spent in college is coincident with that in which a whole gamut of late adolescent adjustments must be made. As we saw in Chapter 14, there are at least four basic changes which must be faced in the years before one attains legal and social maturity: emancipation from the home, development of adequate heterosexual attitudes and values, the emergence of habits of self-control, and the growth of individual and mature responsibility for one's acts. A good deal of the final enculturation of our youth with reference to these matters will occur during their college life. For most of these persons college represents the last period of dependency on their parents before they assume full adult rôles in relation to occupation, marriage, and civic and religious participation in their communities. And yet, because of their physical maturity and intellectual sophistication, they are likely to experience certain frustrations of their desires for financial, sexual, and other adult privileges. Such inhibitions, in turn, may and often do result in anxiety, compensatory aggressiveness, or other means of securing balance or satisfaction for thwarted wishes.

As a background to our detailed discussion we may ask: How extensive are the personality difficulties of college students? And, what are their major problems? No adequate survey has ever been made of the mental health needs of college students, though estimates as to the number of more or less maladjusted range from 5 to 50 per cent. Certainly the studies of Mangus, noted in the previous chapter, give a foundation for inferring that a good quarter of our college population might well benefit from a program of counseling and guidance with regard to personal problems.

If a considerable fraction of college students have disturbing personal difficulties, then it might be wise to discover the nature and extent of capacities, traits, and attitudes of our college population. Certainly there is no reason to assume that college students have any peculiar or unique set of personality characteristics that distinguishes them from others. However, the use of tests, inventories, and schedules purporting to show such social and emotional traits as neuroticism, inferiority feelings, and introversion or extroversion among college students have not proved particularly useful so far either for diagnosis or for prediction of behavior. The internal variables are so many, and the external situations which induce particular attitudes or habits are so diverse, that no completely adequate measuring devices of the paper-and-pencil sort have been developed which will predict either academic performance or extracurricular adaptation.

Yet we all know that emotional and social traits have a bearing on scholarship and on adaptation to the community life in college. They are related to the learning process itself, to teacher-student interactions, to the carry-over into college of home and community influences, to the

nature and extent of contacts with fellow-students, and to such matters as sex and love life, religious beliefs, public morality, and concern with political and economic radicalism. Though a wide variety of new adjustments must be made during the college years, our main concern will be with those which center around scholastic attainment and social-emotional development. The closing section will comment on certain phases of student counseling as it has been developed in our colleges and universities.

ADAPTATION TO ACADEMIC DEMANDS

The traditional function of higher education has been largely that of intellectual training, and our colleges have long placed their primary, if not their only, emphasis upon intellectual achievement. It is now well known that intellectual learning is qualified by social and emotional factors. The college grew up, however, around the book and the laboratory, and inability to master the printed page or failure to learn the techniques of science was taken as *prima-facie* evidence of incapacity to benefit by such training. In fact, even in the face of our equalitarian traditions, American colleges everywhere set up certain intellectual and scholastic specifications regarding entrance and graduation.

Individual Differences in Intelligence. It is now pretty well accepted that a student must possess somewhat better than average or median intellectual ability—as measured in comparison with the general population of his age—to be able to profit intellectually by attendance at college. However, various surveys have shown that there are wide differences in the intelligence of college students, as measured by the usual tests. Such differences reflect variations in cultural backgrounds, standards of secondary preparation, and type of courses which students select.

Although intelligence tests provide one of the most accurate indicators of those who are likely to succeed or fail in college, a high score offers no official assurance of scholastic success. Other factors, such as social-emotional maladjustments or necessity of earning a livelihood, must also be taken into account. And, while the course of study and the classroom demands of most of our colleges are pitched to the level of the modal or median student, there always exist sufficient numbers who fall below or above this standard to warrant special attention.

The low-ability group—that is, those who have poor intellectual promise—may be divided into two sections: those who fail and drop out rather soon, and those who, motivated by strong ambition, persist in their efforts to succeed. In both these groups, of course, social-emotional and other factors enter in. If, for example, there is obvious low ability, the student not only may suffer from scholastic failure but may develop in addition such a distinct feeling of inferiority as to prevent his subsequent adaptation to a satisfactory vocation. On the other hand, the student who fails

may with proper guidance and advice find a successful outlet in some job which does not require college training.

There are others who lack intellectual ability to handle collegiate work, but who do possess, for some reason or other, a strong motive to continue in school. This may be due to some early ideal about the value of a college education, especially as it may provide a good income and high social status. It may arise because of the identification of the student with some former relative or teacher who has stressed going to college. Sometimes, unfortunately, a dull student is the unwilling victim of the projection of thwarted educational ambitions of a parent or relative. Some of these latter cases are tragic indeed because usually—despite urging, employment of private tutors, and changes in courses to seek easier levels—the student finally drops out of school. Such instances, while doubtless a small percentage of the total group, provide a striking illustration of the inadequate accommodation of college instruction to personal qualifications.

In contrast to the maladjustment of the students of low capacity are those who possess superior intellectual ability but who nevertheless fail to adapt themselves to college. As a rule, these capable students either lack the interest and motivation to do good work or become so engrossed in extracurricular and off-campus activities as to neglect their studies almost completely. Of course, the most fortunate individuals are those of high ability, who are also emotionally well adjusted, and whose success in college is a measure of healthy achievement.

In reference to this last point, the study of Terman and collaborators on gifted children is instructive. In 1925, they published an exhaustive investigation of the intellectual and social-emotional characteristics along with much family and other background material regarding 1,528 children with I.Q.'s of 140 and better. Since the initial study, a series of follow-up studies have been conducted. The one for 1940 and 1945 showed that as to physical health, educational and vocational status, and emotional stability these gifted individuals, as adults, were superior to individuals of average ability. The incidence of delinquency and alcoholism was less than in the general population, and the divorce rate was about the same as the generality. They showed somewhat superior results on tests of "marital aptitude" and "marital happiness" than groups of lesser intelligence.³

Again, while the number of cases is not large, most advisers or instructors know college seniors who, though they may be members of Phi Beta Kappa and are scheduled to graduate magna cum laude, are nevertheless bitter and disappointed at their lack of what they call "social suc-

³ L. M. Terman and M. Oden, *The Gifted Child Grows Up* (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1947).

cess." Perhaps this reaction is somewhat more common with women than with men, because the former retain in large part of the traditional American ideals of marriage and motherhood, and failure to secure men friends appears to them as incompetence. One such senior girl expressed herself with considerable emotion in these words: "What good is my Phi Beta pin, my honors, and all that when I've never had a 'date' and when now that I am out of college, my chances of getting a husband are about nil?" There are also, of course, those even more extreme individuals whose intellectual brilliance is linked to neurotic characteristics to such a degree as to provide them with a genuine handicap in all lines except their professional specialty. Many of these individuals are destined to go through life unhappy and poorly adjusted to their fellows.

Besides the fact of sharp individual differences in intelligence, there are also difficulties associated with special abilities, particularly when these are not accompanied by adequate general ability. For example, we may find a college student especially gifted in the arts—music, painting, sculpture, or literary writing—but who lacks sufficient generalized capacity to handle the usual run of required courses in the languages and in the natural and social sciences. Most colleges make no provision for such persons, at least during the freshman and sophomore years, and as a result these students may become hostile or disillusioned, or, if healthier-minded, may leave college to enroll in institutions designed for specialized training only.

We have noted particularly the learning difficulties of the low and high ability groups and of students with special disabilities, but we must not forget that those of average capacity also have their problems. These include poor reading habits, lack of adaptability to particular subject-matter, and a host of difficulties to be described below with reference to the classroom, the laboratory, teacher-student relations, and extracurricular matters.

Adjustment to the Course of Study. The usual curriculum of the college is pitched to the level of average ability. Moreover, the customary American college curriculum has come down to us laden with emphasis upon language, literature, science, and mathematics. The first two years, in most colleges, are given over to a repetition—presumably at a higher level of proficiency—of the very courses which the student had in high school. There is often a considerable loss of interest on the part of the freshman or sophomore as he grinds away at his English, foreign language, science, or mathematics. This is not the place to argue the soundness or unsoundness of these academic culture patterns, but the fact remains that both as to intellectual interest and as to emotional satisfaction many college students grow discouraged, bitter, or indifferent. Not only are many of the courses taught in a mechanical manner, but there is seldom any general meaning or correlation which will link them together.

All too frequently each course proceeds as if it constituted the whole universe of learning, as if it were the only worthy topic, and as if all the students enrolled had no other aim than to become experts in that special branch of knowledge. The net effect is frequently deadening, and there is little wonder that the students fail to achieve a proper balance between the curricular interests and other activities.

In the pre-professional courses this situation is apparently not so common. If the student is motivated toward medicine, law, engineering, research and teaching, or some other special vocation, he may not sense the pressure of traditional courses and methods of training. If, however, a pre-professional student is misplaced in terms of capacity and interest, the effects upon his intellectual attainment and upon his emotional satisfactions may be even more disastrous than with the run-of-the-mill student in the usual liberal arts college who may find compensation in courses not permitted the specialized student.

Teacher-Student Relations. In the classroom or laboratory the student comes to grips with the intellectual demands laid down by the course of study. While the problems of learning and of teacher-student contacts as related to subject matter are too diverse to be treated as a unit, there are certain general aspects which should be noted, such as the size of classes, various mechanical or routine devices of instruction, the study habits of the students, the personality make-up of the teacher as it bears upon his relations with his students, and the systems of reward and punishment which we have developed as measures of success or failure in college.

Doubtless the most spontaneous teaching and learning take place in the interaction of an instructor and a few pupils. In a small group the stimulating dialectic method may be found at its best, or in the laboratory the teacher and student may work together to set up and solve their problems. But there is all too little of this sort of thing in American colleges and universities today. The increase in college attendance in recent decades in particular, has more or less forced mass-production methods upon the institutions of higher learning. At the very time the freshman or sophomore needs the personal attention of a sympathetic teacher, he is likely to find himself forced to attend large lecture classes, marked by rather complete separation of teacher and student. Since this procedure is relatively unknown in high school, most entering college students are quite unprepared for the more or less formal and impersonal presentation of facts and interpretations of subject matter by an instructor. Instead of informal person-to-person contact the bewildered student soon finds this mass system of teaching calling for note-taking on the lecture material and other devices of learning which are unfamiliar to him. There are usually, in addition, extensive and routine reading assignments in textbooks. In some institutions weekly or biweekly quizzes or review section-meetings of 20 to 30 students do afford a certain off-set to the mass-lecture method.

The lock-step schema of college teaching may be essential to mass education but the results are notoriously low in quality.⁴ In recent years efforts have been made to alter this routinized system, but for the great bulk of college students little has been done. All too often the result is a stagnation of motive and interest in the student, resulting in a decline in his levels of aspiration and achievement.

Inadequate study habits of many students constitute a striking deficiency in our collegiate instruction. All too often the students come from high school ill prepared in study habits, and the college as a rule does little in a formal way to remedy the matter. And inefficient study habits play a part in poor scholarship, which, in turn, tends to affect the student's interest and motivation. Since the self is identified in anticipation with success in schoolwork, learning easily becomes a value in itself. Improvement in study habits normally not only aids in the production of better schoolwork, but indirectly influences the student's morale and his sense of satisfaction.

College students react to the personalities of their teachers in much the same way as do elementary and secondary pupils. For the most part they much prefer friendly and democratic to uncongenial and authoritarian teachers. Duncan and Duncan, using a questionnaire, secured from a group of 122 college students certain comments respecting the best-liked and least-liked college teachers. (In a second schedule they got similar information regarding their elementary and high-school instructors.) In summary they state:

"The investigation has revealed that teachers who have been friendly, sociable, and personally interested in the welfare of their students have been the best liked, and that those who have lacked these characteristics have been the most disliked . . . The best-liked teachers also possessed traits of cheerfulness, sympathy, good sportsmanship, appreciation for student's own views, honesty, tendency to praise, neatness, and tact; while the most disliked instructors displayed characteristics of sarcasm, superiority complex, meddlesomeness, and peculiar mannerisms. . . ."⁵

Another study of college students rated their instructors on ten traits listed in the Purdue Rating Scale for Instructors. The qualities of personal appearance, interest in their subject matter, fairness in grading, self-reliance, and sympathetic attitude toward students were the five most important traits of the popular and successful teachers, as judged by these students.⁶

⁴ W. S. Learned and B. D. Wood, *The Student and His Knowledge* (New York, The Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, 1938). For a short, readable summary of this report, see Goodwin Watson, "How good are our colleges?" *Public Affairs Pamphlets*, No. 26 (New York, Public Affairs Committee, 1938).

⁵ H. G. Duncan and W. L. Duncan, "Student-teacher relationships," *Sociology and Social Research*, 1934, 13, 530-540. Quotation from page 539 by permission.

⁶ J. D. Heilman and W. D. Armentrout, "The rating of college teachers on ten traits by their students," *Journal of Educational Psychology*, 1938, 27, 197-216.

Some additional matters may be noted: (1) The common system of mass instruction tends to heighten the social-psychic distance between learner and instructor. The professor is able thereby to remain aloof from direct contact with the student—which may enhance his sense of self-importance but does little for the student. (2) The high degree of specialization demanded of the college teacher tends to set him apart not only from his students but from his fellow instructors as well. (3) Then, too, this very psychological isolation of an important segment of the self furnishes the teacher a cover for his own insecurities, anxieties, and hidden feelings of inferiority. As a result, in his contacts with students we may find all sorts of compensatory mechanisms in operation, such as obvious exhibitionism of learning, oratory, or unchallenged ex-cathedra assertions, especially in the social sciences and literary fields. Obviously not all college instructors are so egocentric and lofty, but the very situation tends to foster such attitudes and habits; and in our large institutions the instructor who seems to the student to be “human,” “natural,” and “sociable” is altogether too infrequent.

In addition to these general features it sometimes happens that teacher-student relations, even in smaller classes, are not satisfactory because a particular student will set up an antagonistic response on the part of the teacher, or vice versa. The ill-disguised prejudice of many instructors against Jews, Catholics, Negroes, or Orientals is too common to need extensive comment. An instructor may arouse in the student responses of negativism and antagonism because the words, tones, gestures, or other qualities of the former may set up in a student unpleasant associations.

Douglas N., a freshman of high ability and otherwise excellent school record, reported that a particular history professor who had “a facile tongue and often voiced sharp bits of sarcasm in class” so irritated him that he lost interest, began cutting classes, and was in serious danger of failing the course. In talking over this situation with an adviser, the student confessed that the manner and remarks of this teacher reminded him unpleasantly of his own father, who had long used bitter sarcasm as a power device over his son. The pent-up resentment toward his father now began to be transferred to this particular professor, who certainly had never directed his sarcastic remarks to him. In the light of the situation, the adviser arranged a transfer of the boy to another instructor, and thenceforward he experienced no difficulty in handling the course.

On the other hand, students may become too highly identified with a particular teacher who symbolizes for them a loved parent, uncle, aunt, other relative, friend, or ideal person. In rare instances, when the opportunity for closer personal contacts are at hand, such fixations may in time distress both instructor and student. It often happens that neither is aware of the mental mechanisms involved in these situations, and find in the end that personal attachments have become burdensome. Most advisers have had some experience with such individuals—those uneasy students who run to them with every little personal problem who cannot choose

a new course without elaborate advice and counsel, who would spend hours in conference or idle talk, or who confess their troubles, not with a view to sound therapy but only to secure sympathy and emotional support. Such over-attachment of student to instructor may, if continued, serve to reveal emotional immaturity on the part of both participants.

The system of grading by percentages or letter grades, which is so widely in vogue, represents a culture pattern having to do with rewarding or punishing the student in terms of his performance as judged by the teachers. Although most grading is notoriously subjective, such a scheme continues as a device for determining the level of achievement, and it is obvious that, if the level of aspiration of the student has been far in excess of his grades, all sorts of social-emotional reactions may arise which not only influence his status with his fellow-students, his parents, and others, but will affect his intellectual performance in the future. A low grade may serve to stimulate the student to greater effort, or it may act to deter him from trying any further.

It is obvious that the ramifications of scholastic performance reach into person-to-person relations of all sorts. Parents who have fondly hoped for high excellence from their son or daughter and have then discovered that the student has dropped far below their expectations often feel bitterness, disappointment, and added strain in the parent-adolescent relations. Then, too, the student's relations to his fellow-students may be influenced by the grades he receives. In this the social situation and certain cultural expectancies play a part. For example, many students somehow associate getting good marks with the "grind," the person who is not successful in the extracurricular "society" life of the campus. This point of view seems to be particularly true of students who belong to exclusive clubs, fraternities, or sororities. In many colleges a "gentleman's grade" is a C, that is, a mark which just passes the requisite standards to remain in school and in line for ultimate graduation. How these anticipated values and attitudes operate is neatly demonstrated in the case of a brilliant girl, who, when asked by her sorority sisters or others about her grades, always lowered her examination marks by at least one grade lest she be considered too studious. Nevertheless, she always expressed elation and amazement when her academic standing was reported as being the highest in her house. It is interesting to note, too, that she secretly suffered from a sense of shame and guilt if her marks were not among the best in her classes.

Associated with the grading system are various special honors, such as admission to Phi Beta Kappa, Sigma Xi, and the many special honor societies—all of which demonstrate again the high value which these external evidences of intellectual achievement have in college and in the community. These facts also reveal a curious ambivalence of value and attitude: the student has long been inducted into a belief in the importance of high grades and honors, and yet the culture patterns of many students, perhaps more

particularly among those in fraternities and sororities, demand less emphasis upon grades and honors and more upon traits and capacities valuable in extracurricular and off-campus activities. For most students, going to college is more than attendance at classes and laboratories, or reading long assignments in textbooks. In fact, adaptation to life at college is bound up with a host of factors which are only remotely related to scholastic performance, such as adjustment to fellow-students, participation in extracurricular activities, and especially to matters that concern healthy emotional balance.

CULTURAL BACKGROUNDS AND SOCIAL ADJUSTMENT

American collegiate education has taken on many cultural features of the secondary-group organization of society, which is marked by mass-production methods, high division of labor, impersonality of contacts, and individualistic choice of rôle and group affiliation. Still, a good many of our college students, especially those from rural and small communities or from European nationality backgrounds, are poorly prepared for the type of daily life which will surround them in school. In addition to the academic demands, students are confronted with social situations which baffle and distress them.

Emancipation from Home and Family. As Fry wisely remarks, "The influence of the family is the most important one outside the immediate environment affecting the student's adjustment."⁷ Often the student finds himself for the first time cut off by distance and situation from home and parental attention. There is no opportunity to run to one's parents with every little difficulty. Mother is not about to care for one's clothes or to supervise in many little daily details of conduct. For the first time many freshmen find themselves with financial responsibilities to pay board and room accounts and to purchase their own clothes. Sometimes observers are amazed at the evident lack of parental training of young people in matters of budgeting money, handling checking accounts, and in habits of sound buying. Too frequently, when students fall into debt or are discovered to have spent their allowances foolishly, their parents turn on them with **severe blame and childish reprisals.**

Another common symptom of maladjustment to the new life is found in homesickness—a real malady to many students. While they usually conceal their real feelings from their associates, the uncertainty and sense of loss of emotional support of the family makes them unhappy and ill at ease. Occasionally a student is so over attached to the parent that he gives up college and returns home. In these instances the parents have frequently failed to allow their child, especially during the high school years, to be-

⁷ C. C. Fry, *Mental Health in College* (New York: The Commonwealth Fund, 1942), p. 19.

come sufficiently free from the former strict and close supervision to prepare him for living away from home.

Still another common problem of reorientation relates to the use of free time. The college novice often fails to realize that the many hours not formally demanded by class or laboratory periods are not opportunities for loafing, attending motion pictures, or indulging in play or sport. Though dormitories, rooming houses, fraternities, and sororities do have regulations as to hours, the freshman often finds himself for the first time in his life with no one around to urge him to study or to go to bed, or to get him up in the morning. All these matters seem trivial, but they are indicative of alterations in the habits and values of the student.

The college community, however, affords many substitutes for the home, and most students quickly adjust themselves and even thrive on the opportunity afforded them for self-control and a sense of responsibility. In this regard going to college is often the final step in the emancipation from the parents. For this reason, those students who live at home while in college sometimes fail to mature as much as do their fellows who have to leave home in order to attend college. (See below on college housing.)

Shift in Community. Not only is leaving home sometimes a distinct crisis to the freshman, but the transition from the country or small-town high school to the large college or university constitutes a considerable strain on the student. Whereas he was, perhaps, well known and recognized by everyone in the high school, the freshman, especially in our large state universities, frequently finds himself alone and isolated in a vast mass of other students who pay little or no attention to him. The matter is doubly acute for those who in high school were "big shots" in athletics, debating, drama, or student-body affairs. The boy who played on the high-school football team may find himself completely ignored by the freshman football coach, or if he tries out for the squad, may soon be dropped because he is "not promising material." The high-school athlete who wears his sweater about the campus becomes the object of ridicule if not of actual discipline and soon stores his prized memento in mothballs. The girl who was the leading lady in the high-school senior play may find herself in competition in dramatics with youngsters far more capable than herself. So, too, the boy or girl who topped the graduating class in scholarship may find the pace of college instruction beyond his ability. Such situations tend to produce frustrations with respect to anticipated success necessitating various efforts to re-organize one's aspirations, values, attitudes, and habits. There may be increased effort to master the new difficulty or to find some substitute outlet in other areas of accomplishment. There may arise a distinct deflation of self-esteem with an accompanying sense of inferiority; there may develop a good deal of fantasy thinking and rationalization in connection with the lowering of the level of aspiration in collegiate matters. In the extreme case there may be retreat into schizoid

reactions of intensive fantasy, avoidance of social contacts, and deterioration of ambition generally.

Effects of Class and Religious Backgrounds. Although, in general, in this country going to college represents a high cultural value, there are class differences in this matter. Sometimes families of relatively recent immigrant origin oppose their children going to college. So, too, nationality or religious and racial prejudices may play a part in adjustment. Students of southern and eastern European extraction may sense some implicit pressure on them to alter their family names. Students from Catholic families may be made uncomfortable when teachers and fellow-students openly discuss biological evolution, authoritarian church institutions, and non-religious and highly rationalistic philosophies. In the South, racial segregation keeps the white and Negro students separated, and even in the North and West prejudices operate to produce a sense of inferiority and anxiety in many colored students, which doubtless has considerable effect upon their classroom performance and upon their adaptation to the college community outside. But, aside from the situation under the color-caste system of the South, the most widespread prejudice in higher education centers around Jewish students.

While conditions in many quarters have been much improved in recent years, many colleges still use a thinly disguised quota system with a view to limiting the number of students from Jewish families. Only gradually and chiefly in the second-level fraternities are a limited number of Jews being initiated.

How the Jewish student reacts to what is essentially a class system in college will vary in terms of his own background and personality. For some the expression of anti-Semitism in college is their first experience with this divisive situation and it may produce a considerable emotional conflict. Others take such attitudes in their stride and make the best of this particular, though unpleasant, social reality.

In any case, once the student is enrolled in college, not only will factors of cultural background play their part, but a number of new situations will develop to affect his adjustment. Among these are two of special importance: housing, and the extent of responsibility for economic self-support.

Living Quarters. At first mention it might seem that where a student lives while in college would have no bearing upon his personal attitudes and habits or upon his standing with the community of his fellows. But social status itself is partially if not wholly determined by such factors and the associated facts of companionship. In colleges and universities where fraternities, sororities, and special housing clubs are a part of the whole culture, where one lives makes considerable difference in his status. Not to be associated with a Greek letter organization is frequently tantamount to "living on the wrong side of the tracks" as the saying goes.

In most rooming houses the daily contact is less close than in a dormitory and situations of this sort not infrequently accentuate homesickness and tendencies to introversion, unless corrected by gradual accumulation of new friends. In time, in both dormitories and rooming houses congenial associations develop which often have marked effects upon students, in regard to their attitudes toward their courses and their teachers, their study habits, and their eating and sleeping habits, and with respect to many other values, such as athletics, recreation, dating, sex, religion, politics, and economics.

In the Greek-letter houses, friendliness is taken for granted, and there is little doubt that in this respect such organizations have a genuine and abiding value to the new student. Coupled with this anticipated intimacy goes the high social status attributed to fraternities and sororities. These groups often encourage snobbery, racial and class prejudices, and other attitudes and habits which provide personal satisfaction. The nature of the social pressure and status connected with membership in a fraternity is well brought out in the following statement of Douglas N., who was mentioned above. This man, who is now professionally successful, wrote:

"When I came to school, I received in due time enough fraternity bids to satisfy anyone's ego. I finally pledged, but broke the pledge after one semester for reasons unnecessary to enumerate. From that time on I was a 'marked man.' An invariable question when a new acquaintance was being made was, 'To what house do you belong?' If I were to say merely, 'I don't belong to a fraternity,' it was considered equivalent to confessing social inadequacy to rise to fraternity standards. If, on the other hand, I were to suggest that I didn't care to belong to one, the obvious mental reservation on the part of the listener was that I suffered from a 'sour grapes complex.' It so happens that neither is true. But it took some time to realize that to anyone really worth knowing, fraternity affiliation is inconsequential. However, when one is alive, young, and yearning to be in the 'big swim,' this is rather a trying situation."

Economic Self-support. Economic independence and responsibility for self-support have long been high values in our culture, but such demands were not traditionally made on individuals until they had completed their education—elementary, secondary, or collegiate as the case might be. Until the great increase in enrollments in our institutions of higher learning the bulk of the students had full or at least partial support from home. Today, there is a tradition of high virtue attendant upon working one's way through college. It is not uncommon, for instance, in Midwestern state universities to find 30 or 40 per cent of the undergraduates dependent upon their own financial earnings, in whole or in part.

Aside from the economic hardships and severe physical strain often associated with earning one's way through college, there are many effects upon the student's attitudes, traits, and values. The awareness of having to work itself often sets up a sense of inferiority. Though many students who work make good grades, not infrequently their intellectual perform-

ance is lowered by the demands of their job on their time and energy. Such a lowering of the level of achievement may make for a sense of inadequacy. Then, too, the necessity to work may prevent any recreational outlets with members of the opposite sex. Girls who take domestic service often complain that they cannot have dates, and boys who have jobs frequently remark that they "cannot afford to take a girl out." And aside from these handicaps, many wage-earning students complain that they have no time for extracurricular reading, dramatics, or other opportunities to broaden their intellectual and esthetic horizons.

In sharp contrast to the student who is wholly or partly self-supporting, is the college man or woman who has too much money to spend. These individuals often fail to develop a sense of personal responsibility, may lack motivation to work hard in their courses, and sometimes get into situations leading to delinquency. On the other hand, many young people from wealthy homes have been well trained and have high aspirations regarding college and a career. Divergences of this sort probably rest on differences in family expectancy and early training of the student.

SOME SPECIAL PROBLEMS

In addition to the difficulties already treated there are others which tend to disturb many college students. In this section we shall discuss those that concern physical health, the love and sex life, religious and ethical reorientation, and present-day trends toward radical political and economic ideologies. We shall also note briefly some of the special problems that concern graduate and professional students.

Physical Health. The close tie between physical and mental health is well known and we shall discuss some aspects of what is called "psychosomatic medicine" in Chapter 21. At this point we shall comment but briefly on some of the more common problems of physical well-being as they relate to adjustment in college. First, with regard to scholastic work, we find a small but significant fraction of students who have defects of vision or hearing, or show lack of certain motor skills. As in the case of more severe and obvious physical handicaps, the psychological awareness of these difficulties enhances any trouble arising directly from the defect itself. Some young people are ashamed to wear glasses. Sometimes the need of a hearing aid is neglected and the student may get on as best he can by his own untutored acquisition of lip-reading. Poor motor coordination may be reflected in inability to handle laboratory apparatus which, in turn, may lead to misunderstandings with the instructor and consequent emotional distress. Many students are also careless in matters of eating and sleeping. Irregular, inadequate, and poorly balanced meals may, in turn, lead to difficulties of digestion and elimination. Inefficient habits of sleep and rest may also undermine one's health. So, too, overuse of tobacco and alcoholic beverages may have their effects upon school and extracurricular

performance alike. Finally there are the hypochondriacs who worry about their physical condition, who indulge in pill-taking and frequent visits to the physician. Such persons always constitute a small but evident proportion of those who turn up for some form of student counseling. As we well know such symptoms often reflect deeper and more serious anxieties.

Sexual Adjustments. The broad outlines of sexual development were treated in Chapter 14. Here we shall discuss student difficulties as they are involved, directly or indirectly, with sex. Adequate and unequivocal data as to the nature and extent of sexual maladjustment in college populations is not at hand. In the ten-year period covered by Fry's report on the mental hygiene program at Yale University, he and his staff accumulated case history data on 1,257 students. Of these, 39 per cent had difficulties in which sexual factors played a part. This does not mean that the problem which the student brought to the clinic was one he regarded as sexual, but that sooner or later in trying to help the student, sexual elements came into the picture. It is interesting to note that while only one-fifth of the freshmen cases concerned sexual matters in any determinable way, more than one-third of the other undergraduate cases had some bearing on sex, and that more than one-half (55 per cent) of the problems of graduate and professional students had sexual components.^a

Certainly we should not generalize from this to other college populations in this country. But any teacher, adviser, or medical man who has dealt with student problems knows that scholastic difficulties, social adjustments, and a host of other problems are often rooted, in part, in anxieties concerning the love life of the individual. There is no denying that matters of affectional satisfaction are of great importance to college students. In our society, most of these young people have to postpone marriage until they can complete their education and establish themselves economically in a chosen vocation. This means that the sexual outlets may be inhibited or directed into varied and often personally unsatisfactory outlets. We shall treat the topic of sexual adjustment under three headings: heterosexuality, homosexuality, and autoeroticism.

(1) As pointed out in Chapter 14, the attainment of normal heterosexual attitudes and values is one of the major needs of late adolescence. And while the student's development in regard to this matter will be determined, in a large part, by his home and community background, in college new attitudes and values impinge upon him from others, and opportunities for personal experience in sexual matters will necessitate for most students considerable reorientation. The problem may be discussed in relation to two levels of activity: the subjective and verbal reactions, and overt conduct.

The place of sex in the consciousness of persons in our society, especially when it takes the form of fantasies, tends to reflect the cultural

^a *Ibid.*, pp. 22, 94-95.

taboos which hedge about any free and spontaneous expression of sexuality. The extent and significance of sexual fantasies among college students are unknown, but from interviews or from other sources such as intimate autobiographies it is my impression that daydreaming about the opposite sex, especially in terms of romantic love, is rather common. So, too, subjective consideration as to whether one should break the code of premarital continence is often accompanied by fantasies as to pleasures or anxieties likely to be associated with such conduct. Among men, too, there is often considerable worry regarding sexual potency, and the imaginary demonstration of adequate capacity often provides certain compensatory satisfactions.

Student discussions—aside from the Rabelaisian story-telling—of these matters often concern such topics as the soundness of the traditional double standard of sexual morality, the extent and advisability of premarital and extramarital indulgence, the meaning of homosexuality and of autoerotic practices, techniques of birth control, and the dangers of venereal diseases.

At the level of overt conduct heterosexual companionship affords opportunity not only for verbal discussion of love, but for kissing, fondling, and other manual and bodily contacts which are biologically and socially preliminary to actual sexual congress. It is rather commonly assumed that petting is a very common practice in our colleges and universities. Kinsey's report seems to bear this out. He writes that about 92 per cent of the men in his sample who went to college engaged in some kind of petting prior to marriage. Moreover, 61 per cent of the men in this category reported that they had on occasion carried petting to a point which induced the orgasm. Only one-half of the men who went only to high school reported such an experience, and only one-quarter of those who did not go beyond the grade schools.⁹

Some people contend that "heavy" petting is likely to be harmful both physiologically and psychologically, but the evidence for such assertions is not reliable. Others hold that petting and fondling afford a valuable preliminary training in heterosexuality. It is believed that such experience helps both the boy and the girl to get over the common notion that a man should never react to a girl in any other way than he would to his mother or sister.

It is not possible to make any definitive judgment on such a question. These areas of behavior are so surrounded by silence, fear, and taboo that it is difficult to know what these experiences mean, and there are wide individual differences in response, since cultural definitions of the situation, except within the broad and vague limits of chastity, are often

⁹ A. C. Kinsey, W. B. Pomeroy, and C. E. Martin, *Sexual Behavior in the Human Male*, pp. 345-346 (Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders Company, 1948). The brief quotations which follow are by permission. Whether such conduct began or occurred during the college years is not made clear.

lacking. In regard to matters of the person-to-person physical contact of love, our culture provides us with only the most general frames of reference. As a result, there is considerable personal-social conditioning in this field of conduct, all of which means that wide individual variation is possible.

Certainly many older codes and practices regarding sex are being modified.¹⁰ While romantic love still remains a high ideal, there is a good deal of frankness about sexual matters which was less true in the Victorian Age. The college years afford an opportunity for courtship, and, while some criticism of petting may be made, on the whole it seems that the values gained in emancipating the young people from parental and filial fixations and giving them a chance to discover their likes and dislikes for members of the opposite sex far outweigh any occasional difficulty that may arise.

Prior to the Kinsey report we knew little about the incidence of sexual intercourse among college men, and some of his data, particularly that from men past the college age at the time of being interviewed are to be regarded as indirect evidence. He states that for his sample, 67 per cent of those at the college level had had intercourse prior to marriage as compared to 84 per cent for the high-school level and 98 per cent for those who had not gone farther than grade school. But this does not indicate whether the premarital relations of those in the first level occurred during the college years or at some other period. For the "later teens . . ." Kinsey says, "the figure for the college group is . . . only 42 per cent."¹¹ This may be interpreted as indicating that this proportion of the college-educated men in his sample were having premarital affairs while in college.¹² Yet one cannot be too certain. There is still need for a carefully controlled survey of the sexual life of our collegiate population, both men and women. Despite the general impression of a loosening of the mores, the taboos on admitting such practices are strong.

The Kinsey data are also somewhat informative on other aspects of this matter. According to them there is less recourse to prostitutes as sexual outlets among those of the college level than is the case of his sample from men of lesser educational background. So, too, the frequency

¹⁰ Kinsey holds that the changes in overt sexuality, especially in such things as premarital intercourse, are not as striking as others have assumed.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 347.

¹² It is rather difficult to tell exactly just what this statement means. This percentage would seem to agree pretty well with reports of others. Kinsey, p. 352, cites a number of studies which give figures for premarital intercourse, for men, ranging in percentage from 45 to 60. The men in these studies would correspond with Kinsey's "college level" category. One study, published in the early 1920's, states that one-third of a sample of college men admitted having indulged in premarital relations. See M. W. Fisk and F. L. Wells, "On the psycho-sexuality of college graduate men," *Mental Hygiene*, 1923, 7:697-714, and their "Further studies in the psycho-sexuality of college men," *ibid.*, 1935, 9:502-520.

of intercourse is notably less among those of higher educational status. He states, "In the age period between 16 and 20, the grade-school group has seven times as much premarital coitus as the college group."¹³ The data further show that men in the college level "are very slow in arriving at their first pre-marital intercourse,"¹⁴ and apparently for a great many it is infrequent, and with a considerable number only with the girl they later marry.

Perhaps more indicative of recent changes in values is the alleged increase in premarital sexual experience among college women. No adequate statistics are at hand, but various questionnaire surveys state that from 10 to 30 per cent of samples of college women admit such behavior. Apparently present-day college girls have values and practices in respect to love and sex which stand in striking contrast to the mores of the nineteenth century.¹⁵

The meaning of premarital sexual congress for the man or woman who has indulged must vary greatly. For one thing, it is difficult in this area of behavior, concerned as it is with one of the deepest physiological drives and so closely bound up with the feelings and emotions, to know what led to the initial intercourse. With serious-minded couples who are engaged it may have a different meaning from what it has for promiscuous individuals. In any case one factor needs reiteration: the wider significance of all such conduct lies within the field of self-control and social responsibility. If premarital sexual relations are indulged in with no regard to the person-to-person moral expectancies, the impress upon the personality organization will doubtless be different than if the experience is linked with serious plans for matrimony. In terms of interactional expectancies, to indulge in sexual congress means that each party thereto places certain claims upon the other. If it falls within the scope of prostitution, impersonal money payment or its equivalent is considered in our culture to solve the problem of moral responsibility; but, if the expectancies are of more personal intimate sort—as they are likely to be among college students—certain mutual obligations are psychologically not to be gainsaid. Stated otherwise, promiscuous and easy-come-easy-go relations with no sense of future responsibility reflect the absence of the *moral* rôle or self so fundamental in a mature person.

(2) The taboos associated with homosexuality in our society are well known. And though there are no adequate data as to the frequency of overt homosexual practices among college students, perversion is suf-

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 349.

¹⁵ See Kinsey, B. D., *Factors in the Sex Life of Twenty-two Hundred Women* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1951). Also the less vital study, Dorothy D. Branson and H. H. Brown, *Marriage and Sex: A Study of 1,400 College Students* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947). The Kinsey volume on the sex life of women will probably furnish some enlightening data on this topic.

ficiently a problem to warrant brief comment. Homosexuality is usually treated with reference to two levels: its overt manifestation, and its disguised and sublimated, that is, its culturally accepted, form.

For obvious technical and professional reasons the customary advisory personnel when confronted with cases of overt perversion, should enlist the services of a psychiatrist who is competent to understand and assist the students involved. To resort to blame, taboo, and legal punishment will do little to aid them. Yet the college administrator, aware that in our culture such practices are under a heavy ban, is usually faced with the practical problem of removing such persons from the college community for at least two reasons. First, there is always the danger of open scandal and public pressure if such facts are exposed; and second, there is the added likelihood that these practices may spread through example and solicitation. The rôle of the pervert in our society is a severe one. Few colleges are equipped to undertake prolonged diagnosis and to attempt cure of the homosexuals who are found in the student body.¹⁶

It should be noted in passing that these practices occur among women as well as among men. The girl who is disappointed in her efforts at dating men may fall into the hands of sympathetic and usually older homosexual women companions. These latter frequently afford the former emotional release and affectional intimacies otherwise lacking. The frequency of such practices among college women is unknown, and since certain aspects of this whole problem will be discussed in Chapter 18, we shall say no more about it at this point.

Sublimated forms of homosexuality are evident everywhere. Men and women are bisexual in nature, and the attachments to one's own sex may take the approved form, in our society, of membership in clubs, congeniality groups, fraternal organizations, and the military. In fact, the high value put upon group activities which concern only men indicates a cultural recognition of this underlying motivation. With women such acceptable cultural outlets are not so widely available, but, as women become freed from the customary dependence upon male-dominated values, we may witness an increase in sublimated forms of homosexual companionship for them too.

(3) It has often been said that masturbation among boys and men is universal. Kinsey's data indicate that well over 90 per cent of the men in his sample admitted having practiced it at one time or another. Yet the specific place it has in the sexual adjustments of men and women in college is difficult to determine. While former fears regarding the effects of masturbation are being cast off, there is some evidence that a great

¹⁶ Fry, *op. cit.*, pp 146-156, has a sound discussion of the difficulties involved in trying to treat overt homosexuality in the college community. Kinsey's material on homosexuality among his college level men is not very helpful since the incidence of overt inversion during the college years is not given.

many college men regard such practices as less desirable than "heavy" petting as an outlet, but again we are depending here on case studies—not on a careful sample of the cross-section of students.

For the college man or woman masturbation may signify a failure to adapt oneself to his male and female companions. Not infrequently it indicates a carry-over from childhood habits. The overt indulgence is often associated with a rich fantasy life involving the other sex. And, when it becomes so habitual as to lead to avoidance of opportunities for heterosexual friendships, it may serve to prevent the individual from ever attaining sexual maturity. The serious consequences of autosexuality lie in the fact that it short-circuits human interactions, eliminates the stimulating influences of contact with others, and tends to self-centeredness and an ultimate restriction of the love and affectional life that is so fundamental to the highest flowering of human personality.

But, no matter what particular direction the sexual life of the college student may take, the important point, to repeat, is its subjective meaning. All too frequently, in dealing with the overt manifestation of such interests or motives, the college administrator has resorted to the primitive techniques of control rather than try to diagnose and assist the student to handle these difficulties in terms of his total make-up and the particular situations in which he finds himself.

Religious and Ethical Readjustments. The frequent transition from rural- and primary-group norms of conduct to those of the highly specialized secondary-group world is reflected in the alterations in many of the students' values and attitudes concerning religion and morals. While we hear less today of the effects of the theory of biological evolution, many college students are emotionally distressed by the impact of the facts of modern science upon their deep-seated religious and ethical views. Courses in animal biology, psychology, philosophy, and sociology are sometimes said to undermine the faith of the students.

When confronted with these new ideas, many students separate their intellectual knowledge from their religious faith—a kind of schizoid dissociation—and live in what is essentially a dual world: one of material science and its applications, and one of traditional religious faith. Others are inclined to take up a crass materialistic and fatalistic view of themselves and the universe, and often these persons for a time run wild in opinion and conduct. Still others essay to integrate their intellectual knowledge with their deeper emotionalized values, and in the course of this attempt there are often considerable emotional insecurity and distress, at least until they work out a new frame of reference with regard to these matters.

The probable rôle of a strong cultural support for personal stability through religion is illustrated in the Murray study, which found that the Catholic subjects "were conspicuously more solid and secure," more happy

and free from conflicting problems, than the average, just as the Jewish students fell below the average in these respects.¹⁷

The nature and degree of personal disorganization which follows the attainment of new knowledge about biological and cultural evolution, man's physiological and unconscious motivations, and the nature of the physical universe and man's place in it depend in part upon the structure of the major values or frames of reference of the individual. It may well be that the exposure of the person to such revolutionary ideas re-arouses latent anxieties and insecurities that have for the time being been suppressed or redirected through the traditional religious, moral, and artistic outlets. Take the instance of a boy who has been so inefficiently brought up that he has not been able to integrate his sexual desires to other features of his personality, such as high vocational aim or his general social contacts with the other sex. In such persons the adjustments are largely those of a repressive type, and, once such a person learns about biological evolution and about the animal nature of much of man's behavior, and gets the first implications of the fact that evolutionism and psychology do run counter to certain traditional beliefs (those very ones which have provided him the devices for repression), he may throw all his old moral and religious values overboard and go in for a period of drinking, sexual promiscuity, and other symbols of emancipation. As a matter of fact, such a crisis, though severe, may but represent a transition stage to a more balanced and healthier view of life. But neither the college courses nor the counseling systems at hand offer much in the way of guidance and help. Rather, if the conduct is obviously against the mores of the institution, he may be dismissed; or, if not, he may go on floundering until he discovers by hard experience the deteriorating nature of such behavior and comes seriously to reorient his basic frames of reference.

Readjustments as to the moral code have to do not only with matters of sexual conduct but with a host of other matters as well. One's standards of honesty, for example, may be greatly disturbed by the discovery that cribbing and cheating in term papers, laboratory reports, and examinations are thoroughly accepted in the folkways of many college students. The individual who refuses his roommate his laboratory notebook so that the latter may fill in his own neglected work may become the object of ridicule, avoidance, and even direct pressure to conform to these standards.

Just how lasting such attitudes and behavior patterns become in the

¹⁷ This does not mean that the Jew may not or does not find solidity and security in his faith. Murray's sample was from Harvard College, and it is quite likely that these Jewish students had broken away, in part at least, from the faith of their fathers. Take, for example, the Catholic boy or girl who has given up his church often possesses the very characteristics which Murray has described for his Jewish subjects: self-consciousness, sense of insecurity, neuroticism, awareness of conflicting ideas and impulses, and possession of a certain insight into oneself and others, not evident in the firm believer. See H. A. Murray, *Explorations of Personality* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1938).

student is unknown. Although moralizing deans often tell recalcitrant students that cheating in examinations is predictive of a future life of crime, the evidence does not seem to bear this out. These boys and girls are simply following the campus definitions of the classroom customs. Whether later in life they will react this way to situations involving truth-telling and honesty will depend upon the depth, persistence, and generality of such values and attitudes, and upon the competition of such behavior patterns with others representing still other values. Thus a boy who would not hesitate to cheat in an examination in a course for which he had little or no abiding interest might never even consider an opportunity to misuse funds entrusted to his care by his fraternity or by a business firm which employed him.

On a broader front, American colleges have traditionally influenced the moral codes and conduct of students in the direction of a firm belief in the virtue of strong ambition and in the validity of intense personal competition in money-making. In this wider dimension of public morality the colleges have simply reflected and transmitted the dominant economic codes of the world outside. Moreover, as we have pointed out elsewhere, the dichotomy between this business morality and that idealized in Christian religion and in primary-group mores often tends to produce a conflict between two patterns of value or fundamental frames of reference. But, as these patterns are being modified in law and mores, and as collectivistic ideals and practices emerge in the present-day world, the colleges, in turn, will qualify and modify their treatment of matters of business morality in line with new public values.

Economic and Political Radicalism in College. In many colleges there has long existed a small minority of professors and students who were highly interested in theories of economic and political revolution. The significance of these interests for the personality structure varies tremendously. In interpreting the increased participation in radical movements, one must be aware of the variety of meanings which such interest and participation have for the individual, and must know how deeply it touches his fundamental values.

S. A. Stouffer and the author, in an unpublished study of political and economic opinions in a Midwestern university during the 1932 presidential campaign, found that some extremely radical students were so in large part because it provided them with a certain amount of public attention on the campus. With others, radical opinions symbolized a revolt from parental authority. The case of L. Z. is interesting in this connection. He had a very high score on the radical side; he had participated actively in a number of socialistic student organizations. But in the interview he admitted that he did it partly as a lark, partly to irritate his father, a wealthy industrialist, and partly because it gave him a certain status on the campus. But he also granted that he was majoring in the School of Commerce and

that he fully intended to return home and take up a business career with his father.

This problem, however, is no different in the wider world outside. Reformers and agitators for revolution often arise, as Lasswell has shown, from a family background of frustration, insecurity, and anxiety in which the individual has transferred his fears about his family status and his hostility to parental authority to the wider public world outside.¹⁸

Social and Emotional Problems of Graduate and Professional Students. Before going on to the final paragraphs of this section, we must turn aside to note some of the difficulties that confront graduate and professional students in our universities. Except for Fry's report, little investigation has been made of these problems.¹⁹ Yet some preliminary investigation and several years' experience in advising graduate students induce me to make the following comments.

One of the most apparent facts concerns that of age. The students postpone the attainment of adult occupational status in the belief that additional training will ultimately repay them in high social status and a good income. Then, too, there are always a number of graduate students who have been vocational failures. These persons enter advanced training in the hope and belief that they will find success if only they secure additional education. Often such aspirations are not fulfilled.

The prolongation of the learning period involved in graduate or professional study touches in particular two vital interests and motives: economic status and marriage. In order to continue in school the student must remain dependent upon the financial support of his parents, with all that this implies as to emotional dependence, or, if he attempts to earn his own way, he is faced with the double demands of a heavy scholastic program and holding a job. Since his earnings are likely to be meager, the student often develops a sense of inferiority associated with poverty. In addition there are difficulties connected with his love and sex life. The necessary delay in matrimony often brings in its wake increased sexual frustrations and anxieties, or the use of substitutes, such as distracting fantasies, autoeroticism, or premarital sexual intercourse with its attendant sense of shame, guilt, and fear of public exposure.

In the case of women who engage in professional and graduate work, it often happens that failure to marry is itself a dominant motive for continuing academic training. Witness a good many unhappy women who not only carry with them the sense of sexual frustration and have to face the intense competition of men in the graduate or professional studies

¹⁸ H. D. Lasswell, *Psychopathology and Politics* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1930). See also his *Power and Personality* (New York, W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1948).

¹⁹ Fry, *op. cit.*, Chap. 8.

themselves, but must anticipate even more severe competition with men once they have graduated. (See Chapter 18.)

Those graduate and professional men students who are married often have still other problems. While matrimony may furnish a natural and culturally accepted release for sexual tensions, there are other difficulties aside from those normally linked to married life. Of first importance are worries over family finances. These not only influence the interspousal relations but are likely to produce mental anxieties which will influence the man's academic performance and thus tend to lower his level of achievement, with all that this implies as to the attitudes of his professors and their possible recommendations for positions later. Then, if children appear, there are added home and financial responsibilities.

If there are no children, and if the wife has some occupational competence, she may undertake a position as a clerk, stenographer, teacher, or housekeeper. This may remove the economic insecurity, but it means further reorientation for both partners regarding household duties and problems of emotional and economic dominance in the home. A certain risk of future marital difficulties is always involved in such a situation. No one has studied the later matrimonial careers of students who were married before completing their professional or graduate training, but such an investigation might reveal valuable data regarding interactional adjustments against the background of professional training, interspousal rôles during this period, and later social rôle and status.

Then, too, the graduate and professional student, even though older in years, often suffers from anxiety about his examinations, the outcome of his research, his grades, and his chances of attaining his higher degree. When to such anxieties are added those attendant upon economic insecurities and sexual frustrations, or, for the married student, those associated with home and family responsibilities, the lot of the graduate student is not altogether happy.

Though we have emphasized the emotional difficulties of these students, it must not be imagined that all graduate students suffer such hardships. Nor must we forget that even those who are economically hard-pressed or who carry the responsibility of a family find many highly satisfying features in life during these years. Satisfactory marital life, good grades, successful research, and the attainment of fellowships, honors, and prizes all tend to enhance self esteem and to raise the social status. The problems have been sketched, however, to indicate that not all social and emotional difficulties are confined to undergraduates.

COUNSELING OF COLLEGE STUDENTS

In recent decades American colleges and universities have begun developing various counseling devices to deal with problems of selection,

guidance, and adjustment of students. Some of these programs have been quite informal while other mental hygiene services have been rather tightly integrated into the health services of the institution. (See below.) The psychologists contributed intelligence tests as aids in the selection of students. More attention was given to advisory work; new methods of handling moral discipline inside and outside the classroom were evolved; and increasing recognition was given to the importance of extracurricular activities. These services often overlapped each other, and not infrequently they operated at cross purposes. Contradictory conceptions and practices were particularly evident in matters of discipline and punishment with reference to the students' social and emotional problems related to matters both in the classroom and outside. For years tradition-bound presidents and deans failed to realize that the increase in enrollments had altered the nature of college life and that social psychology and psychiatry had genuine contributions to make to the improvement of morale and to the satisfactory adaptation of students to college. Only gradually did attention begin to be given to matters of mental health, to advice on courses, to vocational guidance, and to other needs of the students as maturing persons with a wide range of interests aside from the purely academic.

After some years of undirected growth more coördinated programs and procedures for counseling and guiding students have emerged in a good many institutions. The basic philosophy of such service is based on the recognition that the totality of the student's adjustments must be taken into account in directing his college education and that emphasis must be put upon the development of the whole personality rather than upon intellectual training alone.

Organization of Counseling. The manner in which counseling services are provided must, of course, accord with the larger college or university policy. In some institutions there is a good deal of centralization, in others much decentralization. Certainly it seems wise to effect some kind of functional interdependence and coöperation so as to avoid contradictory programs and duplication of effort.²⁰

In general, the following division of labor seems to be indicated: There should be some central person or committee whose function will be determination of major policy and practice and into whose hands the chief coördinating functions will fall. Such a person or body, of course, will operate under general administrative and faculty control. From such a central policy-making and coordinating body there would derive certain specialized functions, including the following: (1) A central service into whose hands would fall the responsibility for the collection of high-school

²⁰ For a collection of papers on the nature and techniques of student counseling, see A. H. Brayfield, ed., *Readings on Modern Methods of Counseling* (New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1950).

records, the entire testing program before entrance, the determination of fitness of applicants for college work, registration, and the preparation and keeping of the usual academic and related records of all students. (2) The medical and health service, including mental-hygiene experts, who should be available for voluntary consultation and prepared to diagnose and advise students sent to them by administrative deans, by faculty counselors, or by parents, friends, or others. (3) The collegiate deans and their assistants, having to do essentially with the scholastic problems. (4) Selected members of the teaching staff upon whose shoulders the major responsibility for the counseling of students must fall. These people will call upon the more specialized services only in extreme cases. (5) A faculty committee or some special personnel officer having to do with moral discipline, both with respect to scholastic work and with regard to the students' extracurricular activities. (If the regular counseling is sound, such a committee or executive officer should have little to do.) Yet, so long as dishonesty in course work and theft of library and other university property occur, so long as sexual and other taboos and laws are broken, colleges and universities will have to continue to deal with those students who do not abide by the mores and regulations of the campus and the college community. (6) An official or committee to control the lodging and feeding of students in dormitories, and to supervise other residential facilities in the college community, such as fraternity and sorority houses, and privately owned rooming houses. (7) A central executive officer or committee having to do with the extracurricular life of the students so far as this is a part of the college or university function, particularly regarding student participation in athletics, dramatics, debating, oratorical contests, and the like. Such an officer or group might also serve in a liaison relation with the student-body organizations and with the staff of student unions or other agencies in the college which foster recreational and other extracurricular activities. And finally (8) some provision should be made for formal or informal relations with off-campus organizations such as various churches, the Y.M.C.A., the Y.W.C.A., the Newman Club, the Hillel Foundation, and like institutions which have frequent and important contacts with the students.

It is doubtless wise to permit direct membership and participation of representative students in some of these committees or agencies. This is particularly indicated with reference to housing and the extracurricular aspects of counseling work. The participation of the students in these matters is important in relation to the democratic process, and it makes for better service and for increased morale and satisfaction.

Attention to the Students' Needs. Although scholastic performance will remain the central theme of college life, sane personnel work should be concerned not only with the student's academic adjustment but with the whole scope of his life during the college years. And, on the purely

scholastic side, tests and other measures for predicting success or failure should be applied with a view not to mechanical grinding out of diplomas but to aiding the student to work up to his intellectual capacity. As Williamson and Darley say, the best counseling on academic matters is concerned with judgments of the probable success or failure in college work rather than with attempts to fit the student to a specific occupation in later life.²¹ Aside from the strictly pre-professional and professional courses, where the teaching and guidance may bear more directly on a particular vocation, training for the bulk of college students should be general in character and concerned with a form of preparation which will make the student sufficiently flexible to meet the varied requirements of vocational, marital, civic, and other public duties later in life.

As for the quantitative data from scholastic records, tests, and questionnaires, good counselors will regard them chiefly as indicators of symptoms of personality make-up. They are reliable aids in diagnosis and prediction. But the fundamental advice and direction to the student must come through the person-to-person contact of the administrative staff and the faculty advisers. It is through the interview, bolstered as it may be from the quantitative records—including school grades, scores on intelligence tests, and the like—and from biographical and autobiographical materials from the student or his previous advisers, that the most effective help will be given the student. In this way the student will come to be treated not as a subject for exposure to a certain course of study or as a nuisance when he gets into trouble, but as a person with a variety of needs, interests, and ambitions who must somehow adapt himself to the collegiate environment and at the same time prepare himself for a satisfactory life when he leaves school.

In all these contacts the psychological principles of interaction operate, and the student, if he is to be helped, must himself contribute to the contact with his adviser. The latter is not a mechanical robot who will hand out *obiter dicta* as to what the student must or must not do or who will fix up a life schema which will protect the student against any future crises. Too frequently students approach the counselors in a childish belief that some sort of magical devices can be furnished them which will once and for all relieve them of their problems and of their personal responsibility in connection therewith. The soundest help which a counselor can give is to get the student to help himself, to indicate to him the need for self-control and for a mature sense of responsibility for his conduct.

There has been considerable discussion of the value of courses in mental hygiene for college students. It is believed that such informational courses will give the student insight into the mental and social mechanisms

²¹ E. G. Williamson and J. G. Darley, *Student Personnel Work: an Outline of Clinical Procedures* (New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1937).

which operate in his life. While such classes may be valuable for many students, their limitations must be recognized. At best they can but furnish a body of information; they cannot replace the need for person-to-person contact of adviser and student. Moreover, such courses sometimes serve to provide the student with a host of new concepts with which he may easily rationalize his own maladjustments. In these instances the benefits from such knowledge are slight indeed. Too frequently there has been a pious notion that sheer information about mental, social, and emotional processes will provide all that is needed to make for happy orientation to college or to life later. Such a naïve view is analogous to recommending that a man with typhoid fever read a textbook in physiology or a sound treatise on *materia medica*.

No, the student must come to realize that in our society individual responsibility and self-control are two fundamental values in adult adjustment, and, with specific reference to college, he must realize that success therein is related to self-determined levels of aspiration and that achievement, in turn, depends upon his drive, ability, and interest, and upon his social-cultural background and present opportunities for learning. Moreover, he must discover that skill and attainment are dependent in large measure upon persistent effort and hard work, and finally that scholastic achievement is only complete when it is correlated with the deepest interests and motives of the individual. Only thus can it become an integrated part of the larger pattern of personality. In short, counseling can only aid the student; it cannot remake him or assume the responsibility for his motives, values, traits, attitudes, and conduct.

Qualifications for Sound Student Counseling. Success in guiding and advising students generally will depend upon the qualifications of the administrative staff and especially of the faculty counselors. A member of the technical staff must be adequately trained in his own specialty, be it medicine, psychological testing, or the housing and feeding of students. And those concerned with the extracurricular relations should possess, aside from executive and leadership abilities, a good deal of rather technical information bearing on their work.

But in addition to these specialized areas of knowledge and skill, the formal counseling staff should be selected from individuals who themselves are socially and emotionally well balanced. Not only should they have a sound knowledge of the principles of mental hygiene and be able to apply these in their daily contacts with students, but they ought to be persons of sound mind and healthy traits and attitudes. Little or nothing has been done in the way of formal training in this whole field, but beginnings have been made, and, as college personnel work becomes recognized as an integral part of our total educational program, we may look for more deliberate attention to these matters.

Yet the heart of sound advising of students lies with the teachers them-

selves, especially with those faculty members selected to act as student counselors. But all too frequently faculty advisers have no interest or skill in dealing with the students. Too often their contacts are perfunctory, having to do almost entirely with the registration of the student in a course of study and occasional visits from the student, chiefly from those who are called in because of reports of failing work. We cannot go into the range of difficulties arising from the traditional student-adviser relation. We have already commented on the problem of teacher-student contact in the classroom or laboratory, and some of the difficulties cited there are also evident in this field of interaction. First of all, the usual college teacher considers himself an expert in a particular branch of knowledge and feels little or no responsibility for collegiate matters outside that narrow boundary. Second, a goodly proportion of college instructors are none too healthy-minded themselves. The ivory tower of the academic profession has long provided many highly capable introverts a protective environment in which they could carry on their intellectual labors without the distractions of the marketplace or the ordinary world of their fellows. Third, most of those who are interested in helping their students have no knowledge or understanding of human psychology or mental hygiene. As a result, they frequently flounder about in the face of a student's emotional difficulties, or fall back upon their culturally imposed patterns of blame and punishment at the very time when the student needs sympathetic aid in diagnosing his difficulties and in planning a program to overcome them.

Although many teachers, even though unfamiliar with the technical jargon of psychology, do know a great deal about problems of personal adjustment, many others do not. But it does not follow that faculty counseling should be abandoned and a specially trained staff engaged to do such work. Few colleges are financially able to bear the costs of strictly professional counseling, nor does satisfactory mental hygiene indicate such procedure to be sound.²² It seems wisest to keep student advising closely geared to the classroom and everyday campus life. Three suggestions may be made to improve the system of faculty counseling:

(1) There is every reason for making the advising of students a recognized part of the college instructor's duties. But such time as teachers devote to this obligation should be considered a part of their regular working schedule and professional responsibility, not put on them as extra tasks in addition to a heavy teaching load.

(2) Prospective college teachers should have a modicum of training or instruction in social psychology and mental hygiene as a phase of their

²² The thesis that the "growth of college mental hygiene is in large part the responsibility of psychiatrists," is by no means generally accepted. (See C. C. Fry and E. M. G. Rost, "The problem of college mental hygiene," *Mental Hygiene*, 1941, 25-57.) Mental hygiene is not the private domain of psychiatry, and experience has shown that very effective programs of mental health have been conducted by personnel trained in social psychology, clinical psychology, sociology, and psychiatric social work.

general background for teaching, which all instructors should have in addition to their specialized preparation for particular fields. Lacking this, specially designed seminars on mental hygiene, including attention to the psychology of the interview, might be provided the faculty counselors by college departments of psychology, sociology, or education. So, too, periodic conferences on student advisory problems by faculty members and the central counseling staff might be held for discussion of common problems.

(3) For handling instances of more severe maladjustments some system of case conferences might be arranged for counselors and technical experts. Though at the outset such a program might set up an emotional resistance on the part of certain faculty members, it might, if skillfully handled, have lasting effects upon the faculty themselves and upon the students who have to come into daily contact with them.

Every faculty man or woman need not be an expert in mental hygiene, but everyone who is responsible for student counseling should know something of this field, just as every elementary- and high-school teacher should. Success as an adviser rests not only upon knowledge alone, but upon the fundamental structure of the personality of the instructor himself. As we come to take these matters into account in our teacher-training programs, as these broader as well as specialized features of college teaching come to be recognized by administrators and the public outside, we may hope to see better-balanced and healthier-minded college teachers in charge of our young people during the critical years of late adolescence and early maturity.

Recently, these years of later adolescence have been especially difficult ones for our American population. Recent college generations derive from a background of serious crises: the extreme economic depression of the 1930's, the social and emotional distractions of the Second World War, and the events of the years since the war which have continued to stimulate mental conflict and anxiety. Our college students, from whom a large fraction of our later leaders will come, need advice and guidance, in particular, with regard to their civic duties, both military and civilian, in respect to their preparation for a career as well as in regard to subsequent marriage.²¹ In the next chapter we take up some aspects of adjustment in marriage; problems of occupational adjustment will be considered later.

²¹ See a suggestive article, Portia B. Hume, "Shattered students in an atomic age," *Mental Hygiene*, 1947, 31: 567-575.

CHAPTER 17

Some Problems of Marriage and Divorce

In our society the family is legally a marriage pair—that is, a man and a woman lawfully wed. Sociologically a family is a primary group made up of parents and their immediate offspring. Despite the very evident loss or reduction of many subsidiary functions of family life, inter-spouse relations and child-bearing remain the focus of the family. As Sapir puts it, the continuing major functions of the family in our society are:

“First, to give the sex relationship its greatest emotional value; second, to rear children in an atmosphere of intelligent affection; third, to prepare the individual for the give and take of society; and fourth, to prepare the child unconsciously for satisfactory mating in the future.”¹

In this chapter our concern will be chiefly with certain psychological features of mating and courtship, and with marriage and the interactional patterns of the spouses. The final section deals with problems arising from the dissolution of the family. It should be borne in mind that, for the most part, we shall be concerned with marital adjustments as they take place within the framework of American society.

COURTSHIP AND THE PRELIMINARIES TO MATRIMONY

The mobility of our population, the emancipation of women from household duties, the entrance of young women into business and the professions, the rise of new agencies which afford chances for young men and women to meet, all illustrate changes from the earlier days of the isolated community wherein the families tended to intermarry among themselves.

Yet, despite these changes, the romantic pattern of free choice in love is considered to be the basis for successful monogamous marriage. The ideal of romantic love is believed to be so fundamental that comment on certain of its features is necessary if we would understand some of the important aspects of sexual selection and sexual adjustment in our society.

Romantic Love as a Culture Pattern. So far as Western history goes, romantic love began in the Middle Ages when chivalry among men con-

¹ Edward Sapir, “What is the family still good for?” *American Mercury*, 1930, 19:145-151. Quotation from page 151 by permission.

sisted not only in valor on the battlefield or at the tourney, but in a passionate attachment to some courtly woman. Sometimes this intense love was fixed upon a woman already married, under the custom of the time, to a man of her family's choice. Since marriage was largely determined by class and family status, the opportunity to link romantic love to marriage and family life was far less common than it was later. Thus medieval romantic love, if it became overt, often took the form of clandestine sexual relations. The romantic passion no matter what its physical basis was frequently sublimated into lyrical and spiritual poetry, songs, and certain highly conventionalized forms of conduct.

Psychologically, romantic love may be characterized by (1) a strong physical attraction, (2) the dominance of the male in courting, and coyness, shyness, and a certain passivity on the part of the female, (3) a feeling that the love thus unleashed is permanent—the constancy of the lovers was a high mark of romance, (4) an idealization of the personal characteristics of the beloved individual and a rather complete glossing over of any faults or deficiencies, and (5) pain and discomfort arising from the absence of the loved one or from inhibitions which in any way prevented the romance from taking the course which the lovers wished.

As the medieval period gave way to what we call the modern age, these romantic patterns were adopted by the rising bourgeois classes, where wealth rather than aristocratic family position determined high social status. But the upper bourgeoisie, unlike the medieval nobility, tended to link romantic love closely with monogamy. This shift, in fact, was one of the most important items in the history of romantic love in Western society. Later, especially in the British countries and in our own country, with their expansive colonial and pioneer life, economic and political freedom became correlated with romantic love. In time romantic choice of a mate became a widespread form of sexual selection among the agricultural and industrial classes. Today we have gone so far toward individualizing the selection of mates among most classes in this country that we look askance at any attempt on the part of parents to interfere in the love life of their children—except, of course, as these matters themselves are associated with questions of class, racial, or religious differences.

Factors Influencing Sexual Selection. Strictly speaking there is no absolutely free choice of mates. People have to associate with those who are near them, and, despite mobility of population and freedom in selection of friends, social circumstances tend to restrict the number of individuals with whom one has contact. Age, occupation, social class, and propinquity profoundly influence mating. Women, on the whole, have a harder time than men in finding a mate, and, although 90 per cent of American women who live to the age of 55 years or over do marry, there are considerable differences in the percentages married at varied age groups when the factors noted above are taken into account.

In this country men tend to marry women younger than themselves. It has also been shown that a woman's chances of marrying become steadily less after her twenty-second year. Propinquity appears to be correlated with sexual selection. Bossard's study in Philadelphia reported that of 5,000 consecutive marriage licenses issued in that city, one-third of the couples who applied lived within five blocks of each other. Other studies confirm this fact, though density is also known to be a variable. But propinquity and density, in turn, merely reflect the fact that people of similar class and occupational status, and similar nationality backgrounds, often live in the same neighborhoods.² Also higher education tends to militate against a girl's chances of matrimony—itsself a reflection of a certain cultural lag in the matter of masculine attitudes toward the educated woman.

Of more interest to us, however, are certain psychological factors which come into play in mate selection. One feature of romantic love is the *idealization* of the prospective spouse. Popular slang and popular songs about one's "dream girl" or "dream boy" illustrate this fact. Various studies of American college and university students show that for this sample, at least, men say that in choosing a wife they would stress sexual attractiveness, sexual purity, beauty, and health to the relative neglect of class status, education, or domestic habits related to housekeeping and child-rearing. In contrast, college girls emphasize for their prospective husbands occupational ambition, ability to make money, and social status. They put less stress on good looks than do the men. Both sexes note the importance of common race and religion and also personality traits, though all are vague as to just what they mean by the latter.³

Related to the matter of idealization and sexual attractiveness is the widespread belief that men wish to marry women like their mothers and that girls prefer to marry men like their fathers. There is some support for this notion in the Freudian theory of the Oedipus complex, which states, in effect, that little girls become more attached to their fathers than to their mothers and little boys more attached to their mothers than to their fathers. While there are ample individual case records which seem to validate this theory or hypothesis, other studies of large samples of persons do not seem to bear this out entirely.

Mangus, using 600 college girls as a sample, tried to find out if their image of an ideal husband was more closely associated with their conception of their father than with that of their most intimate male companion or their most intimate male relative. He reports that as to personality

² For a discussion of various studies in mate selection, see Kimball Young, *Sociology, A Study of Society and Culture*, 2nd ed. (New York, American Book Company, 1949), pp. 332-336. See, also, M. F. Nimkoff, *Marriage and the Family* (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1947), Chap. 13.

³ For a more detailed discussion of various studies, with bibliographic references to the same, see K. Young, *op. cit.*, and Nimkoff, *op. cit.*

traits, the ideal mate was more like the most intimate male companion than the father or intimate male relative.⁴

A much more exhaustive effort to test the theory of the Oedipus was made by Winch. He found that the son-mother relationship in his sample of American college men supports the Oedipus theory but that as to daughter-father relationships there is no positive evidence at all. In trying to explain this apparent discrepancy or contradiction Winch draws upon what we know of differential exposure of boys and girls to culture in the American middle-class family.⁵

Surely the selection of a mate is bound up with the conscious and unconscious needs of the individual. But as to just what elements in the personality come into play in these situations is not entirely clear. Strauss showed, for a limited sample of men and women, that men tended to stress the need for a mate who would appreciate what the man wished to achieve and to stimulate his ambition. The women emphasized the need for someone to love them and to confide in. The women also mentioned the need for someone to help them make decisions, someone to look up to, and someone to stand by them when in difficulty. Both men and women wished to have their personal ideals respected and to find relief from loneliness.⁶

It is apparent, then, that sexual selection is influenced by both external conditions, place of residence, race, differences in class, and the like—and by internal or subjective factors such as, felt need and idealization of prospective mate. These factors set the stage for courtship as it is practiced in our society.

Courtship Patterns. Writers on the family are often ignorant of the fact that in other societies courtship as we know it does not exist. Hence cross-cultural comparisons are apt to be misleading. Our discussion is oriented chiefly to the American middle-class pattern.

Although, traditionally, male dominance in courtship was taken for granted, there is considerable evidence that aggressiveness in love on the part of women is gradually becoming more common. It was once assumed that male dominance was innate and universal. But we know that in part at least it is a cultural product, and there is no reason to believe that, in our own society, women as well as men may not in time change their traditional rôles in courtship.

⁴ A. R. Mangus, "Relationships between the young woman's conception of her intimate male associations and of her ideal husband," *Journal of Social Psychology*, 1936, 7:403-420.

⁵ R. F. Winch, "Some data bearing on the Oedipus hypothesis," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1950, 45:481-489. (This also contains references to various other papers on this topic by Winch and others.) See also, his "Further data and observations on the Oedipus hypothesis: the consequence of an inadequate hypothesis," *American Sociological Review*, 1952, 16:784-795. By permission.

⁶ Anselm Strauss, "A Study of Three Psychological Factors Affecting Choice of Mate." Ph.D. thesis (Chicago, University of Chicago Library, 1945).

The whole romantic love pattern emphasizes thrill, lyrical expression of affection, high idealization of the prospective mate, and continually reasserted loyalty and constancy. There is the cultural pattern of expected and habituated jealousy if there is any threat to this relationship by a third person. Then, too, in the middle classes in this country, there is a good deal of lavish expenditure of money during courtship. The free spending gives the girl a certain idea of luxury which the young man, once married, may neither be able, nor even intend, to carry on. But the most notable feature of courtship is that much of it goes on—using an old homely expression—in what may be called one's Sunday clothes. That is, young people tend to do their courting, at least in a wide range of social classes, as a leisure-time activity, often on holidays and Sundays, and through it all there runs a certain "dressed-up" attitude. In fact, the whole courtship tends to take place in a sort of Cinderella or daydream world which they and others build up.

The fantasy life set up in both the young man and the young woman during courtship may provide a good deal of sublimation for their overt sexual expression, but at the same time it may prove in the end to be the basis for misunderstanding and conflict in matrimony itself. The over-idealization of romance and marriage and the unique rôle-taking of courtship foster such fantasies. A rude awakening later may be the beginning of difficulties and strains that make marriage itself somewhat hazardous.

One function of courtship is to advance the development of heterosexuality so important for the maturation of the personality. The traditional courtship, with its trappings of romantic sentimentality, frequently leads to over-expectation and a certain temporary, immature rôle-taking which may prevent arrival at effective maturity. If in courtship, moreover, the high idealization of women, which is often childish, continues, then that preliminary experience of mutual "testing" and "experimentation" will not prove helpful in later adjustment. It is not an easy matter for the young person in these days of many conflicting patterns of behavior and the varied opportunities for premarital sexual congress to know just what to do. The difficult choices between overt outlets and the values of sublimation and inhibition with an eye to future marriage are not easy to make.

Changes in Premarital Folkways. The rise of new folkways and mores respecting sex relations prior to marriage indicates a shift in the romantic pattern and in the nature of courtship. The extent and frequency of premarital sexual intercourse in contemporary America so far as men go has been reported for a large sample by Kinsey.⁷ The evidence regarding premarital relations on the part of women is not, as yet, very adequate. Certainly there is a widespread belief that premarital sex experience is

⁷ A. C. Kinsey, W. B. Pomeroy, and C. E. Martin, *Sexual Behavior in the Human Male* (Philadelphia, W. B. Saunders Company, 1948.)

more common among women today than it was a few decades ago though this may simply mean that women are more willing to talk about sex than women were earlier and that in overt conduct there has not been as much change as some imagine.⁸

While expressed opinions are often quite uncorrelated with overt conduct, various surveys made in the United States throw some light on American folkways and beliefs regarding sex. On the basis of Roper's poll in 1937, *Fortune* reported on the question whether it is "all right for either or both parties to a marriage to have had previous sexual experience," 48 per cent of the men and 65 per cent of the women respondents said that it was not right for either party to indulge. Of the respondents over 40 years of age, 51 per cent agreed to this same view. In 1943 another Roper survey of a cross-section of American women between the ages of 20 and 35 years secured opinions on premarital chastity. Asked, "Do you think that most men require virginity in a girl for marriage?" 59.1 per cent said "Yes" and 31.3 per cent said "No." To the question, "Do you think women should require virginity in men?" 45 per cent said "Yes," and the same percentage, "No." The balance, as in the other question, were in the "don't know" category.

Those women who had attended college and who lived in big cities were least concerned about male virginity. The same was true of Catholic and Jewish women. Those who believed in the need for male chastity came from smaller localities and from Protestant backgrounds.⁹

As to statistical evidence regarding overt conduct, we know very little, and what information we do have comes almost entirely from the upper and middle classes.

Hamilton reports that, of his selected sample of 100 men whom he interviewed, 54 per cent admitted premarital sex relations, and that, of his 100 wives, 35 per cent admitted like practice. Harvey, in summarizing the results of ten investigations on this topic—six dealing with men, four with women—states that about 35 per cent of the men and 15 per cent of the women reported premarital sex experience.¹⁰ A study of the folkways of sexual behavior made in 1943-1945 by Porterfield and Salley reports that of a sample of 613 college men and women, 1 out of 5 of the men ministerial students and 3 out of 5 of the V-12 navy students admitted to premarital sexual congress. For the entire group of women subjects only 10 per cent admitted to unchastity. When the sample was divided as to membership or non-membership in a church, and by sex, we find that for

⁸ Kinsey's book on American women may help enlighten us on this matter. As a hint on this and other topics, see M. L. Ernst and David Loth, "What Kinsey will tell," *Red-book Magazine*, 1150, 95, 36-37, 86, 90.

⁹ "The Fortune Survey," *Fortune*, 1943, 38, 20, 24.

¹⁰ G. A. Hamilton, *A Research in Marriage* (New York: Albert & Charles Boni, Inc., 1929); O. L. Harvey, "Some statistics derived from recent post-war studies relative to human sexual behavior," *Journal of Social Psychology*, 44, 1952, 3, 97, 100.

the men nearly 2 out of 5 church members and 3 out of 4 of the non-members admit to premarital intercourse. For the women the corresponding ratios are 1 out of 12 and 1 out of 5. The percentage for college men in 1940-1942, shown in another survey, was about what it was for the V-12 students.¹¹

There is not only the direct and indirect evidence of the sort just described, but there are, I believe, everywhere in this country a much more rational and de-emotionalized discussion and recognition of all aspects of sex than was true a generation or two ago. Take for example the matter of feminine personal hygiene having to do with periodicity. One has only to examine the advertising pages of the current issues of such magazines as the *Ladies' Home Journal*, the *Woman's Home Companion*, *Good Housekeeping*, and *Harper's Bazaar* and compare them with the same periodicals of a few decades ago to realize the growing tolerance regarding these matters.

There remains, of course, the problem of the relation of sexual life to other aspects of personality, and many persons continue frankly to ask whether premarital sex relations for late adolescent youth are either physiologically or psychologically necessary for their well-being. Certainly many medical authorities, clinical psychologists, and endocrinologists doubt very much that continency before marriage is injurious to young people. And there are certain obligations and "claims," emotional and social, which are set up by premarital sexual relations and which cannot be ignored.

These intimate matters cannot be dissociated from a host of other aspects of interaction. Preparation for a profession or business, the attainment of economic security, the probability of pregnancies—despite the widespread knowledge of birth control—these and many other factors must not be ignored by young people contemplating matrimony, who have strong and natural urges to follow their biological impulses before marriage, but must be faced frankly. Yet, where men and women find it necessary economically to postpone marriage into the late twenties or early thirties, there are likely to develop certain premarital sexual outlets which would not have been approved formerly.

The problem is essentially that of fostering healthy and sublimated relations of young people and of eliminating the temporary and "false" rôles of prospective spouses during courtship so that there will not result the all-too-common "let-down" in human relations later. The issue is not so much that of trying to carry over-romanticized courtship patterns into marriage as of qualifying courtship practices in the first place. When we have done that, many of the problems of subsequent adjustment may be more easy to solve without the dissolution of the family itself.

¹¹ A. L. Porterfield and H. E. Salley, "Current Folkways on sexual behavior," *American Journal of Sociology*, 1946, 52: 209-216.

MARRIAGE AND EARLY ADJUSTMENTS

So far as the external relations to others go, the entrance into matrimony by two persons is largely controlled by culture. One is impressed by the attitude in present-day America that frequently anticipates marriage as a greater crisis than it need be, just as we overemphasize the importance and significance of pubertal and adolescent changes. The problems of marital adjustment seem to arise chiefly because as individuals we are exposed to a wide variety of choices of life organization and to a set of poorly defined cultural situations in these days of rapid social change.

The Wedding and the Honeymoon. Among other changes in marital patterns the importance of wedding ceremonials has been altered. The freedom of choice of mates is reflected in the fact that young people often resent the public demands for elaborate weddings and their trappings. It is not uncommon to discover that it is the parents of the couple who want an elaborate wedding, and elopements are frequently nothing but an attempt to escape these formalities.

Although the honeymoon has become less expected in many social circles, it still remains conventional in many others. And, although some of its traditional aspects have changed, certain features still remain. It marks the beginning of serious readjustment of many habits. First, in most instances there is the initial sexual intercourse, at least for the bride. There may be for both spouses, but perhaps more frequently for the bride, some trauma in the initial physical relationship. Not infrequently the wedding night remains for the couple an unpleasant rather than a happy memory. Second, the honeymoon is often undertaken in the same romantic tenor as the traditional courtship. Expensive living in hotels and leisure-time activities sometimes give the couple—but again perhaps more often the bride—a false start as to the obligations and rôles which will follow in ordinary daily life. Like the over-idealized courtship, this is perhaps not unrelated to some of the subsequent marital difficulties. If the courtship has taken a more rational course, the honeymoon likewise will be managed with some reference to the everyday life soon to follow.

Variations in Spousal Rôles. The beginnings of new patterns of interaction in the newly founded family, of course, reach to other areas of behavior than the sexual. It is a great mistake to assume that adjustments regarding this phase of spousal relations are the only significant ones—though they are undoubtedly of high importance in our society. New rôles are developed and new status determined with reference not only to these matters but to many others. Moreover, the previous history of each spouse will in large part determine the interspousal relations developed in the new home.

The husband may take the authoritarian rôle of command or the lover rôle of the courtship period, a dependent one as to household affairs,

or that of friend and companion. So, too, the wife may take the wife-and-mother rôle, a companion or a partner rôle, or other. There is some evidence that in middle-class America, at least, there is a shift from the former patriarchal rôle of the husband and father to one of a more companionable type. But there are great variations in this matter.

There is doubtless a great deal of carry-over into matrimony of interactional patterns developed during childhood and adolescence. However, infantile, childhood, and adolescent rôles are not unitary and single, but diverse and multiple, depending upon the various other persons and groups with whom the individual interacts. Just how these varied rôles and associated attitudes and habits get reorganized for the marriage pair is the important question. No adequate study has been made of the matter for a large sample of the population, but we have some suggestive leads from case studies and from general observation. The Freudian psychologists have long contended that many of the overt manifestations of inter-spouse relations are symbolic of rôles and attitudes developed in infancy and childhood with reference to mother, father, sibling, or other relatives, and to non-relatives. From a sociological approach Cottrell has also shown that the rôles of the spouses in marriage not only vary with the particular social situation but are often only slight modifications of rôles which were present in the respective family configurations from which the spouses came. He writes:

" . . . Cases seem to indicate a multiplicity of rôles. For example, a wife may play a much depended upon mother-rôle, a hated sister-rôle, and a beloved brother-rôle at different times for her husband. The husband may in turn be for his wife her distantly respected father, her hated younger brother, and her beloved older sister. The startling ambivalence frequently displayed by married persons for one another may not be true ambivalence in the strict Freudian sense. It may actually be the result of corresponding attitudes for different rôle patterns derived from early family relations. Thus a husband may call out affectionate as well as hostile responses from his wife by playing rôles of members of her family who earlier called out the different responses. Of course it is not at all necessary nor even likely that either husband or wife will be aware that he is playing such rôles."¹²

It is apparent, too, that, though the culture of our society defines the major relations of the spouses to each other, it also permits certain alternatives; and it is in this connection that the effects of personal-social conditioning may come in. Thus a spouse who was the pampered youngest of his own family may continue to employ some of his infantile devices for getting attention in marriage. Without doubt some rôles are transferred from the past into the newly established family and come to play a distinctive part in determining success or failure in matrimony.

We must not forget that, as predetermined in its main lines as adult

¹² L. S. Cottrell, Jr., "Rôles and marital adjustment," *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, 1933, 27: 167-115. Quotation from page 105 by permission.

behavior is by what has gone on in infancy, childhood, and adolescence, there still remains the possibility of reorienting an individual in a marriage group—as in any other—in terms of certain alternative choices or probable patterns. There are vast differences in the flexibility of adults in adopting new rôles and new attitudes, and this itself is obviously a problem for considerable further study. But it is increasingly evident that the simple rôles of dominant husband and submissive wife do not fit the concrete situation, and the variations of rôle with reference to familial situations must be very great and have a distinctive effect upon the degree of marital harmony.

Bearing in mind this general comment on the problem of the rôles in marriage, let us examine more closely some of the situations and reactions which give rise to strain or to coöperation and which in turn will profoundly influence the development of relatively stable and personally satisfying attitudes, habits, and ideas of the spouses in relation to each other.

Sexual Factors Which May Influence Marital Relations. A fundamentally important adaptation of the spouses to each other concerns the sexual relations. If a bride brings into this situation the notion and feeling that the whole matter is nasty, sinful, or crude, she may find considerable difficulty in adjusting herself to the necessary biological aspects of wedded life. The adjustment apparently depends upon informational preparation for marital relations, upon complete satisfaction, upon the relation of sexual passion to frequency of intercourse and the art of love, and upon numerous other factors.

The importance of some of these matters for marital happiness (leaving the meaning of "happiness" to the subjective judgment of the respondents) is shown in Davis's study of a sample of 1,000 married women of middle-class and college background. She writes:

"We are able to show that for the group under consideration preparation for the sex life of married life is a factor making for married happiness; that there is a correlation between preparation and the attractiveness of the married relationship itself as it comes into experience, that when these first experiences are attractive there is a greater chance for subsequent happiness. There is, as might be expected, a greater chance for happiness where the original experience was pleasurable, and four times as many of the happy group as of the unhappy have found these sex relations so during their entire married life. On the other hand, at the time of filling out the questionnaire more than four times as many of the unhappy group as of the happy group found them distasteful. Where the husband's intensity and frequency of desire are greater than those of the wife, there seems to be about an even chance for happiness. Something over 50 per cent of cases in both groups belong to this class. Where frequency and intensity of desire of both husband and wife are approximately equal the chances are greater that they will be happy than unhappy. Where the wife's desires are greater we find the higher percentage in the unhappy group."¹²

¹² Katherine B. Davis, *Factors in the Sex Life of Twenty-two Hundred Women*

Davis's study also indicates that, according to her informants, the use of contraceptives had little to do with happiness in marriage, but that on the other hand "abortion is about three times as frequent in the unhappy group, as in the other." Yet the reader must note the limited number of cases and the fact that her sample came largely from persons in the upper social strata. Also her data were collected during the 1920's and some changes in attitude and practice may have taken place since.

In keeping with what we know about the biology and psychology of sex, there must be noteworthy individual variations in the amount of sexual gratification among both men and women. Yet in the face of our puritanic restraints regarding sexual expressiveness on the part of women, the "normal" frequency of sexual outlet for men is doubtless much greater than it is for women. While Kinsey's data on female sexuality are not, at this writing, available, his book on male sex life points out that the sexual activity of adolescent girls and of women in their twenties and thirties is strikingly below that of males of comparable ages. Such differences are probably due, in part, to cultural rather than to biological factors, though, in general, Kinsey tends to stress the latter. In any case there is ample evidence to show that there is a period of sexual adjustment in the early married years, the repercussions of which may be varied and, at times, widespread for any given couple.

The correlations between the inhibitions regarding sex and the educational and social levels of women have not been fully explored. However, in one matter, that of nudity, married women as well as men in the upper educational and economic brackets have far less inhibitions than do women and men with less schooling and with lower incomes. This includes such matters as going about the house without clothing and also the habit of having sexual intercourse in the nude.¹⁴

The frequency of intercourse likewise probably varies in relation to the education and social status of women just as it does for men. Various studies have shown marked orgasm deficiency among women of college and university training, again a matter reflecting a combination of biological and psychological factors.

As we have previously remarked, however, sexual adjustment is only one phase of marriage, successful or otherwise. Many factors, such as, clothes, personal habits of bodily care, manners, the use of money, recreational interests, and religious, political, and economic views, affect happiness and satisfaction in married life. Moreover, many of these items be-

(New York, Harper and Brothers, 1929), pp. 76-77. By permission. These cases represented one-third of the questionnaires which she sent out.

¹⁴ See Kinsey *et al.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 223, 265-277. While the material on Kinsey's study of American women was summarized, in part, by First and Lath, *op. cit.*, apparently Kinsey was not satisfied and after the article was published, he issued a denial of its authenticity.

come linked together and thus influence the total sense of well-being and of happiness or unhappiness.

Other Factors Affecting Interspouse Adjustment. Once the honeymoon is over, the spouses find themselves confronted with all sorts of problems of adaptation of which they had, perhaps, little dreamed previously. The courtship fantasies begin to dissolve in the strong light of everyday living. One spouse may have been brought up and habituated to very careful and orderly practices in regard to the wearing and care of clothes. The other may be careless, indifferent to appearance, and given to tossing discarded garments on chairs, beds, and divans, or leaving them on the floor. So, too, if a man wants to take off his coat and go about in his shirt sleeves in the house, or even to sit at the table with his coat off, the wife may be emotionally upset by such habits. Failure to tidy up a bathroom after bathing or shaving, carelessness in brushing the teeth, or many other minor and trivial items of daily routine may be enough to start a divergence of attitude and reaction which in time may lead far beyond these petty matters.

Then, too, attitudes and habits regarding finances may differ greatly. One spouse may wish to budget the family income carefully, while the other may not. One may be thrifty, saving, and even penurious, the other a spendthrift. Likewise, differences in economic and political philosophies may produce strain. Religious differences may also crop out to disturb marital happiness, especially when problems of religious training of children arise, or when, as will be noted below, such variations get linked up with other features of interactional conflict. In the realm of recreation and leisure-time activities certain divergences may soon appear. After a hard day's work at the office, factory, or on the farm a husband may wish to spend his evenings in peace and quiet at home, whereas the wife, perhaps having been rather tied to routine household duties all day, may wish to go out for entertainment.

In and for themselves these divergences may and usually do become accepted. The difficulty arises when these irritations get linked to other problems, when, for example, carelessness in money matters leads to indebtedness, worry, and ultimately to denial of genuine necessities for the household, or when indifference to orderliness in personal habits of dress, cleanliness, and the like are used in an argument concerning something quite remote. For instance, a wife who feels herself inferior to her husband's intellectual and professional standing may insinuate in a somewhat heated interplay that the husband "is not all perfect" as he imagines himself to be, "else he would not be so slovenly in the bathroom" or "about picking up his clothes." It is in just these ways that insignificant items in personal behavior begin to take on more and symbolic importance with reference to other matters of interspousal adaptation.

Although in the total situation financial status does not seem to be so

significant as some have imagined it to be, nevertheless in many instances money does play some part in influencing interspousal relations. A husband unable otherwise to control his wife—that is, to maintain his expected dominance—may use his financial power as a symbol of strength. Also, because married women in our society so frequently have no economic independence, a wife may barter her sexual charms and favors to her husband to offset or counteract the masculine economic supremacy over her. Observation leads one to believe that the linkage of such responses to intimate sexual life is more common than might be imagined. A couple is always faced with the likelihood of unwanted and disturbing association of sex love with other features of behavior which originally had no relation to these intimate contacts. Finally, the artificial character of the courtship prevents two young persons from discovering many of these points of divergence before marriage. It is for this reason, if for no other, that the first months or years of marriage are often considered the most critical.

Another area in which readaptation is often necessary and may be fraught with considerable likelihood of conflict concerns the continuation of friendships made before marriage. A long-standing friendship of two men may be disturbed by the entrance of one or both of them into matrimony. Or the husband may not enjoy some of the wife's former friends; especially if he suspects that his wife is deliberately keeping him from his old cronies, he may set up strong resistance.

A more serious problem, one which reflects very largely our cultural pattern of jealousy, is the common objection of a husband to his wife's interest in her former men friends, or the wife's resentment of the husband's continuing any friendship with women. All the traditional attitudes and ideas of sexual jealousy, of fear of infidelity, past, present, or future, may come into play. Women who have been in business or the professions before marriage may resent this attitude on the part of their spouses, but they often find it difficult to continue such friendships despite their completely professional and non-sexual character. So, too, professional men who have congenial relations with professional women dating back for years are frequently amazed to discover that their wives object strenuously to any gestures of continued friendship with such persons. The subtle, often half-conscious, interplay of spouses which centers in these matters may in time distill the poison which will kill their love. Some interesting facts about the time it takes to achieve a workable and reasonably satisfactory adjustment after marriage are brought out by Landis.¹ He secured data from 409 couples who had been married, on the average, for

¹ J. T. Landis, "Length of time required in achieving adjustment in marriage," *American Sociological Review*, 1946, 11, 696-677. Most of this paper is incorporated in J. T. Landis and Mary G. Landis, *Building a Successful Marriage*. New York, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1948, pp. 242-247.

20 years. Each spouse was asked independently of the other as to adjustment in these areas: spending the family income, sex relations, adjustment to in-laws, place of religion in home, choice and association with friends, and social and recreational activities. As might have been expected, in no single matter was there complete agreement between the spouses as to the time it took to become adjusted or whether agreement had ever been reached. Adjustment in sexual relations required the longest time, although slightly more than one-half of the couples agreed that their sexual relations were satisfactory from the beginning. The balance, 47 per cent, either disagreed on how long it had taken, or said it had taken anywhere from one month to twenty years or not at all. As to agreement on family spending, 56 per cent said it was satisfactory from the outset. In contrast, 3 out of 4 of these couples stated that with respect to mutual friends and religion, there was satisfactory agreement from the start. Regarding social-recreational life and relations to in-laws about 2 out of 3 said there was agreement from the outset.

After indicating the length of time it had taken to get agreement or not, each subject was asked whether the adjustment was satisfactory to both, to one, or to neither with respect to each of the six areas. As to sex, 4 out of 10 said it was "mutually satisfactory"; as to mutual friends, 8 out of 10 gave it this same rating. Finally there is evidently a close relation between happiness in marriage and length of time required to make satisfactory adjustment. "The earlier the adjustments are made, the more likely is the marriage to be happy; and the fewer the areas in which the couple fails to adjust, the better are the chances for happiness in the marriage."¹⁶

The Processes of Marital Conflict. The interactional patterns which arise in family life are crucial to its continuity or dissolution. These interactions may be cooperative or conflictive in character. Marital conflicts may take any number of forms. They may be acute and rather violent, or chronic and habituated, they may be concealed and subtle in character, or they may be more or less open for all the world to see and hear.

As to the situations which set up conflict, they may be as varied as the items in familial interaction. In our society the most common factors giving rise to marital conflicts concern finances, occupation, age differences, sexual responsiveness, mutual recognition of position or prestige, the family status in the community, divergences in cultural background, philosophy of life, temperament health, and the more personal behavior patterns and attitudes. A serious difficulty often develops when the spouses come from different religious backgrounds. Sometimes the problem is solved by conversion of one spouse to the church of the other—sometimes one spouse is indifferent to the religious training of the children. But often conflict arises because difference in religious belief and background may

¹⁶ Landis and Landis, *op. cit.*, p. 247. By permission.

become symbolic of other divergences between the spouses.¹⁷ Many of these matters we have already discussed as they bear upon marriage adjustments.

The precise nature of marital conflict will vary along a scale from subtle verbal thrusts and soft words of *double-entendre* to vociferous quarreling, to violent, overt fighting. The level at which these interactions take place is partly the function of social class to which the person belongs.

The outcome of conflict varies, of course. There may be some sort of direct adjustment in which a temporary or more permanent truce is declared without any real and genuine solution. There may be the more sublimated and congenial forms of accommodation such as conciliation and compromise. In fact, conflict itself may be constructive and indicative of future more satisfactory adaptation, or it may be destructive of the personalities involved and ultimately lead to dissolution—either overt, as in divorce or separation, or more covert, as in indifference or infidelity. If, however, serious disagreements are made to serve as stimuli to better adaptation, it is important to prevent the areas of controversy from spreading to ever wider features of the total interactional pattern. If a couple do quarrel, it is highly important that the wrangling be limited to the specific issues and that some mutually agreeable decision be reached rather promptly. Many adjustments of this sort occur early in marriage when the couple discover that they must give up some of the romantic fantasies and idealizations of courtship and move on to more reasonable habits and attitudes. The destructive conflicts are those which become increasingly intense, in which chronic and habitual quarreling keeps the family in a more or less persistent state of emotional tension, which tend to become generalized as a pattern to which all sorts of new items are constantly being added. Neurotic persons are bad marital risks, as a rule, and conflict with them is usually destructive of marital happiness. When tied to such a person, the other spouse, despite patience and insight, may in the end give up the attempts at satisfactory adaptation. One of the serious aspects of dealing with the neurotic is that so often such a person has no insight and does not develop any of that give-and-take which is essential to the healthy interplay of two personalities.

Factors Promoting Harmony. Although irritation and conflict may diffuse from trivial or single items to other features of married life, it is also true that love, affection, and sympathy may spread and grow. There is too common an assumption, as Folsom puts it, that "love forces" are a given quantity at the beginning of marriage and like a fixed reservoir will in time be drained away. Nothing is more false. The whole pattern of sympathetic and mutual interaction may be likened rather to a spring than to a stagnant reservoir. Love may grow and ripen just like irritation, and

¹⁷ For a good discussion of this whole topic with references to various studies, see Landis and Landis, *op. cit.*, pp. 155-152.

hatred. Intelligent couples, freed of much of the traditional nonsense of lyrical romanticism, will continually try to adapt themselves to each other and to reckon at all times with both pleasant and unpleasant features of their own and the other's personality. In fact, the individual of insight—that is, the one who recognizes his wishes and impulses and their relation to his "me's" or images of himself in others' eyes—when irritated or angry, will first look into his own ideas and attitudes rather than blame his spouse. The following from Folsom constitutes sound though homely advice:

"Play together, fret separately. Tell each other the interesting things which have happened to you during the day. Don't hash over the disagreeable things except to get positive advice or help. Don't use your mate for a mere outlet. Spend your times of leisure and relaxation together. Spend your moments of anxiety or strain as much as possible apart. If you cannot, then, at least, don't get each other's personalities mixed up with the situation which causes the unpleasant emotion . . ."

"The old-fashioned philosophy held that love is strengthened by the troubles we endure and the burdens we bear together. Love is strengthened by the knowing that your mate has endured something with courage; it is strengthened when you really can do something which helps him in trouble . . ." ¹⁸

There are, of course, many additional items to be taken into account in satisfactory marital adjustment, and Waller's criteria of sound adjustment are still valid: (1) the fixation of love upon the mate; (2) the development of sound methods of accommodation, compromise, conciliation, and other devices to reduce interspousal friction and personal mental conflict; (3) emergence and continuation of common activities which give "rise to fusion of purposes, duality of participation, common memories, and other forms of solidarity"; (4) maximal satisfaction wherever possible of the "ego and sexual demands" of both spouses; (5) satisfactory solution of the economic problems, and (6) greatest possible freedom for self-development and self-expression compatible with marriage and family life itself—in other words, the fullest recognition of the integrity of personality in another.¹⁹

We have emphasized the difficulties and problems of marriage in order to bring into focus some of the situations which the wedded couple must learn to face. In the next section we shall comment on factors making for success or failure of marriage as a total experience.

SOME FACTORS IN SUCCESSFUL MARRIAGE

Present-day conflicting cultural norms of family life play a decided part in making for success or failure in marriage. We need a new ethics of marriage and family life, but the cultural transitions of the present are

¹⁸ Reprinted by permission from *The Family and Democratic Society* by J. K. Folsom; published by J. C. McVey & Son, Inc., 1943, p. 470.

¹⁹ W. F. Floyd, *The Family and Democratic Interpretation* (New York: The Doubleday Press, Inc., 1938), pp. 434-436.

so vast and multitudinous that we are not yet in a position to formulate an adequate code of marital morality. Some matters, however, need special emphasis. A wider recognition of the fact that marital relations constitute a *social act* would go far in giving us a theoretical concept upon which to base our analyses as well as to give us a base for sounder and more satisfactory marriage practices. Sexual love rests upon one of man's two most absorbing and powerful drives, and certainly the sexual interest of the spouses in each other may be and is conditioned to strong incentives to carry out common and congenial activities aside from their physical intimacy. Normal love impulses can be fully satisfied only when they involve both verbal communication and overt sexual intercourse and a whole range of impulses, attitudes, and ideas associated therewith. Every fundamental sensory process—tactile, auditory, visual, gustatory, olfactory, and kinesthetic—may come into play. There is perhaps no other social act which is, in this sense, so complete. The common contention of observers and students of marriage that sexual compatibility is fundamental to successful marriage and family life rests upon sound biological and psychological grounds. Yet the ramifications of this close contact into other areas of interaction are obvious even to the casual observer of married couples. We have already noted the significance of personal habits, economic problems, and childish sexual exploitation in disturbing healthy adjustment.

The rather biologically motivated and tradition-bound assumption of the husband that he should have ready sexual access to his wife at any time that suits his whim reveals a cultural pattern that easily inhibits full and esthetic expression of sexual activity on the part of either wife or husband. Every competent commentator on marital problems in Oriental and Occidental literature has recognized the need for an art of love in marriage. As the novelist Honoré de Balzac, in his book *The Physiology of Marriage* (Meditation V), well put it, "A husband's own interest, at least as much as his honor, forbids him the indulgence of any pleasure which he has not had the talent to make attractive to his wife."²⁰

Ideal Rôle and Actuality. In addition to the problem of attempting to build up a happy sexual adjustment to each other and of trying to work out various mutually satisfactory interactional patterns, other difficulties confront the married couple today. In the modern world, with the disappearance of many traditional economic, religious, educational, and other functions from the home and household, the ideal rôles for the man and for the woman are being profoundly altered. The ideal rôles which the

²⁰ There is a strong implication in Kinsey's work that female sexuality as evidenced in orgasm interest and capacity is inferior to that of the male. This view is in keeping with Kinsey's biological orientation but there is a wealth of data on human societies which indicate that within the limits of individual differences in sexual drive which apply, of course, to both sexes, female interest and capacity in sexual matters is highly qualified by culture.

man constructs, however, are all-important for his normal functioning, not only in business and civic affairs but in matrimony as well. It is a "generalized other," as G. H. Mead would have put it, which may become a driving force in his assuming and carrying on a marriage. If this imagined rôle is too farfetched in the light of present-day economic and other forces, or in the light of his own abilities, a man may have great difficulty in adapting himself to the marital expectancies of his spouse. Many young married men today have a sense of insecurity which is handicapping their adjustment in matrimony. We need to integrate the love life of the husband and father to other phases of his life organization. The old idea that love was "a thing apart" from occupation and other status-giving functions may give way to a closer coordination of the intimate affectional life of the spouses with other aspects of their activity. The husband's ideals regarding his vocation must find support from the wife, and, as Frank remarks, "If his ambitions are high but incompatible with the new conditions of life, then he is threatened with heightened anxiety from without and from his wife's too trusting faith in him."²¹ So, too, if he has overestimated his capacity before marriage, the wife should help him reorganize his life in line with achievable ends. She must not use the divergence between aspiration and achievement to deflate his pride. A husband's sense of inadequacy with reference to his wife's ideal of him does not make for marital harmony.

Many women, especially of the middle class, are also at sea about themselves. With the decline in the number of children and the removal from the home of many former housekeeping functions, they find time resting heavy on their hands. The wife must find substitutes in the form of new activities and yet she may find her husband opposing these, be they vocational or recreational. For successful marriage and family life, she, too, needs the kindly emotional support of her husband. In the face of a common set of new difficulties it is all the more imperative that affection and full sexual realization play an increasingly important part in marital satisfactions.

Happiness and Success in Marriage. Against the background of these rather confusing norms and changes, we may well ask: What constitutes successful or happy marriages? Obviously the terms *success* and *happiness* are subjective categories. They must be, since personal satisfaction, happiness, or success in any activity does depend upon how the individual defines this activity for himself. There have been hosts of individual comments on the matter of happiness or success in marriage, and in recent years a number of statistical studies have been made which provide more valid data on these matters, especially for the urban middle classes.

Those studies, using questionnaires, report that from two-thirds to three-

²¹ I. K. Frank, "Social change and the family," *Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 1932, 160-61, 162. Quotation from page 160.

fourths of their respondents consider their marriages successful or very successful. It must be noted that a large fraction of the individuals of this, the middle class, though highly verbal are also likely to avoid admitting, even in an anonymous questionnaire, failure or lack of happiness in their marital situation.²²

Reports on marital happiness which have come from more intensive interviews of individuals give percentages only of about 45 to 50 who say their marriages are successful. In these cases the respondent was dealing with physicians or clinicians under conditions of confidence and apparently reasonable rapport. These reports probably are more accurate since a greater degree of frankness might be expected in these situations.²³

The "Causes" of Marital Troubles or Marital Success. Various attempts have been made to determine the "causes" of marital maladjustments and successes. As might be expected these range over a wide area of interpersonal and situational factors. Most of the studies verbalize the "reasons" in terms of actions and attitudes which are liked or disliked in the other spouse; but seldom, if ever, are the deeper unconscious roots of difficulties or successes exposed. Nevertheless the various studies which have aimed at uncovering the factors making for marital success or failure are a first approximation in a search for a technique for developing generalizations. If developed, they may give us highly useful predictive devices. We can not overlook the two pioneer studies of Terman and of Burgess and Cottrell.²⁴

²² The two most impressive of these studies are: L. M. Terman, *Psychological Factors in Marital Happiness* (New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1935) and E. W. Burgess and L. S. Cottrell, Jr., *Predicting Success or Failure in Marriage* (New York, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1939). Davis, *op. cit.*, reports that 87 per cent of her sample of married college women said that their married life was "a happy one." See, also, Jessie Bernard, "The distribution of success in marriage," *American Journal of Sociology*, 1933, 39:194-203; and her "Factors in the distribution of success in marriage," *ibid.*, 1934, 40:49-60.

²³ Two important and often quoted sources are: G. V. Hamilton, *A Research in Marriage* (New York, Albert & Charles Boni, Inc., 1929), and R. L. Dickinson and Emma Beam, *A Thousand Marriages, a Medical Study of Sex Adjustment* (Baltimore, The Williams & Wilkins Company, 1931).

Dickinson's sample came from his clinical records (from 4,000 married women from among whom a total sample of approximately 1,000 cases were taken and covered the years from 1885-1925) and is therefore perhaps statistically biased toward the maladjusted wife. Yet in other ways the sample is superior to either Davis' or Hamilton's, for it covers a wider range of economic and social status. The occupational standing of the 509 couples known from the records show 51 per cent from the "professions", 24 per cent from "trade", 11 per cent from "manufacturing and mechanical industries" and scattered smaller fractions from "clerical work," "domestic service," and "public service." Only two cases of the total come from agricultural pursuits. Figures from Dickinson, p. 100.

²⁴ Terman, *op. cit.*, and Burgess and Cottrell, *op. cit.* For a full review of these two studies, with a rating scale for measuring marital and family adjustment, see E. W. Burgess and H. J. Locke, *The Family from Institution to Contemporary Society* (New York, American Book Company, 1945—Chaps. 14-15). See also E. W. Burgess, *Problems*

Terman's study was based on a sample of 792 married couples from the urban and semi-urban middle classes of California. Verbal reactions were secured to three sets of variables: (1) certain personality-test items, (2) background conditions, and (3) sex factors in marriage. From these replies Terman developed a weighted scoring to secure a total "happiness score" as an index of marital satisfaction. On the personality items, his results show that unhappy persons—in his sample—were: inclined to be grouchy; easily aroused to anger; hypercritical, and careless of the feelings of others; resistant to discipline; quickly expressive of any dislikes they felt; easily influenced by praise or blame; lacking in self-confidence; dominating toward the other sex; uninterested in old people, children, teaching, or charity; unconventional in religion, drinking, and sexual ethics; distressed at times by "useless thoughts"; and, finally, characterized by alternation between states of happiness and sadness.

As to background factors, he found among other things that income, occupation, or the presence or absence of children in the family, amount of religious training, adolescent popularity, and age differences between spouses had little or no correlation with happiness scores. The happiest wives in his sample were those who were from 4 to 10 years the senior of their husbands, while the happiest husbands were those 12 years or more older than their spouses. Of the many background circumstances which he studied, he found the following to be the most predictive of happiness in marriage: high degree of marital happiness in one's parents, childhood happiness, absence of conflict with mother or father, firm but not harsh family discipline, strong attachment to mother and father, frankness of parents regarding sexual matters, mild and infrequent punishment during childhood, and absence of disgust or aversion about matters of sex in the premarital years.

Regarding the specific sexual factors which make for happiness in marriage, such matters as techniques of sexual relations, use of contraceptives, fear of pregnancy, duration of intercourse, wife's history of sex shock, and others frequently considered important one way or another had, on the whole, no appreciable bearing on the happiness scores of his subjects. On the other hand, the wife's happiness score (but not her husband's) is distinctly correlated with the intensity of her pleasure at her first sexual intercourse, while the husband's happiness score is negatively correlated with the wife's tendency to marked prudishness. But, of all the sexual factors investigated in his study, the two which correlate most significantly with marital happiness scores are the adequacy and satisfactory character of the wife's orgasms, and the "equality or near equality in sex drive" of

methods and family stability. *Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 1950, 272: 47-51. See also David G. Wattle's, "The Post reports on divorce," in series of five articles, *The Saturday Evening Post*, Jan. 21, 28, Feb. 4, 11, 18, 1950. These articles are based on data collected and analyzed by W. J. Goode, who conducted a careful study of 425 divorced women, ages 20-38 years.

the spouses. In this sample nearly one-third of the wives confess to what Terman calls "orgasm inadequacy," that is, never or "only 'sometimes'" experiencing orgasmic release during intercourse.

Burgess and Cottrell devised an extensive questionnaire with which to discover the elements in behavior and situation which make for marital success or failure. Their report is based on the analysis of the returns on this questionnaire from 526 husbands and wives, representing a cross section of urban, native white, middle-class Americans. They summarize their major findings under six headings: (1) Contrary to the popular conception, American wives, of this stratum at least, are obliged to make the major adjustments in marriage. Obviously the patriarchal pattern of male dominance seems to persist. (2) The affectional relations of the child to his parents tend distinctly to determine his love life when he grows up. Thus the parents' happiness in marriage is highly correlated with the subsequent happiness of their children. So, too, close attachment of the child to the parents, especially of son to mother, of daughter to father, and the absence of conflict with the parents, are highly correlated with the individual's own satisfactory adjustment when he, in turn, becomes married. (3) The nature and degree of socialization, as measured by participation in group and organizational activities, have an important bearing on marital success. The person with wide social contacts is—other things being equal—more likely to make a satisfactory marriage than one with few such contacts. (4) The economic factor as such was reported to be of little or no importance as an indicator of success in matrimony. (5) For the majority of the couples in this sample, their sexual adjustments to each other seem to result not so much from the biological as from their prior psychological and cultural conditioning toward sex. (6) On the basis of this investigation the authors believe that premarital prediction of marriage adjustments is entirely feasible, and "should and can be further developed through statistical and case-study methods."²³

While we have not yet at hand a marital expectancy table analogous to the life-expectancy tables used in life insurance, these two studies not only advanced our knowledge but stimulated further study. We may look forward to the time when it may be possible to predict marriage success not only in terms of group probabilities but in terms of an individual's score or performance on some valid and reliable test yet to be devised.

The two investigations agree remarkably well that, for these middle-class samples at least, the economic factors do not seem to be considered as important as might have been imagined. Second, the significance of a happy childhood in a satisfactory family wherein there are definite affectional contacts is clearly shown. And, third, the importance of initial sex adjustment is indicated in both studies.

As to the broad scientific meaning of these studies we must remain in

²³ Burgess and Cottrell, *op. cit.*, p. 349.

some doubt. Certainly the definitions of happiness, success, or satisfaction are subjective. Moreover, two aspects of these studies must be borne in mind: (1) The samples are highly biased toward the middle and upper brackets of occupation and status. We have no adequate studies of the lower strata of the population, or of people from village and rural areas. (2) The individuals who furnished these data come from groups that are habituated—by virtue of cultural training—to relatively easy verbalization, and, what is more important, they come from classes of people who fall easily into our contemporary patterns of rationalization. With this caution in mind, it is interesting to note that, on the whole, the results of these studies show that for these samples between two-thirds and four-fifths of the respondents rate themselves as fairly happy or happy in their marriages.

On the other hand, it may well be that more intensive and extensive analyses would show that underneath these opinions there exist in many of these couples deeper attitudes of non-acceptance and dislike of the matrimonial status. It may be that the Hamilton and Dickinson and Beam studies report a lower proportion of their cases as being dissatisfied in marriage because, in part, they did probe more deeply into the underlying factors in marital life.

THE DISSOLUTION OF THE FAMILY

The phrase "broken home" refers to the disintegration of the family as a group of interacting persons brought about by the death of one or both parents, by the desertion of one or both, or by legal separation or divorce. While the broken home has been the topic of much discussion with reference to schoolwork and juvenile delinquency, here we are concerned only with its relation to bereavement, desertion, and divorce.

Effects of Bereavement on the Family. The death of one of the spouses profoundly alters the social attitudes and habits of the one remaining. The loss likewise influences the development of the children.²⁶ The process of reorganization of attitudes and actions of the remaining spouse which follows the death of the other will involve among others the following processes of adjustment: (1) As Becker notes, the loss may be marked by violent outbursts of grief or even a sort of frenzy, by a mute and tearless numbness, by a sinking into weakness and complete discouragement, or by fatigue and prostration.²⁷ Culture sets the general framework of response to the loss of a spouse. The cultural rituals such as the funeral and the necessary prior arrangements which surround this

²⁶ The death of both parents obviously greatly affects the subsequent rôle and status of the child but since we are chiefly concerned with interspousal and parent-child relations in the family, the problems of the completely orphaned boy or girl do not come within the scope of the present chapter.

²⁷ Howard Becker, "The sorrow of bereavement," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1932, 37:391-410.

event serve to afford the widowed person considerable social attention and a kind of gratification. There often arises a great deal of self-pity supported by the sympathetic reactions of relatives and friends. The remaining spouse is for a time the center of much attention, and the expected reactions of others canalize the grief into accepted forms.

(2) Once the excitement of the death and the funeral is over, the individual is more or less obliged to begin the reorganization of his life. Bereavement dreams are not uncommon, and they frequently, though not always, are direct wish fulfillments that the dead have returned to life. Images of the dead arise very naturally through contact with objects previously associated with the deceased person, and these become the stimuli for elaboration into all sorts of imagery and dreams. Not infrequently there begins fairly early an idealization of the qualities of the deceased person, which may grow and continue through the years. But these fantasies aside, the person must make everyday adjustments, such as a will to be opened and property to be legally disposed of. New household arrangements have to be set up.

(3) Sooner or later arises the problem of love life and sexual adjustment. Although for a time these impulses may be suppressed and sublimated in mourning, sooner or later the imperative nature of the sexual drive may arise to become troublesome. Daydreams associated with sex are not uncommon, and it may be that, when not too persistent and too absorbing, they serve to aid the remaining spouse to adjust himself to his everyday living.

Society, however, provides not only permissive but more or less expected alterations in the love life. As habituation to the new living arrangements advances, widowed persons ordinarily renew their social contacts with their friends and acquaintances, and often new associations are formed. Obviously, these matters are qualified by age, opportunities, the nature of the family, and the financial obligations of the widowed spouse. The variations in readaptation are great. Sometimes, after due deference is paid to the culture in the way of mourning, a person may go off into a sort of Bohemianism.

In some instances the idealization of the deceased spouse may be so powerful that it will prevent either Bohemian experimentation or remarriage. If age is against the probability of re-entering into matrimony, this idealization may serve the useful function of rationalizing the continuance of widowhood. In many instances it is difficult to know how much the idealization may itself prevent remarriage and how often it serves this defensive reaction of protecting the person from a realization of failure to be sufficiently attractive to secure a new mate.

(4) As time goes on, however, there emerges some sort of more stable adaptation to oneself and to the social world. If widowhood is accepted and if some occupation or other objectifying activity is forthcoming, the

widowed person may carry on in fairly well-adjusted fashion. But a high percentage of widowed persons wed again, especially if they fall into the acceptable age classes for matrimony.

(5) If there are children from the first family, remarriage of the widowed person brings about many problems of the relation of the step-children to the new spouse, and later, if the latter has children, there may arise conflict between the half-siblings. In these matters age and sex differences play their part. In any case new rôles have to be developed for the spouses and for the children.

(6) At the death of a parent many of the same psychological features appear in the attitudes and responses of the children as are manifest in the spouse. Self-pity bolstered by sympathy from others is a common reaction. Another common pattern is found in the cases where the widow does not remarry but where her idealization of the husband and father becomes the basis for holding the family together. A mother may project her idealization of the dead father upon her son to such a point that it becomes an important factor in the boy's own development, and the son will assume many of the father's masculine dominating rôles.

Desertion as a Device. Desertion may be defined as the prolonged absence from home of either spouse without the consent of the other. Unlike formal separation or divorce, it has no legal sanctions. It is, in fact, often called "the poor man's divorce," or in more critical tone is sometimes referred to as a "moral holiday" of one spouse from familial responsibilities.

The psychological factors involved in desertion have never been adequately described and analyzed. But inferences may be drawn from case studies, derived chiefly from the records of family-welfare agencies. Behind desertion as a rule, as behind divorce, lies a long period of preparatory conflicts involving economic factors, sexual life, impairment of the self-esteem and pride of the spouses, and other problems found in ordinary family situations. For example, when the husband deserts his family just prior to the birth of another child, his behavior often represents a definite "escape mechanism" to avoid further responsibility. Some social-work records show that a husband who is fairly well adapted to his family rôle leaves home just before another baby is born. And, curiously enough, these spouses may turn up later and reunite themselves with their families.

So far as the wife is concerned—and the bulk of desertions involve the husband's leaving the wife—desertion by the spouse may set up many reactions of bitterness and the desire for revenge. At times it may actually—especially if economic security is not threatened thereby—result in a sense of relief from former family tensions. But, for the most part in our country, with divorce rather easily available, except where one's church prohibits it, desertion is but a preliminary step toward divorce.

The Effects of Divorce on the Family. The more conservative leaders of religion and morals who have commented on the rise in the divorce

rate in this country tend to assume that divorce is a social disease. Many have advocated stricter laws prohibiting dissolution of marriage as one device, among others, to "cure" this "pathological" situation, as they view it. However, most careful students of society regard divorce as a symptom of maladjusted marital life rather than as a disease to be dealt with by law. Certainly we must analyze the whole topic in terms of changing interactional patterns within the family and the community. For example, despite statutory barriers, there is a growing disposition on the part of judges to grant divorces in terms of what is actually mutual consent, no matter how this has to be disguised in legal jargon. However, long before a couple starts for their lawyers and the courts, a process of alienation has gone through a steady progression toward divorce.

The Process of Alienation. All the background factors of previous rôle and status in childhood and youth play their part in alienation as they do in the making of a successful marriage. The elements in interaction which lead in the end to loss of affection and of desire to continue in matrimony are none other than those which we have already discussed with reference to marital conflict and adjustment generally. If courtship and mating represent the expression of complementary needs and the summation of stimuli of an emotionally pleasant sort, the process of alienation and divorce represent a summation of unpleasant stimuli. Because the personality has its deviant and unique as well as common traits and attitudes, there is nothing approaching complete uniformity in the process of losing affection. We may note some features of the process which seem to be more or less common to a great percentage of cases.

(1) As a rule, the sexual relations of the spouses sooner or later become deranged. Differences in intensity of this drive, inability to work out a satisfactory *modus vivendi* as to time, place, and frequency, and inability to develop the subtler aspects of play so important to full sexual pleasure often bring on emotional tensions within the individual and conflict with the other spouse. Then, too, the affectional life may not reach sufficiently beyond the purely sexual aspects to everyday courtesies so necessary to satisfactory adjustment.

(2) From these sources in the love life and in self-esteem emerge the conflicts, often slight at first, but gradually becoming more serious as the elements of opposition become associated into larger constellations. Yet following overt conflict there usually come attempts to "patch up the differences." Staying together "for the children's sake" is a common rationalization. But, as the months or years go on, all the devices for reconciliation seem more or less exhausted.

(3) A next stage emerges when the *idea* of divorce arises in consciousness and begins to grow as the only or best way to resolve the conflict. Such an idea may persist for months or years without being expressed, but, once it is uttered as a phase of the conflict, an important milestone

in the process has been passed. It brings the possibility of divorce into the open forum of conversation. At first the expression of the idea may prove a shock to the other and may actually intensify the conflict or it may lead to more attempts at further compromises. The word "divorce" may be uttered hundreds of times in interspousal conflicts before the overt act of divorce is consummated.

(4) There frequently follows or accompanies the verbalization of probable divorce a further break in the familial solidarity. The hopelessness of continuing in the state of controversy becomes more evident. The decision to resort to divorce is a kind of commitment, and, though not as irrevocable as the overt act itself, it nevertheless outlines a form and direction for ending a cycle of conflict and for reducing or ending a given state of strain.

(5) Then comes the walkout. This is a more definitive act, of course, than the verbal threat to seek a divorce. But, when one or the other spouse packs up to leave, a step is taken which is much more difficult to retrace than any previously taken.

The emotional atmosphere which surrounds the departure also varies greatly. Sometimes a wife or a husband stalks out in high dudgeon in the dramatic manner of the motion pictures; sometimes it is done quietly and with a certain wistful attitude on the part of both husband and wife when they realize that they have come, at last, to the parting of the ways.

(6) Finally, there is the divorce procedure itself. There is consultation with attorneys which may induce emotional distress and a sense of guilt at having to go through the whole legal ritual. There are usually problems of property settlement and agreements about the children. In contested cases, of course, the whole conflict may be aired in public.

Effect of Divorce on the Spouses. With few exceptions a divorce leads to rather marked reorganization of the lives of those concerned and presents a crisis even as a *fait accompli* which the parties thereto often do not anticipate. The processes of readaptation which follows divorce involve such matters as the love life, the restoration of one's self-esteem, the changes in daily routine habits, the reorganization of one's social contacts, the bearing of the divorce upon one's vocational responsibilities, and especially the resolution of internal conflicts and the arrival at some satisfactory subjective and emotional integration or balance.

(1) The reorganization of the individual's love life may take a variety of forms. It usually happens that, long before the divorce is granted, sexual relations with the spouse have ceased or at least become highly unsatisfactory and infrequent. The suppression of normal sexual activity during the whole pre-divorce period often enhances the conflict of the spouses. And, once the legal bonds have been severed, a number of somewhat aberrant responses may be unleashed. These may be regressive in character, taking the form of autoeroticism. In other instances the new-found freedom finds outlet in a delayed adolescent fling at Bohemianism.

In some instances the bitterness and desire for revenge which arise from an injured pride may set up an exploitative pattern, and a man or a woman may, for instance, set out to make "game" of as many different persons of the opposite sex as possible.

Sometimes extramarital sex life begins prior to the divorce and may be marked with considerable hope of permanence. Many of the more severe features of the divorce crisis itself may be reduced where one party or even both have already transferred their affectional life to another person and are looking forward to remarriage.

(2) The repairing of one's pride and the recovery from any sense of disgrace and guilt which accompanied the divorce are imperative. Guilt may take such a form as a belief that one has "let the former spouse down" even though the conflict had become intolerable. So, too, the individual may be "cut" socially, and in this, as in other critical situations, be driven to adopt some face-saving device. In certain instances an ex-spouse may feel much abused and develop a strong sense of self-pity which can be resolved only by vigorous projection of hatred upon the former spouse. Divorced women sometimes come to hate all men and to project these ideas upon their daughters. Ex-wives also report that upon occasion they have to put up with solicitations from men who assume that, because they are divorced, they are "open game" for sexual advances. This may lead to a variety of defensive responses and further enhance any disgust toward men already set up by the initial experience. At other times there may be a retreat into a sense of inferiority and failure. It sometimes happens that one who has been divorced takes up residence with parents or other relatives who furnish solace and support for an injured self. Or one may find escape in liquor, in gambling, in neurotic illness, or in some other symbolic release from emotional frustrations.

(3) A reorientation of everyday habits is also necessary. The ex-husband may find it tedious and difficult to go back to bachelorhood. So, too, an ex-wife may miss the family car, or may get a sense of lonesomeness when she no longer hears the husband's footsteps about the house. In some cases the sexual habits themselves are often so deeply established that, despite quarreling, conflict, and finally divorce, the ex-spouses may experience strong impulses to see each other and not infrequently indulge in sexual relations after divorce. These relations plus the loneliness and other changes in daily life probably have a definite part in reuniting many divorced couples in remarriage.

In short, the emancipation from the former marital situation may be more imagined than real. Not infrequently a divorcee has a tendency to talk about the former marriage, about the children, and about previous occasions when the spouses were together with their friends. Although such conversation is vitally concerned with building up a self-defense and may take on a critical or emotional tone, the very discussion demonstrates the

continued attention or stimulus value of the ex-spouse despite legal dissolution of the family.

(4) The reorganization of the social contacts of the divorced individual goes on apace. Just as marriage may lead to the giving up of old friends, so divorce often makes necessary the finding of new ones. A sense of guilt may make it hard for the person to seek out former friends, because their reactions, real or anticipated, such as their implicit disapproval, make it necessary to look elsewhere for congenial companionship. Despite so-called emancipation and freedom, it is often emotionally unpleasant for the ex-mates to go about in the same social circle.

(5) There is often a need on the part of the ex-wife to find work. This may be required by the financial situation, or it may arise from a realization that a job affords one an excellent and objective focus for one's energy and attention. But a woman who has once given up a career may find it difficult to find re-employment. So, too, sometimes a divorced man is required by circumstances to find another type of work as in situations where a minister or teacher may not be able to keep a position because of the local disapproval of divorce.

(6) The reorganization of one's inner life, the resolution of mental conflicts, in short, the development of some integration or compromise with one's self, is fundamental to all other adaptive reactions. According to Waller, the "most important, most intangible, and most subtle of the necessities of the divorced person's new life is that of settling the rebellion within himself."²⁸

The Meaning of Alimony. There is no doubt that many abuses have crept into the system of paying alimony. If there are children to support, the provision of money for their support may be cheerfully assumed by the husband, though not without some conflict in instances where he has remarried and has another family to support. In any case, it is easy for the divorced husband to develop a good deal of resentment at the ever-recurring date when a sizeable fraction of his salary must be paid over to his ex-spouse. Such an obligation serves as a constant stimulus which easily symbolizes or keeps alive a host of unpleasant memories. The man may and often does find in such legal requirement a foundation for self-pity and a bid for sympathy from his friends. Alimony often takes on something of the nature of damages—reflecting definitely the continuation of the property idea behind marriage. As one divorced woman frankly admitted to her ex-husband's attorney, "I gave ten years of my life to this man; why shouldn't I be paid alimony now that he has left me?" The function of alimony as a bolster to an injured self is apparent.

There is developing an attitude, however, on the part of many women that alimony, aside from support for children, is an outmoded and barbaric

²⁸ Willard Waller, *The Old Love and the New: Divorce and Readjustment* (New York: Livinglight Publishing Corporation, 1930), p. 15.

form of punishment. This reflects, of course, the changing views of women both toward marriage and toward careers and financial independence. But, so long as most women give up earning money when they marry, or never were gainfully employed prior to matrimony, we cannot expect any marked change in present practice regarding alimony, and support of the children.

The Children of Divorce. There is a division of opinion among students of personality about the effects of divorce upon children. Youngsters brought up in a household marked by quarreling, violence, and conflict between the parents are often characterized by nervousness, distraction, divided affection, and mental confusion. Many critics contend that it would be better if such children were taken out of these situations either by divorcing the parents or by placing the children in foster homes. Others hold that, despite such disharmony, it is preferable to keep the family together if possible, since the children need the emotional support and help of both parents. After all, the family is a group of interacting personalities, and sharp divergence of opinion and some controversy, as well as coöperation and love, may be a common and normal feature of family inter-stimulation and inter-response. It is impossible to generalize on either of these points of view, but certain comments may be made.

Assuming that the conflict has resulted in divorce, the question arises, what effect will such action have upon the children? During the past 30 years I have read dozens of biographical documents on this problem written by my students and others. Yet out of all this material it is difficult to formulate any consistent and generalized statement. For some individuals divorce of their parents constituted a grave crisis. Others take the view that it ended an intolerable family situation and that their lives were much calmer and happier afterward. Then, too, re-marriage of the parents often further complicates the rôle of the child, and introduces still other crises requiring readjustment.

Recalling that we have to deal with the interaction of the child with his parents, siblings, step-parents, step-siblings, probably half-siblings, as well as members of the community, the response of the child of divorce is always qualified: first, by his own make-up; second, by the reactions of these others to him; and third, often by physical and other environmental circumstances which may be somewhat independent of either the child himself or the other persons in this social drama.

It is difficult to state definitely whether the age of the child at the time the parents are divorced has as much influence as some writers hold. True, the young child may continue for some time unaware of growing conflict of the parents, while for the adolescent a divorce may lead to considerable sense of inferiority, conflict of loyalties, and social disgrace which a younger child would not feel. Much depends on the entire social configuration within the family and on the community standards. A considerable number of my own case records and student comments maintain

that a divorce of parents while their children are in high school—junior and senior—constitutes the most serious crisis for the latter. But there is as yet no adequate way of checking these judgments.

In most instances no major influences operate on children of divorce which are not found also in undivorced families in our present-day society. Obviously, some interactional tensions may be enhanced, and others may be reduced in their effects, but one may be reasonably sure that there is no single phase of child-parent relationship or resulting problem in the situation involving divorce that is not found in families which are not so broken.

The changing public opinion and the mores in regard to divorce may in time influence the responses of the child to such a situation. When legal dissolution of marriage becomes more or less accepted, when an understanding appreciation of the rôle of the step-child arises, and when ridicule and disgrace no longer accompany divorce, many of the emotional problems for the child of divorced parents should, other things being equal, decline if not disappear entirely. Yet it must be realized that emotional growth, in our society, is normally tied up with family life, and in parent-child relations there still remains the need for emotional and economic security. Hence, though tolerance for divorce may change certain older cultural and personal-social interactions, such a break-up of the family may easily produce untoward influences on children which otherwise might not arise.²⁹

Remarriage. The importance of marriage and family life for the great majority of adults in our society is evident in the fact that divorced individuals, if they can, remarry. Various statistical reports show that while marriage is frequent, so is remarriage. In 1948, for example, of all married persons in this country, 13 per cent were cases of remarriage.³⁰ Even after the somewhat unpleasant experience of divorce, most Americans seem willing to make another try at matrimony. Common-sense observation would tell us that some of these ventures turn out very well; others do not.

One of the first serious statistical studies is Locke's. While broad generalization is out of the question, his findings are informative and suggestive. Locke first compared a group of 400 happily married individuals with 525 divorced persons by using the Burgess-Cottrell adjustment questions.³¹ Twenty-eight per cent of the divorced persons had remarried. Of these he found that 77 per cent of them "rated their subsequent marriages

²⁹ See Kingsley Davis, "Children of divorced parents: a sociological and statistical analysis," *Law and Contemporary Problems* (Durham, N.C., Duke University Law School, 1944).

³⁰ P. C. Glick and Emmanuel Landau, "Age as a factor in marriage," *American Sociological Review*, 1950, 15, 517-529.

³¹ See E. W. Burgess and L. S. Cottrell, Jr., *op cit*. This questionnaire is reproduced in Burgess and Locke, *op cit*. The sample came from the records of Monroe County, Indiana.

as happy or very happy, which compares rather favorably with the 90 per cent of the most happily married persons who rated their marriages in these two categories. The conclusion that divorced persons in this particular sample constituted good risks in subsequent marriages seems warranted.³² In a second study Locke and Klausner compared the marital adjustment scores of a group of 47 individuals who had remarried with the scores of 64 persons married only once. The results did not entirely support those of the other study. While they found that divorced women were about as good risks in subsequent marriages as were women being married for the first time, as judged by the adjustment questionnaire, divorced men were not such good risks for marriage as were those who had never been married.³³

On the qualitative side some of the considerations of remarriage are the following: (1) It is important not to get into the habit, when little rifts occur, to make even mildly favorable comparisons with the former spouse. Time often tends to heal the wounds of conflict, and a certain idealization of the former marriage may actually emerge in the face of somewhat unpleasant contemporary situations. (2) There will be losses of old friends associated with the first marriage, but new contacts and new experiences related to the subsequent marriage will tend to offset them. (3) Great care must be used in dealing with step-children, if there be any, since differential treatment of the children of the present marriage in relation to those of either spouse from previous marriages may make for trouble. (4) While divorce and remarriage are generally no longer regarded as guilt-laden acts, in certain communities and in some occupations such conduct is not fully approved. It may be necessary to locate in another place and even to take up another vocation if such pressure threatens to disturb the new marital venture.

EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN MARRIAGE AND FAMILY

As increasing numbers of the lay public have become concerned over marital and family problems, various new institutions and agencies have emerged either to help young people to prepare for marriage or to aid those already wed who have troubles which derive from their interspousal relations. Let us briefly comment on the efforts to deal with this topic through formal education and with what has come to be called "marriage counseling."

³² H. J. Locke "Predicting marital adjustment by comparing a divorced and a happily married group," *American Sociological Review*, 1947, 12: 187-191. Quotation from pages 189-190, by permission. These data are presented more fully in Locke's book, *Predicting Adjustment in Marriage: A Comparison of a Divorced and a Happily Married Group* (New York, Henry Holt & Company, Inc., 1951).

³³ H. J. Locke and William Klausner, "Prediction of marital adjustment of divorced persons in subsequent marriage," *Proceedings of the Pacific Sociological Society*, for 1948, published in: Pullman, Washington, *Research Studies of the State College of Washington*, 1949, 16: 30-33.

Education for Marriage. Although increasing attention is being paid to problems of marriage and family life in connection with high-school courses, our attention will be focused on developments in colleges and universities.

Traditional courses in the sociology of the family have usually paid some attention to practical problems of marital adjustment, but special courses designed to aid college students to understand what marriage might entail for them personally began in a serious way under the leadership of Groves at the University of North Carolina.³⁴ Topics having to do with courtship, engagements, marriage and first adjustments, finances, birth control, pregnancy, divorce, and others were taken up. Such courses have spread widely and, on the whole, have been well received by students.

In some institutions, in addition to formal courses on courtship and marriage, provision is made for personal counseling in these matters. But such service is expensive, since it needs trained personnel and takes a good deal of time to be done adequately. We are more likely to see a growing spread of formal courses than to see a rapid growth of the more personalized advising. Sometimes, however, where colleges have an established student counseling service, of the sort described in Chapter 16, some of their work centers around such topics as marriage and family life.

It must be noted, however, that there are limitations regarding the impact of such courses on the students. At best the lectures can be accompanied by frank discussion of pertinent topics by students under sound guidance of teachers. But even this leaves more intimate and personal matters out of consideration. Moreover, the student seldom knows or senses many of the particular problems which he is bound to have to face once he is actually married. If such courses can help to teach him some of the general principles of human behavior and social adjustment and how to apply them to himself, they will accomplish about as much as we have a right to expect.

Marriage Counseling. Certain service agencies have arisen which aim to give advice to prospective mates or to help solve the problems of married couples with marital troubles. Sometimes the counseling is carried on as a part of the large function of public or private social service agencies. Sometimes individuals or special groups undertake such advisory service.

Those who support such activities believe that, in time, a new profession of counseling will arise to handle these problems. To date those who engage in this work are, for the most part, recruited from social casework, psychiatry, clinical psychology, sociology, and the ministry. Much of their counseling is of the common-sense and rule-of-thumb variety, some-

³⁴ The story of the development of such courses, with bibliographic references to some sources, is briefly given in Francis E. Merrill *Courtship and Marriage: A Study in Social Relationships*, New York: William Sloane Associates, Inc., 1949, pp. 315-321.

times it is more professional in the sense that those giving it have had reasonably sound training. Unfortunately, as we have tried to make clear throughout this chapter and elsewhere, we still lack a solid body of systematic facts and principles of human conduct on which we might project predictions as to human conduct under conditions of the modern family. This is not to say we should not make use of what knowledge we have. This would include the use of personality tests, study of familial backgrounds of those who come to such agencies, and follow-up to see how advice works out. Furthermore such practical counseling itself might contribute to a solid body of fact and theory of personality if careful records were kept and analyzed, and especially if control groups could be studied for purposes of comparison. In view of the usual philosophy behind these agencies and the limitations of scientifically trained personnel the more objective and systematic benefits of such operations are likely to be limited.

In social-psychological terms the main concern of the marriage counselor "is to bring the husband and wife together on a common definition of their affectional rôles."³⁵ As a rule, this is easier to do when one is trying to give advice before rather than after serious conflicts have arisen. While such services put much of their efforts into trying to affect remedies for difficult situations, in the long view, programs of prevention would seem to be more intelligent. As more definite facts and principles emerge from research into human personality as well as into particular problems of marital relations, we may expect a more solid basis for this practical help.³⁶

³⁵ Merrill, *op. cit.*, p. 329.

³⁶ There is a growing literature on marriage counseling. See, among others, John F. Cuber, *Marriage Counseling Practice* (New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1948).

CHAPTER 18

Psychology of Modern Woman

While the rôle and status of women are linked up closely with marriage and home life, there still remain other aspects regarding changes in their rôle and status which may profitably be presented. This chapter will deal with certain aspects of adjustment peculiarly related to women in our own day. We shall first consider the traditional position of women in Western European society. Then we shall go on to discuss the topic of careers for married women. The chapter will close with two sections on certain problems of the older single woman.

HISTORICAL PLACE IN THE WESTERN WORLD

In the past the position of women in society has been largely characterized by inferiority and degradation in comparison with men. A long-familiar rationalization contends that they are biologically inferior to men. There are, of course, the childbearing and child-rearing functions of the female which set her off from the male, but aside from these there is still a common belief that women are intellectually not equal to men. This is evidenced in current conversation, in discrimination against them regarding education and occupation, in our contemporary literature, and in much wit and humor about their alleged inadequacies. Even educational psychologists long held that female students as measured by mental tests were less intelligent and less variable than their male confreres.¹

Psychological Differences. Recent intelligence test results have tended to support a growing belief that there are no essential differences in intellectual performance of boys and girls. The makers of tests, however, in order to establish a fair basis for comparison, deliberately select only items which do not reveal a consistent difference between the two sexes. In the revised Stanford Binet Scale, some items which serve to differentiate the sexes were retained but others were eliminated. One of the confusing features is that a single item may yield a sex difference although other similar items in the same category revealed none at all. Disregarding

¹ Havelock Ellis, *Man and Woman, A Study of Human Secondary Sexual Characters*, 1st ed. (London: Walter Scott, 1894).

² Aaron Schendfeld, *Women and Men* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, Inc., 1943), p. 85.

these "exceptional" items, superiority for girls occurs during the earlier years in the areas of manipulative ability, that is, tying a bow knot; discrimination, for instance, esthetic comparison; and number facility, for example reciting numerals. Girls also do better on age discrimination from pictures.³

The items on which boys do best appear in the later ages. Excluding again those which are isolated from parallel items, boys excel in the following types of response: "picture absurdities," orientation, block counting, plan of search, and substitution. All of these might be subsumed under space ability, according to McNemar. So, too, induction, arithmetical reasoning, "word naming," and ingenuity items give better returns for boys.⁴

Margaret Mead, who has always tended to emphasize the effect of culture on the individual, apparently gives credit to biologically determined differences when she says that we should not "gloss over or deny . . . the learnings that are harder for boys, the learnings that are harder for girls," and criticizes "our tendency at present . . . to minimize all these differences in learning, in rhythm, in type and timing of rewards."⁵

The probability of certain basic differences is also complicated by the fact that girls mature physically faster than boys. (See Chapter 14.) Just what this means with respect to differences in performance on intelligence tests is by no means clear. However the kind of I.Q. tests now being used indicate that deviations in performance between the sexes are so slight that we may disregard them.

While we are not able to rule out the possibility of biological bases for differences in performance by the sexes, we are aware that the subtle influence of cultural sex-typing makes itself felt at a very early age. Are not girls and boys directed in the development of their skills by the types of toys given to them from infancy on and by the kind of play they are encouraged to carry on? In our society, at least, the evidence is clear that culture has much to do with such differences.

The Roots of Woman's Low Status. The subjection of women to men has a long cultural history, and in our Western society their emancipation has taken place in a relatively recent period of time. Among other important features in the history of their status are the following:

(1) Hebraic and Christian ideology placed woman definitely in a position inferior to man; it was woman who had caused man's expulsion from the Garden of Eden and thus brought sin into the world. Although the doctrine of love had great emphasis in Christianity, the early church fathers gave voice to the idea that there are two kinds of love, sacred

³ Quinn McNemar, *The Revision of the Stanford-Binet Scale* (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1942), p. 51.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 52.

⁵ Margaret Mead, *Male and Female* (New York, William Morrow & Company, 1949), p. 369. Quotations by permission.

and profane, the first ascetic, the other lustful. Though sexuality was nature's way of keeping mankind going, as a means of pleasure it was thoroughly taboo. (2) Although romantic love often bore only superficial relationship to a woman's real station, it did serve as an ideal to help free woman from the degradation laid on her by Christianity. (3) The Industrial Revolution gave women an opportunity to earn money outside the home and thus to become at least partially independent of their fathers and spouses. (4) The extension of political suffrage to males of practically all classes in time led to like provisions for women. (5) In this country frontier and pioneer life stimulated the emancipation of women, particularly evident in the freer choice in mating, in a recognition of their economic importance, and in their attainment of political suffrage. (6) Finally the whole change in the view of women in this "man-made world," as Charlotte Perkins Gilman aptly described it, is reflected in the gradual recognition of the educability of women.

Yet, despite recent changes, in many areas of conduct women remain definitely in a lower station than men. In many of our own states they still lack full legal equality with men in such matters as power to make contracts and to control their own earnings, in guardianship rights, and in the determination of their domicile.

Sex Differences and Certain Rôles for Women. In examining the rôles ascribed to women, as apart from men, in human societies generally, we are led inescapably to the conclusion that physiological differences play a part. Childbearing and the period during which the infant is breast-fed means that woman must be closely tied to the home. However there are certain variations due to cultural factors. Anthropological data from other societies has given us much information on how culture may alter and vary the rôles characteristic of the sexes. Margaret Mead has pointed out, for example, that among the Tchambuli of New Guinea, men play a passive rôle in contrast to the active, managing position of the women. Both sexes among the Arapesh, who also live in New Guinea, tend to have passive, receptive personalities. In contrast, the Mundugumor of the same region train both sexes to be aggressive.^a Granted that there is great difference in cultural molding of the accepted "types" of personalities associated with each sex, are there left any universal or nearly universal elements in the rôles assigned to men and women in human society?

Mead herself points out basic regularities in physiological sex development which may be reflected in universal behavioral differences. The life cycle for women includes menstruation, child-bearing, nursing (in most societies), and the menopause—all of which are unique to her sex. It is unlikely that the variations in experience resulting from these physiological events would not mean accompanying differences in personality for women in contrast to men.

^a *Ibid*

According to Mead, the fact that many women in all societies spend part of their time in bearing and caring for children is important in explaining one characteristic of female behavior. For Mead the childbearing capacity of women is the reason why they do not enter into many masculine areas of achievement and also why they make less display of creative abilities. She asserts that women can reach fulfillment of their creative desires through childbearing. Man's paternity is not equally satisfying to him, for it must always remain putative. For this reason men

"need to find reassurance in achievement, and because of this connection, cultures frequently phrase achievement as something that women do not or cannot do, rather than directly as something which men do well . . . Each culture—in its own way—has developed forms that will make men satisfied in their constructive activities without distorting their sure sense of their masculinity. Fewer cultures have yet found ways in which to give women a divine discontent that will demand other satisfactions than those of child-bearing."⁷

Whether or not this explanation is valid, it is true that there are creative activities in many societies from which women are disbarred or in which their numbers are proportionately very small.

Divergent views exist as to the reflection of physiological sex differences in personality. Deutsch—essentially a Freudian—takes the position that certain universal personality differences distinguish men from women. She says, "the fundamental identities 'feminine-passive' and 'masculine-active' assert themselves in all known cultures and races, in various forms and various quantitative proportions."⁸ She explains the divergent cultures cited by Margaret Mead as exceptions "which cannot change the general principle," and adds that "this principle will continue to assert itself until we succeed in influencing the internal, hormonal constitution of the human body."⁹ The anatomy of the sexes and the reproductive function, too, she says, would have to be altered to permit such a change. Horney does not agree that masochism—the essential component of female passivity—has its source in female physiology or indeed in physiology at all. According to her, "masochism is not a primarily sexual phenomenon, but is rather the result of certain conflicts in inter-personal relations. . . . From this point of view masochism cannot be a specifically feminine phenomenon."¹⁰ Horney believes that cultural factors foster masochistic attitudes in women in our society.

"They were more relevant for the past generation than for the present one, but they still throw their shadow today. They are, briefly, the greater dependency of woman; the emphasis on woman's weakness and frailty, the ideology that it

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 169 By permission.

⁸ Helene Deutsch, *The Psychology of Women*, Vol. I (New York, Grune & Stratton, Inc., 1944) pp. 224-225 Quotations by permission

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 225.

¹⁰ Karen Horney, *New Ways in Psychoanalysis* (New York W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1939), p. 112 Quotations by permission

is in woman's nature to lean on someone and that her life is given content and meaning only through others: family, husband, children."¹¹

It seems possible that Deutsch and others who accept her position—not having first-hand acquaintance with any society other than our own—lack awareness of the cultural influences which incline women in the direction of narcissism and masochism in our society. Even she must add to her list of female types, the "active" woman, who has a masculinity complex.¹² The cross-cultural evidence indicates that passivity as opposed to aggression is not used to distinguish the sexes in many societies and would not be regarded as a relevant indicator of "femininity" versus "masculinity."

If one accepts the position that sexual functions are responsible for passivity, there is still the point that these can be interpreted in more than one way. Instead of passivity being based on woman's physiology, Margaret Mead speaks of a society in which "the assertive, invasive side of the suckling relationship may become dominant for both mother and child, with both sexes becoming assertive and demanding."¹³

In other words, exercise of the female sex organs can influence personality trends of children differently in various societies. (See Chapters 12 and 14.) We are left, then, with the conclusion that there are certain resemblances in the division of labor established for the two sexes in human societies. Further investigation is necessary to determine (1) the extent to which any biological feature, sex characteristic or not, is responsible for any personality complex; with careful attention to (2) the cultural interpretation of and emphasis on physiological processes; and (3) cultural ideals as to the way people in certain categories, male and female, old and young, members of certain occupational groups, and so on, are expected to behave.¹⁴

RECENT CULTURAL CHANGES AND WOMEN

Any marked reduction in birth rates, and hence in the size of the average family, influences profoundly not only the interspouse relations but also the rôle and status of women in regard to groups other than the family itself. Such changes in our society are related to our urban and industrial culture. Certainly in most communities the household has been relieved of many of its customary activities and there arises among women a demand for outlets in remunerative work, in politics, or in play outside the home.

Meaning of Changes in the Rôle and Status of Women. The independence of a woman economically and politically means that her responses to

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 112.

¹² Deutsch, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 279-324.

¹³ Mead, *op. cit.*, p. 770.

¹⁴ For a balanced discussion of this topic, see Georgene H. Seward, *Sex and the Social Order* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1946).

herself and to others will be different from those of her ancestors. Today, the woman at work outside the home is cut loose from the former specific rôle as daughter, or wife, or mother. The old symbols and habits of inferiority, dependence, and submission are being lost. In their place is arising a new sense of power and freedom, especially in the economic and political aspects of our society.

The most important single feature of these alterations is the de-sexing of many customary relations of men and women. Because of the close linkage in the past of the rôle and status of women with the home and with the bearing and rearing of children, it is only natural that, as women have moved out of the home into business and industry, they have carried over the older identifications and expectancies of their position with regard to men. Men, too, have tended obviously to carry over somewhat similar attitudes and ideas toward women. The persistence of these attitudes and habits can be observed not only in the economic life about us, but in the responses of men to women whom they meet in political or community life. While we may never entirely escape the influence of sex differences in the non-sexual areas of interaction, the emotional-social maturation of women lags because the older attitudes regarding these differences do continue in situations where they need not apply.

The maturity of women is not necessarily measured by their mere aping of masculine ways, though this is a rather common practice in many quarters. One of the first evidences of emancipation was the imitating of certain external habits of the dominant male group. The symbols of female freedom came not only with the securing of the ballot and the right to work, but with the imitation of men's speech, clothes, drinking and smoking habits, and general freedom of mobility. The earlier wearing of bloomers and the continuing wearing of slacks symbolize, in part at least, this protest.

The retention of sex differences in those relations of men and women which have essentially nothing to do with sex tends in the long run to restrict the more lasting and fundamental emancipation of women from their position as essentially a suppressed minority group. Many women fail to realize this. They continue to use their physical charm as means of power over men in business, industry, and civic affairs. This is similar to the behavior of the immature person generally, but notably the child or adolescent. Many of them want the old-line chivalrous attention, the flattery, the care, the deference, and at the same time they crave and demand their independence. But, if their real emancipation is to continue, in time these dual rôles and dual symbols will give way to mature equalitarian relationships which will be relatively free from extraneous sexual connotations.

Effects of Women's Emancipation on Masculine Dominance. The changes in the rôle and status of women, married or single, must neces-

sarily influence profoundly the rôle and status of the men of our society. Male dominance is easily associated with childish and adolescent patterns rather than with those of full maturity. In the past the permissible culture patterns enabled men to exercise power over women and children in forms which we today consider to be essentially immature: violence, temper tantrums, and the withholding of privileges, without any adequate accounting to those around them. Not that most men use these in our society, because, ideally at least, their patriarchal authority is assumed to carry with it full maturity and responsibility. But it is true that often men do control women by methods which, though tolerated by the culture norms, continue to represent a retention of many outmoded behavior patterns.

When we speak of immaturity, however, we must not forget that maturity itself is largely defined by culture. In our own society we like to define maturity in terms of such features as the sense or recognition of other personalities, of their rights, duties, and desires, and of the approximate equality involved in a given social interaction. When women wish to shift the traditional interactional pattern from that of submissiveness to a dominant male to a more equalitarian relationship, they frequently find that men resent and resist such attempts at redefining the situation. However, because economic independence has such a high prestige value in our society, the financial freedom of women becomes important in forcing this redefinition upon men. There follow, too, the new rôle of women as potential and actual participants in political and civic affairs and finally the reflection of these changes back into the home and into the interspouse and parent-child relations.

Some of the changes in the household rôle and status of the wife and mother in American middle-class society bear clear witness to this whole shift. The mother has come more and more to control the children in their earlier years. With the father out of the home during so much of the day, many matters of discipline and instruction must fall upon the wife and mother, and there is in our urban and suburban communities a pattern which Ralph Linton has called the "new American matriarchate," that is, a dominance of women over many matters formerly in the control of the men.

COMBINATION OF MARRIAGE AND GAINFUL WORK

In societies dominated by farming, married women have usually had some part in the economic life of the family aside from that associated with household duties. In urban industrialized societies, too, married women of the lower economic levels were usually obliged to seek gainful employment when not tied down by childbearing and child-rearing. In the upper and middle classes, on the other hand, married women were supposed to center their attention on the functions as mother and manager

of the household. With the decline in family size and the changes in customary housekeeping functions, more and more married women of these classes have entered the labor force. This has meant that many women could try to combine a vocation or career with marriage. Obviously, for the single woman a career outside the home may well afford her an integrating center for her life. (See below.) But what of the woman who has to, or wishes to, combine gainful employment with the duties and pleasures of wife and mother? Can she effectively combine the two? Or shall she sacrifice one for the other? Is such a plan successful for more than a few women in special circumstances?

Some opinions on this matter are suggestive. A *Fortune* poll asked a cross-section sample of American women 17 to 35 years of age their preferences as to marriage and/or "successful career." Of the married women in the sample, less than 4 per cent said they would prefer to "be unmarried and have a successful career"; 16 per cent would have liked to combine marriage and a successful career; and 80 per cent preferred to "be married and run a home." The corresponding replies on these three ideal choices for single women were 11 per cent, 22 per cent, and 64 per cent respectively.¹⁵ The great majority of women in this country, if this sample may be regarded as representative, prefer to be married and run a home. This view is further confirmed in the fact that of the women who wanted to combine marriage and a career, when asked to choose between them, 79 per cent chose marriage.

Why Married Women Work. In 1949 there were over 17 million women in the labor force of the United States. This was 30 per cent of the total number of women 14 years old and over. Of those in the labor force 34 per cent were single, 47 per cent were married and living with their husbands, 4.5 per cent, married but living apart from their husbands, and 10.6 per cent were widowed or divorced. The total group of married women in the labor force outnumbered the single women by over three million. The proportion of married women employed outside the home has climbed steadily since 1890. Even after the Second World War, the per cent of working women who were married did not fall off as might have been expected. In 1940, for example, only 14.7 per cent of the married women living with their husbands were in the labor force; by April, 1949, the proportion had risen to 22.5 per cent. That these women are largely from the cohort who do not have small children is evident in the fact that "only about 10 per cent of all women living with their husbands who had children of pre-school age but none of school age were in the labor force."¹⁶

Economic necessity within the household is the primary motive of

¹⁵ "The Fortune Survey," *Fortune Magazine*, 1943, 28: 12-30.

¹⁶ *Current Population Reports: Labor Force Series* P-50, No. 22 (Washington D.C., Bureau of the Census, April 19, 1950), p. 3.

wives who are gainfully employed. These women are drawn mainly from the lower economic levels.¹⁷

This is borne out not only through the indirect evidence of correlation between husband's income class and per cent of employed wives, but also by what women themselves say. Interviews conducted with a sample of 13,000 women employed in ten major manufacturing areas during the Second World War revealed that the majority of married women who planned to continue work after the war did so in order to support themselves or themselves and others. Only 25 per cent gave "like employment only" as a reason.¹⁸ This expression of monetary need reflects certain changing characteristics of our way of life. Increasingly more and more of the activities which were formerly carried on in the home have been removed from it. Laundering, preparation of food, making of clothing, and recreation are being taken over by outside agencies. This means that American homes more and more depend on a money economy. Because of the nature of the crowded living quarters and lack of facilities in many urban homes, the wife may spend her time more efficiently in working for money to exchange for goods and services than to attempt all the varied household duties carried on by her grandmother. It will be pointed out later, however, that whatever part is played by use of services outside the home in causing the wife to work, that when she does work, these services in many cases are not utilized to reduce her household tasks to the possible minimum.

Looking at the change from the point of view, not of the woman, but of society as a whole, our working force has come to depend upon women to fill its ranks. Since married women of working age are much more numerous than single women, they must be drawn upon to supply the needed workers. Women are regarded as essential now not only in terms of sheer numbers but because of a developing rationale that they possess special sex-linked abilities. We pointed out earlier that while we do not have satisfactory explanations of these sex differentials in performance, they do occur in our society. The First World War and the Second World War brought recognition of women's aptitudes, for example, in assembly and inspection operations.¹⁹

In the foregoing, economic motives have been largely stressed, but the increase in married women who work cannot be wholly explained on such a simple basis. Other changes in the society involving the rôles of women and men are factors in this shift.

Neither men nor women any longer view the employed woman, mar-

¹⁷ See *Handbook of Facts on Women Workers*, Bulletin of the Women's Bureau, No. 225 (Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1948), p. 11.

¹⁸ *Women Workers in Ten War Production Areas and Their Postwar Employment Plans*, Bulletin of the Women's Bureau, No. 209 (Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1946), p. 40.

¹⁹ *Women's Occupations through Seven Decades*, Bulletin of the Women's Bureau, No. 218 (Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1947), p. 10.

ried or unmarried, as an anomaly, except perhaps in certain isolated regions in which folk culture with its traditional division of labor prevails. Women are now expected to work at least during the period between school and marriage. The conception of those who may acceptably work is coming to extend to married women without children as well. Margaret Mead states that "an increasing number, by substituting the expectation 'work until I have a child' for 'work until I marry,' are coming to see the alternatives of children or outside work, instead of marriage or outside work."²⁰ In our culture, certain vocations, such as nursing, elementary school teaching, stenography, and social work have come to be regarded as the peculiar provinces of women so that they are preferred employees in them. Occupations approved for women are necessary in providing employment opportunities.

Effect of Work Outside the Home on Women. The traditional view of the wife as the homemaker does not vanish at once when she takes a job outside. There is a marked culture-lag in this respect. When the wife goes to work, household tasks are not immediately divided on an equitable basis between herself and the husband nor are they relinquished to outside agencies. In studies made of women workers during the Second World War in thirteen war plants located in communities ranging from rural towns to metropolitan centers, it was found that they retained household duties along with their outside work. Half of the women who were or had been married did the major part of the housework which included most of their ordinary duties as full-time housewives. Half of them did share work in the home with other members of the family. "Only 9 in every 100 women (both married and unmarried) reported that they lived at home but assumed no continuous household duties."²¹

In this survey, women with children under fourteen were asked about the care provided for them. In most cases, an adult relative living with them took charge. The next most frequent solution placed them in the charge of the husband working on a different shift. "Little use was made of child-care nurseries and only a few families used paid service to care for children."²² Even before the Second World War, a study of working mothers in Cleveland and Utah in 1940 disclosed that only a few families sent pre-school children to day nurseries. Paid helpers and adult relatives cared for the children.²³ Even though these women's earnings are required for the maintenance of the family, there is still no well worked-out solution available for the care of their young children.

²⁰ Margaret Mead, "Cultural aspects of women's vocational problems in post World War II," *Journal of Consulting Psychology*, 1946, 10 24

²¹ *Women's Wartime Hours of-Work*, Bulletin of the Women's Bureau, No. 208 (Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1947), p. 4.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 5.

²³ *Women Workers in Their Family Environment*, Bulletin of the Women's Bureau, No. 163 (Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1941), p. 10.

In our society, the rôle of working women has not been clearly defined. Their obligations and rights are not universally agreed upon by members of the society. This lack of consensus appears in the criticism levelled at them from various sources. Employers claim that married women are more prone to absenteeism, quit their jobs more readily, and in general show less interest in their work than unmarried women. Members of the married woman's family are apt to complain about inadequate care of the home, and there is the widely expressed view that employed women neglect their children and shirk their household tasks. As in other areas, where the culture does not provide consistent and acceptable formulations, there is great variation among the solutions worked out by individuals. Until an ideal picture of the career wife and her activities has general concurrence, her adjustment, whatever it is, will not be felt to be satisfactory.

Effects on Both Spouses. The inter-personal relations of wife and husband are certain to be affected when the former works away from home. As noted above the wife may have to do a lot of household chores in her off-hours. If the husband is coöperative and willing to help out a good accommodation may develop. If he is demanding of time and energy and is unsympathetic toward her working, although he knows the need for the wife's income, trouble may ensue. That a pattern of common responsibility for household obligations may be developed is shown in LaFollette's group. She reports that nearly three out of four of the husbands coöperated in housekeeping.²⁴ In some families the husband resents his wife's working because he feels that it symbolizes a certain loss of masculine dominance, as it often does.

The sexual relations of the spouses are obviously of great importance in their happiness and in the stability and continuity of the family. How much does the wife's working influence these matters? Some individual cases show that conflicts arise because the wife is tired, or busy with other interests, or because the husband becomes jealous and suspicious of her vocational relations with other men. But, when we examine such data as LaFollette's, for instance, it is difficult to segregate the factors producing controversy; and it is impossible to know whether conflicts might not have arisen even if the wife had not taken up gainful employment.

In the LaFollette study 87 per cent of the wives said their sex lives were satisfactory. As to the frequency of their responsiveness to their husbands' sexual wishes, 65 per cent said that their own reactions were "in accord with the husbands' desires." Fifty nine of the women, or 9.0 per cent, said their sex lives were unsatisfactory and 23.6 per cent stated that they failed to respond sexually as often as their husbands wished. An analysis of the reasons given for failing to react to their husbands' desires

²⁴ C. T. LaFollette, *A Study of the Problems of 652 Gainfully Employed Married Women Homemakers*, No. 614 New York, Columbia University Teachers College Contributions to Education, 1934. Quotations by permission.

is classified by LaFollette into "physical," "psychological," and "environmental," but it is apparent that these interact. Among the first she notes menstruation, lack of "general physical vigor," and fatigue. Psychological factors include "a fear of pregnancy" (noted 42 times), "too many things on one's mind" and "childhood inhibitions" (mentioned 34 times each), "husband unattractive" (25 notations), "emotionally upset" (12 times), and a wide scattering of other items including attitudes toward coitus, antipathy toward using methods of birth control, husband's drinking, and lack of kindness on the part of the husband. "Environmental" factors include the belief that the necessary methods of birth control take "too much time," lack of proper leisure time, and the disturbance of the "smooth running of household."²⁵

While the majority of married women who must work outside the home do so first of all from economic pressure, to supplement or replace the husband's income, it is apparent that an increasing number of them choose to carry on their vocations after marriage. And, as the older cultural norms give way to new ones, we may look for an increase in the percentage of women who deliberately choose to combine marriage and a career which they like or which will afford them the independence and scope for their abilities that they believe themselves capable of enjoying. Many of the women in LaFollette's study admitted that they had had no intention of keeping on at work after they married. But they also stated that they did enjoy working and were trying to meet adequately the problems of the dual rôle of homemaker and wage-earner. Again the alteration of the masculine attitude and rôles will play an important part in all this. Only when new patterns emerge for both sexes will a more satisfactory relationship be possible.

New Patterns of Interaction between the Sexes. In both matters, home and occupation, women are learning that their emancipation consists not in mere aping of men or completely abandoning certain traditional feminine traits. Equality and adequate differentiation of social and economic rôles do not depend upon the elimination of sexual differences, but they will tend to be reduced to a minimum in those situations which do not call for them. There will, of course, remain the fundamental divergence of rôles in the matter of childbearing and child-rearing, and the very physiological make-up of women may mean the development of variabilities even though women be exposed from birth to similar social experience as men.

The freeing of women from their traditional position of inferiority should stimulate a wider range of individual variation in personal qualities through altering the interactions of men and women. I believe that, as older cultural taboos give way, men and women will be able to meet on more companionable bases, and from these, in time, new culture norms.

both sexual and non-sexual, will arise. If so, there should result an enrichment of life for both men and women; and in time such differences may be the source not of a sense of inferiority or pettiness but of respected and prestige-giving functions. Even the single woman and the childless wife will be accorded a rôle and status as women distinct in some qualities from men and accepted by all without any psychological discount.

As to the sexual and love relations of men and women in the future—assuming that the emancipation of women proceeds in our country as it seems to be doing—it is evident that these relations will also take on new meanings. They should become more equalitarian in character; there should be more mutual toleration for differences in desire and in capacity and the relations should be more stabilizing in the end. Sexual love not only may be the most intimate and enjoyable interaction of two persons, but may itself become the symbol of a lasting affection and joint partnership in life.

ADJUSTMENT OF THE SINGLE WOMAN ²⁰

While many older single women may feel that their position and rôle in modern society are anomalous and unpleasant, they have much better chances for an adequate social and personal adjustment than did such women a few generations ago. The traditional status of the spinster in the Western world has not been an enviable one. Unless protected by wealth and high social status, she was likely to be looked upon as a useless individual, especially if she had little or no economic value to offset her virginity. In a society which values marriage and motherhood highly—at least as to their reproductive features—for a woman to remain unwed was often a disgrace, considered *prima facie* evidence of incompetence, physical or otherwise.

Social and Emotional Problems. The principal personality difficulties which confront the single woman are feelings of inferiority, of difference, and of loneliness or isolation, often accompanied by restlessness, resentment, and various compensatory responses. There are doubtless both biological and social-cultural factors behind these ideas and attitudes. The unmarried woman is often the target for ridicule, or, if she is successful in taking up remunerative occupations, she must frequently experience the sense of a lower status as measured by income and prestige. Perhaps the core of the whole matter lies in the failure to meet the cultural norms of

²⁰ We shall hereafter use the expression *single woman* for unmarried women thirty years of age or older. The term *bachelor women* would serve except for its connotation in some circles of sexual freedom. Because there are historically many negative connotations in the terms *spinster* and *old maid*, I shall avoid using them except in contexts where they clearly belong in terms of cultural definitions. The phrase *unmarried woman* is too broad in meaning, but it will be used in certain contexts as a synonym for *single woman*. Here we are concerned with the woman whose probability of marriage is so slight that she has had to adjust herself consciously, if not unconsciously, to the idea of remaining unwed.

marriage and reproduction. The sense of an unfulfilled and incompleting sexual life has strong physiological roots, but the manifestations are intertwined at every point with social and cultural features, as Dickinson and Beam have so admirably shown in an extended report.²⁷

This book presents a description and analysis of 1,000 single women who were examined for reasons of health. (About 300 came for medical care directly relating to sex, 150 of whom were rather intensively diagnosed and treated.) These cases represent over 40 years of gynecological practice, and, although the bulk of them were from the economically more privileged classes of American urban society, the results reported constitute one of the few studies of this sort in English. Over and over again these writers demonstrate that pelvic disorders in the unmarried woman were bound up with wider problems of emotions, of adjustment to family or community obligations, and of getting on with others and with oneself in society. Writing in particular about virginity (and six out of every seven single women in their series, with the median age at thirty-four years, were "presumed" to be virgins), they state:

"The pelvic disturbance is associated with a breakdown in the emotional resources of the patient. Typically it is not associated with men but takes some form recognizable as the direction of a major interest, whether or not specifically sexual; perhaps work or family obligation, lack of joy or an impasse in the religious experience. Without direct sexual experience with others, the patient can spin exuberant fancy, display acceptance, negation, boredom, or cynicism; the real meaning of her virginity is not necessarily in her attitude about sex."²⁸

The sense of loneliness and isolation arises from a restriction of the social interaction that is so important to personal development. And, since sexual congress, normally the most absorbing social act in marriage, is denied these women (except those who have had extramarital experience), it follows that on this score alone they experience an absence of the intimate social stimulation and response normally found by married people. In this regard they tend to remain asexual, or at best dependent upon relatively inadequate forms of sexual expression. But isolation and loneliness arise perhaps equally often from the lack of normal and culturally expected family life with husband and children. If we take the view that childbearing itself completes the physiological demands of the normal healthy female, we see that the failure to have such experience puts these women in a class by themselves. So far as reproductive functioning goes, the single woman has something in common with the childless wife.

Faced with these problems, these women may express their adaptation to their condition of isolation and inferiority in various ways. As we shall note shortly, these concern not only substitute sexual adjustments, but

²⁷ R. L. Dickinson and Laura Beam, *The Single Woman: A Medical Study in Sex Education* (Baltimore, The Williams & Wilkins Company, 1934). Quotations by permission.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 101.

work, play, religious experience, and relations to relatives, friends, and other persons. We find emotional responses ranging from strong resentment, through irritability and restlessness, to unconscious but powerful anxiety, and on to melancholia or complete retreat. Among the gravest temptations to the woman faced ever more obviously with spinsterhood is to regress to childish and early adolescent modes of action and attitude. Of course, in this she is not different in response from others faced with personality crises, except that her problems are complicated by changing moral, economic, and familial patterns. Her greatest task or ideal aim is to grow up and remain mature in her work, in her friendships, and in other activities, and within this framework to make the most adequate sexual and affectional reorganization possible in the modern world.

Without doubt the actual reasons for not marrying are many and complex. Even the conscious justifications or rationalizations which single women provide represent a wide range of such items: "I had to care for an invalid father"; "I wanted a career rather than marriage"; "I was jilted in a serious love affair and decided never to try again"; "the man I loved belonged to another religious faith than my own, and I could not marry him"; "I prefer sexual freedom outside marriage"; "my mother had such a terrific time in marriage that I decided never to marry"; "I never was able to attract men"; "the right man never came along"; "my parents always objected to my choice of beaux, so I lost out"; and so on endlessly.

In any case the basic background factors in the love life of the unwed do not, in essence, differ from those of the married. They must rest, for example, on the degree of emotional as well as of intellectual growth and maturity arising from the social and emotional seedbed of the family and community standards. Much of the clinical evidence of the psychiatrists and gynecologists shows clearly the importance of these family factors. The differential reactivity which we have already noted many times is apparent here. Where one sister will marry, another may not. Where one family situation may show emotional storm and stress between the parents, leading to a disgust or fear of marriage in a child or adolescent, another situation of family conflict often has no such effect.

Knopf contends on the basis of her medical experience that frequently the single girl comes from a home where the feminine rôle was little esteemed, where the father and brothers were brought up as the "lords of creation," and where the family life centered in them. She also often finds that the over-obedient daughter is numbered among the unmarried. In fact, she says, as do others, that a spinster's own resistance against marriage may arise from an unusually obedient attitude toward the parents.²⁹

Dickinson and Beam's study is enlightening here. Although no direct attempt to discuss the family background was made, they note that family

²⁹ Olga Knopf, *The Art of Being a Woman* (Boston, Little, Brown & Company, 1932).

matters are mentioned 312 times in the 650 case histories which they used as the basis of their discussion. In these cases as in others the family furnishes the primary pattern of affectional life for the individual, and unless there is subsequent maturation, the family may remain either the direct or the sublimated and often unconscious foundation of later love life. Moreover, there is clear evidence of the ambivalent desire both to grow up and to remain somewhat childishly attached to the family members, especially to one or both parents. Nearly one third of their sample specify difficulties with other members of the family, and, of these, 28 per cent had trouble with the mother, 24.8 per cent with the father, 17.3 per cent with "the family as a whole," 13.5 per cent with a brother, and 11.9 per cent with a sister. Curiously enough, many of these women report having either strong hatred or overlove, or fluctuate between intense desires to leave the parent or family and overattachment in the form of high sense of duty and obligation. This ambivalence is neatly shown in the fact that a good many of them reported either strong "mothering" habits or strong desires to be mothered. The former is seen in instances where the family is economically dependent or where there is invalidism in the family, the latter in those situations where the mother or some surrogate sister or relative cares for the unmarried woman either in economic matters or in regard to health, or, more especially, acts as an emotional anchor. The authors also point out that in certain women this overattachment to the mother is bound up with hatred of some other family member, most typically a father or brother.

In their case histories dealing with the family and home, it is the mother who is noted most frequently. They say that "mentioned as strength and dependence or as burden and problem in nearly half the 650 chief case histories in this series, absorption between mothers and daughters exceeds that noted about other relatives."³⁰ The father or other male relatives who might be considered father substitutes are mentioned less frequently, but, when noted, the responses may be either negative—that is, opposed to the male members—or positive and favorable.

There is often considerable conflict in identification and rôles in the family drama on the part of these women. Thus such a woman may swing between the imitation of the aggressive father, helpful sympathy with the spendthrift brother, and identification with the abused brother in turn. In fact, one serious difficulty of many unwed women is apparently their failure to develop a sufficiently strong "generalized other" or central rôle for themselves—one on the basis of which they can operate as mature persons.

There are various outlets for the emotional and social needs of these women: in direct or substitutive attempts to solve the problems of their sexual life, in their careers as workers, in their friendships, and in their

³⁰ Dickinson and Beam, *op. cit.*, p. 299.

recreational or religious life. Let us examine some aspects of these problems.

DIRECT OUTLETS IN THE LOVE LIFE OF THE SINGLE WOMAN

The affectional life of the single woman in our society becomes an acute problem because she finds it difficult if not impossible to satisfy her sexual impulses and love in a manner culturally accepted. There are three ways in which such a woman may find outlets in direct fashion: (1) autoeroticism, (2) sexual inversion or homosexuality, and (3) heterosexuality "without benefit of clergy" and ordinarily without social approval.

Autoerotic Practices. Autoeroticism, or autosexuality, as Dickinson calls it, is a form of self-stimulation either imaginal or overt which sets up sexual excitement and in its completion leads to a sexual climax. Periodic sexual desire arises chiefly from changes in the glands, and satisfaction is ordinarily dependent upon external stimulation. Normally, of course, this takes place by means of intercourse with a member of the opposite sex. While, physiologically speaking, there is no reason to believe autoeroticism to be harmful, psychologically it may or may not be, depending upon cultural conditioning.

The culturization of sexual life is all-important to the individual's adjustment. We have already noted in another connection that the practice of masturbation is no longer regarded as necessarily harmful. But the continuation of certain old beliefs may serve to set up a sense of guilt and shame in many people. Just how frequent this practice is among the general population of unmarried women, especially those over the usual age of marriage, is unknown.³¹ Yet the Davis study and that of Dickinson and Beam, already referred to, throw some light on this topic.

As a section of her larger study Davis undertook to discover the extent and nature of autoerotic practices among the unmarried women of her sample. She defined autoeroticism very broadly to include sexual daydreams or reveries sufficient to induce sexual excitement as well as manipulation of the sex organs to bring about overt reaction. Dickinson and Beam in contrast, apparently confined their discussion to data from patients who showed anatomical evidence of overt excitation only, although some of their informants told of indulging in reading erotic books, reveries, and dancing as means of securing satisfaction.

Davis's sample of 1,000 unmarried women, ranging in age from 22 to 68 years, consisted largely of professional and well-educated women. It is worth noting that, of the 954 who were engaged in gainful employment, only 121, or 12.7 per cent, failed to find their work "absorbing and satisfactory." Of the 938 who listed masturbation, 30.8 per cent admitted such practices at the time of replying. Since her sample ranged from 22 years

³¹ We may expect some important information on this matter in the forthcoming Kinsey book on the sexual life of women.

upward, and since we are concerned with the single woman who falls in the conventional age range of spinsterhood, I have retabulated her data on those who were 30 years of age or older. Of the 928 persons who reported on this item in her questionnaire and who also gave their ages, 80.1 per cent fall at 30 years or over in age. Of these, 257, or 34.5 per cent, admitted the practice of autoeroticism at the time of reporting; 229, or 30.8 per cent, said they had once done so but had stopped; and 258, or 34.7 per cent, denied ever having indulged in the practice.³²

Davis's data also show that these practices seldom grow up *de novo* during adult years, but rather that these persons usually had already developed the pattern of autosexuality in childhood or adolescence. This leads at once to the reasons (largely rationalizations, of course) which the women in Davis's study gave for their indulgence. Table 6 is drawn from a rather detailed tabulation of the replies, in which the individuals not only quoted the particular categories, but provided a five-fold rating of their estimate of its particular importance in their own instance. An informant might, of course, check more than one category.

Table 6

SUMMARY OF REASONS FOR PRACTICE OF AUTOEROTICISM AMONG DAVIS'S
SAMPLE OF 1,000 UNMARRIED WOMEN *

Reasons	Percentages	
	AMONG 308 NOW PRACTICING	AMONG 295 WHO HAVE STOPPED
I. Desire for pleasure	69.1	60.0
II. Desire for physiological relief	52.3	31.5
III. Desire set up by exceptional situations only, such as spooning, dancing, seeing vaudeville, reading books	36.3	28.4
IV. Uncontrollable impulse	40.6	24.0
V. Other "reasons"	0.7	0.6

* Adapted by permission from Davis, *op. cit.*, Chap. 6, Table 18, pp. 126-127. Only the totals of those who checked in each category were used.

An inspection of the original table shows not only that category I was checked most frequently, but that it was rated as most important for 56.3 per cent of those who checked it at all; so, too, for category IV, 64.7 per cent of the 125 who checked it gave it as most important to them, on the other hand, only 32.9 per cent of those who checked category II considered it the most vital to them. At least so far as these records go, apparently either the desire for sheer pleasure or an uncontrollable impulse looms largest as the rationalized foundation for such indulgence.

In our society and culture the psychological effects of masturbation, such as sense of guilt and of inferiority, must be set over against the al-

³² Katherine B. Davis, *Factors in the Sex Life of Twenty-two Hundred Women*, New York, Harper and Brothers, 1929, p. 101.

leged biological release of unpleasant tensions. Compared with normal, socially accepted heterosexual intercourse, these autoerotic practices at best do not provide full substitution. Davis's sample also reported some differences in regard to their sense of present sexual problems as related to the presence or absence of autoeroticism. Of the group now practicing, 46.3 per cent said they had no problem, 57.4 per cent of the group who had stopped said they had no problem, and 68.9 per cent of those who denied ever having indulged said they had no sexual problems. These differences are statistically significant and naturally raise the question of whether this form of self-indulgence gives the satisfaction, in the face of social taboos, that might be anticipated.

Dickinson and Beam found "by anatomical signs [that] approximately every other person in this series is believed to have had sexual experience with the self and every seventh in 1,078 has said so."³³

Apparently the gynecological problems of single women are complicated by emotional conflicts, such as sexual shock, memories or anticipations of sex, loneliness and sense of isolation, and the feeling that they are carrying too heavy burdens. A strong sense of sin frequently appears. It is also evident that autoeroticism does not follow any particular sequence but varies with conditions of living at home, with work, recreation, religious activity, and the like. Moreover, the authors note that autosexuality "can not be consistently associated with the incidence of serious constitutional unbalance," that is, it is not directly or necessarily correlated with pelvic or other physical disabilities.

The adaptive nature of autoeroticism is clearly indicated by its relation to periods of isolation and disappointment. Although only 66 of Dickinson and Beam's patients made mention of factors which brought on the practice, an examination of their comments makes clear that loss of affectional companionship, loneliness, or other lack of satisfactory affection had much to do with the matter.

"In these few cases autosexual interest like heterosexual interest was not continuous. It appeared in cycles or intervals; in more extreme cases, the patient loved herself most when she lacked other love interests; she was self-centered, had difficult living and working conditions, sometimes had been aroused to sexual channels of life but had lost love or could not get it."³⁴

In concluding this section let us note, first, that physiologically there is no evidence that autoeroticism is harmful to women, within the limits, obviously, of physical damage from the use of mechanical devices or from

³³ Dickinson and Beam, *op. cit.*, p. 223. Their data, unlike those of Davis, are drawn from over 40 years of clinical experience, and obviously the persons whom Dickinson examined came to him for medical and surgical aid. In this sense his results must necessarily differ from those reported from the exhaustive questionnaire of Davis. The two samples, however, are alike in that Dickinson's patients also came largely from the "well-treated clinical" group. On the average they were about 30 years of age.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 238.

such over-indulgence as to injure bodily tissues. Second, as useful as the practice may be for release of sexual tensions, and as free as a person may be from the old wives' tales about its harmfulness, it certainly cannot be considered a complete substitute for the normal sexual intercourse of husband and wife.

There is much to be said in criticism of autosexuality because it is fundamentally so self-centered. It lacks the quality of give and take, of anticipation and response, found in the normal interaction of two persons in affectional relations. And we must remember that, despite any intellectually acquired emancipation from cultural taboos against the practice, unconsciously one may be still bothered by the sense of guilt. This sense of sin may enhance the deleterious emotional effects upon the self; it may tend to disintegrate the personality organization, leaving it divided against itself.

Sexual Inversion. Homosexuality or sexual inversion is another means by which the single woman may find direct outlet for her sexual life. If there are strong traditional taboos on autoeroticism in our society, there are still more intense taboos on sexual attraction and love between persons of the same sex. Yet in the face of urbanization and the secondary-group organization of society generally, and in the face of the breakdown of the older mores, the public attitude toward homosexuality is gradually becoming more tolerant.

Not only do we lack adequate statistical evidence regarding the extent of sexual inversion, we have no completely satisfactory definition of homosexuality. Many writers distinguish between intense hugging, kissing, and the like and actual interstimulation of the erotic organs. Havelock Ellis maintained, on the basis of rather inadequate data however, that the incidence of homosexuality among women, in Western societies at least, was about twice that among men.¹² It stands to reason also that, as is true of men, such practices may be expected to increase as single women advance in years. The Kinsey report on American women should provide some important data on this entire topic.

Davis's study of unmarried women showed that, of 1,200 individuals at least five years out of college, slightly more than 50 per cent reported that they had experienced intense emotional relations with other women, and that 26 per cent of the entire group had experienced overt sexual stimulation with other women. This group is interesting for us since most of these women would fall within the category of "single women," that is, **would be 30 years of age or over.**

Davis suggests further that overt inversion in the later years may itself

¹² See A. C. Kinsey, W. B. Pomeroy, and C. E. Martin, *Sexual Behavior in the Human Male* (Philadelphia, W. B. Saunders Company, 1948), pp. 618-619. Despite Kinsey's demurrer regarding the article [see p. 490 footnote 14], the interested reader may consult M. L. Ernst and David Loth, "What Kinsey will tell," *Redbook Magazine*, 1950, 95-106-37, 86-90, for some interesting materials dealing with sexual inversion among both men and women.

represent an adult adjustment predicated upon pre-pubertal homosexual patterns. Apparently, in a high proportion of cases, homosexual adjustment in single women in later years may be partially predetermined by very early erotic interests which are not diverted into heterosexual channels in later adolescence and early womanhood. Over 11 per cent of the overt-practice group believed that these relations were important in preventing their marriage.²⁶

It is often said that attendance at women's colleges encourages inversion. Davis states that those who attended coeducational colleges reported significantly fewer homosexual experiences, although 18 per cent of the total number who reported intense emotional relations with other girls and 21 per cent of those in the overt-practice sample had graduated from coeducational schools. There is no difference in reports of present health between those who denied ever having experienced intense affectional relations with other women and those who did experience them, but the overt-practice group had had in the past a higher proportion of nervous breakdowns. As to occupational concomitants, those who were engaged in teaching or other educational work showed no significant differences in percentages in any one of the three groups: overt practice, intense emotional responses, or no such experiences at all. Those in social-service work, however, showed high percentages in both the homosexual categories. In regard to happiness and success as stated by the informants, there are no significant differences among the groups. Curiously enough, masturbation was found to be significantly higher in the group which had experienced overt practices, but heterosexual intercourse was "significantly lowest" in the group which had indulged only in intense emotional relationships without overt practice. Finally, there is no evidence of any relation between observed periodicity of sexual desires and overt homosexuality.

It is most significant, too, that there is no evidence in this group, taken as a whole, of psychopathic symptoms, although there is some evidence that neuroticism is more closely associated with the overt-practice group than with the other. But, since neurotic responses may be both constitutionally and culturally conditioned, it is difficult to know how much of the nervous breakdown reported is related to the practice of inversion and how much to other factors. It is interesting to note that a higher proportion of the women who admitted overt practice also found more heterosexual outlets in comparison with the group of less overt reactions. Furthermore, those who denied homosexual experiences of any kind admitted signifi-

²⁶ Davis, *op. cit.* Kinsey will bring out more details on this matter than have hitherto been known. See Ernst and Loth, *op. cit.*

As to the etiology of homosexuality, there is a sharp division between those who believe it rests upon constitutional foundations and those who attribute it largely to factors arising from the life history of the child and adolescent. Clear evidence on which we might settle this dispute is not at hand.

cantly higher percentages of being disturbed by sex problems than did those who did admit them. Finally, Davis remarks, "Intense emotional relations with other women, whether leading to overt practices or not, seem to make little difference in the proportions of those who regret their single state."⁸⁷

Sexual inversion, like autoeroticism, is to be studied only in the light of the total personality and the cultural milieu in which it operates. So long as society continues to place heavy taboos upon extramarital sexuality for the unmarried, yet fosters increased freedom of working women, there is likely to be considerable homosexuality. Many single women indulge in homosexuality—perhaps many of them never going beyond the mild type—who in other circumstances would marry, or find extramarital heterosexual outlets were these socially sanctioned. These women can scarcely be termed homosexual, if by this term is meant a very definite personality structure. There are, however, those women who are sometimes referred to as "true Lesbians" (from the legends of Lesbos, once thought inhabited by female homosexuals); they have the masculine-feminine make-up and fall into what is sometimes called the type of intermediate sex. They have strong male attitudes and often certain male physical features. Such persons may well have a constitutional predisposition toward the masculine type due to endocrine or other factors.

Aside from these possible organic foundations for the male counterpart among the inverts, the Freudian psychiatrists have much to support their argument that many, if not all, homosexuals represent in terms of personality an arrested love development. The theory is that these persons typify a certain continued fixation upon themselves and their own sexual makeup going back to their early childhood, which has been projected outward upon persons like themselves, that is, upon others of the same sex. As Hutton puts it, these women's masculinity and appearance of strength and responsibility are often only a veneer "covering often an entirely childish and dependent craving for love and attention, with nothing of the giver behind it all. They are simply mother-seekers, not the mate-seekers they appear at first to be."⁸⁸ Often girls who are lonely and disappointed from lack of men friends fall into the hands of such inverts only to be greatly disillusioned in the end.

In the face of both cultural taboo and the psychological instability which may arise from such relations, it is questionable whether overt homosexuality will prove very satisfactory. There is much more to be said for a sublimated and milder emotional attachment between women as companions. Again we must be cautious about generalization, because instability itself is highly conditioned by the cultural influences which

⁸⁷ Davis, *op. cit.*, p. 273.

⁸⁸ Laura Hutton, *The Single Woman and Her Emotional Problems*, London, Baillière, Tindall & Cox, 1935, p. 127. By permission.

play upon the individual. Doubtless there are some women who find overt homosexuality satisfying and unmarked by negative counterparts of guilt or obvious neurotic symptoms. Even those women who live together in friendly companionship without such overt relations often have to face a good deal of ridicule and other unpleasant forms of social disapproval. Moreover, the practice appears connected with a certain kind of sophistication in the upper strata of occupation and social status. We have few or no data on its prevalence among women, married or single, in the lower economic brackets of our society.

Heterosexual Relations. Heterosexuality is another means by which some single women find a direct expression of their love life. But, as with autoeroticism and inversion, sexual relations outside marriage are under a powerful taboo, and many women find them a costly experience, not only in terms of peace of mind but in relation to their occupational success.

Adequate statistical information on the extent of extramarital sexual practices among single women is lacking, although Kinsey will probably report that the incidence is much less among his women than among his men subjects.³⁹ Of Davis's sample of 1,200 unmarried women who were five or more years out of college, 11.3 per cent admitted sexual intercourse. This figure may be compared to the 7.1 per cent of her sample of 1,000 married women who confessed to premarital relations.⁴⁰

There are many inhibitions which prevent single women from going into such affairs, or from enjoying them if they do. Fear of pregnancy, guilt about possibly taking the married paramour away from his wife, sense of inability to combine marriage with the strong passion felt for the man, and others are frequently reported to be restraining factors.

Doubtless many unmarried professional women have worked out fairly satisfactory relations with men, married or single, and these relations have not interfered too greatly with their careers or with their emotional balance. If such experiences are to mean anything significant for the individual, they must involve mutual responsibility of the man and the woman. There must be an assimilation of such experiences with the rest of the personality if such love life is to provide adequate satisfaction. The practical difficulties for most individuals who find themselves in this situation are the social taboos and the need for secrecy and dissimulation before others. For example, a professional woman may find herself increasingly involved emotionally with the man she loves and yet the fear of discovery prevents a normal satisfaction of the desires thus set up to share his successes or failures. There is developed an isolation of the affectional life from the rest of one's everyday activities. This often produces a curious sense of unreality about the love affair, in time producing a dissociation of attitudes and habits toward the loved one as compared with attitudes and

³⁹ Ernst and Loth, *op. cit.*

⁴⁰ Davis, *op. cit.*

habits toward others. Discussing this sort of situation for the unmarried woman, Harding remarks: "It is lived so exclusively, is touched so little by other realities, that it becomes almost like a dream life lived in an enchanted castle. This, at least, is the danger of having to guard it too closely from contact with everyday concerns."⁴¹

An incipient mental conflict over such a situation may in time grow to large proportions. The whole relationship tends to rest upon strong feelings and emotions whose expression must of necessity be restricted. The attitudes of the lovers toward each other are limited to their own interactions and are seldom openly shared with others. In other words, from the point of view of the personality structure such a deep-laid attachment cannot link its attitudes, values, and habits to the community-determined generalized or central rôle which is so important for integration of the personality. Add to this the frequent danger of public exposure, the fear of pregnancy, the sense of "being out of things" in the many relations which other persons tend to share, and it is evident that these heterosexual attachments outside marriage often prove unsatisfactory in the end.

In summary, we may say that none of these three ways of seeking direct outlets for her sexual life is, as a rule, entirely satisfactory for the single woman. Unless she has become thoroughly emancipated from the traditional mores and from the associated sense of guilt and inferiority, she is likely to find herself emotionally trapped in her very efforts at freedom. Despite our present-day cultural changes, there remain the large body of moral ideas and moral norms which reach most girls in the formative years long before they ever dream of having to face the problems of love life as lonely unmarried adults. Therefore, no matter which one of these outlets a single woman may choose, there usually remains the specter of unconsciously motivated sense of sin and of guilt, as well as the whole restriction of the normal sharing with others of these deep emotional expressions. Such a pattern of life tends to be dissociative rather than integrative; and, since love and sex life are so vital, so deep-seated in the constitutional motivations, and yet so overlaid with cultural expectancies of normal monogamous marriage, in our society the individual is likely to come off second-best if the love life is organized around these practices.

INDIRECT OUTLETS IN THE LOVE LIFE OF SINGLE WOMEN

Many single women find love outlets in indirect ways and in this manner avoid some of the difficulties we have just described. In comparison with men, of course, women are still highly restricted.

Friendly and Congenial Sublimations. The desexing of the relations of men and women in occupational and civic contacts easily leads to situations which prevent any friendly or congenial but sublimated affectional

⁴¹ Esther Harding, *The Way of All Women* (New York, Longmans, Green & Company, 1933), p. 263. By permission.

relations with men outside the family. Thus the single woman may find her affections limited to a father, a brother, or another male relative, which may not be so satisfactory as she wishes because there are hosts of associations, as daughter, as sister, as cousin, which date back to childhood and which the other person involved may not easily forget or overlook. Or the woman may find sublimated outlets in friendships with other women, but, even in the absence of any implication by others of more overt homosexuality, these relations are not always easily maintained. We find, for example, instances of an adolescent attitude of weakness and dependence of one woman upon another who is more mature and who perhaps carries for the first certain implications of masculine strength and dominance. Out-and-out friendships on an equalitarian basis such as are found among men in our society are apparently less common among women, not because women are potentially incapable of such relations, but because the growth of women toward maturity in all aspects of their personality is still retarded. Yet, as men themselves become freed of traditional attitudes toward women, there should arise opportunities for friendly relations of men and women on intellectual, professional, and artistic levels.

Then there is the practice of setting up a partial family situation by adoption of a child by the single woman. Adoption is fraught with serious enough obligations for the childless married couple; for the single woman, however, not only is there the matter of the maternal without the balance of the paternal pattern, but there is likely to arise over-attachment to the child, projection upon him of conscious or unconscious ambitions and ideals, to say nothing of the likelihood of ambivalent resentment and rejection later if he does not turn out as anticipated.

It is important for the single woman, as it is indeed for others, to divide her emotional energy among a number of outlets: work, recreation, religion, and the more intimate attachments to other persons. Only in this way will a proper balance be struck among the varied motives of the normal man or woman. To overload any particular person with too much affection is to limit the outlets in other directions and in turn to restrict that essential spread of interaction with other persons which is so important to normal personality growth and integration.

Objectification of Work. Perhaps the greatest challenge to the single woman, as to all women who seek outlets in work or other activity outside the home, lies in the need to objectify their interests and actions. As we shall note in the next chapter, the chief asset in work lies in the fact that it forces activity to be directed from the inner self toward some object outside. It obliges one to focus one's attention and energy on the external world of other persons and physical things. And for the single woman, as we noted for the divorced woman too, this is perhaps more important than it is for the married woman who tries to combine work and family life.

Furthermore, objectification of work not only implies the acquirement of skill and intellectual capabilities for handling the demands of the job, if it is to serve the purpose we are discussing at this point, it must also carry with it a part of the emotional and feeling life. The most satisfying work for anyone is that which involves his deeper interests, which permits an outlet not only for skill and intelligence but for emotions as well. Obviously, the problem of the single woman in this connection is not different from that of any other worker, except that for the single woman her other outlets are at best likely to be only partially satisfying. If for no other reason than this, the single woman should, if she can, take up a line of work which will give her this objectification of activity and emotional satisfaction at the same time.

There has been little systematic study of the relation of a job to personality balance and satisfaction among single women, but we do have some case histories, some autobiographical accounts, and certain other data. Of the 1,200 single women in Davis's sample 78.3 per cent stated that their life was "happy," 63.7 per cent that it was "satisfactory," and 65.1 per cent that it was "successful." It would seem that a large proportion of these women find their work a definite factor in giving them an adequate life, despite many minor difficulties.

Certain occupations, of course, afford a sublimated outlet for women's love interest. This is particularly true of nursing, child-welfare work, and teaching; in these the maternal rôle may be and often is evoked. But the matter is not so simple as it appears. Women teachers often become too involved emotionally with their pupils, either leaning toward over-affection and sentimentality or developing a certain defensive "hard-boiled" attitude toward their charges, neither of which bespeaks well-trained attitudes. Similar ambivalence may be true in child-welfare and related social-service work. Although nursing as a profession is protected, in part, from too much of this type of response by its more technical and objective character, it is patterned on maternal care of the patient, and on the dependency rôle of daughter to father in the relation of nurse to physician. Not only do these occupations reflect the mother pattern, but so do others, such as missionary work, dress making, millinery, and domestic service. Often the daily relations of secretaries or stenographers to their employers take on many of these features. For those women who take up some form of religious activity as a vocation there may well be an outlet which may use both emotional and intellectual interests in a healthy and socially accepted form. Love, marriage, and family patterns are most evident in religious social-service work and in missionary endeavors. Dickinson and Beam aptly observe:

"The working woman who must also appear as potential Madonna finds her ideal of her own mother important for happy acceptance of occupation.

"In this series, 2/3 or half the cases [of those who work] are employed in ways

which stress the mother pattern. Nearly a hundred are in clerical work, another in domestic or personal service, thirty more are milliners, dressmakers and seamstresses, preoccupied with feminine trade. Such workers learned their job and served their apprenticeship to women, and either work together with women or in a capacity which lets the personal relation to man be the traditional one of waiting on and helping him.

"It is then occupational preparation and sustenance to remember the mother as cheerful, lovely and good, superior in tenderness, an anodyne. She healed, encouraged, and appreciated; the maternal ideal is a figure of renunciation. . . .

"[And] when work is so closely tied to the sexual impulse that it becomes the main avenue of life, it uses the familiar ingredients of the love pattern. . . ." ⁴²

In the building of the personality, there are often ambivalent identifications. The father may serve as an ideal for the daughter; and perhaps in many single women the over-emphasis of this pattern in the personality may account, in part, for their failure to marry. (There is no man as "good and kind as father.") Or it may take the negative form, as when the father is thoroughly unpleasant, feared, and hated—the "all-men-are-brutes" assumption. No adequate studies of the effects of father or of mother ideals upon the personalities of single or of married women are at hand, but there are data which suggest that in the case of many successful unmarried women the father ideal has played a definite part. This is particularly likely to be true among women who go into business and professional work where masculine traditions and customs dominate. But this outlet is not always psychologically simple for the woman, for following the father's ideal into such vocations throws her into competition with and opposition to men.

On the other hand, recourse to the mother image may help the single woman over some of her problems, since male occupational associates of superior rank easily take on the father's pattern of authority and dominance, and in dealing with them the woman may drop back into the feminine rôle. The teacher's attitude toward the superintendent, the nurse's toward the doctor, the social worker's toward her male executive, the religious worker's toward the pastor, all show evidences of the customary response to the father as authority. It is also to be noted that, if the father image has set up antagonism, the daughter may carry this over to those who symbolize the father in vocational as in other fields. The woman may reveal a timid, silent, and even brooding reaction, or assume the compensatory attitude of being over-aggressive, sarcastic, and over-emphatic about her "rights." ⁴³

Sublimation Through Recreation and Art. The single woman may with profit find considerable objectification of interest in healthy play life or in avocations or artistic work. These activities provide a culturally accepted

⁴² *Ibid.*, pp. 357, 360.

⁴³ The Fortune Survey, *op. cit.*, shows that for the sample and at that time (1943) women, both single and married, preferred men to women as bosses over them at work.

and easily available means of sublimating many thwarted wishes. There is a close linkage of play life and artistic creativeness. As a vocation or hobby, art has many of the symbolic creative features of motherhood. The development of clubs and congeniality groups among professional women, or of such groups sponsored by religious denominations, is an indication of the recognition of this problem and an attempt to solve it.

Sublimation Through Religion. Not only does church work provide the single woman with an outlet for her energy and time, but personal religious experience itself may furnish a socially accepted form of sublimation for love life. This refers not only to women who take the veil or who go into church work as an occupation, but to the fact that worship, prayer, and participation in religious services afford excellent release from repressed emotions, which will get many single women over difficult periods in their loneliness and sense of inferiority.

On the other hand, it must not be denied that the moral-religious ideology which many women have acquired from their Christian or Hebraic training prevents their making any adequate adjustment to their sexual and love life. Their conditioning in early years to the doctrine of sin and guilt may act to inhibit any satisfactory direct or substitutive forms of emotional release. In such instances spinsterhood may either mean a docile retreat from the adventure of living in a modern world or end in some sort of neurotic breakdown.

Limitations and Advantages of Sublimation. The single woman must reckon, therefore, with many limitations so far as her sex life is concerned. Not only is she denied the most complete and intimate relations and the wide range of esthetic and intellectual interests that may be associated therewith, but, despite the most adequate sublimation, there usually remains some sense of futility and incompleteness. There is always a physiological and psychological price to be paid for such sublimation. Adherence to the ethical and other demands for conformity indicates some of the definite limitations to the various substitutions which one may develop. Nevertheless, there do exist a wide gamut of approved social acts, aside from love and sex, and it is in these that the single woman must find her substitutions if she can. In the development of personality we find that the single woman may be mature and thoroughly responsible in a certain range of activities and still remain childish and immature in others. In this regard she is no different from any other individual, and, like other women who are trying to become emancipated, she not only has to face the problems of loneliness and isolation and the sense of being thwarted in her love life, but must also carry many burdens laid on all women who are attempting to escape the traditions and customs of the man-made world.

CHAPTER 19

Psychological Problems Associated with Occupation

Work and occupation derive from the fundamental needs to satisfy hunger and thirst, and to provide for bodily care and shelter. They have their roots in one or more of the basic drives. In contrast to play, which is spontaneous and more or less immediately satisfying, work may be defined as regularized, recurrent, utilitarian, and organized effort directed toward a somewhat more remote goal. In our Western capitalistic system the possession of a specific occupation, the virtues of hard work, thrift, responsibility, steadiness of working habits, keeping a regular job, and various bourgeois patterns of business are all high values. The needs for security and recognition which develop in the earliest years becomes in time, closely associated with getting and keeping a job. The high prestige value of a good position, especially one that provides a handsome income, stimulates the aspirations of young people. In contrast, the jobless man, the lazy fellow, the idler, has little or no satisfactory status.

In our society occupations themselves range up and down a scale of status. The personnel of a given vocation tend to develop their own occupational egocentrism, and associated with this is a sense of social distance with respect to members of other vocational groups. The prestige differential about occupations held by the general public further stimulates the idea of a hierarchy of value as to the kind of work one does. In general, persons in big government and big business jobs and in medicine rate **highest in this country.**¹

Our American society has been characterized by an open class system, that is, free movement up and down the ladder of societal status. With respect to occupations this is evident in the strong hold which the social myth of upward struggle from poverty to riches has in our folkways. But, as economic opportunities begin to be restricted, we may see the rise of

¹ On the matter of relative occupational status, see Walter Contu, "The relative prestige of twenty professions as judged by three groups of professional students," *Social Forces*, 1936, 14: 522-524; C. C. North and P. K. Hatt, "Jobs and occupations: a popular evaluation," *Cypress News*, Sept. 1, 1947, 3-15. Reprinted in E. Wilson and W. L. Kottler, ed., *Sociological Analysis* (New York, Harcourt, Brace & Company, Inc., 1949), pp. 464-473.

an ever sharper discrepancy between actual achievement and the level of aspiration set up in terms of this cultural expectancy.²

There are, in addition to the prestige scale of the whole range of occupations, definite differences in the sub-cultures of employers and of workers. Since work and a vocation have such important places in the individual life organization of Western society, it follows that class distinctions between employers and workers are reflected in the personality structure and function of members of each group. The general myth of business success and money-making ramifies widely throughout our American society, though labor unionism and various forms of economic-political radicalism tend to develop strong in-group attitudes and values on the part of workers, aimed at their own solidarity and at opposition to employers. But despite the impress of labor unionism in this country, the mass of workers remain little influenced by the ideology of sharp class distinctions. The "success story" motive is still potent. The present chapter will deal chiefly with the psychological aspects of work, although the social-cultural factors will become evident as the discussion proceeds. We shall begin with a consideration of the objective nature of work, the influence of the machine upon the worker, and the effects of fatigue and monotony on efficiency and personal satisfaction. A section will be devoted to morale and incentive and the final section to a discussion of personality in relation to occupations.

PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF WORK

Against this review of the general background factors, let us examine some of the psychological features of work as they bear upon the individual's attitudes, habits, and ideas.

The Objective Character of Work. From the point of view of psychology, work represents an objectification of activity. In motor skill this occurs through the overt, muscular movements of the individual directed toward some external object. The farmer planting, tending, and harvesting his crops or the skilled mechanic making a machine is a case in point. In activities involving symbolic behavior, such as doing research, literary writing, painting, and the fine arts generally, the expression in purely material form may be reduced to the minima of the medium itself, but the objectification remains in terms of standpoint, method, and possible verification by others, and in the sense that the results of the activity may be communicated to others. Moreover, in both material and symbolic forms of work, there are other important objective aspects. The aim or purpose of the activity sets certain limits; the nature of the medium or material dealt with sets others. There are usually various standard rules or tech-

² For a discussion of some aspects of this mobility and its implications for education, see P. E. Davidson and H. D. Anderson, *Occupational Mobility in an American Community* (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1937).

niques of handling the data to which the worker must conform, at least if his product is to fit into the acceptable norm of his society and culture. And the work itself both as activity and in relation to the object upon which it is directed serves to focus the attention of the individual outward, away from his subjective world, from his vague ideas, and from his fleeting or **persistent wishful thinking**.

Then, too, work takes on the character of a social act because it involves interaction with others, both direct and indirect. The hand-eye and motor activities with material objects—like much of speech—constitute reactions that for social beings fall between the need and the attainment of the goal. Not only are these things universal, but symbolically, by gestures and words, we can communicate with each other about them. In other words, the manipulation of physical objects comes within the scope of the social act.

Also there are the direct contacts of the workers with each other, their mutual identification with each other in regard to the nature of their work and to the wages that the work will bring, and the whole congeries of related factors of family, neighborhood, and general culture—all of which become introjected into the worker's self-organization.

Another important aspect of having an occupation is the regularity of work habits. The repetitive nature of much work is partially the foundation for this; routine motor habits have to be learned and kept alive by practice. Moreover, the specific locus of our working space, the regularity of hours of work, and the customary and predetermined monetary returns which we receive—all these indicate further objectification and standardization of a job within the societal order itself.

There is no doubt that the objective character of work, psychologically considered, is one of its most significant features. It is ordinarily associated with the ideal aim or aspiration of securing a livelihood. Work symbolizes maturity; it affords a useful area of direct contact with others; and it gives a basis for status and esteem. Finally, the very character of work as an *outward* act, as an integrating pattern of behavior in which idea, emotion, and motor skill combine, is most significant for mental health. We have already commented on some aspects of this with reference to education and to careers for women. And we shall later note its importance for the readjustment of the delinquent and criminal, for the sane treatment of constitutional handicaps, and for various more general social and emotional **maladjustments**.

Only recently have industrial and vocational psychologists begun to recognize the importance of the social act or person-to-person contact in work. We shall take note of these as we proceed with our discussion, but especially in treating personality in relation to occupation.

Dissociative Character of Machine Work. When the handicrafts thrived, and the making of a pot, the weaving of a rug, or the tillage of

the soil was a more or less unified activity, the effects of these habits on personality organization were doubtless different from those of present-day machine production. Under the old system a man's tools were almost a part of himself. Moreover, the product of a man's labors was a unified, complete object. Its inception and completion constituted an integrated series of responses involving the entire personality. Today men operate machines which make only a small part of the manufactured articles. The individual worker may have little or no conception of the finished product as a totality, as a creation of his own hands. The former pride in skill and handicraft ability disappears when machines make the parts of a product, and at best men have only a slight function in putting these parts together. The artistry of the product is transferred from the man to the machine.

From time to time writers have sent up a lament that the workers' "instinct of workmanship," his "creative impulses," or his native inventiveness are throttled by the ogre of machine production. The use of "time study" methods to improve productivity, the minute breakdown of the methods of making standardized parts and the use of the assembly line have contributed to this viewpoint.

This is not the place to debate about the creative impulse of the workers, on the one hand, and the damaging influences of machine production, on the other. The events of the past few decades have indicated once more the amazing adaptability of man. Some of the dire effects anticipated have not taken place, and we are rapidly becoming much more accustomed to the machine age than we formerly imagined possible. In fact, the anxiety about the industrial creativeness of the ordinary worker reflects a certain sentimentality regarding the past, arising from a false notion that every worker is a potential genius and from the belief that there is some special virtue in the handicrafts and some special vice in machine production. Without doubt some of the problems of dissatisfied workers, of the breakdown of health and morale due to speeding up of work, of fatigue and monotony, represent a transitional phase in the adaptation of workers to machine production.

Yet there does remain the larger question of the dissociation of work itself from the rest of the individual's life organization. While the human being is remarkably adaptable in habits and attitudes, it may well be that the segregation of the work habits and attitudes from other aspects of man's personality tends to produce in him somewhat serious mental dissociation, which in time may influence his whole adaptability to society.

But, aside from these matters, there are problems, such as fatigue, escape from monotony, daydreaming, morale, and incentives to work, which must be reckoned with.

The Effects of Fatigue. There is a vast literature on the subject of fatigue, drawn from hundreds of experiments by physiologists and psychologists and from the observations, controlled and otherwise, made in indus-

trial plants. A commonly accepted characterization of fatigue covers at least three items: (1) an objectively measurable evidence of decline in output on a given task, known as the "work decrement"; (2) a physiological state, involving the reduction in the muscle tissue of the amount of energy-producing material, particularly glycogen, and accumulation of waste products in the muscles and blood, particularly lactic acid and carbon dioxide; and (3) a feeling or sense of fatigue.

On the whole the studies of fatigue have turned out to be rather equivocal. Some writers have gone so far as to suggest seriously that the word *fatigue* be eliminated from our scientific vocabulary, since it is obvious that it is not some *one* thing, some *entity* which an individual has or does not have, any more than work is something which one gets out of a worker. Nevertheless, with these cautions in mind we shall use the term to classify a wide range of mental and muscular phenomena which influence directly or indirectly the work habits and the productivity of the worker. At this point we shall note only certain objective evidences of fatigue as they reflect themselves in the personality of the worker. The mental conditions of monotony which may or may not accompany fatigue will be discussed in the next subsection.

The reduction in the hours of work per day almost invariably results in increase in the rate of output, although various investigators have found that these improvements appeared slowly, sometimes not until weeks or months had elapsed. It is clear that mental attitudes play a large part in these matters. If the workers secure the shorter working day through their own solidarity, say as union members, they may take a more favorable attitude toward work after they have won their point than previously, or than they would have if the change had been initiated from the management.

Innumerable studies have shown that the curve of productivity for a large sample of occupations rises in the early part of the day, slumps before the noon hour, rises again after luncheon, and then falls off again toward the close of the working day. Also, it is apparent that workers everywhere develop their own rhythms of effort and rest. One British study found marked variations, the rest periods occurring with considerable regularity in some types of work and irregularity in others. In one sample of men engaged in moderately heavy work, such as road building, agriculture, and dock labor, these spontaneous rest pauses averaged eleven minutes an hour. Men working in coal mines took rests varying from seven to twenty-two minutes an hour, depending somewhat on atmospheric conditions. This report, in fact, states that "the more arduous the work the longer the rests."¹

¹ H. M. Vernon, T. Bedford, and C. G. Warner, *Rest Pauses in Heavy and Moderately Heavy Industrial Work*, Industrial Fatigue Research Board Report (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1927).

The contention that highly mechanized and repetitive tasks produce fatigue and feelings of monotony has led the sentimentalists to argue that the workers suffer greatly from such work. As we shall note below, monotony is a subjective factor which varies greatly among individuals. But studies have shown that varying the tasks and the introduction of rest pauses do cut down the feeling of fatigue. Also, it is shown that workers of less general intelligence tend to do better at simple repetitive work than do those of higher intelligence. In purely automatic activities the worker may carry on elaborate daydreaming while tending to his job, while work characterized by variation in the amount of attention demanded may itself be sufficiently varied to offset the fatiguing effects of more repetitive work. Also, tasks which demand very close attention, unless personally interesting to the worker, often set up marked feelings of fatigue even though the muscular effort is not arduous. In such situations rest periods have proved beneficial. In contrast, an occupation in which the person is deeply interested, in which his own creativeness may enter, may, on the other hand, be carried on for long stretches of time without any obvious signs of either mental or muscular fatigue. In such cases the occupation approaches the nature of play rather than work in the sense of an imposed task.

The Effects of Monotony. If the concept of fatigue is vague, so too is the concept of monotony. In general the term is used to indicate a satiation of an activity with a concomitant subjective state of boredom or ennui, induced by the required repetition of some task.⁴ Though often associated with fatigue, it is not to be identified with the latter, for a person may be bored from monotonous activity without showing any evidence of physical or mental fatigue. Moreover, it is worth noting that freedom from boredom seems to lead to an increase in production rate even in the face of some evidence of physical fatigue. Monotony is related to the nature of the task and to a host of factors arising from cultural conditioning.

Various theories have been advanced to account for monotony, but perhaps the most suggestive relate it to the broad differences between work and play. It is apparent that play is characterized by a spontaneity of action which is not found in the imposed task of regularized and restricted movements in work. To contrast work and play is but another way of noting an important difference between interest and monotony itself. If interest be considered in this connection as relating to a pleasurable incentive in a given activity, monotony or sense of boredom may be considered as a function of, or result of, the process of struggling against inclinations or tendencies to discontinue a given job. Thus boredom may be defined as a mental state arising from the more or less enforced necessity to continue given responses in the face of competing and intruding

⁴ See E. E. Glasell and C. W. Brown, *Personnel and Industrial Psychology* (New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1945), p. 416.

impulses. It implies a conflict of drives or incentives, one toward keeping at a task, the other toward escaping it. A fundamental characteristic of interesting activities is that they are done with a minimum of effort, and a prominent feature of monotonous activities is that they are marked by a sense of strain and perhaps frustration. Boredom, then, is obviously an avoidant reaction toward a tension set up by what is essentially a conflict situation. It is a warning or symbol that the individual is not doing what he really wishes. But the demands of a job and all it implies in the way of economic and other security serve to keep most individuals at their tasks even though they desire to be free from them.

The psychological factors in monotony, such as intelligence and attitudes, like those in fatigue, have been examined by a wide range of investigators. Judged by laboratory experiments at least, boredom seems to be definitely associated with the difficulty in the reception of uniformly repeated stimuli and the accompanying uniform motor responses. Apparently it is most marked in individuals who are compelled by the nature of the job to attend to each successive sensory impression and to correlate successfully the appropriate motor response with this impression.

As scientific studies began to be made of the daily activities demanded in mechanized industries themselves, it became evident that some of the laboratory-trained investigators were quite unwittingly projecting upon the workers their own belief that repetitious tasks must of necessity be highly monotonous. This arises from the fact that the research workers come from a social class quite unaccustomed to remaining long hours at simple motor tasks of repetitious character. But, when the verbal reports of the workers themselves are considered, it is clear that there are wide individual differences among them. Some of them do not mind repetitious labor; others do.

There is considerable evidence that job satisfaction varies with level of intelligence. In highly routine jobs individuals of mediocre mental ability often do not seem to suffer from boredom; where the job demands a good deal of mental alertness to changing work situations the individuals of limited intelligence may be dissatisfied.

It would be a mistake, however, to believe that intelligence alone will account for the variations in the sense of boredom among workers. Attitude or mental set must also be reckoned with, and, when the attitude is surcharged with strong emotions, its influence on the worker may offset the otherwise expected influences of variability in intelligence itself. Attitudes may have a deep-seated source in the wider cultural training of the worker, or they may reflect his experience with his job more directly. (See below.)

The place of both intelligence and attitudes will be further apparent if we examine the problem of monotony in relation to the nature and organization of the job itself. Just as mechanization of work has been held re-

sponsible for industrial fatigue, so, too, mechanization has been blamed for producing negative effects on the worker's interest. A highly routinized task which would bore an intelligent man may, in the words of Viteles, be "the boon of stupidity" to another.⁵

As suggested above workers doing highly standardized and more or less automatic forms of work may and do engage in daydreaming. The fantasies may range over a wide variety of topics: the job, home problems, one's philosophy of life. They may be morbid; they may be pleasant in nature. One study showed that when the working conditions were improved by introducing rest pauses and other changes, the unpleasant daydreams tended to disappear.⁶

Before going into the larger problem of morale and incentives, we must note the fact that monotony itself, within the narrower limits of the job, must be understood against the background of the larger society and its culture in which the worker finds himself. The classic investigation regarding telegraphists' cramp by Smith, Culpin, and Farmer throws this matter into interesting focus. It has long been known that a common ailment of British telegraphists was the development of muscular cramps which incapacitated them for their work. By all the usual tests telegraphy is not unduly different from many allied occupations, although the work is exacting and is marked by a definite inflexibility of the conditions of operation and also by a certain personal isolation. But the curious fact remains that this "cramp" is an "occupational disease" known to British telegraphists and not to American. Why should this be so? In the first place, in England telegraphy is a permanent vocation, whereas in America there is much greater mobility in this as in other types of labor. Second, many of the British workers evidently suffer from considerable mental conflict between a desire to retain a permanent and fairly well-paid job and an aversion to the exacting task and the rigid conditions it imposes. The result is a neurotic, essentially hysteric and functional avoidance reaction developed as a means of solving or reducing the tension or strain set up, in part, by the cultural connotations of the job itself.⁷

Not only fatigue but monotony, therefore, is bound up with the whole subjective life of the individual, which reaches beyond the factory, office, or merchandizing establishment. Not only does he carry to his work, from the outside, attitudes toward his vocation and his employer, but the conditions of labor themselves foster or hinder pleasant mental associations between what he does and what he wants to do. In other words, the levels of vocational achievement are constantly circumscribed and qualified by

⁵ M. S. Viteles, *The Science of Work* (New York, W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1934).

⁶ Elton Mayo, "Revery and industrial fatigue," *Journal of Personnel Research*, 1924, 3:274-278.

⁷ M. Smith, M. Culpin, and E. Farmer, *A Study of Telegraphists' Cramp* (Industrial Fatigue Research Board Report No. 13, London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1927).

the levels of aspiration, and the latter are determined both by conditions surrounding his work and by those which touch his social life in the family and community. For this very reason many serious problems of occupational adjustment often remain even when wages and external working conditions are pretty adequate, because the life in the plant is not integrated with the life outside. This fact leads easily to the broad topics of morale and incentive.

MORALE AND INCENTIVE IN WORK

The term *morale* is about as vague and uncertain of specific meaning as are the concepts of fatigue and monotony. It relates to the subjective, internal state—ideas, attitudes, feelings, and emotions—associated with a job, qualified, of course, by various features of the wider social configuration. More specifically it refers to the zest for activity, coöperativeness, sense of satisfaction and well-being, loyalty, and courage to carry on a task. Conditions of work such as wages, fatigue, monotony, and plant comforts, and family and community factors all influence morale, as do various subjective states themselves.

The term *incentive* is a synonym for motive, and indicates the push or inclination of the worker to activity. Obviously, incentive and morale are linked together, and both in turn are related to the level of the individual's achievement and his level of aspiration. The former might be measured by monetary considerations, by prestige, and by other satisfactions to the self of a nonmaterial but nevertheless social-cultural sort. The latter is also qualified and varied. Here culture patterns and norms play a decided part. For instance, what are the occupational levels of ambition in the bourgeois classes of our society with their emphasis on individualistic enterprise and competitive devices for getting ahead? Or, in the laboring classes, what are the levels of aspiration and what are the symbols of demand and expectation of performance among organized as contrasted with unorganized laborers? In turn, how do the discrepancies between achievement and aspiration influence not only the working process but related behavior? And then, too, how do the levels of achievement and aspiration in a capitalistic society compare with those in a socialistic?

Many theories and explanations have been offered as to why men work, what the incentives to labor are, and what produces or induces morale among workers. The philosophically-minded moralists often contend that man works from a strong inner compulsion to contribute his share as a working member of society. Hard-headed and practical psychologists usually contend that man works only under compulsion for food and shelter for himself and his family. But is the so-called hard-headed realist correct in attributing the full cause to a rational demand for food and shelter? A number of investigations have thrown some light on this question. But again it must be borne in mind that many of the research workers were unable

to get beyond the intellectual and emotional boundaries of their own capitalistic industrial societies, although others fortunately have begun to reckon with the wider cultural implications of their findings.⁸

Let us examine some of the important factors which affect incentive and hence morale, such as financial and non-monetary rewards, the rôle of supervisory and minor administrative officials, and the social configuration of the workers themselves. These considerations, in turn, will force attention to the wider social and cultural milieu of which working conditions are a part.

Financial Rewards as Incentives. In an economic order which emphasizes individual profit-making and high wages as providers of superior social status and material comforts, it is easy to assume that monetary considerations are the sole motivations to work. Yet even in our capitalistic society the matter of incentive is not so simple. Though a rise of wages often improves morale as well as productivity of the workers, investigation shows that it does not inevitably do so. Excellent evidence on this point has come from the various methods of paying workers in terms of the specific units of work performed. Since F. W. Taylor and others developed their time and motion studies⁹ as a basis for differential wage payment, all sorts of schemes of payment—piecework, bonuses, and the like—have been developed. All these schemes have the one central purpose of lowering the unit cost of production by using the lure of increased wages. In general these programs have raised the level of output although there have been many exceptions. Especially in the initial period of such arrangements, workers often found, as they increased production and hence their wages, by piecework and bonuses, that their rates of pay were reduced. This induced disgust and fear of further cuts and even of unemployment. The speeding-up processes often resulted in the rise of negativistic attitudes and more or less deliberate habits of restriction of output.

Workers have long had their own cultural devices for protecting themselves against what they think to be unfair pressures of management. "Soldiering" on the job is an old device not only to protect the worker from overfatigue, but to reduce output deliberately. So, too, various forms of sabotage are employed, as in one case cited in a report of a factory engaged in making tin cans, where an efficiency engineer had been introduced to speed up production; the workers from time to time would slyly toss tin scrap into some machine or conveyor or otherwise interfere with the production process. This would result in a temporary shutdown of that unit, which not only relieved the workers for the moment but of course

⁸ For a valuable discussion of morale in relation to job assignment in the army, see S. A. Stouffer, et al., *Studies in Social Psychology in World War II*, Vol. I, "The American Soldier: Adjustment During Army Life," Chap. 7. The findings and the interpretation in this chapter have many implications for problems of industrial morale.

⁹ For a convenient review of these studies, see Joseph T. Lipp, *Industrial Psychology*, 2nd ed. (New York, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1947), pp. 338-403.

irritated the foreman, the efficiency experts, and the management generally. All such situations tend in time to affect the morale in the plant.

Several studies have shown that the amount of work done in a certain period "is a definite function of the amount that remains to be done."¹⁰ Without doubt the anticipation of a long day's work ahead and of a large amount of work to be accomplished results in an unconscious slowing down of the worker. This fact is another excellent illustration of our constant contention that in human adaptation anticipatory reactions have much to do with overt conduct itself. We shall illustrate below the importance of the attitudes of the employees toward the job and the management in relation to morale and productivity.

Nonfinancial Incentives. Non-monetary factors also influence incentive and morale. Common-sense observation and various scientific surveys confirm this. In one study Houser reports that such things as full and consistent information from management as to what is expected, reasonable treatment of grievances, and being permitted to make suggestions were ranked as more important than pay itself. Hersey, in another survey, also found that other factors than wages ranked as "most important" in relation to jobs. The non-union workers in his sample put down "steady employment" as their first and "amount of pay" as their second choice. The union men put "fair adjustment of grievances" as first, and "steady employment" as second. "Amount of pay" tied with "working conditions" with a rank-order of 4.5, in the total of 14 ranks. Other studies report much the same kind of findings.¹¹

The factor of skill must not be overlooked in job satisfaction and in the motivation of the worker to put forth effort. One study by Fairchild made in four different plants, compared the factors which gave satisfaction for the workers, including wages, conditions of work, and skill. It showed rather well that, where skill is a large item in the total situation, it is reported as the primary source of satisfaction, but where skill is of less importance to the workers, such factors as wages and general working conditions are more important sources of satisfaction.¹²

A factory, office, or store will develop a network of social relations associated with the formal organization of personnel in matters of authority, responsibility, and skill. These reach from the top executive down to the lowliest employee. One's rôle and status are correlated with income, privilege, and deference in the hierarchy of power within the organization.

¹⁰ M. S. Viteles, *Industrial Psychology* (New York, W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1932).

¹¹ See J. D. Houser, *What People Want from Business* (New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1935), p. 29. Also, B. B. Hersey, "Psychology of workers," *Personnel Journal*, 1936, 14, 211-296. Other studies are reviewed in Tiffin *op. cit.*, pp. 457-462.

¹² M. Fairchild, "Skill and specialization, a study in the mental trades. Part I. The nature and measurement of skill. Part II. The significance of skill," *Personnel Journal*, 1930, 9:28-71; 128-175.

In addition to this formal structure there are important informal groupings among the employees which affect production, attitudes toward management, views on trade unionism, and many other aspects of life both inside and outside the plant.¹³

Studies in Inter-personal Relations and Productivity. The place of both formal and informal relations as they affect production, job satisfaction, and morale are nicely brought out in the now classic study made at the Hawthorne plant of the Western Electric Company.¹⁴ Subsequent investigations elsewhere have confirmed and elaborated what was found there and brief note will be made of one such study.

The investigation of the Hawthorne plant was originally set up to find out about factors making for fatigue and in general to examine the working conditions of that plant. As the investigation proceeded it became clear that many factors previously little suspected by the management were influencing production and morale. For purposes of illustration and with reference to our discussion we shall summarize but three of the researches: (1) an interview study of employees' attitudes and opinions regarding their work; (2) an investigation of the work habits, attitudes, and social relations of fourteen male employees whose work concerned "connecting banks of terminals with color-coded wires"; and (3) a study of the work behavior and inter-personal relations of five women assembling small electrical relays under specially controlled conditions.

(1) Over 20,000 employees were interviewed, and an approximate verbatim account was kept of their comments on a wide variety of matters: fatigue, monotony, hours of labor and rates of pay, physical conditions—such as lighting, temperature, ventilation, safety devices, tools, and machines—and the entire managerial organization of section chiefs, foremen, supervisors, and others under whom they had to work. For our purposes the most striking fact brought out by these interviews was that

¹³ See W. F. Whyte, ed., *Industry and Society* (New York, M. Graw Hill Book Company, Inc., 1946); D. S. Heslett, ed., *Human Factors in Management* (New York, Harper and Brothers, 1946); B. B. Gardner and D. C. Moore, *Human Relations in Industry*, rev. ed. (Chicago, Richard D. Irwin, 1950); W. F. Moore, *Industrial Relations and the Social Order*, revised (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1951).

¹⁴ The chief data with interpretations of this research are found in: F. J. Roethlisberger and W. J. Dickson, "Management and the worker: technical vs. social organization in an industrial plant," *Publication of the Graduate School of Business Administration*, 21, Business Research Studies, No. 9 (Boston: Harvard University Graduate School of Business Administration, 1934); F. J. Roethlisberger and W. J. Dickson, *Management and the Worker* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1939); F. J. Roethlisberger and W. J. Dickson, *Management and Morale* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1943); T. A. Whitehead, *Leadership in a Free Society* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1936). For a broad interpretation of this whole project see Elton Mayo, *The Social Problems of an Industrial Civilization* (Boston: Harvard University Graduate School of Business Administration, 1947).

On the interplay of home background and work adjustment, see Jeanette G. Friend and F. A. Haggard, "Work adjustment in relation to family background," *Applied Psychology Monographs* No. 16 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1948).

throughout the plant there existed informal social groupings of workers which in no way corresponded to the assumptions behind the technical operational program of the plant as devised and put into effect by the management. The latter had organized the operations of the plant on the traditional but patently false assumption that workers were interested only in wages and the physical conditions of the plant.

One important feature of the informal association of the workers was "a banding together for purposes of protection against practices they interpreted to be a menace to their welfare."¹⁵ These practices may be regarded as a sub-culture of the employees which were expressed individually in a number of interactional rôles. For example, pressure was put on any worker who tended to exceed a minimum standard of output. This consisted of ridicule, name-calling—such as "a rate-killer"—and even mild physical punishment. Many of the men admitted that they could have turned out much more work, but said they feared that if production was increased very much, the rates of pay would be cut.

Informal leadership also appeared among the workers. In one section of the plant there were two leaders. One of them, A, an excellent operator, habitually took the brunt of supervisory criticism and argument for the entire group, thus preventing external pressures from upsetting their morale. The other leader, B, more or less regulated the behavior of the group in relation to the work itself. For example, he taught the men various "tricks of the trade," saw to it that they appeared to be busy when the supervisory staff made rounds, and advised them not to tell other workers that their own operations were easy, or that they got through the day's work early and had time to loiter.

The group chief who had general charge of these workers always consulted with either A or B about particular matters. Moreover, the group chief defended this group against the foreman, and said he refused to "bawl out" the men as the latter suggested, since he found that he got better results by more friendly methods.

The relations of the workers to their immediate supervisors or foremen were found to be the key to high or low morale. As Putnam says: "The relationship between first-line supervisors and the individual workman is of more importance in determining the attitude, morale, general happiness, and efficiency of that employee than any other single factor."¹⁶ The existence of these informal social groupings with their leaders, however, served as a buffer between the supervisory and managerial staff and the individual operators, as the next study clearly indicated.

(2) Fourteen operators—nine wiremen, three soldermen, and two in-

¹⁵ Roethlisberger and Dickson, "Management and the worker: technical vs. social organization in an industrial plant," *op. cit.*, p. 2.

¹⁶ M. L. Putnam, "Improving employee relations: a plan which uses data obtained from employees," *Personnel Journal*, 1930, 8, 314-325. Quotation from page 325.

spectors—were closely observed and extensively interviewed over a period of more than a half-year. We shall note but a few of the total findings which show how the informal social groupings operated with high effectiveness in counteracting the elaborate technical program of the management. There was a complicated but technically satisfactory system of wages which involved a base rate called "day work" and a special premium for output above a minimum, to be paid on a "piece rate" basis. The bonus, however, could only be secured by the hearty coöperation of the entire group, and the technicians in control had followed the old assumptions that man was a rational being who would always act in his own best monetary interests, and in the interests of others when the latter benefited him directly. It was assumed, then, that the workers would do everything they could to produce enough so that the bonus could be secured by all. Yet exactly the opposite happened. The "day work" pay was on the whole considered preferable by the majority of the men. The workers put their pressure on the faster, not on the slower, workers.

In these situations, the "first-line supervisor"—the man in immediate authority over a group of workers—was caught between the system of actual operation by the men, of which he was fully conscious and with which he was in some accord, and the demands of the foreman and the managerial staff that his group increase their output. And in the interplay between the workers and the managerial group, he was intellectually and emotionally in a highly exposed situation, and had to make a variety of adjustments in the way of rationalization and projection upon others of blame for failures.

This study also revealed how a pattern of interaction arises among the workers themselves: how the wiremen, for instance, sometimes blamed the solderman for delays, and how difficult the rôle of the inspector became if he tried to assume authority which he did not really have. Thus when one inspector appeared who aroused unpleasant and antagonistic responses because he did assume superiority and authority, the wiremen and soldermen combined against him. He became the object of sabotage of his instruments, blame for delays, ridicule, and other control devices, so that in a few weeks he had to be transferred to another place in the factory.

Within a plant, then, there may emerge a form of social grouping with certain standard practices which can completely undo the programs of management when the latter fail to reckon with these human and irrational factors in behavior and attitude. In this particular example, there was no evidence that the management had ever cut the rates of pay of these men once production had been increased, and there was no general overt hostility between the employers and the employees. There was no evidence either that the supervisory staff was inefficient or given to oversympathy with, or to antagonism toward, the workers. It was only that

the restriction of output had become a part of the whole cultural pattern of the workers, which psychologically may be "characterized as a protection from too rapid changes in their environment," a matter implicit in their overt restriction and in their rationalizations for doing so. Roethlisberger and Dickson aptly point out that the whole rational process of improving technical production implies rapid changes for which the workers are not psychologically prepared. The inventors and engineers make the technological changes, but it is the individual workman in the plant who, though he has no place in initiating the changes, has to accommodate himself to them. Moreover, these changes often run counter to customs and traditions of work which are the product not of logic but of "deeply rooted sentiments." Constant interference with the established methods of work induces frustrations and "an irrational exasperation with technical change in any form." It is on such a foundation that a system of practices and values arises which would protect the worker who is "at the mercy of technical specialists."

If industrial management is to secure the maximum from its workers, it must recognize the place of the culturized habits and values of the workers. To follow the logic of a technical blueprint designed on the theory that workers are mere robots in a production system is to court failure. As these writers say, "Successful management of any human enterprise depends largely on the ability to introduce more efficient methods without disrupting in the process the social foundation on which collaboration is based."¹⁷

(3) A special controlled study of certain workers was made in order to discover, if possible, some of the decisive factors in rates of pay and working conditions which make for the highest efficiency. After a preliminary record of everyday performance at a certain task, five women workers were asked by the management to participate in the project. These women were given an outline of the general purpose of the program, and careful records were kept of their performance. During the first five weeks no changes were made in the work situation beyond putting them in a new location apart from the other workers. For this period there was no appreciable change in output. Following this, variations were introduced in terms of rates of pay, methods of pay (piecework), hours of labor, and rest pauses. This group remained together for approximately four and a half years.

The results were rather startling. There was a gradual but regular increase in productivity, regardless, to a large extent, of the conditions of work imposed. How may these changes be accounted for? There was no evidence that there was any relief from the usual cumulative fatigue found in other workers. There was no evidence that alterations in pay incentive

¹⁷ Roethlisberger and Dickson, "Management and the worker: technical vs social organization in an industrial plant," *op. cit.*, p. 17.

played any special part, for a control group with the same working conditions and varying only in the basis of compensation made gains equal to those of the experimental group. The most likely and probable explanation is that their improved industrial efficiency depended upon their psychological attitudes toward the work and toward each other. It was a matter of producing a freer, happier, and more enjoyable life on the job itself.

Perhaps the most important feature of this whole project was the development of a new social configuration in which the workers developed a certain *esprit de corps* among themselves, so that they took pride in their work and their output as a group, and in which freedom from constant and negative supervision of minor executives fostered a more natural inter-relation of workers as well as a freer rein to their skill. Although the investigation took into account the home environment and other outside conditions, especially in relation to loss of sleep or the appearance of depressed feelings, which were shown to have their effects, the central feature remained the favorable changes in mental attitudes induced by the new social situation in which the work took place.

One further comment is enlightening. The whole pattern of congeniality and high productivity began to decline in 1932 in the face of economic depression then at its worst. The output fell off rapidly in the last weeks just before the girls were discharged. Some months later one of the girls was shown the production charts and asked her opinion as to the reason for this final and striking drop in output. She summed up the whole matter in four words: "We lost our pride."¹⁰

The importance of friendly supervision, less authoritarian directives, and realization of appropriate rôles of both supervisor and worker in the job situation is neatly demonstrated in a study of a high-production as against low-production group in a large office force. In concluding their report on this research the authors say:

"People are more effectively motivated when they are given some degree of freedom in the way in which they do their work than when every action is prescribed in advance. They do better when some degree of decision-making about their jobs is possible than when all decisions are made for them. They respond more adequately when they are treated as personalities than as cogs in a machine. In short, if the ego motivations of self-determination, of self-expression, of a sense of personal worth can be tapped, the individual can be more effectively energized. The use of external sanctions of pressuring for production may work to some degree, but not to the extent that the more internalized motives do. When the individual comes to identify himself with his job and with the work of his group, human resources are much more fully utilized in the production process."¹¹

¹⁰ Whitehead, *op. cit.*

¹¹ From "Productivity, supervision, and employee morale," *Human Relations*, Series I, Report 1, Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Survey Research Center, 1948, p. 4. By permission. For a more complete report on this project see Daniel Katz,

A most suggestive study of inter-personal relations in a factory is reported by Elliott Jaques of the Tavistock Institute of Human Relations, London, England.¹⁰⁰ This investigation has important methodological as well as systematic implications. The research technique followed somewhat along the lines developed in connection with Lewin's Field Theory (see Chapter 10), particularly that associated with group dynamics. A team of workers went into the plant of the Glacier Metal Company and in collaboration with the management and various other units of the factory undertook to study the psychological and institutional forces affecting group life, morale, and productivity.

Some years prior to this project the company had set up a system of "joint consultation" between top management and representatives of the workers. While this program appeared sound in theory, it had not worked out well partly because it by-passed those in intermediate positions of authority, the supervisory staff. The scheme did not provide a workable system of communication "in the executive chain to allay the anxiety of the middle management strata." Members of the supervisory staff felt that their rôles became increasingly insignificant and they lost their former sense of importance. (See below on status of foremen.) Then, too, certain changes in the top management personnel had produced other difficulties regarding the distribution of authority and responsibility.

The research team undertook, through conferences and participation in group discussions to help top management, supervisory staff, and workers to understand their respective rôles, to develop democratic ways of solving mutual problems, and to bring about such changes in the organization of the plant as would improve morale and output. The aim was to get individuals at all levels to understand their frustrations and anxieties and to develop ways of discussing the same with others and of learning together to solve their problems. Members of the research team, however, assumed no responsibility for making any basic decisions although at times the personnel of the plant expected them to do so. Part of the plan of the study was to help the personnel—at all levels—to make decisions, to avoid conscious and unconscious means of dodging their responsibilities, and above all to train them in techniques of group discussion and judgment which would improve the interpersonal relations in the plant.

Out of this study a variety of important changes were made. Among the more important was a clear demarcation between the executive system which was reorganized all the way from "Managing Director to shop floor" and the consultative program itself which aimed at larger policy-making and not at detailed managerial functions.

Nathan Maccoby, and Nancy C. Morse, *Productivity, Supervision, and Morale in an Office Situation*, Part I. Ann Arbor, Mich., University of Michigan Institute for Social Research, (1950).

¹⁰⁰ Elliott Jaques, *The Changing Culture of a Factory*. London: Tavistock Publications Ltd., in collaboration with Routledge & Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1951.

Social Relations Among Workers. All this evidence makes it clear that the interactions among workers and between them and the supervisory and managerial personnel have profound effects upon motivation and morale. If a foreman or minor administrator is abusive, domineering, or petty in his demands, he tends to set up all sorts of resistances in the laborers, no matter how favorable wages and hours and other conditions may be. So, too, it often happens that events—such as transference of workers from one department to another without their knowing the real reasons—lead to misunderstandings, and in time not only the individual involved but his fellow-workers, who identify themselves with him, distrust the management and lay blame which might actually be unwarranted were all the facts known.

The social relations among workers are so important that any device tending to disrupt a social configuration or a custom of long standing is likely to destroy morale and good-will. The use of the labor spy to report to the management the attitudes and ideas of the workers, especially regarding such things as "soldiering on the job," sabotage, agitation for unionization, and the like, easily leads to increased resistance toward management and ultimately to open conflict between workers and employers.

Labor unions have come to play an ever larger part in worker-management relations. The shop steward who represents the union in the plant has an important function. He takes workers' grievances to the management. Moreover, most union contracts permit him to carry complaints to the managerial staff at any level from foremen to plant manager himself. This flexibility is often a boon to the employees since it permits more direct and faster decisions. In this way the settling of grievances need not be delayed because of the routine required when handled through the usual administrative channels.

Where there is any extended history of continued employment of the same worker on a particular job, new customs and traditions arise as changes in production procedures occur or older ones are carried over from other work situations. These tend, on the whole, to stabilize and structuralize the social configuration of work and hence foster morale. As a rule, cooperation among laborers is common. There is often a good deal of airing of views and grievances among themselves, which enhances negatively or positively the state of good-will. Even in the midst of highly individualized attention to the machine processes by the workers, social interaction takes place. To try to circumvent at least a modicum of contact among the workers is out of the question unless the employees are literally put in complete isolation from each other.

Then, too, a certain stratification develops in a plant, as witnessed in a certain hierarchy of social status among workers. This may be defined as occupational distance. Workingmen in the highly organized skilled trades represent the upper levels, those in the unskilled trades represent the

lower. Even within a given plant differentials of status are often to be found. Frequently it is rather the nature of the job than the earning power which determines this social standing. In addition, social superiority is shown among workers by tangible evidence of their material possessions, such as ownership of cars and education of their children, and by their opportunities for conspicuous leisure. Once more one notes the close relation of self expansion to rôle and status. What a man does and what his associates think of it determine pretty largely his own conception of himself, and without this support from others the individual has difficulty in maintaining his self image at the high level he might wish.

An important feature of the informal social order of a plant is the rise and operation of cliques or congeniality groups among certain workers. On the one hand, they induce and maintain high solidarity of those who belong, but on the other hand, they may make for a certain amount of conflict, expressed between various cliques, and between clique members and individuals who do not belong to any such group. Since management cannot prevent the rise of this type of primary group, it is wise to recognize it for what it is and utilize it, wherever possible, to facilitate high plant morale.

Surely the social configuration of work has direct bearing upon incentives and morale. Our whole laissez-faire tradition, with its emphasis upon personal competition and struggle, the high ambition to climb up the economic scale through individual effort, the fostering of a sense of personal independence, the prestige of the job, and especially the importance of monetary return—all these play a part in stimulating the worker. Yet many employers consider their workers as merely individual units whose relations with other human units are chiefly mechanical, like the relations of material things to each other. While individual differences in productiveness need to be recognized, and while the division of labor itself sets up divergent rôles and statuses which employers may use as appeals, it must not be forgotten that there are habits, attitudes, and values that must be taken into account in describing and predicting human behavior in industry. Mere money success and good external working conditions are not enough, the worker's rôle as worker must somehow become integrated to his other rôles in society.

Counseling in Industry. As a result of such investigations as those at Hawthorne, management has rather generally come to recognize the utility of personal counseling of workers. The forerunner of such programs, however, was the attempt to apply the principles of mental hygiene in various firms in the early 1920's.²⁰ During the Second World War such programs became widespread.²¹

²⁰ See, for example, V. V. Anderson, *Psychiatry in Industry* (New York, Harper and Brothers, 1924).

²¹ B. B. et al. surveyed 64 companies and government agencies which had installed course counseling services. She says, "The response to a question concerning present usefulness

Plant counselors usually try to perform at least four major functions: (1) help the employee to make a more satisfactory adjustment to the work situation, especially as this relates to complaints and emotional disturbances which may arise in the plant; (2) aid the management in communicating the company policies and practices to the workers; (3) help communicate the attitudes and ideas of the workers to the management; and (4) help the employee to solve personal problems which arise outside the work situation but which nonetheless interfere with the worker's effectiveness and sense of well-being.

Such counseling usually takes place through the use of the interview. The services are made available to the employees but there is no compulsion to use the services. Participation is completely voluntary. In some plants the interview may be somewhat formalized but those who follow the pattern developed at the Hawthorne plant use an unstructured, rather non-directed type of interview.²² (See Chapter 11.)

The counseling program at Western Electric grew out of the investigation noted above. The investigators spent thousands of hours just listening to what the workers had to say. The listening feature has since remained as one of the characteristics of counseling which differentiates it from objective tests or more formal question-and-answer interviews. The counselor allows the employee to talk as he wishes; he does not interrupt or seek to direct or force the conversation into channels of his choosing. He may from time to time summarize in a statement or question what the subject has said, but he does not introduce new ideas as he does so. His attitude is permissive and sympathetic, yet he refrains from giving advice or showing agreement or disagreement with what the other says.

As in the free association technique of the psychoanalyst, the very act of talking about personal difficulties is thought to be of benefit to the subject. As the worker verbalizes, he comes to define his own problems, states them specifically, and works out solutions to them. This heavy reliance on the subject himself is based on the assumption that he is not deeply disturbed. While attention is paid to the content of what the subject says, the therapeutic value of his talking is considered to be equally important. The therapeutic effects, of course, will vary with the seriousness of the difficulties and the skill with which the counselor and employee cooperate.

The counseling system likewise contributes to the smooth operation of an industrial concern by improving communication between the worker and management. A tenet of counseling is that the individual conversation remain confidential, but common problems brought out in interviews with

was invariably favorable'. Only one company stated that it planned to reduce or discontinue such service. See Helen Baker, *Personnel Counseling: Problems and Functions* (University Press, 1944), *Questionnaire*, p. 75.

²² See W. J. Dickey, 'The Hawthorne plan of personal counseling', in S. D. Hoebbel, ed., *op. cit.*, pp. 228-275.

many employees may be summarized in reports to management in such a way that no one contributor can be identified.

A sound counseling program will be so set up as to leave the counselor outside the formal hierarchical organization of the plant. He should not be loaded with any other duties than counseling and, in turn, he should have a supervisor of his own who will stand between him and the managerial line of authority. A good supervisor, moreover, will provide the counselor a conversational outlet when the going gets difficult.

As is true in all counseling—educational, industrial, or otherwise—the good counselor will not only be well trained in the necessary background subjects and experienced in interviewing, but will himself be free from anxieties and personality difficulties. The wise selection of the counselor is the first step to any successful program of this kind.

PERSONALITY AND OCCUPATION

While various aspects of personality have already been treated with regard to motivation, morale, and other aspects of work, in this section we examine, first, the possible correlation of certain personality characteristics with the social rôles demanded in selected occupations. Then we shall take up some problems of the emotionally maladjusted worker. Since the possible relationship between personality traits or types and certain basic social rôles was discussed in Chapter 9, and since the major ways of studying personality were presented in Chapter 11, we need not review those data here.

Personality Differences in Selected Occupations. Serious research on the problem of trying to relate personality traits to occupational rôles has only recently begun. Moreover the findings so far reported are not entirely consistent and certainly no coverage of even the major occupational categories is at hand. We have selected but three occupations: executive, salesman, and engineer, to illustrate the kind of studies that have been undertaken.

The *executive* has a key place in our economic system. He is the central figure in the administrative organization and, if successful, is a symbol for many young people in their own upward striving for status. On the basis of his extensive experience in industry, Barnard describes the successful executive as displaying a high degree of "loyalty, responsibility, and capacity to be dominated" by what he calls the "organization personality."

He divides the more specific characteristics into two classes: "relatively general abilities involving general alertness, comprehensiveness of interest, flexibility, faculty of adjustment, poise, courage, and so on, and specialized abilities based on particular aptitudes and acquired tech-

niques."²⁴ The first class he attributes to "innate characteristics developed through general experience." These abilities cannot be acquired through training alone.

Henry has found a constellation of personality characteristics for executives, which he says, constitute the "minimal requirements for 'success' within our present business system" and "the psychodynamic motivation of persons in this occupation."²⁵ According to Henry, executives have desires for high achievement, strong mobility drives, expectations of help from superiors, ability to organize unstructured situations, decisiveness, well-developed sense of self-identity, high level of activity, pronounced aggressiveness, feelings of apprehension and fear of failure, strong orientation to immediate realities, identifications with superiors and detachment from subordinates, emotional break with family, dependency on father-image, and need to operate within an established framework.

These conclusions were made on the basis of a study of over one hundred business executives. Techniques used were the Thematic Apperception Test, a short undirected interview, and a projective analysis of a number of traditional personality tests.

Rieger gave Rorschach tests to 64 executives and administrators, 53 engineers, 66 clerical workers, 36 supervisors and foremen, and 24 personnel interviewers. She found the executives characterized chiefly by their "facility in producing and handling ideas." Members of this group also displayed ability and freedom of expression. "Their wide range of ideas and interests, savoir-faire, emotional responsiveness to the needs of others, and creative potential surpass those of the ordinary applicant for a job."²⁶ While it is too early to generalize on the central psychological traits of executives, Barnard's point that the executive is dominated by "organization personality" is paralleled in Henry's "need to operate within an established framework."

The *salesman* is also symbolic of the economic life of our society, and much attention has been paid to finding out what makes for success in this occupation. Dodge, on the basis of the Bernreuter Personality Schedule, found salesmen as a group strongly marked by social dominance.²⁷ While the social dominance score on the Bernreuter did not distinguish the most successful salesmen in a large department store from the least successful ones, as judged by the personnel manager and department heads, an item analysis of the schedule did show a high correlation between certain per-

²⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 221-222.

²⁵ William E. Henry, "The business executive: the psychodynamics of a social rôle," *American Journal of Sociology*, 1949, 54: 286-291.

²⁶ Audrey B. Rieger, "The Rorschach Test and Occupational Personalities," p. 83 Ph.D. Thesis, Committee on Human Development, University of Chicago (Chicago, 1948).

²⁷ A. F. Dodge, "Social Dominance and Sales Personality," *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 1948, 22: 142-145.

sonality characteristics of the salesmen and their sales success. The "good" salesmen revealed themselves to be higher in self-sufficiency, self-confidence, and aggression than the poorer ones. They also described themselves as

"more willing to assume responsibility, as more social, as less self-conscious, as less desirous of telling others of personal good or bad fortune, as less resentful of criticism or discipline, as more radical and unconventional, as preferring face-to-face discussion rather than reading or writing, as more diplomatic, and as more subject to changing interests."²⁸

Verniaud, using the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory in testing twenty-seven saleswomen, discovered that they rated high in "masculine" tendencies. Although little work has been done on the meaning of a "masculinity" score by women in this inventory, Verniaud suggests

"it might mean a tendency to dominate and direct a situation rather than be dominated by it, a tendency to aggressiveness rather than passivity, and since many of the statements have to do with expressed interests and aversions, a tendency to share 'masculine' interests to a greater extent than might be expected in an unselected sampling of women."²⁹

These interpretations fit with Dodge's conclusion that salesmen are high in social dominance.

Engineers are another group with high prestige in our economic order. They have been described as possessing "imagination, open-mindedness, self-criticism, organization ability, enthusiasm, perseverance, originality, and initiative."³⁰ Rieger found the engineers, to whom she gave Rorschach tests, less interested in other people than were members of other occupational groups whom she tested. Also in contrast to executives the engineers in her sample displayed "a greater disturbance in their attitude towards their own problems and their ability to feel at ease with others."³¹

Although these scattered results do not provide us with an adequate picture of a personality structure which would distinguish engineers from other types of occupational rôles, the findings are suggestive. In regard to all these occupations we need further research, especially of the kind which will correlate the basic personality traits with the given rôle required by one's occupation.

What has been said about the psychological traits of executives, salesmen, and engineers must be regarded as representing a bare beginning

²⁸ A. F. Dodge, "What are the personality traits of the successful sales-person?" *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 1935, 22: 232. By permission of the American Psychological Association.

²⁹ Wilhe Munde Verniaud, "Occupational differences in the Minnesota multiphasic personality inventory," *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 1946, 30: 609. By permission of the American Psychological Association.

³⁰ *Vocational Guidance Research* (Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1945), p. 16.

³¹ Rieger, *op. cit.*, pp. 59-60.

of an adequate analysis of what might be called the occupational personality. As we pointed out in Chapter 9, the crux of this problem lies in developing the possible relations of given traits or types of personality as the background for the later assumption of a given social rôle in a given vocation. For example, Harmon and Wiener suggest from their analysis of the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory that individuals whose scores reveal tendencies to hypochondria, depression, and hysteria

"often indicate severe limitations on the kinds of work a man is willing to undertake, most frequently eliminating dirty or heavy jobs . . . also . . . [causing] the desirability of a job at the lower end of a man's ability level, where a minimum of stress will be encountered."³² So, too, high scores on items revealing tendencies toward psychasthenia, paranoia, and schizophrenia would seem to indicate such individuals to represent higher risks than "elevation on the other six scales."³³

Suggestive also is the work of McMurray, who has been considerably influenced by psychoanalytic theory. He has developed a thesis as to the desirable traits in workers regardless of the particular job they do. Two central concepts are those of maturity and immaturity. The latter is characterized in an adult by "the infant's passivity, irresponsibility, dependence, and lack of perseverance." The former, in contrast, has acquired "initiative, responsibility, aggressiveness, and perseverance." In short, he learns to adjust to his environment and to other people."³⁴ McMurray regards immaturity, in the adult, as the first stage of mental illness which may lead, in time, to more serious emotional maladjustment.

This approach has much to recommend it since it takes off not from the angle of either specific traits or general types, but from a consideration of the whole adjustive constellation of the individual seen against the background of his drives and degree of socialization.³⁵ Yet these and other interpretations offer only the most general foundation for assuming that certain traits and types of personality fit a person better for one kind of job than another. There is a real problem to be solved in this field, but much more research is needed before we may expect a reasonably satisfactory answer.

The Rôle of the Foreman. Before leaving the topic of personality and occupation we should make some comments about a few of the personality problems of the foreman, or first-line supervisor. In an earlier day

³² L. R. Harmon and D. N. Wiener, "Use of Minnesota multiphasic personality inventory in vocational advancement," *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 1945, 29: 153. By permission of the American Psychological Association.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 134.

³⁴ R. N. McMurray, *Handling Personality Adjustment in Industry* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1944).

³⁵ For a report on the validity of his technique, see R. N. McMurray, "Validating the patterned interview," *Personnel*, 1947, 24: 40. On the importance of personal history, see also Roger Bellows, *Psychology of Personnel in Business and Industry* (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1949).

the foreman had considerable authority; in fact, he was the first decision-making unit in the managerial order. Today with the growing complexity of many industries and with the spread of unions, many of the supervisor's traditional functions have been taken over by individuals higher in the line of authority. For the most part he acts largely as a transmitter of decisions which are made by his superiors. Hiring and firing are seldom his responsibility, as they once were in many cases. He may receive complaints from workers but any serious differences are usually settled between representatives of the union and some member of the higher staff. He seldom if ever enters into any negotiation or discussion between the shop steward and the management. If they come to decisions he merely carries out their orders.

The foreman, then, has become, as Wray puts it, the "marginal" man of industry.³⁶ He is expected to supervise production, and to see that the work is performed, but he has no actual authority in planning any important phase of the plant operations. As a result he is frequently frustrated and feels the lack of appreciative support from management. Aside from strictly technical matters, the workers often regard the first-line supervisors as someone to be tolerated but otherwise of not much importance.

A study by Sufrin showed that although the majority of workers wanted their foreman to show a combination of authority and good fellowship, and that while the foreman often represented a father image to the men under him, the foreman, in turn, had no "corresponding image" in the management above him.³⁷ In many work situations, however, employees who are union members may not need a friendly father-figure in a foreman. They get their protection from the steward who looks after their interests with management. Where such is the case it would be very easy, in conflict situations especially, for the foreman to be regarded as a hostile father-image on whom the workers could project a good deal of blame for their troubles. Obviously there are wide differences in these matters. Among pressmen in the printing trades, for example, the foremen are recruited from the workers but the usual practice is for the foremen to retain their union membership. Although not always the case, the relations of the foremen and those under him are usually good. There is often less sense of separation than is true in other plants.³⁸

For many supervisors, then, their treatment from upper management and from the men often means a feeling of rejection, a loss of a sense of importance, and a considerable load of internal conflict and anxiety. The

³⁶ D. E. Wray, "Marginal men in industry: the foremen," *American Journal of Sociology*, 1944, 54:298-331. For a fuller discussion see D. C. Miller and W. H. Form, *Industrial Sociology* (New York, Harper and Brothers, 1951), pp. 207-217.

³⁷ S. C. Sufrin, "Foremen and their social adjustment," *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, 1951, 4:386-392.

³⁸ Elizabeth F. Baker, "The printing pressman-foreman—union man: a case study," *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, 1951, 4:367-385.

occupation has experienced a kind of degradation of former status and rôle to which the individuals involved have not been able fully to adapt themselves. Such situations may easily induce neurotic and other forms of maladjustment.³⁹

Emotionally Maladjusted Workers. While their total numbers are not large, there are always some individuals who fail to adjust themselves to the work situation. This small army of misfits, labeled "maladjusted" or "neurotic," are always on the move from job to job. Fundamentally the maladjusted person in industry or business is no different as to symptom and behavior from such persons in other groups: family, neighborhood, church, or community. And, since we shall discuss the mildly neurotic and maladjusted person in Chapter 23, we shall only briefly note certain features as they relate specifically to industry.

We must never forget that the work situation is social in character and that maladaptation is clearly related to the worker's efficiency, to his degree of satisfaction with the job, and to his wider rôle as a member of society, as regards his relations both to his fellow-workers and to other groups with which he comes into contact. The maladjusted worker is one who is intellectually and emotionally so maladapted to his work and society as to be unreasonably irritable, unhappy, and morose. He is likely to drift from one plant to another, either from external pressure (failure to make good from the standpoint of the employers) or from internal pressure (attitudes and wishes and ideas derived from his own mental conflict or sense of inadequacy). Often these persons fail to find sufficient justification for their rôles as workers or, sensing the incompatibility between their achievement as workers and what they aspire to be, fail to find balancing factors in life outside the shop which will offset the disturbance due to the work itself. There is a lack of integration among the varied units of the neurotic's life activity, and we must not neglect the probability that in part these maladjustments reflect the cultural dissociation between work and the rest of life. But it would be a mistake to attribute the whole bulk of problems of maladjustment to the dissociative character of modern industrial life; otherwise a much higher percentage of workers should reveal instability. In any event, a certain percentage of workers do fall within the categories of neuroticism as defined by our culture.

Let us note some of the commoner types of symptoms often found among workers. These range from minor and less serious difficulties, which nevertheless interfere with efficiency and happiness, to more serious types which border definitely on the psychotic manifestations which are legally called insanity. Among the minor sorts of difficulty may be noted the following: (1) There are workers who express a wide variety of psychosomatic complaints, ranging from headaches, sick stomach, dizziness, and

³⁹ However, Sullivan *op. cit.* says that 88 per cent of his sample of foremen reported their marriages to be either "extraordinarily happy" or "normally happy."

nervousness to more serious disorders. But many are chiefly of the attention-getting sort: demands for sympathy which find outlets in minor illnesses. (2) Inclination to accidents is another neurotic symptom of importance to students of industrial efficiency and morale. By this is meant "the tendency of persons to retain their relative liability to be involved in accidents."⁴⁰ Although, in reality, some jobs are much more hazardous than others, it does seem that even when we keep type of job constant, some individuals are more likely to be injured than others. Yet, to be objective about the matter, we must recognize that some accidents seem definitely related to physical conditions, such as visual acuity, and some to emotional factors. It is the latter which are usually considered the more significant elements in dealing with this condition in a given plant.⁴¹ (3) There are many workers who expect undue attention from their fellow-workers, supervisors, or employers, who often reveal decided trends toward self-pity, or who indulge in persistent faultfinding. Others develop marked jealousy and unfounded suspiciousness of workers and supervisors, often feeling that they are discriminated against. (4) Still others find their outlets in aggressive behavior. They are defensive of their rights, or, if in positions of authority over others, often evolve into the familiar "hard-boiled" foreman or supervisor who is the bane of many plants because such a person disturbs the harmony essential to sound morale. (5) Some workers are decidedly noncoöperative; they withdraw from their fellows as much as possible, and many of these indulge in a good deal of daydreaming, though in certain occupations, as we have seen, this does not interfere with their work.

More serious symptoms, found doubtless in but a small percentage of total workers—since their elimination sooner or later is more or less a foregone conclusion—are those associated with psychotic breakdown. Among these are the following: (a) Extreme irritability, suspiciousness, and paranoia. These people are marked by feelings of being persecuted; they accuse their supervisors and fellows of spying on them; their associates are believed to foster plots against them in order to discredit them in the eyes of their employers and perhaps thus to secure their job. (b) Some workers are characterized by abnormal fears, which may develop into real anxiety psychoses. The fear of making mistakes, or fear of machines, or fear of others, may in time completely incapacitate them for normal activity. (c) There are some who so completely withdraw into daydreams and inner life as to prove completely ineffective. Employers and supervisors sometimes have to contend with definitely psychotic individuals, who suffer from hallucinations, such as hearing voices, who show definite symptoms of schizophrenia, or who break down into marked

⁴⁰ Ghiselli and Brown, *op. cit.*, p. 383.

⁴¹ For a full discussion of this topic, see Tiffin, *op. cit.*, pp. 421-454. See also, Ghiselli and Brown, *op. cit.*, pp. 380-411.

repression or melancholy or into manic behavior of a more serious sort.

In their futile efforts to adjust themselves to the job these maladjusted persons not only make themselves unhappy but affect the morale of other workers. Moreover, when economic conditions force widespread unemployment, these persons are often among the first casualties of the economic depression. But it would be a mistake to forget that in almost every instance of maladjustment there are doubtless many causes. The individual, as we have insisted, is continually in the process of adaptation to situations around him and within himself, and those who so obviously fail to make a successful adjustment—as demanded by the cultural norms held by others and hence by the persons themselves—fail from a variety of causes. The foundations of maladjustment lie both within the individual and in the situation outside him. His inability to adapt himself to the demands of the world reflects back into himself in terms of thwarted wishes, unhappiness, and feelings of failure—a discrepancy between his achievement and his aspirations. And naturally such a person carries these attitudes or “emotional complexes” into new situations. Usually the individual does not know why he is unhappy or dissatisfied or unsuccessful, and it is not uncommon for him to project the blame for his maladjustment upon his job and the working situation, as he may also cast the blame for other felt difficulties upon his family, friends, church, community, state, or any other symbol which seems to him to be a factor in his own maladjustment.

Reactions to Prolonged Unemployment. One of the most serious crises which workers have to face is that associated with prolonged unemployment. In the United States, as elsewhere, it is rather widely recognized that even after years of good times and relatively full employment people recall with some anxiety previous periods of unemployment. Among other devices used for meeting the loss of economic security are these:

(1) The individual may evidence extreme aggressive attitudes toward his situation. His frustrations may take an antagonistic turn. He may show resentment to his former employers or to the political-economic system in which he lives. This may consist in grumbling, irritability, self pity, and various forms of “blowing off steam.” Or these hostile reactions may be transferred, under the stimulus of reformers and agitators, into adherence to a “cause” or “movement” that promises to replace the old order with a better one. Such social myths offer the worker new symbols of identification, expectation, and demand for a “new deal,” “land for the landless,” “social credit,” or “redistribution of wealth.” The cause absorbs his energy, **and he takes it seriously.**

(2) In contrast, the individual may retreat from the situation, losing in time his courage, ambition, and morale. The logical end of such personal demoralization may be complete pauperism in which the individual falls into a new culture pattern of exploiting those better off and accepting the doles and handouts of public or private charity.

Economic recovery, however, or devices like public work or community organization of leisure, may prevent such complete breakdown. Yet there is no doubt that long-continued public and private relief to large numbers of individuals and families has had the effect of undermining former attitudes of self-assertion, independence, and individual responsibility. Correlated as these practices are with detailed control of budgets, expenditures, and everyday life, it is easy to understand how, in time, many individuals come to anticipate such care even though it represents a lower standard of living than they have been accustomed to. For the individual this wider public program tends to represent a return to the form of control exercised over him during his childhood and adolescence. One is frequently amazed at the growing inclination in this country among many classes to refer all problems of economic security back to the state and federal governments, much in the manner of a distressed child or adolescent who turns to his parent for help and advice when he cannot solve his problems.

(3) Retreat into fantasy thinking and acting is not uncommon in crises. This may take the form of a vast amount of wishful thinking, or it may find its expression in running after fortune-tellers and other modern magic-makers, or it may, in some, be linked up with hopes inspired by the reformers mentioned above.

(4) Unemployed persons may take to excessive alcoholic drinking or to indulgence in drugs. These provide at least temporary surcease from worry, inferiority, and sense of guilt.

(5) A common occurrence is the escape into illness, either mental or physical or both. This is a well-known and widespread device for meeting what seem to be insuperable difficulties. This device is perhaps one of the most widespread types of readjustment in persons of a mildly neurotic make-up.

(6) There is always a small minority who find outlets in criminal and quasi-criminal behavior. This may be associated with revenge or other forms of negative expression toward society, or it may take the form of desertion of families, gambling, sexual perversity, or sexual immorality.

(7) A final gesture of despair and self-pity, of course, is suicide. The suicide rate almost always rises during periods of prolonged business depression and is evidently not confined to those in the upper social strata alone.

To conclude this chapter on a somewhat more optimistic note, let us remind ourselves again that although vocational rôle and status are central to the conduct of individuals in our society, we must not forget other important factors in adequate personality adaptation. These include the individual's functions in relation to his family, his church, and his community, to note only the more significant groups to which he belongs and in reference to which he has both obligations and privileges.

CHAPTER 20

The Psychology of Later Maturity and Old Age¹

In recent years our attention has been increasingly drawn to the old people in our population. In a society whose culture has put high values on the period of young adulthood, we are gradually becoming aware that people in later maturity and old age will require more public interest. There are several reasons for this new recognition. In the first place, in terms of sheer numbers, persons in the older age ranges are noticeably on the increase. The proportion of persons aged 65 years and over has grown steadily from 1850, when 2.6 per cent of the population was in this category, to 1950, when 8.0 per cent were in this age group. Projecting this trend into the future, it has been estimated that by the year 2000 about 13.2 per cent of our people will be 65 years of age or over. Expressed in terms of numbers, this increase seems even more impressive. For example, in 1900, only about 3 million persons in the United States were 65 years old and over; in 1950, over 12 million were in this age bracket. By 1975 there will probably be 18 million, and by 2000 the number will be around 20 million.²

We are faced, then, with a population with ever-growing proportions of elderly persons. In the second place, old persons demand our attention, because, as we shall see, our society is one in which they have special problems of adjustment. Nevertheless, our social system at present does not offer satisfactory ways of providing for the aged.

VARIATIONS IN CONCEPTS OF AGING

Just how members of a society define later maturity and old age will depend, of course, on the criteria set down by the culture. In this section let us examine the possible criteria of old age in our society, make some cross-cultural comparisons with other societies, and take note of some of the changing conditions in our own society with respect to aging.

Criteria of Old Age. In order to discuss old age intelligently, we have

¹ The author is indebted to Dr. June M. Collins for her help in preparing this chapter.

² See Louis I. Dublin, "Public health and the diseases of old age," in James S. Simmons, ed., *Public Health in the World Today* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1949), p. 232. See also C. V. Koser, "The demographic background of our aging population," *The Social and Biological Challenge of Our Aging Population* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1970), pp. 11-25.

to delimit the period. Are we justified, for example, in setting a beginning point in terms of years? Can we assume that all people beyond a certain age will share a cluster of personality characteristics and thus justify our grouping them in a special category? When we examine the evidence, we find that classifications based on chronological age are unsatisfactory in many respects.

One of the assumptions current in our society is that old age is a period set apart by consistent traits. We tend to think of later maturity and old age as characterized by physical and mental decline and by social disability. If, however, we consider any one feature such as eyesight, memory, or income, we find that it may or may not differentiate an older person from a younger one. Further, the idea that each individual at a certain age enters a static period in which his behavior remains unchanged does not hold for old age any more than for any other period in the life cycle. Changes take place during the later years as well as during the earlier. As Pollak points out, "The popular stereotype of old age as a unitary period is misleading and so is the conception of the aged personality as a rigid and static configuration of traits."³

While for purposes of discussion it is convenient to set a lower age boundary for the old in our society, it should be pointed out that actually this fluctuates considerably from individual to individual and also from one trait to another in the same individual. Pollak sets 60 years as the beginning of old age. Many studies set a different year, as we shall note later.

In any treatment of old age, however, it is necessary to consider the years of what we will call later maturity, the forties and fifties, in order to include changes which have relevance for the final period. One such important change, for example, is the climacteric in women which ends the capacity to conceive children and which usually occurs in the forties. Nevertheless, personality traits which in our culture are associated with old age frequently have their inception in an earlier period. The alternative to the use of chronological age-boundaries is the appearance of certain psychological or social characteristics, but these are so variable that an arbitrary distinction in terms of years is probably preferable.

Old Age in Other Societies. Before examining the problems faced by the old in our own society, we will look at them in the broader setting afforded us by other cultures. We will then be better able to see which, if any, features of our own culture are unique or unusual in relation to the old. When we examine different societies, so much variation in the demarcation of old age appears that no limit in terms of years has universal significance. Simmons, who has made the most exhaustive study of the

³ Otto Pollak, *Social Adjustment in Old Age*, Bulletin 59 (New York, Social Science Research Council 1948). See also W. R. McIntyre, "The Social Psychology of Old Age," Ph.D. Thesis, Northwestern University Library, 1951.

aged in other cultures, includes as "old" any person who is "so regarded and treated by his contemporaries."⁴

What we consider in cultural comparisons is the last category of age-grading before death. This period is not often sharply set off from middle age. In many societies, persons of advanced years are not treated differently from those in the full bloom of maturity until they can no longer perform certain tasks. Because death comes earlier for most persons in societies lacking modern medical and public health facilities, a smaller proportion of the population falls in this last age-grade than in our own.

In all human societies, attitudes toward the old are molded by culture. The range extends from high prestige accompanied by special care and consideration to devaluation and deliberate neglect or abandonment of the old. Simmons concludes that where the aged have prestige, it is "for a limited age period which rarely extended into decrepitude."⁵ He also found "that underlying any high regard for old age was some enforcing power, real or imaginary, to safeguard it . . . In brief, the evidence that when conditions called for respect to the aged they got it; when these conditions changed they might lose it."⁶ This point, as we will see, has special import for our own society.

"Under close analysis," Simmons says, "respect for old age has, as a rule, been awarded to persons on the basis of some particular asset which they possessed. They might be respected for their extensive knowledge, seasonal experience, expert skill, power to work magic, exercise of priestly functions, control of property rights, or manipulation of family prerogatives. They might be highly regarded for their skill in games, dances, songs, and storytelling. They might even receive consideration for their faithful performance of camp or household chores. It is important to note both the extent of general respect accorded to them in old age and the range of avenues which afford 'access to homage.' Some social systems have provided many ways by which the aged could attain prestige, while in others the opportunities were all too meager."

Simmons lists a series of factors associated with honor and respect for the old. Where property control, political authority, and leadership in secret societies for the initiation of the young is in the hands of the old, they tend to receive prestige.

Since one of our important considerations will be the group charged with the care of the aged in our society, it is of interest to look for the kinds of social structures providing for their care, which are most prevalent in other societies. In such an inquiry, the family clearly emerges as the principal social unit for the support of the aged in societies throughout the world. As Simmons says, "Family ties have been the most inti-

⁴ Leo W. Simmons, *The Role of the Aged in Primitive Society* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1945), p. 16. All quotations by permission.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 81.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 50.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 51.

mate and long lasting, and on them the aged have relied for greatest security."⁸

Changing Conditions in Our Society. Historically our own society has been no exception in supporting the view that the family was the haven for the elderly. Traditionally, older persons have been sustained by younger relatives within the household. In recent times, however, our own society has been undergoing changes which have adversely affected the position of the aged; situations which called for respect to the old have altered and accordingly they have suffered. In work and within the family, new conditions have tended to rob the old of the status and esteem they formerly had. This holds true for Western European societies in general but perhaps to the highest degree in the United States. During the Industrial Revolution, when large numbers of men first began to work for a livelihood outside of the family, emphasis came to be placed on hiring them during the best years of productivity. When the labor supply was overabundant, employers could afford to hire only those at the peak of ability. For many of the factory jobs which came into being with modern industry, the theory developed that young men and women were best equipped to perform them satisfactorily. A survey of present-day newspaper advertisements in the "Help Wanted" columns attests to preference for employees below 40 years and often the limits of acceptability are set even lower. Certain jobs, in which a high level of sustained speed, physical strength, and perception is required, may justify this rationale, but many other jobs have come to be regarded as the province of the young without adequate reason in terms of actual performance. As we shall show in a later section, the evidence by no means indicates that people in older age groups are always less satisfactory employees for all jobs.

Further, our industrial organizations tend to discharge workers after a certain chronological age regardless of their ability to continue producing. In the older rural society, no such sudden cessation of work took place. As their powers waned, the old gradually decreased the amount of their labor and substituted easier tasks for the ones they could no longer perform. In contrast, our society has developed no consistent, well-worked-out solution for making use of the abilities of people after retirement.

Changes in our familial system likewise affect the position of the old person today. The ideal household in urban society now consists of father and mother and unmarried children. Grandparents or other old relatives are regarded as unwelcome burdens both financially and socially. The assistance of the grandmother in child care and in other household tasks is not so welcome nor necessary as it once was. The removal of many traditional jobs from the household to commercial agencies means that old people of both sexes cannot contribute to the household economy as they once did. There is even less likelihood except probably in farming that the

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 177.

grandfather can help outside of the household by assisting his son or son-in-law in his work.

Since the aged are no longer satisfactorily cared for within the family, they must be assisted in some other way. Increasing recognition of this fact appears in political platforms. Such programs as the Townsend Plan, for example, were designed to secure support for the old from governmental funds. The present Social Security Act provides old age assistance although the programs vary greatly from one local unit to another. The present-day tendency is to look toward the community and the state, to structures other than the family, in meeting the needs of the old.

PHYSICAL AND MENTAL CHANGES ACCOMPANYING OLD AGE

As the human organism ages, certain physical changes occur which are regarded as "normal" and not pathological. These have been summarized by Carlson as follows: gradual tissue desiccation; gradual retardation of cell division, capacity of cell growth, and tissue repair; gradual slowing up in the rate of tissue oxidation, cellular atrophy, degeneration, increased cell pigmentation, fatty infiltration, gradual decrease in tissue elasticity, and degenerative changes in the elastic connective tissue; decreased speed, strength, and endurance of skeletal neuromuscular reactions; decreased strength of skeletal muscle; progressive degeneration and atrophy of the nervous system, impaired vision, hearing, memory, and mental endurance; and gradual impairment of the factors which in the normal person in his earlier years maintain a fairly constant internal environment (homeostasis) for the tissues.⁹

Let us look more particularly at some of the difficulties associated with aging. These will include physical and mental illness, and effects of old age on intelligence and other psychological functions.

Diseases of the Body. The normal changes listed above, although they may encourage susceptibility to sickness, are not regarded as diseases. Yet it is commonly believed that old people are inclined to be sickly. There is some basis for this view in mortality statistics, but these must be carefully examined in terms of medical trends. The major causes of death in the United States now act mainly upon people in old age, whereas they formerly took a heavy toll of children and young adults. Several examples will suffice to show the trend. In 1900, the leading cause of death was tuberculosis. In 1946, it had dropped in importance to seventh place and it is becoming a fatality of old age. Dublin comments on this shift as follows. "The reduction in tuberculosis has been especially great in the productive ages of life. As a consequence, the peak of mortality among males has

⁹ A. J. Carlson and E. J. Stieglitz, eds., *Geriatric Medicine* (Philadelphia, W. B. Saunders Company, 1949), p. 49.

shifted from youth to old age, and to some degree the same tendency is found in women."¹⁰

The reduction of pneumonia, second in the list of death-bringing diseases in 1900 but occupying sixth place in 1946, "has been greatest among young people, so that the mortality is now more heavily concentrated at the older ages than before."¹¹

Diarrhea and enteritis which came third in 1900 were no longer even among the ten leading causes of death in 1946, largely because of the reduction in mortality during infancy when these diseases struck. The two major causes of death in 1946, heart diseases and cancer, are today diseases of old age. In other words, developments in medical science have operated selectively to reduce fatal sickness during youth and middle age, thus leaving the causes of death to create their havoc in the older years. According to Dublin, "major illnesses and invalidism are now concentrated mainly at the older age level . . . It is the result of efforts which have saved large numbers of people from premature death and which have also spared them from serious illness during the prime of life."¹² If this trend to reduce death in the earlier years continues, we can expect to find proportionately larger numbers of persons in the older age ranges receiving medical aid and occupying beds in our hospitals.

At each period in the life cycle, the organism appears to be peculiarly susceptible to certain illnesses. This is true for infancy, childhood, adolescence, maturity, and also old age. Unlike the diseases of youth, which tend to be infective in origin, those of old age arise from within the body. Further, while the former tend toward spontaneous cure, those of the later years are progressive and tend to get worse.¹³ Proper medical care can do much toward alleviating the latter, especially if diagnosis and treatment take place at an early stage in the development.

The diseases of old age include "several forms of heart disease, arteriosclerosis, high blood pressure, diabetes mellitus, obesity, gout, chronic kidney disease, involutional melancholia, abnormalities of the climacteric, arthritis, and cancer."¹⁴

It should be pointed out that old persons in poor health often suffer from several different ailments and not just one; hence each disease may contribute to greater general vulnerability.

Although the aged are peculiarly susceptible to certain illnesses and although they account for increasingly larger proportions of the mortally sick, we should not get the impression that poor health is always found in

¹⁰ Dublin, in Simmons, ed., *op. cit.*, p. 230. All quotations by permission.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 230-231.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 231.

¹³ E. J. Stengler, *The Second Forty Years* (Philadelphia, J. B. Lippincott Company, 1946), p. 93.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 89.

old age. Self-ratings of health by 499 men and 789 women, aged 60 years and over, on the Burgess-Cavan-Havighurst schedule, "Your Activities and Attitudes," gave substantial percentages describing their health as "excellent or good."¹⁵ In fact, for males the percentage, except in the age range of 85-89 years, was over 50 per cent.

Mental Diseases. Mental illnesses, like physical diseases, are not found distributed at random among people of all ages. Each mental disorder finds more victims in one age period than in others. Pollock points out that schizophrenic and manic-depressive psychoses tend to develop among people in the thirties, forties, and fifties; general paresis, and alcoholic and involutional psychoses in the forties, fifties, and sixties; and senile and arteriosclerosis psychoses in the sixties, seventies, and eighties. The last two groups are called the psychoses of old age because "they are due to changes in the tissues and blood vessels of the brain that take place in later life."¹⁶

In discussing mental diseases, we may divide them into two types: those which have a well-established organic basis and those which appear to be functional in origin. (See Chapter 23.) In the first group belong pre-senile psychosis or Alzheimer's disease and cerebral arteriosclerosis. Pre-senile psychosis tends to appear in the fifties.

"Beginning with marked failure of memory there is a rapid development of confusion and disorientation leading by way of aphasia and apraxia to complete organic dementia. . . . Irritability and anxious depression may be attended by compensatory psychic symptoms such as sexual deviations, grandiose business plans, paranoid ideas. [Cerebral arteriosclerosis which may be started by a major or minor cerebral accident, has as symptoms,] organically determined disturbances of consciousness and mentation and emotionally determined apprehension and panic, delusions of threats of bodily harm, nightmares, and depression. . . . There may occur episodes of violence against even those closest to the patient, these being dictated by delusions of threat against the patient's person."¹⁷

The effect of an organically based disease, such as cerebral arteriosclerosis upon the individual is possibly influenced by his personality. Gitelson suggests that

"elderly people with more or less well balanced personalities . . . are able to withstand a considerable amount of cerebral damage, while less balanced personalities may produce a frank psychosis with a minimum of cerebral pathology. It seems to be the case that cerebral organic pathology is only a final precipitating factor in persons already excessively burdened by . . . emotional problems."¹⁸

¹⁵ Ruth Shonle Cavan and others, *Personal Adjustment in Old Age* (Chicago: Science Research Associates, Inc., 1941), p. 55.

¹⁶ H. M. Pollock, "A statistical review of mental disorders in later life," in Oscar J. Kaplan, ed., *Mental Disorders in Later Life* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1945), p. 7.

¹⁷ Maxwell Gitelson, "The emotional problems of elderly people," *Geriatrics*, 1949, 3:135-154. Quotation from p. 144. All quotations by permission.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 143.

Lewis agrees with this position, saying that

"so far, investigations of the physical factors have not only failed to reveal important differences, but similarities have been found in the brains of cases of senile dementia and of normal seniles. Moreover, there is a lack of correlation between the severity of the pathological changes and degree of intellectual impairment, and equally severe alterations have been found in the brains of old persons of normal mentality."¹⁹

There are also functional personality disorders associated with old age. These include, in addition to senile dementia, involutional melancholia, paranoid states, and simple depressions. Involutional melancholia is anxiety ridden and often shows agitated depression accompanied by delusions of guilt, hypochondriasis, and destructiveness. Senile psychosis is distinguished from *cerebral arteriosclerosis* only by absence of organic symptoms.

The mental diseases of old age are requiring more attention in recent years because of the increase in patients hospitalized with old age psychoses. The rate of first admissions of patients having senile psychoses to the New York State civil hospitals doubled between 1920 and 1942. An even greater increase appeared in the number admitted with cerebral arteriosclerosis which showed a five-fold increase in this same period.²⁰ According to Pollock the statistics concerning first admissions for senile and arteriosclerotic cases from other states are of much the same order of magnitude.

The increase in the number of senile psychotics, however, is proportionate to the increase in the number of old in the population. In contrast, the increase in the arteriosclerotic group is far greater than the growing numbers of old would justify. We do not know whether this change in rate is due to an actual increase in persons afflicted with arteriosclerosis or whether it means that more people who have this disease are now diagnosed correctly and hospitalized.

Certain other characteristics of the statistics on mental disease are noteworthy. Among these are the sex differences. More women than men were admitted to the New York State civil hospitals for senile psychosis during every year from 1920 to 1942, and the "rate of involutional psychoses is about three times as high among women as men."²¹ This sex differential doubtless partly reflects the greater numbers of women in the advanced age groups. However, more men than women were admitted for cerebral arteriosclerosis in every year during the same period. Pollock suggests that "syphilis, alcohol, and the more strenuous life of the males

¹⁹ N. D. C. Lewis, "Applying mental health principles to problems of the aging," in George Lawton, ed., *New Goals for Old Age* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1943), p. 99.

²⁰ H. M. Pollock, *op. cit.*, pp. 12, 13.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 22.

are responsible in large part for the more frequent breakdown of the arteries of the brain."²²

Rural and urban incidence of mental diseases shows differences. In New York State, for senile psychosis and arteriosclerosis the urban rate is higher than is the rural in each age group beyond 45 years. Pollock offers as an explanation the greater stresses of urban life which may be conducive to mental disease. Then, too, the greater occurrence of venereal disease and of alcoholism in cities may be possible factors. Moreover, urban oldsters with mental diseases are more likely to be sent to hospitals than those in the country. The urban household is less well adapted than the rural to tolerate a senile psychotic within it. Cities also usually have much better hospital facilities than country localities.

Another interesting fact is that the rate for senile and arteriosclerotic psychoses is higher among the foreign-born than it is for the native white.²³ This difference has a bearing on the larger matter of social adjustment in old age. Being of "native born white" stock appears to be positively correlated with good adjustment in later years.

The explanation of this difference is not known, but one suggestion is that the strains involved in adapting to a new culture may have a greater effect on the personality at a time when the normal controls of behavior are weakened. This would follow from the theory discussed elsewhere that personality difficulties which arise in old age are often only more pronounced manifestations of tendencies present in youth. Wexburg, in his treatment of the same matter suggests that economic factors may be involved, "since the foreign-born are more commonly in the lower income groups."²⁴

The increase in the numbers of old patients with psychoses presents a serious problem for our mental hospitals which are already overcrowded. In many cases, proper care can help these patients despite their ages, yet this view must combat the frequently expressed attitude that psychiatric attention is wasted on persons who can be expected to show only progressive decline.

Effect of Old Age on Intellectual Abilities. In justifying our emphasis on youth, people note the decline in abilities with age, especially in regard to employment. Since we expect an increasing number of old people, it is important to examine the evidence in this matter carefully. Much work has been done on this topic, and rather than review it all, we have selected for discussion certain capabilities which seem especially significant in individual adjustment. Various intelligence tests which have been

²² *Ibid.*, p. 13.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 18.

²⁴ L. E. Wexburg, "Discussion," *Mental Health in Later Maturity*, Supplement No. 168 (Washington, D.C., U.S. Public Health Reports, 1942), pp. 19, 20.

given to large numbers of people show "the full retention of some intellectual abilities in old age while others decline to a significant extent."²⁵

Willoughby, for example, on testing 611 subjects, ranging from 10 to 60 years of age, found performance in vocabulary and general information tests to remain stable throughout adulthood. A falling off of ability in opposites, series completions, and analogies tests was noted with advancing age.²⁶

Wechsler examined 1,441 subjects ranging in age from 7 to 59 years with the Wechsler-Bellevue test. He lists a series of traits which hold up with age and a series which drops most markedly with advancing years. The former include tests of information, comprehension, object assembly, picture completion, and vocabulary; the latter, digit span, arithmetic digit symbol, block design, similarities, picture arrangement.²⁷

Failure of memory is one of the signs of decline frequently attributed to old age. Evidence at the present time does not justify any sweeping generalizations. Studies give conflicting results as to the occurrence of this decline with old age. Kubo states that among 355 healthy men and women, between 70 and 100 years of age, rote memory showed little loss until the eighty-second year of life.²⁸

Gilbert, who administered memory tests to two groups of 174 persons each, which were matched for intelligence, one aged from 30 to 40 years, the other from 60 to 70, found that rote memory of digits forward and the repetition of simple material, when either meaning or concentration was involved, was a little lower in the older group.²⁹ Moreover, Gilbert found that his older subjects had greater difficulty in memorization which required the formation of new associations.

Speed of Reaction. The view that the old person is "slow" is borne out by the results of numerous tests. For example, Bellis found in his study of 150 subjects, 40 to 60 years of age, that the oldest among them took almost twice as long to react to light and sound as the younger ones.³⁰

²⁵ Samuel Granick, "Studies in the psychology of senility, a survey," *Journal of Gerontology*, 1950, 5:45.

²⁶ R. R. Willoughby, "Family similarities in mental test abilities," *Genetic Psychology Monographs*, 1927, 2:235-277.

²⁷ David Wechsler, *The Measurement of Adult Intelligence* (Baltimore, The Williams & Wilkins Company, 1949), p. 64. More or less similar findings are those of: M. J. Madonick and M. Solomon, "The Wechsler-Bellevue scale in individuals past sixty," *Geriatrics*, 1947, 2:34-40, and A. I. Rubin, "Psychometric trends in senility and psychoses of the senium," *Journal of General Psychology*, 1945, 32:149-162.

²⁸ Y. Kubo, "Mental and physical changes in old age," *Journal of Genetic Psychology*, 1938, 53:101-108.

²⁹ J. C. Gilbert, "Memory loss in senescence," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1941, 36:73-86.

³⁰ J. Bellis, "Reaction time and chronological age," *Proceedings of the Society of Experimental Biology and Medicine*, 1933, 30:901-903.

Goldfarb, too, says that a group of 108 men and 60 women, aged 18 to 65, displayed a consistent decline in reaction time with age.³¹

Speed of reaction must be considered in evaluating the results of many tests on the old. A common feature of tests is the emphasis upon time of performance. Since old people are less speedy than younger ones, it is pertinent to ask about their scores on tests where the time element is disallowed. Lorge corrected results obtained from several intelligence tests for reaction time and found, when this had been done, little decline in intelligence with advancing age.³² Goldfarb also observed little or no difference in intelligence between older and younger persons except on those tests involving speed.³³ In Sward's comparison between two groups, one made up of 41 university professors aged 25 to 35 years, the other of 41 professors from 60 to 80, their scores on a series of difficult mental tests shows a decrease in speed for the older group but not in performance.³⁴

Not only are the old handicapped on tests because of the speed factor but possibly because of inferior formal education and differences in education. Our level of education has become higher, so that in an unselected group, persons 65 years of age and over will tend to have had less schooling than a younger group, say aged 25 to 29.³⁵

Individual motivation must be taken into account in considering tests given at any age level. The possibility should be kept in mind that old persons as a group may not have the incentive to perform well on the tests that younger subjects have. Whatever the explanation is, "all studies imply a marked decrease on the part of the aged to utilize their capacities fully."³⁶

ADJUSTMENT TO OLD AGE

Having considered the physical and mental changes as well as those in abilities which appear in old age, we can now turn our attention to the adjustment of the individual to this period. Personal adjustment may be defined "as the individual's restructuring of his attitudes and behavior in response to a new situation in such a way as to integrate the expression of his aspirations with the expectations and demands of society."³⁷

In discussing personal adjustment, let us first examine the social in-

³¹ William Goldfarb, "An investigation of reaction time in older adults and its relationship to certain observed mental test patterns," *Teachers College Contributions to Education*, No. 531 (New York, Columbia University Teachers College, 1941).

³² Irving Lorge, "The influence of the test upon the nature of mental decline as a function of age," *Journal of Educational Psychology*, 1936, 27: 100-110.

³³ Goldfarb, *op. cit.*

³⁴ Keith Sward, "Age and mental ability in superior men," *American Journal of Psychology*, 1945, 58: 443-479.

³⁵ Cavan *et al.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 41, 42.

³⁶ Granick, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

³⁷ Cavan *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 11. By permission.

fluences. The changes in rôles and ways of behaving which society requires of the old are of the greatest importance to the individual entering this period. One of the striking characteristics of our society as compared with many others is the lack of constructive design for the later years. We do view and treat the old in special ways but these are for the most part negatively conceived and consist mainly of restrictions or limitations on the behavior of fully-functioning adults. We have already made the point that old men are not expected to continue in their regular employment as men in middle age are. Yet our society offers no alternative kinds of occupations for the old. In many nonliterate societies, the elderly look forward to spending their time at special tasks which are set aside for people in their later years. Our old people must work out their own solution and that solution must be found within greatly narrowed limits. As already noted, old people are not preferred employees. There are probably few fields in which people over 60 are hired on a permanent basis. Another example of the lack of cultural norms is found in matters of residence. Older persons cannot look forward to any special living arrangements during their declining years. And any individual choice as to housing will be decidedly qualified by the level of income, social status, and immediate family situation. In short, old age is a period of diminution of adult activities without provision for satisfactory substitutions.

In contrast to many other societies we regard old age as a period of lowered prestige. Simmons found a high correlation between prestige for the old and culturally formulated ways of allowing the old to achieve prestige.¹⁸ With us, where prestige is derived largely from success in one's occupation and the size of one's income, removing the old person from the first and so eliminating or reducing the second, contributes to lowered status.

The rôle of the oldster is not conceived as an active, vigorous, or independent one. Both physically and mentally, he is expected to be dependent on others. He is regarded as no longer able to take full care of himself or make decisions for his own welfare. Accordingly, many of the restrictions placed upon the old by, for example, their younger relatives, are couched in terms of protection and safeguards. While a greater degree of protection may be necessary in some cases, in others it appears to be "over-protection." The limitations set upon behavior of the old may arise from mixed motives. During childhood, the parent is dominant. In later years, when the rôles are reversed and the child has become more powerful, he may give expression to aggressive tendencies against his parents which he had earlier concealed. When his parents become old, the child then has the opportunity to take revenge on them for their behavior to him during his youth. A study by Gardner in which members of the family with whom old people lived were interviewed as well as the old

¹⁸ Simmons, *op. cit.*

people themselves brings out this point. "Any sugar-coating of 'You should not work so hard' was recognized by the old member of the household as deriving from a desire to be dominant rather than friendly and considerate."³⁹

The old person in our society is expected to lose his sexual drives and interests. Old people who express sexual desires are usually viewed with disgust. In many societies this is not the case. The old are permitted love affairs and encouraged in them.

From the individual's point of view, we can note the problems of adjustment which the person must face as he grows older. Some of his needs remain unchanged while others grow in intensity or decline. In the physical sphere, he still needs sustenance and shelter. His sexual needs may decline but not fully disappear. He is apt to be sickly and to suffer impairment of one or more faculties. This means that he requires more medical attention and possibly devices to offset his physical disabilities, such as, spectacles, false teeth, or a hearing aid. He may require some assistance in bathing and dressing and performing other motor acts. Where mental activity is concerned, he may need a longer period in which to perform a given task than he did as a younger man. As we saw above, in certain areas measured by intelligence tests, he may show a decline, but in others he may remain close to the standards of younger years.

Socially his need for affection from others continues. He, or his female counterpart, is more likely to be widowed than when he was younger, and his children grown and established in homes of their own. As he grows older, his circle of old friends will become increasingly reduced because of death. New bonds must be established if he is to continue to receive love and affection.

His need for status recognition and prestige probably remains unabated, but he experiences increasing difficulty in achieving it. Need for work or purposeful activity persists despite the lack of opportunity to engage in such. Finally, the need for expression of interests, as in hobbies and other forms of recreation endures, although health, social norms, and economic conditions are responsible for narrowing their range of expression.

Adjustment as Measured by Activities and Attitudes. Studies of individual adjustment to old age have multiplied during recent years. One of the most extensive of these projects was developed by Burgess, Cavan, and Havighurst. They worked out a measurement of activities and an attitude questionnaire to examine adjustment in older people. These schedules have been combined into one manual.⁴⁰ The instrument calls for self-

³⁹ L. Pearl Gardner, "Attitudes and activities of the middle-aged and aged," *Geriatrics*, 1941, 4: 35-50. Quotation from p. 47.

⁴⁰ E. W. Burgess, Ruth S. Cavan, and R. J. Havighurst, *Your Activities and Attitudes* (Chicago, Science Research Associates, 1948).

ratings by the subjects and for information regarding overt behavior. The criteria used to select the items were participation in activities, satisfaction with activities, happiness rating, absence of non-adaptive behavior, and wish fulfillment. The test score is regarded as an index of adjustment.

Various investigators have used these schedules to secure information on the adaptation of the aged. Others, like McIntyre, made up their own questionnaires. Rather than review these researches *ad seriatim*, we shall draw on various reports, first, with regard to what may be called external or objective criteria of adjustment, and, second, with respect to internal or subjective estimates of satisfaction.⁴¹ We shall begin with the former, which includes such factors as age, sex, nationality background, health, and residence.

McIntyre found the older people in his sample less well adjusted than those just entering into the period of the aged. But this may be related to other factors such as level of education and degree of economic security. Sex differences are apparent. First, as should be anticipated from the census of older people, there was a much higher proportion of widows in the upper age brackets than of widowers. There were evident disturbances in the affectional lives of those who had lost their spouses. Shanas, for an urban sample of 388 persons 60 years and older, found that those of native stock were better adjusted than the foreign-born.

Several studies report that women are less disturbed about changes in economic activities than men. When the latter are forced into retirement they frequently show considerable distress. The women, especially if they continue on in their usual household duties, do not. As might be expected, awareness of economic security is an important factor making for sense of well-being and safety. Practically all these studies show that the higher the level of education of the aged, the greater the likelihood of satisfactory adaptation to life as an elderly person.

Health is clearly a factor making for more adequate adjustment. A great many older people suffer an impairment of eyesight and/or hearing. In addition to these, as we have already noted, the illness of old age, such as, heart ailments and cancer are serious. Shanas found that those with a good health score and with less than four physical problems were well adjusted.

The living arrangements of the aged are obviously important. McIntyre found both sexes more satisfied when residing in their own home or in a home for the aged than when living with relatives or in a rooming house. For his sample, too, he found urban males better adjusted than rural. Of

⁴¹ The material here is drawn chiefly from the following: Burgess, Cavan, and Havighurst, *op. cit.*; Ethel S. Shanas, "The personal adjustment of recipients of old age assistance," *Journal of Gerontology*, 1950, 5:249-253; J. T. Landis, "Social psychological factors in aging," *Social Forces*, 1942, 20:465-471; J. F. Schmidt, "Patterns of Poor Adjustment in Persons of Later Maturity," Ph D thesis, University of Chicago Libraries, 1950; W. R. McIntyre, *op. cit.*

the women, those who lived in villages or small towns seemed best adjusted.

The nature and amount of social contacts is distinctly related to a sense of happiness and satisfaction. For their sample of 499 men and 759 women aged 60 years and over Burgess, Cavan, and Havighurst report certain changes with age. There were decreases in participation as shown by attendance at meetings, number of offices held, number of hobbies, and plans for the future. In Shanas's group those who had a number of leisure-time activities, did at least an hour's reading a day, and took part in clubs and other groups were better adjusted than those who did not. The findings of McIntyre tend to confirm this.

Internal or subjective reactions must also be considered. One widespread attitude is resentment at growing old, revealing, among other things, a failure to accept the fact of aging. A severe crisis may be anticipated when a man suddenly realizes that he has been retired from his job and that he has made no psychological or other preparation to meet this change. What happened to S. D. illustrates this.

Case of S. D. "Mr. S. D. was an office manager of a local branch of a large manufacturing concern. At the age of sixty-five the company gave him a farewell party with congratulatory speeches, a gift watch, a scroll signed by the officials of the company and by all of the employees of his office. His pensions and savings were adequate to insure an old age free of financial insecurity. After a month's vacation at the company's expense, he believed that he was ready to enjoy his unaccustomed leisure. The vacation was less than half over before he was ready to return home. He completed the trip only because his wife insisted. When they returned, he arose at the hour that almost forty years of routine had established, but after completing shaving, dressing, and breakfast he had nothing to do. He volunteered for some household duties but after his wife found that he was beginning to do the directing and was encroaching upon and disrupting her regular routine, she made him retire from housework. He made numerous and often unnecessary visits to his former office until his reception became somewhat cool.

"Mrs. D. reported to the interviewer that her husband was like a lost soul. He paced the floor; would start one minor task to abandon it for another; would turn on the radio and find nothing of interest. He had never cultivated hobbies, and though he tried, he could not find any that appealed to him. He developed a stomach disorder which he worried about. His wife believed that he found diversion in the periodic trips to the doctor for he usually returned in a happier state of mind. He became exceedingly apathetic, complaining, and critical. Mrs. D. said that her own life had been greatly altered, for he interfered with her housework, he afforded her less companionship than when they spent fewer hours together. She was forced to give up much of her interests apart from him. When she attempted to have more social life in their own home, he offended old friends and kept his wife constantly on the alert to avoid open breaks.

"At the time of the interview with Mr. D. the situation had temporarily improved. He had found part time employment and absence from home during the working hours had raised his spirits immeasurably and had also freed his wife of the necessity of watching out for him. She was able to resume her cus-

tomy tasks and social contacts. She dreaded the time when he was again without regular employment of any sort."⁴²

Anxiety about both economic and emotional security, is, as common-sense observation shows, a widespread indicator of poor adjustment among older people. They often resent their loss of status, develop a sense of being mistreated, especially with regard to their relatives, and show other evidences of frustration and anxiety. Such attitudes are frequently linked to loss of social participation with others, failure to make any plans for the future, and in general to retreat from social contacts. Schmidt, whose 900 subjects—over 50 years of age—were chosen to represent three socioeconomic strata, found no differentiating pattern of maladjustment among the three classes.

Subjective responses regarding health are pertinent. In Schmidt's sample those with low scores on the Burgess, Cavan, Havighurst questionnaire described their health as poor or merely fair and as getting worse, although there was no evidence of their requiring serious medical care.

Some interesting differences have been reported regarding religion. Burgess, Cavan, and Havighurst state for their group that with aging there is an increase in religious activities and dependence on religion. Also they found that women had more favorable attitudes toward religion and took more active part in religious functions than did men. McIntyre reports no correlation between faith in religion and degree of adjustment. However, individuals who had once been religious but had lost their faith in it tended to show poor adjustment.

Some Psychological Comments. An adequate description and analysis of the problems of old age must rest on the fact that the individual is an older version of what he was at any earlier time. In analyzing personality, a man's entire life cycle should be viewed as whole and as a continuity. For example, the kind of disorder to which an older person is liable, derives from predispositions evident much earlier. Lewis, for example, holds that oldsters tend to fall into one of the four personality types which he believes emerge earlier in life: schizoid, cycloid, paranoid, and neurotic.⁴³

There is a widespread opinion that the personality structure is weakened in old age, although there are noticeable individual differences in this matter. Some writers have suggested constitutional factors to account for these variations. Others, while not neglecting this possibility, consider "the quality of the emotional life and the character of the personality organization" ⁴⁴ of great importance.

While many individuals display pronounced personality disorders in old age, the point should be stressed that this is not true of all persons.

⁴² From McIntyre, *op. cit.*, p. 221. By permission.

⁴³ N. D. C. Lewis, *op. cit.*

⁴⁴ H. W. Dunham, "Sociological aspects of mental disorder in later life," in O. J. Kaplan, ed., *op. cit.*, pp. 131, 132.

"A well integrated personality combined with a satisfactory adjustment in past adult life should be able to cope with an abrupt change (such as retirement or the death of a spouse) better than a personality which has not achieved integration and previous adjustment."⁴⁵

Sudden and unexpected aberrations, such as a sexual offense by a respected and elderly businessman, are usually explained in terms of outbreak of the instinctual life. According to Gittelsohn, these are more likely to appear in people who have led lives of great restraint and rigidity. In a person, on the other hand, who has "regulated and directed his instinctual tendencies rather than attempting to smother them . . . the pressure of the instincts will be at all times less threatening."⁴⁶

How individuals will react to the facts of aging will, of course, depend on how they and others define old age. The age at which people first come to think of themselves as old is far from uniform. It will vary widely in different societies and within any given society. Kuhlen's review of age differentials in relation to personality noted that as indicators of the onset of old age, physical symptoms appeared to be twice as numerous as were mental symptoms.⁴⁷

The importance of how others define aging is shown in Gardner's study. She not only interviewed oldsters themselves, but also members of families with whom the aged were residing. The results bring out some divergences. In regard to faults, two-thirds of the old admitted they were irritated and quick-tempered. Their families, on the other hand, "considered this a fault in hardly one-eighth of the cases. Two-thirds of the family fault-finding centered about the aged talking too much . . . interfering in family affairs and slightly about their poor personal habits."⁴⁸

Gardner interprets these data to mean that the family resents attempts at domination by the old. The elderly people did not describe their interests or activities as oriented toward domination. Instead, their complaints were phrased in terms of being "no longer considered important in the family affairs" and of resentment at "being in the background."⁴⁹ These self-ratings fit in with the idea expressed earlier that the need for prestige continues into old age. The ratings of the relatives demonstrate the cultural tenet that old age is a period of lowered status. Further investigation both of the old person's concept of himself and of others' depiction of him would provide data which would be helpful in formulating suggestions for change in the lot of the aged.⁵⁰

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 129.

⁴⁶ Maxwell Gittelsohn, *op. cit.*, p. 146.

⁴⁷ R. G. Kuhlen, "Age differences in personality during adult years," *Psychological Bulletin*, 1945, 42, 333-358.

⁴⁸ L. Pearl Gardner, *op. cit.*, p. 47. By permission.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 47.

⁵⁰ McIntyre, *op. cit.*, has made a first approximation at doing this. He got listings of words (stereotypes) which individuals at various ages from high school to old age be-

IMPROVING THE ADAPTATION OF THE AGED

The principal problems of old age, as they emerge from the foregoing discussion, can be placed in four groups: (1) retirement from occupation, (2) physical deterioration, (3) disruption of the social life of the individual, and (4) loss of status. None of these difficulties is unique to old age, which fact emphasizes the lack of consistency and unity in the use of the term *old age*. Certainly it does not refer to some distinct entity.

In this chapter, we have placed our focus on two main aspects of adjustment, one being the part played by society and the other that played by the individual. We have implied that improvement is possible in both the social and individual aspects of adaptation. Suggestions for change should ignore neither of these. The responsibility for individual "happiness" cannot be placed entirely on the social structure nor can it be left entirely to the person himself. Let us comment briefly on two phases of adjustment—employability and social reorientation.

Employment Possibilities for the Old. As people reach the age when they are defined as "old," they are faced with problems in readjustment of their occupational status. For some, this may be brought about by being placed involuntarily on a pension; for others, physical and mental deterioration may force recognition that they cannot continue to perform adequately the tasks required of them. Even when employment is no longer necessary for financial reasons, healthy people of 60–65 years may have a strong psychological need for work. In addition, it is almost always true that being placed on a pension means a serious curtailment of income and a corresponding inability to maintain a satisfying social position. Furthermore, many forms of old age assistance are identified in people's minds with charity.⁵¹

For these and other reasons, we need a reorientation regarding employment in old age. Old people have certain special needs in their work. In many cases, they require shorter working hours, less exacting types of work, or an occupation which does not place too great a physical burden upon them.

Since, as has been pointed out, sudden ending of employment may aggravate maladjustment, it is necessary that we find means of fitting individuals into gainful occupation after their capacities have become restricted.

"According to present material available, it would appear that the employability of older men for jobs not demanding heavy muscular effort, prolonged standing, or discrimination of fine details is, in general, not restricted by physiological handicaps. To a large degree, some physiological inferiority can be compensated by technically minor improvements of working place or work or-

lived must adequately characterized the aged. It is clear that the older folks in our society define themselves quite differently than do our youth

⁵¹ Pollak, *op. cit.*, p. 146.

ganization . . . For office jobs, age trends of intellectual performance are fundamental." ⁵²

The adjustment of older workers to industry can be improved by more careful job analysis. In most organizations, there are probably many jobs occupied by young men which could be quite capably filled by older men. As Simonson says,

"To meet present and future demands of industry, it would be necessary to analyze jobs as to the degree of involvement of age-resistant functions in various types of industrial work. On the basis of such material, older workers could be assigned to jobs they would be able to do at a high degree of efficiency." ⁵³

Klumpp suggests several ways of solving the problems of labor for the old. To minimize the competitive situation, he suggests reducing working hours for all workers. ⁵⁴

He also suggests that compulsory retirement on the basis of chronological age be abandoned and that instead, retirement be selective and based on unfitness, as hiring is supposed to be carried on in accordance with fitness. He puts forward the idea that the older workers be offered downgrading in position and salary if wages in proportion to performance be recognized as a fundamental principle. ⁵⁵

Social Readjustment of the Old. Growing old is, like all social processes, in a measure, a learning process. The individual has to redefine himself in society, to find a new basis for feeling that he is useful and necessary to people around him. But he cannot learn these things if people around him make the tacit assumption that all old people are past the point where they have anything to contribute to the world they live in. As Frank well says: "We are not making sufficient demands upon older people. What they want is not idleness and boredom, but an opportunity to do something to make their lives significant." ⁵⁶

Certainly as the number of older people in our total population increases some kind of stabilization of their rôle and status should emerge. However, in a society which puts such stress on youth and upward striving for wealth and status as does ours, any special function of the aged may be difficult to develop. In the meantime it is important for those in the middle years—if not earlier—to anticipate the personality changes which inevitably must come with retirement from a vocation and the lessening of both physical and mental vigor. Prior understanding and planning for later maturity and old age should serve to take some of the sting out of the alterations that must take place in the later years.

⁵² Ernst Simonson, "Physical fitness and work capacity of older men" *Geriatrics*, 1947, 2: 110-119. Quotation p. 115, by permission.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 110.

⁵⁴ Theodore Klumpp, "The future of the older worker," *Geriatrics*, 1947, 2: 165-172.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 171.

⁵⁶ I. K. Frank, "The changing social scene," in Lawton, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

CHAPTER 21

Constitutional Deficiencies and Adjustment

This chapter will treat certain aspects of the interplay of severe physical defects and social-cultural adaptation. The most common of these defects are found in cases of endocrine imbalance, among cripples, among the totally and partially deaf, among the blind, and in those feeble-minded persons in whom the constitutional, especially hereditary, factors are rather clear-cut. The social participation of these individuals is profoundly influenced not only by their own condition but also by the manner in which other persons define the rôle and status for these defectives.

Although in the development of these personalities the same mechanisms arising from social interaction are found as in more normal individuals, certain mechanisms are accentuated. Compensatory responses are very common. Projection of blame on others sometimes plays a great part, or the identification with others in a rôle of dependency is distinctly infantile in character. We also find many instances of sublimation. The problem of training and education for these constitutional defectives is partly one of controlling as far as possible certain critical situations in which they may be taught to take a healthier view of themselves as well as to give them skills which will make this training more effective.

EFFECTS OF ENDOCRINE IMBALANCE ON PERSONALITY

We have already discussed the relation of the endocrines to some of the constitutional foundations of behavior. We must remind the reader that wild speculation and fantasy thinking in this field have carried many writers far beyond the verifiable findings of science and medicine. The greatest difficulties in evaluating material on the relations of endocrines to personality arise, first, from the failure of the investigators in this field to control other factors in the situation, and, second, from the tendency for the enthusiasm of these workers consciously or unconsciously to bias them toward a particular explanation of complex personality manifestations. It must be recalled that scarcely any gland operates independently of others. Although in the following discussion we shall deal with certain defects associated with particular glands, the inter-relationship with other glands must be remembered.

Thyroid Malfunctioning. One of the most common diseases arising

from undersecretion of the thyroid in adults is called *myxedema*. In children it is commonly called *cretinism*, but more properly *childhood myxedema*. The myxedematous child is characterized by limp and weak musculature, coarse dry hair, and rough and folded skin. There is general evidence of retardation or subnormality all along the line, in basal metabolism, temperature, pulse rate, blood pressure, dentition, sexual maturation, and mental development.

Less severe cases, however, may be helped by thyroxine medication. Growth is accelerated, bone and dental development is stimulated, intellectual acumen rises, and the individual develops into a normal human being.

Adult myxedema, as a rule, appears in middle years, chiefly between the ages of 35 and 50, and apparently from atrophy or degeneration of the gland. The incidence of this condition is said to be more frequent in women than in men. Its onset is usually gradual.

The most prominent symptoms are an increased sensitiveness to cold, and a tendency to fatigue, chronic headaches, and constipation. Usually there is a considerable increase in subcutaneous fat. Sexual vigor is diminished in both men and women. There is a gradual slowing up of mental processes. The face becomes puffy and bloated.

Childhood myxedema prevents the child from developing mentally and physically in the normal fashion. Without doubt the mental inadequacy of many low-grade feeble-minded persons is due to prolonged thyroid deficiency. Such persons will not be able to develop into socialized personalities. In cases of myxedema among adults we observe gradually increasing mental sluggishness, lessened sexual vigor, and changes in physical characteristics. Not only do such persons become objects of attention by those around them, but there results from the patient's awareness of his illness a sense of difference which may easily develop feelings of inferiority, with their attendant compensatory reactions, the assumption of a lowered status, or a retreat into a vegetative existence. In fact, the extreme cases of thyroid deficiency often develop the symptoms of schizophrenia.

There may also arise excessive growth of the thyroid gland, due perhaps to demands of the body for a larger quantity of the hormone than is normally produced. This condition, called "colloid" or endemic goiter, is at the outset non-toxic. It seems to develop in certain fairly well-defined geographical regions—particularly those whose geologic history is one of recent glaciation. The condition is generally attributed to lack of iodine in the water and foodstuffs of these areas. But, despite personal concern over the appearance of the swollen glands, which show in the neck, there is no great danger unless severe degeneration takes place. If so, the condition may become toxic. Since, however, there is always danger of this toxic condition, prevention by thyroid feeding has been found efficacious.

Hyperthyroidism, arising from oversecretion of throxine, is also fairly

common. The condition may be produced by too great medical dosages of thyroxine or by natural overactivity of the gland itself.

The most common symptoms are rapid and irregular pulse, nervous excitation, sometimes with muscular tensions, more often with muscular weakness, a sense of warmth in the skin, frequent profuse sweating, and shallow respiration. The face shows an anxious, restless expression. The eyeballs are very prominent, often with dilation of the pupils; the eyes seem unduly bright and sparkling. Frequently there are insomnia and alternate crying and laughing. There is a loss of body fat. Mental functions are often speeded up. The cause of this condition is an increase especially in oxygen consumption and in protein metabolism. There is also a loss of calcium.

When overactivity of the gland becomes serious, the disease is known as *exophthalmic goiter*. It is believed that the thyroxine is not only excessive but of different quality from the normal extract. The ratio of incidence of this goiter is 4.6 in women to 1 in men. This apparent sex difference in susceptibility may be related to female sexual changes at puberty and to conditions associated with pregnancy.

The person with a hyperthyroid condition clearly reveals a constitutional foundation for variations in behavior. His restlessness, his impulsiveness, the speeding up of his mental processes, his tendency to insomnia, his overactivity, all mark him off from those about him. Yet situations which involve emotional stresses may easily set up a hyperfunctioning of this gland, so that one does not always know whether recurrent high emotional tension induced by a series of severe crises may not actually set up such a condition in the first place. Until we know more of the effect of social and psychological stimulation upon endocrine processes, we must be extremely cautious in drawing our conclusions. It is quite possible that learning, especially when it obviously involves the autonomic system (as it does in emotional responses), may itself affect glandular balance.

Pituitary Malfunctioning. The pituitary glands have decided effects upon growth, upon sexual periodicity, and upon cerebral functions, to note only three of the most obvious. *Gigantism* is apparently the result of overactivity of the anterior pituitary during the early years. *Acromegaly*, a condition of increase in bone structure after normal growth has ceased, appears in adults who suffer from a like overactivity. The giants of the circus are good illustrations of gigantism, but no one has made any adequate study of the personality make-up of such individuals.

Deficiency in the secretion of the anterior pituitary results in a retarded growth, and the midget or dwarf becomes a marked person. He is forced by his lack of physical stature into a position of inadequacy, and he can hardly escape feelings of difference and perhaps of lowered status. But his rôle and prestige in any given group will greatly affect his conception of himself. Midgets and dwarfs have been the objects of humor, have been

the heroes or heroines of folk fairy tales, and have at times even acquired positions of social power. It all depends on how they are received by their fellows. We have certain stereotyped concepts of what these people should do. For instance, a midget who recently graduated from a state university in the field of commerce told of the difficulties he had in securing a place in business. He wanted to go into personnel work, but some of his instructors thought he should have remained on the vaudeville stage, and others advised him to go into salesmanship on the theory that his small size would prove an attention-getting device.

A rather common disorder apparently associated with posterior pituitary malfunctioning is the so-called Fröhlich syndrome or disease, named for the Viennese neurologist who did a great deal in the clinical study of this problem. It is technically called *dystrophia adiposa genitalis*.

The prototype is the fat boy in Dickens's *Pickwick Papers* or the fat lady of the circus sideshow. One of the commonest symptoms is the marked increase in fatty tissue, distributed especially in the region of the mammary glands and over the pelvic girdle. There is marked flabbiness of the muscles. Frequently there is a tendency to drowsiness and evidence of mental sluggishness. Usually there is a high tolerance for sugar. Sexual development is delayed and may remain in abeyance, leaving a distinct condition of infantilism. The female menstruation is irregular and infrequent. In both sexes there is a retarded development of secondary sex characteristics. The pubic hair in the male tends to take on the distribution of that in the female. The female characteristics of the male are not restricted to the distribution of pubic hair, however. There are usually the broad pelvis, rounded limbs, small hands and feet, slender fingers, and a tendency to mammary development. The skin is smooth and delicate and free from moisture. If this sort of hypopituitarism occurs after adolescence, certain of the above symptoms do not arise. The high tolerance for sugar, the subnormal metabolism and temperature, and a tendency to adiposity are, however, present. There is often a dryness of the skin and a loss of hair. The male tends to change to the female type of distribution of pubic hair, even if the male type has already been established. Often *diabetes insipidus* (marked by excessive discharge of water through the bladder) accompanies hypopituitarism.

There are many people whose excessive obesity does not offer them any great handicap in their life adaptation. They may suffer somewhat from occasional jokes; they may have some handicaps in muscular activity; but they do not appear to us in our society as sufficiently divergent to warrant the amount of attention which we give to the giants and the dwarfs or to the cripples, the blind, and the deaf. But those who cannot accept their physical condition as more or less normal may and often do develop certain traits of difference and definite feelings of inferiority.

Endocrine Imbalance and Sex. Malfunctioning of the sex glands has

widespread influences on behavior. The most obvious effects on the personality are seen in those males who fail to develop the physical characteristics traditionally associated with masculinity. Effeminate men, in our Western society, are generally considered ineffective and are ridiculed. But in other societies people of this sort may be given a definite status. So, too, the woman with masculine characteristics arising from an endocrine imbalance is likely to be marked as an unusual and not quite normal person. But the cultural definition of masculinity and femininity always determines in large part the rôle and status of those individuals whose particular endocrine balance gives them a body build which tends toward that of the opposite sex. This is an excellent illustration of the point already made that the constitutional factors operate always within the milieu laid down by society and culture.

Personal Adaptation and Endocrine Malfunctioning. Persons afflicted with marked malfunctioning of the endocrines easily develop feelings of inferiority, with their consequent various means of compensation or other adjustment devices. The reasons for such feelings of inadequacy are self-evident. The individual with a glandular malfunction often has definite and unmistakable physical abnormalities which are certain to influence his interactions with others. If the defect is apparent in the formative years of childhood, a successful adaptation may be all the more difficult. Even if the child's own family are sensible, other children in the neighborhood, in the schoolroom, or at play may treat him with ridicule, indifference, or even cruelty. He easily develops a "generalized other" of being inadequate and different from his acquaintances. And his rôle and status are colored at many points by this sense of inferiority. If an adult develops endocrine difficulties, his previous adjustments may be of such a stable character that he can weather the crisis, in his own estimation, with reasonable success. Yet it is certainly a rare person who is insensitive to the stares, whispers, and altered treatment of himself by his associates.

Physical abnormalities in some endocrine cases are not, of course, obvious to a passerby on the street. But those suffering from these difficulties may nevertheless be harassed by the knowledge that they may be physically or emotionally unfit to compete with normal individuals, even if their defects are not visually apparent. Men who lack sexual potency are not "men" in our society. Many sterile women feel that their lives have been incomplete because of this defect. So, too, general physical weakness, muscular inadequacy, and constant feelings of debility and lassitude incapacitate the individual for taking even an inconspicuous place in the social world, for he is unable to endure a day of constant work.

An individual who is thus forced to feel apart from his associates and inferior to them may react in many different ways. Irritability is perhaps the most commonly found personality attribute of endocrine cases. It is manifested particularly by giants, acromegals, the sexually underdevel-

oped, women spayed after maturity, and patients with hyperthyroidism and nonmyxedematous hypothyroidism. Such irritability may well be an outlet for mental conflict induced by their contact with other persons who have set them apart. Giants, cases of precocious puberty, and the sexually underdeveloped are clinically described as "hard to control" or negativistic. This is a common reaction in an individual who finds himself unable to cope with a situation. States of anxiety such as are found in cases of exophthalmic goiter, and in women deprived of their ovaries or women during the menopause may also be an expression of unresolved mental conflicts in which the physical differences have become culturally interpreted as unfavorable. Sullenness, moroseness, and hostile attitudes as met in the acromegalic, the eunuch, and the giant are other defense mechanisms.

THE CRIPPLED

A crippled person is one whose activities have become so restricted by the loss, defects, or deformities of bone or muscle as to incapacitate him for the usual education, for maintaining himself, or for otherwise taking a normal rôle in society. Crippled condition arises largely from one of the following: (1) congenital factors, such as birth injuries or faulty fetal development; (2) accidental factors, such as injuries to limbs; (3) illness, such as severe rickets, infantile paralysis, and tuberculosis of the bones; (4) defective muscular development which makes coordinations difficult or impossible.

The crippled child or adult is so obviously handicapped in physical motion that he easily becomes the object of comment by others. Such an individual may retreat from ordinary social contact, withdraw into the inner citadel of daydreams, and give only the minimum energy to the absolutely essential overt reactions to others. Or he may take an aggressive, overcompensatory view of his condition and attempt some sort of overt adjustment. This may be defensive and negative, or it may be sensible and fall within normal categories. In any case, there is need for education and training which will help the crippled to become self-supporting if they can work, and above all to make them capable of living in a world of more normal persons without undue injury to their self-esteem. They must, if possible, build up a conception of themselves and of their place in society which will make them capable of free interaction with others and capable of viewing their handicaps in a realistic, not sentimental, fashion. In this training, of course, parents, teachers, and playmates will play a part. The education of the handicapped child or adult always involves the education of those around him. The handicapped can no more develop a condition of mental health by himself than can any other individual. The following case, given only in brief summary, presents some of the concrete problems

of a crippled child against a family background which reflects certain cultural values unfavorable to such a condition.

Case of Louise B. This girl of 14 has a serious hip deformity brought on by tuberculosis in infancy. Louise is a fat, "greasy," unpleasant-appearing child with a distinct sense of inferiority. On the Rogers personality test she showed a high score, indicating marked maladjustment. She feels that life holds nothing for her. She cannot have nice dresses; she cannot go to parties as other children can. At about the age of 12 she attempted suicide and is still chagrined at her failure to end her life. The father is a junk dealer, an immigrant from Russia who has spent his life in building up a paying business but who is not willing to spend money on the necessary surgical correction and education of the child. To him the child is a "dirty" nuisance. The mother, a superstitious immigrant of little or no education, overindulges the child, is highly sentimental toward her at times, and shows great pity and childish affection for her. The mother has the firm belief that the child's condition is God's punishment of her (the mother) for attempting an abortion while she was carrying the child. Moreover, the social atmosphere of the home is frequently disturbed by conflicts between the parents.

In the face of these factors, the treatment of Louise was not easy. She was finally brought to the state orthopedic hospital, where she received surgical care, was given treatment to reduce her weight, and was taught to keep herself tidy and clean. As a part of the educational program her interest in schoolwork was aroused, and she has begun high-school work with considerable promise. One of the remaining problems, aside from her vocational future, is to teach her parents to take a healthier attitude toward her. Most serious is the persistence of the mother's projection of the sense of guilt upon the child. To play the rôle of being divine punishment for someone else's folly or "wickedness" is itself a serious handicap without the complication of a physical deformity. The prognosis of a child like this is none too good.

A second case—that of Teddy R.—represents an astonishing capacity for adaptation at a certain level despite a serious physical handicap and a substandard family background.

Case of Teddy R. This boy—15 years old—had one leg amputated following an injury from being run over by a truck when he was five years of age. Teddy has a long record of truancy, lying, stealing, begging, running away from home, sexual misconduct, and arson. He was finally committed to the state industrial school for boys, after having been the object of attention by the school and by private and public social-welfare agencies for nearly 10 years.

While the crippled condition of this boy doubtless was an important factor in his social maladjustment, his familial and neighborhood background might well have stimulated him to misconduct anyway.

Mary B., Teddy's mother and his father's first wife, had been married and divorced previous to her marriage to Teddy's father. The father divorced her shortly before the accident that resulted in the boy's disability. After the divorce both parents married other persons, both were subsequently divorced, and they remained each other. The family has a low economic status. The father has had difficulty with the police for infraction of the liquor and game laws. There is a long record of marital conflict, sexual immorality, and family disorganization. Teddy grew up a ragged, dirty urchin in an unkempt household. Just before his

accident he had been transferred to a good boarding home as a ward of the juvenile court in the hope that he might make a new start.

Interestingly enough, the boy was pleasant in manner when he wished to be, was ingenious in arousing sympathy, sought the good will of others, and showed a certain leadership ability with his playmates. He developed an amazing capacity for getting around with his crutch. But he early showed a tendency to lie and to steal, and his quick temper led him into frequent fights with his playmates. He showed other evidences of emotional instability. He was hyperactive, always on the go. On one or two occasions he tried to set fire to buildings. He developed a certain revengefulness toward those whom he disliked. Complaints also reached the school and juvenile-court officials that he was manifesting abnormal sexual interests.

Over a period of years attempts were made to place him in various boarding homes and in private schools for problem cases, and to exhort and teach him to be a "better" boy. But he constantly ran away and got into difficulties with the police. They usually sent him back to his own community where further efforts would be made to correct his attitudes and habits.

The boy, however, represents an amazing adaptation to his world and to himself. He learned to exploit others by smiling, by a pleasant manner, by congeniality. He developed great capacity to tell a tall yarn of how he came to his difficulty. He traveled over half of the United States, hitch-hiking to California, to Texas, and elsewhere. In one community he was picked up for vagrancy and made such a good story of his life that one of the businessmen's "service" clubs, learning about him, raised money so that he could purchase an artificial leg. (Later he enjoyed gloating over the social workers in his own community, who had not been able to make arrangements to secure one for him.)

Psychologically considered, this boy, developing habits which culturally are considered "bad" and "wrong"—lying, stealing, begging, truancy, arson, obscenity, and sadistic sexuality—built up a well-integrated personality. True, he lacked a moral rôle or self. But, as to getting basic satisfactions, as to living in the world—within the limits of his capacities—the boy made a remarkable adjustment. This adaptation, of course, failed to secure community approval, and he had in the end to be sent to a correctional institution. Whether Teddy will be reconditioned to moral aims at the institution remains to be seen.

The adaptation of crippled children is clearly affected by their age and social status. As one very successful teacher of handicapped children writes:

"Personality studies of 25 crippled children ranging in ages from 8 years to 20, and of varying degrees of disability indicated that they were well adjusted to their handicaps until they entered adolescence. At that time they have to leave the orthopedic schools and must begin to compete with normal children. Then, in time, such problems as being a burden to their families, being unable to marry, and the fear of losing their parents arise to depress them. It appears that the crippled child who has a favorable home environment and who attends a school especially suited to his needs, develops a well adjusted personality at these levels of adjustment. But he has the greatest need for guidance and understanding when he goes from the special school into the high school with the burden of a crippled condition added to the usual instability of adolescence.

The Rogers Personality test was given these 25 cripples. The responses were, on the average, those of normal children. All the children gave as their first wish the desire to be stronger than they are now. Only one out of the 25

showed a well-developed fantasy life. He was the child with the highest Intelligence Quotient. He was given to extensive reading for his recreation."¹

The attempts to rehabilitate crippled veterans, following the Second World War, made people generally more aware of the need for sound therapy in retraining adults who have been seriously injured. In many ways the crisis of losing an arm or a leg while engaged in the military is more extreme than a like injury would be to a growing child or to an adult who suffered injury at work. The sacrifices demanded by military service seem severe enough to most men without having to face further deprivations as a result of bodily injuries. Therefore it becomes essential that such men be given the best of both surgical and psychological care as a part of their re-education.²

The major problem of the crippled, like that of other persons, is that of confronting the world. Society should provide means by which the acceptance of a healthy rôle and status will be made possible within the limits of the handicap. This involves the basic relations of the crippled to his family, to the community, and especially to the economic order. As we have seen, to have a job and to be able to earn a living is one of the central factors in personality integration. Employers must change their own views and attitudes—which frequently reflect long-standing cultural interpretations of the crippled—if we are to provide these individuals with an aim or goal in life around which they may center their lives.

THE DEAF AND THE HARD OF HEARING

The deaf are those who lacked a sense of hearing at birth or who lost their hearing before the establishment of speech. The hard of hearing are those who suffered an impairment of their auditory sense after they learned to talk. The psychological and educational problems of these two groups are somewhat different.

Personality Problems of the Totally Deaf. The *totally deaf* suffer a handicap which makes their socialization extremely difficult. Since speech and hearing are so intimately bound together in the rise of consciousness and the sense of self, it is apparent that the deaf person's development will be quite different from that of the individual who has normal hearing unless special provision is made very early for some adequate form of communication. The acquisition of speech and of lip-reading by the deaf is a long and trying process. Often so much time and energy are required to master the tools of communication that the child, even with the best of educational facilities, falls behind his normal fellows. And when, as often

¹ Statement furnished the author by Mrs. Mary Dean Scott Parks. For critical comments and bibliography on the social psychology of cripples and other forms of physical disability, see Roger Barker *et al.*, *Adjustments to Physical Handicaps and Illness: A Survey of the Social Psychology of Physique and Disability*, Bulletin No. 55 (New York, Social Science Research Council, 1946).

² For a good discussion of problems of crippled and other war casualties, see Howard Rusk, *New Hope for the Handicapped* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1949).

happens, he reaches school age with little or no adequate training, he has already lost some of the most valuable years of his life—years when social and verbal interaction have brought the normal child into close touch with the world of things and people.

Although they have the advantage of visual experience—which the blind do not have—the higher mental development of the deaf is limited, since concepts and ideas depend so much upon oral communication. There arises a sense of being left out of activities which they see going on about them. The old proverb, "What the eye does not see the heart does not grieve for," scarcely applies to them, for they may suffer intensely from observing social activities in which they cannot fully participate. Feelings of inferiority, attempts at satisfaction by fantasy thinking, and even perhaps strong resentment are clear evidence of their efforts to make some sort of adjustment to their world. In brief, the deaf suffer from mental and social isolation. Unless they are taught adequate methods of speech and communication, their contacts with others must remain at a rather rudimentary level of manual and facial gesture.

Problems of the Partially Deaf. In the total population the *hard of hearing* are much in excess of those who are totally deaf. Their social contacts with others are also distinctly limited by their handicap. Failure to hear what others are saying sets up a barrier to normal interaction. There may result habits of inattention and a tendency to retreat into daydreaming. The failure to participate with others results in a degree of isolation that retards mental and social development.

However, there is no reason to believe that the deaf or hard of hearing develop a "sixth sense"—a special capacity or intuition which enables them to overcome their handicap. The deafened person is often tactless and mistakes the meaning of a social situation for varying reasons. These include (1) misrepresentation of the facial and bodily gestures which accompany the speech of others; (2) failure to catch the modulations of voice and variations in tone which so frequently convey the meaning even more than do the spoken words (the louder sounds, being harsher, are often wrongly taken to indicate anger in the speaker); (3) grasping only fragments of the total situation, which leads to a mistaken idea of what is going on; and (4) loss of the intimate and emotionally toned character of the human voice so important in self-development. Because of their sense of isolation and their inclination to live within themselves, the hard of hearing tend to lack self-confidence and to show many other features of the inferiority complex.

The interaction of the partially deaf with others of normal capacities illustrates the manner in which one's own attitudes and those of others are closely linked together. The normal person may take an attitude of "tolerance," impatience, pity, or even superiority toward the deafened. The normal often avoid such persons because they find it difficult to con-

verse. There is not that intimacy and mutuality of interaction found in ordinary person-to-person contacts. The primary-group, face-to-face situations in which the fundamental patterns of personality organization are developed thus become the very social situations in which the hard of hearing and the deaf suffer most. This begins to be apparent in the partially deaf child and continues throughout his life. Hence, in a way, the deaf and the hard of hearing may make better contacts in secondary groups. This all goes to enhance and build up the sense of isolation and inferiority of the hard of hearing and often results in certain resentments and a sense of being abused.

It is not always easy for the deafened person to decide how far he should go in attempting to live as if he were not handicapped. It is not always a simple matter to know how such things as making purchases, for instance, may not become an imposition on others which may in turn react on oneself. Then to decide whether to go to lectures and concerts, or to attend church, or to try to enter into conversations going on about one—these are vexing questions. So, too, if the deafened person tries to imitate the overt actions of others, he may end up in embarrassing situations. As a consequence, he often avoids following such cues. Finally, though he may enter some vocations, many lines of work are closed to him, particularly those dependent on close verbal and overt cooperation with others. All these merely illustrate the cumulative character of handicaps and the more or less inevitable stimulus to give up trying to operate in normal social intercourse.

THE BLIND

Technically blindness is defined as the inability to see at 20 feet what individuals with normal vision can see at 200 feet.³ Blindness does not consist in complete incapacity to see. Many persons who would be called blind can make broad and uncertain distinctions between bright daylight and darkness. But this ability is seldom of much help to them in locomotion or other adjustment.

The blind are conventionally divided into those who are congenitally sightless and those who have lost their sight from disease or accident. The personality problems associated with this handicap differ from those of the deaf in a number of respects. While the blind miss the visual world around them, and, therefore, movement in space is more difficult for them, they are not cut off from auditory communication with their fellows. Since, as we noted in Chapter 7 on the self, this auditory function is highly important, we may assume that in some ways their handicap is less serious than that of the totally deaf, unless the latter learn lip-reading or have some other device for communication with their fellows. But the visual

³ Edith M. Stern and Elsa Castendyck, *The Handicapped Child: A Guide for Parents* (New York, A. A. Wyn, Inc., 1950), p. 75.

world has to be translated for the blind into visual imagery (if they have any, as do most of those who lost their sight after some years of normal vision) or into other sense modalities, usually that of auditory sense and kinesthesia. Persons who are blind from accidents often retain a good deal of visual memory which helps in their adaptation to the world of sight. Yet, because movement in space is restricted, the blind easily develop a peculiar helplessness and dependence on others in relation to those situations that demand walking or other movements in space. They have ample excuse for developing a sense of isolation and inadequacy.

These attitudes are definitely related to their interactional contacts. Oversympathy and emotionalism on the part of others are the greatest handicaps to the blind. For some reason or other the crippled and deaf do not seem to face so much oversolicitude from others as do the blind. As a consequence, those who have lost their sight easily tend to avoid adjustment to many situations which they might learn to manage. Self-pity finds its concrete expression in the continuation of infantile dependence of the blind child on the mother and others in the household, or in the retreat, for example, among those blinded by accidents, to an infantile pattern of interaction with others.

Often parents and other sighted persons encourage such dependent attitudes. One of my former students rendered sightless shortly before entering puberty, had a rather bitter attitude toward his father. He resented the fact that the father had no adequate idea of his son's vocational and social possibilities. "My old man," as he put it, "never encouraged me to go on to school, certainly not to college. His idea was that I should stand on a street corner and sell lead pencils for a living!"

The responses of the blind to such treatment by others, of course, vary. While some remain infantile and dependent, others resist. And their resentment may take the form of overt aggressiveness or fantasies. In the healthy-minded home the blind child grows up to take his place in the family circle and in the community in as normal a fashion as his handicap permits. Here the self-reliance of the child is built on solid accomplishment, or on compensatory activities of a nature to capture his interests and fit his capacities.

Certain important features of the interaction of the blind with the sighted have been studied by Pechtel. She interviewed and tested a sample of 30 white blind women, ages 20 to 45 years, in metropolitan Chicago. At the time of the investigation all were at least three years beyond high school graduation and all had lost their sight by age 13 or earlier. None of them showed any apparent serious personality disturbance and had no other physical handicaps.

Her first aim was to discover if there were any evident effects on personality and social adjustment which could be traced to schooling—that is, whether there were any important differences between those subjects who had attended the public schools and those who had gone to

special residential schools for the blind. She found that the type of school attended "makes no significant difference in an adult blind woman's contentment, social acceptance, and economic self-support." But in relation to some other matters she did find some interesting facts in terms of both subjective and objective evidences of adjustment. Thus, on the basis of certain statistical measures she found

"that the proportion of sighted friends is significantly related to attitude toward sighted persons, neighborliness, and doing for others. Dating sighted men, the second measure of social acceptance, was found to be related to intelligence, sociability of the mother, training in etiquette, and animation—all variables which might operate to help overcome specific social handicaps of blindness and make the individual appear more 'normal' or which might increase the attractiveness of the individual's behavior. There is evidence to suggest that contentment is influenced by the proportion of sighted friends. Also there is strong indication that, in the significant relationship found between the proportion of sighted friends and attendance at college without a blind friend, the former is the principal determining factor."⁴

The emotional disturbances of the blind are largely a product of the definition of the situation and of the rôle which the seeing determine for them. Very frequently those who become blind through accidents inform us that their first attempts at the reorganization of their habits and attitudes are not marked by undue emotionalism at all. Learning to shave, to find their clothes, and to move about proves interesting and challenging. But their imagined or real loss of rôle and status may soon enter to disturb them. And even more significant is the intrusion of over-anxious relatives and friends into their process of readaptation. Cutsforth, himself blind since he was 11 years of age, thus states his view of the problem:

"The seeing members of society and the self-regarding attitudes they induce in the blind are entirely responsible for the emotional disturbances found in the blind as a group. The manner in which seeing friends, relatives, and strangers approach the blind induces one of two forms of emotional maladjustment. The blind must either preserve their positive self-regarding attitudes by resisting emotionally the subtle, and not always so very subtle, suggestions of social and organic inferiority or accept the social and personal evaluation of the seeing, thereby sacrificing their self-esteem. The former retain their self-respect by becoming socially distasteful. The latter gain social approval by selling their self-regarding attitudes for conformity with the attitudes and concepts of the seeing. They become precisely the defectives that society conceives the blind to be. It is the rare blind individual who emotionally treads the middle ground by conforming outwardly, when it is discreet to do so, to the evaluation of the seeing and at the same time preserves his self-respect by emotionally thumbing his nose at those who would love to aid him by unwittingly achieving his complete destruction."⁵

⁴ Joanne DeBarr Pechtel, "Type of Education and Other Factors in the Adjustment of Blind Women," p. 78. Ph.D. thesis, Northwestern University Library, 1951. By permission.

⁵ T. D. Cutsforth, *The Blind in School and Society* (New York, D. Appleton-Century Co., Inc., 1935), pp. 124-125. By permission.

Good physical exercise and health, vocational guidance and placement in a satisfactory occupation, and opportunity for normal love life are the three most important matters for the blind. With these essentials taken care of, good conduct, well-balanced emotional attitudes, and civic participation ought to follow. Failure to attain these goals will usually lead the blind to make their adaptation at other levels: sheer infantile dependence, begging and exploitation, or some other sort of life organization which will permit them to carry on. But there is little or no excuse for these latter sorts of adjustment if the community standards are what we have come to expect in our present-day society. The burden of responsibility, however, rests on the seeing, not on the blind.

Difficulties of the Deaf-Blind. Cases of deaf-blindness present difficulties of social and personal adaptation more complicated than do either the blind or the deaf. Although this condition is not nearly so common as that of either blindness or deafness, the study of such cases throws considerable light on the problem of the handicapped. Moreover, because of the well-known work of Dr. S. G. Howe with Laura Bridgman and of Miss Sullivan's success with Helen Keller, the topic of the deaf-blind has received considerable public notice.^a

There is plenty of evidence that, given normal intelligence, the deaf-blind are capable of being trained. Also, the individual case method of treatment is doubtless preferable to group therapy. In commenting on the education of the deaf-blind, among other matters, Merry remarks:

"It seems probable that the deafness of a deaf-blind individual is responsible for a greater share of his mental retardation than is his blindness. Serious dearth of vocabulary and awkwardness in use of language, which are found more commonly among deaf than among blind persons, would seem to bear out this fact."^b

This recognition of the importance of linguistic handicaps further confirms the view of the importance of language and speech in the development of the normal self. Only in communication with others does one's self-esteem, one's self-security, emerge. Lacking this, the person fails to develop an adequate personality and must remain at infantile or childish levels of adaptation.

ADJUSTMENT PROBLEMS OF OTHER CONSTITUTIONALLY DEFICIENT

The personality problems associated with certain other constitutional deficiencies may be briefly noted in particular cases suffering from cerebral

^a The account of Laura Bridgman will be found in Manual Howe and Florence Howe Hall, *Laura Bridgman: Dr. Howe's Famous Pupil and What He Taught Her* (Boston, Little, Brown & Company, 1903) and Laura F. Roberts, *Laura Bridgman, the Story of an Opened Door* (New York, D. Appleton & Company, 1925). Or Helen Keller see her own *The Story of My Life* (Garden City, New York, Doubleday & Company, Inc.).

^b R. V. Merry, "A case study of deaf blindness," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1930, 25: 133-148. Quotation from p. 143 by permission of the American Psychological Association.

palsy, organic speech disorders, and feeble-mindedness. While the total proportion of individuals, child or adult, who are so handicapped is low in comparison with normal persons or with the percentages of the blind, deaf, and the crippled, they do warrant some comment.

Cerebral Palsy. The basic fact in cerebral palsy is the impairment of that part of the brain which controls the efferent nerve paths to the muscles. There is no evidence that it is due to biologic heredity. It may be due to faulty fetal development of brain. It may be due to birth injuries. It is sometimes the aftermath of postnatal infection or injury.

The particular manifestations vary. Sometimes the muscles move involuntarily, and the child makes aimless, random responses which he cannot control. This condition is known as athetosis. Sometimes there are rhythmic tremors. In other instances there is spasticity or muscular rigidity. In still others, in ataxia, the individual has difficulty with keeping his balance and is often dizzy.

At one time it was generally believed that nothing could be done for individuals who were the victims of cerebral palsy. While the extent of therapy and education is still very limited, progress is being made in the treatment of many cases. In the first place, the old notion that all children with cerebral palsy were inevitably feeble-minded has been dissipated. It is now estimated that at least two-thirds of such cases are of normal or superior intelligence.

While the treatment of such individuals must necessarily vary with the severity of the trouble and with the level of intelligence, patient care and training may go far in helping them to learn to help themselves. Obviously the more severe cases will require expert institutional care. But if the child is sent to a special school or hospital, the family should keep up its close contact with him. In other, and less severe cases, with some help from outside agencies, such as schools and social services, much can be done. The socio-emotional climate of the home, however, is often as important as the particular regimen which is set up to assist the child to do simple muscular tasks and to participate with others in the social life of the home. "Harmony in the home, a smooth-running, orderly household, are especially important for these youngsters, since tension increases their muscular difficulties."^{*} Simple chores, sympathetic discipline, but not sentimentality, and a sense of participation with the family will facilitate not only the child's adjustment but that of the other family members as well.

Organic Speech Disorders. While many speech difficulties are psychological or functional in origin rather than organic, some are distinctly related to organic structural malformations. Not infrequently faulty speech may be the result of a combination of both functional and organic causes. For example poor articulation may result from a misshapen mouth, or

^{*} Stern and Castendyck, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

misplaced teeth, or a tongue too large or too sluggish. Yet sometimes it results from poor speech habits. Where there is a cleft palate or a hair lip, the speech defect arises directly as a consequence of atypical structure. But if given surgical attention early in life many of these conditions can be rectified. In some instances trouble in speaking derives from faulty hearing—not from physical defects in the speech organs themselves.

As is the case with stuttering, which has its roots in anxiety or other psychological sources, the handling of organically founded speech disorders should be carried out with patience, calmness, and emotional warmth toward the child. There are various methods of dealing with the re-training of both functional and organic speech troubles, but a central element is a recognition that speech is the crucial means of developing self-confidence, self-esteem, and the sense of emotional security—all so basic in the development of an effective personality.*

The Feeble-minded. We have already discussed the usual classification of the feeble-minded and indicated some of the limiting factors in their social adjustment. (See Chapter 14.) Here we shall comment briefly on some of the general social-emotional problems of such individuals.

We may take the view that true mental deficiency rests upon constitutional or organic conditions without committing ourselves to the earlier but rather too naïve view that feeble-mindedness is a simple recessive genetic character or unit trait of some sort. Until we know more concerning the effect of faulty glands and nutrition upon embryonic and fetal growth, especially upon the development of the higher nerve centers, we must be wary of assuming too much regarding simple and direct inheritance of mental defectiveness. In fact, about one-half of all mentally deficient children are born to families of normal or better intelligence.¹⁰ Moreover, a sizeable fraction of the more severe cases result from birth injuries, infections, or cerebral palsy. In any case, assuming a fair degree of mental ability, the social and cultural adaptation of the feeble-minded individual, as of other handicapped children and adults, has much to do with the development of his rôle and status, with the emergence of his *self*, that important core of life organization. In view of this fact we may quite rightly take the position that the only adequate definition of feeble-mindedness for the student of personality, as for the student of social problems, must be in terms of social and cultural adaptability.

Mere designation of the I.Q. of the mentally deficient individual is not sufficient for our purposes. Labeling the child or adult with a certain I.Q. will hardly answer our demands when we are concerned with social and cultural adjustment. Unfortunately too much attention has been placed

* For some sound and homely counsel on speech troubles by one who himself has a speech handicap, see Wendell Johnson, *People in Communication* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1946). Also Johnson, *et al.*, *Speech Handicapped School Children* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1949).

¹⁰ Stern and Castendyck, *op. cit.*, p. 115

upon scholastic attainment in studies of the feeble-minded and not enough upon their emotional and social training and their preparation for a rôle and status in the community in which they will be as self-supporting and as self-respecting as possible.

There have been a good many investigations of the social adjustment of the feeble-minded. Most of these were follow-up studies of children who at one time or another had been in special classes or schools for the mentally deficient. In the early days of intelligence testing when the I.Q. was regarded as the major key not only to intellectual but to other forms of adjustment, there was a tendency to ignore the importance of other elements in the personality. Today psychologists and educators take a broader view and regard intelligence as but one of several important factors in personal and social adaptability.

Almost all of the more carefully designed studies of the personal and social adjustment of the feeble-minded show that those in the moron category, unless also emotionally disturbed, may make reasonably good adjustments. If, however, youngsters of this level of ability are pushed too hard in school, if they are expected to perform beyond their intellectual powers, they may become truant from school or engage in more serious delinquencies.

The home atmosphere is particularly important in laying the foundation for good adjustment during childhood and adolescence and later. So, too, economic sufficiency of the parents is an important factor in many cases. In poverty-stricken homes it may be difficult to distinguish the relative weight of low intelligence as a factor in social adaptability from other factors, such as anxiety arising from the demands for sheer survival.

An investigation by Fairbank confirms the conviction that many subnormals may make, on the whole, satisfactory adaptation to the outside world even when no exceptional training and opportunity for self-support are afforded them. This study was a follow-up at the Phipps Psychiatric Clinic in Baltimore of the later life of 166 feeble-minded children who had been first diagnosed as such in 1914. These children lived in a district of low economic status, vice, crime, and community disorganization. At the time of diagnosis it was predicted that they would furnish society an undue share of vagrants, alcoholics, prostitutes, delinquents, and dependents, and furthermore that they would very likely reproduce other mental defectives.¹¹

Of the 122 living who were re-examined 17 years later, Richards remarks in summary:

"Ninety-six have married, of this number seventy-four have produced 179 children—seventy-seven of whom are of school age. Only four of the unmarried women have produced children. Among the men who have married there are

¹¹ B. E. Fairbank, "The subnormal child—seventeen years after." *Mental Hygiene*, 1933, 17:177-208.

eight divorces and two separations; of the women who have married, . . . three divorces and two separations. Only sixteen of the married families are being helped by relief agencies, and seven of these are emergency cases due to the present depression. Thirty-six of these families either own or are buying their homes; thirty-two live with some member of their family and contribute to its support. There are only eight cases of chronic alcoholism. In twenty three homes there is social drinking which does not interfere with family stability or economic support. Of these 122 cases only thirty-two have court records, twenty-seven of which were Juvenile Court records years ago. These boys and girls had intelligence ages of nine to twelve years in 1914. Of the forty re-examined in 1931 the intelligence age has remained the same as in the tests of 1914. Of their seventy-seven off-spring of school age we have examined fifty-eight. Three show I.Q.'s under 70; twenty-two show I.Q.'s of 90; six seem to be average normals at the present time with I.Q.'s of 107; four have I.Q.'s of 120; and twenty-four average I.Q.'s of 96."¹²

Such studies are interesting for several reasons. They show first that intelligence is only one ingredient in the personality and only one factor in making or unmaking a successful adaptation to the social-cultural world. They show also that the earlier assumptions of directly inherited feeble-mindedness—so common, say in 1914, at the time of the first Baltimore study noted above—will have to be revised. While the feeble-minded for the most part may be considered as falling within the category of constitutional divergents, since their neural organization appears to be faulty in comparison with that of the normals, they, like other constitutional defectives, frequently make rather adequate adjustments to themselves and to others. It should, of course, be borne in mind that most of the investigations have reported only on individuals who would fall in the category of morons. Those individuals diagnosed as imbeciles very evidently need more careful societal supervision, including in many instances institutional segregation. And the lowest grade—the idiots—obviously are incapable of self-care or self-help beyond the most rudimentary sort. Certainly there are some definite biological limitations to the socialization of the seriously mentally deficient which cannot be ignored.¹³

All the physically handicapped individuals of the sort we have discussed in this chapter represent rather strikingly the interplay of organic and social-cultural factors in the development of personal attitudes, ideas, and habits. The self of these persons is markedly conditioned by the handicap, but chiefly as it is directly or indirectly defined for the child or adult

¹² Esther L. Richards, "The origin of conduct problems in school children," *Child Welfare Pamphlets*, No. 34 (State University of Iowa, 1934). By permission.

¹³ Over the years there have been periodic professional squabbles about the constancy of the I.Q. For a review of some of the pertinent literature see R. L. Thorndike, "Constancy of the I.Q.," *Psychological Bulletin*, 1940, 37: 167-186. See also R. S. Woodworth, *Hereditary and Environment: A Critical Survey of Recently Published Material on Twins and Foster Children*, Bulletin No. 47, New York, Social Science Research Council, 1941. For a critical discussion, see Anne Aronson and I. P. Fuld, *Differential Psychology*, revised (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1943), pp. 292-296 and appropriate references cited by these authors.

by those around him. While feelings of inferiority and compensation are most apparent in the physically handicapped, the manner in which these characteristics arise is no different in social-psychological principles than in other instances. One of the most important facts for the layman and the normal person to realize is that it is largely *his* attitude that determines the behavior difficulties of the handicapped. As people everywhere change their views and beliefs about cripples, the deaf, the blind, those with cerebral palsy, the stutterers, the feeble-minded, and others with organic deficiencies, the personality organization of the handicapped will also change. There is no special psychology for the handicapped. For the most part, they only represent an accentuation of certain responses to the material and social-cultural world around them.

CHAPTER 22

Some Personality Characteristics of Delinquents and Criminals

While certain aspects of divergent conduct have already been described and analyzed, we turn now to discuss what is often regarded as more evident and more serious forms of deviant behavior. The present chapter will deal with certain personality characteristics of delinquents and criminals. Chapter 23 will treat the neurotic and psychotic manifestations of personality.

To mention variant conduct at once raises the question: What is meant by normal activity? The adjective *normal* is derived from the substantive *norm*, and a norm has to do with some standard accepted as correct and proper. From the standpoint of this book, what is normal in thought, speech, or overt behavior depends on three factors: (1) the cultural standards of acceptable thought and conduct as usually defended and maintained by the dominant elements in a given community or society. (2) The nature of the social interaction which furnishes the genesis and constant support of the personality. Here, of course, the culturally determined definitions of conduct come into play, but many variations are possible in concrete interactions, so that the applied norm tends, with few exceptions, to be at best an approximation to the *ideal* norm. (3) The manner in which the individual reorganizes his own experience: how his values or frames of reference are set up, that is how he accepts, rejects, or modifies this or that cultural definition.

Delinquency and crime are activities which run counter to the conduct norms of a given society. In the words of Selin, a conduct norm is fundamentally "a rule which prohibits, and conversely enjoins, a specific type of person, as defined by his status in (or with reference to) the normative group, from acting in a certain specified way in certain circumstances . . . [It is] a rule which governs a specific type of life situation and is authoritative to the extent of the group's resistance to violation" of this norm. The resistance of the norm setters toward the violation of the code Selin calls "resistance potential," and this varies, obviously, with the definition of the seriousness of the infraction.¹

¹ Thorsten Selin, *Culture Conflict and Crime*, Bulletin No. 41 (New York, Social Science Research Council, 1935), pp. 32-33, 34.

Behavior that is variant to one group may not be so to another, and we must recognize that abnormality is not purely a matter of how a given individual reorganizes his experiences. There may be culturally accepted patterns of conduct in a sub-group existing within a wider community. For instance, some forms of behavior which the general public consider delinquent or criminal may be fully accepted by some particular group living in a community. Organized racketeers do not consider their conduct reprehensible. In fact, if forced to justify it, they can often produce amazingly plausible rationalizations for their practices in terms of our economic and political order.

Tolerated but deviant behavior within a larger framework may reach into situations which directly touch the individuals and families of the more "normal" community. The pillars of society often indulge in conduct which does not match up to their moral professions. People in high places "get away" with acts they condemn in others not of their own social class.² This is but a phase of that divergence between moral ideals or aspirations and actual achievement which we have already observed in other connections—in family life, in school, and in occupations.

There are always two aspects of adaptation to social norms: how the person himself interprets or gives meaning to his own reactions, and how they are considered by others. The definition of normality is the product of one's acceptance (introjection) of others' real or assumed definition of the situation. But in regard to many matters an individual may fail to take over the moral-legal rôles expected of him by others, and his unique organization of experience may lead him into difficulties with those around him if they do not, in turn, accept or tolerate his peculiar rôle or definition of the situation. For example, a delinquent boy or an adult criminal may possess a definition of certain conduct that does not agree with that of persons who maintain the *status quo*—the peace officers, preachers, and civic-minded members of the community. We must never forget that the accommodative relations of persons who are labeled divergent by others are constantly qualified by just such factors.

Since conduct defined as delinquent or criminal runs counter to strongly emotionalized moral and legal taboos, it easily arouses more or less intense resentment, blame, and inclinations on the part of others to punish the malefactors. Misconduct has high social visibility. Our culturally acquired sentiments and attitudes are such that it is extremely difficult for even otherwise intelligent laymen to take anything approaching a rational view of this sort of divergent conduct. For example, the high value which our society puts on private property and on adherence to our sexual code makes an individual highly sensitive to the breaking of these codes by others, and the rather cruel punitive justice which we mete out to offenders

² Some implications of this type of misconduct are discussed in E. H. Sutherland, *White Collar Crime* (Philadelphia: F. B. Lippincott Company, 1939).

is evidence, in part, of our own strongly repressed reactivity to these same taboos. In a very real sense when we punish others we punish ourselves. The mechanism of projection is all too often evident. Offenders are psychological scapegoats for the so-called law-abiding and normal people in the community. We cannot understand or deal with the problems of delinquency and crime without bearing in mind the relations of these deviates to the rest of us. As with the neurotics and psychotics, these individuals are in great measure like ourselves. In truth, the motivations and meanings of actions which are labeled illegal and immoral are often not strikingly different from motivations and meanings which lie behind socially approved conduct.

If one asks why we study the personality of the delinquent or criminal, the reply must be that only by discovering the meaning and impulses of these variant individuals may we hope to discover the factors which induce this type of social-cultural adaptation. Until we understand these factors in conduct, we cannot hope to predict and hence control such behavior in the best interests of the larger community. In other words, the prevention of such habits and attitudes or, at second best, the restoration of the delinquent or criminal to the normally accepted forms of activity cannot be expected until those who deal with these individuals know what principles to apply. While we lack adequate knowledge of these principles, psychology and the social sciences have made some contribution toward a more adequate comprehension of the incitement and course of delinquent and criminal careers.

The etiology of delinquency and crime is usually complex and numerous. The older particularistic theories which essayed to explain such conduct have given way generally to a recognition that in dealing with these problems, many and varied factors have to be taken into account. These are sometimes classified into the external and the internal causative elements. The former are situational and cultural conditions. These usually include sociological factors, such as place of residence, economic status, and the like. The latter are the psychological factors, such as intelligence level, motivation, social-emotional adjustment, and overt responses. But the former are not independent of the latter. After all, it is the meaning to the individual of the poor home, of the low income, of the neighborhood companions, or of his family background which is significant. While broken homes, unemployment of parents, squalor, and family conflict may be factors inducing a delinquent or criminal career, it must always be remembered that thousands of children and adults who live in such circumstances are not delinquent or criminal. Moreover, not every act, but only certain ones, get a person into legal difficulties. In other words, the process of adjustment is not essentially different from what it is in many other situations involving home, school, vocation, play life, church, and citizenship. There is no special psychology of delinquents and criminals.

While the sociologist is chiefly concerned with the situations which stimulate delinquency and crime and with the broad effects upon the community of such responses, the social psychologist and the psychiatrist are concerned fundamentally with the drives and meanings, that is, with the internal factors. In keeping with this approach we shall deal with the situational and external factors only as backgrounds to the personality manifestations of the delinquent and criminal.

SOME PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF DELINQUENT CONDUCT ³

Narrowly regarded, delinquency may be defined as infractions against or violations of laws and ordinances by children and youth of specified ages. To determine guilt or innocence and to provide forms of punishment and/or care, special courts and special personnel are provided by the state. But both in theory and practice delinquency refers to additional activities not specified. As Rubin wisely says, "No juvenile court law confines its definition of delinquency to violations of laws and ordinances."⁴ It includes all sorts of provisions to protect the child from difficulties as well as to apply sanctions if he violates various provisions of the juvenile code. In fact, it is difficult at times to know where to draw the line. For example, efforts made to distinguish between the child with "behavior problems," the dependent child, and the neglected child, on the one hand, and the cases often brought before juvenile courts are not always easy.

Although one aim in setting up juvenile courts was to remove the stigma of adult criminality from young persons and to remove them from some of the responsibilities which the old common law and the statutes imposed on youth, another reason for their establishment was the public recognition of the fact that the traditional familial and neighborhood mores were no longer operating successfully in respect to many young children. Unlike the law for adult malefactors, the statutes for juvenile offenders do not place the responsibility for their acts entirely upon their own shoulders, but also upon the parents and other family members, or upon guardians and others who are held accountable for them. The juvenile court judge, in fact, often stands *in loco parentis* to the child.

The juvenile judge, the probation officer, the social-service worker, and

³ The student who wishes to examine the large literature on juvenile delinquency in its wider aspects may consult such standard books as these: L. J. Carr, *Delinquency Control*, rev. ed. (New York, Harper and Brothers, 1950); J. R. Ellington, *Protecting Our Children from Criminal Careers* (New York, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1948); Sheldon Glueck and Eleanor Glueck, *Unraveling Juvenile Delinquency* (New York, The Commonwealth Fund, 1950); Maud A. Merrill, *Problems of Child Delinquency* (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1947); M. H. Neumeyer, *Juvenile Delinquency in Modern Society* (New York, D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1949); P. W. Tappan, *Juvenile Delinquency* (New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1949); N. K. Teeters and J. O. Rememann, *The Challenge of Delinquency* (New York, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1950).

⁴ Sol Rubin, "The legal character of juvenile delinquency," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 1949, 281:2.

the psychologist are concerned with more than the overt act. This, to them, is merely the symptom of some underlying maladjustment of the child or adolescent. The aim of these persons is so to understand the young offender's motives and meanings as to help him to return to habits and attitudes more in conformity with the community standards of conduct.

Social-cultural Backgrounds. The following have usually been regarded as important factors in the description and analysis of delinquency: (1) The nature and quality of community organization is important. In our society, at least, delinquency is highly associated, statistically, with modern urban, industrialized life. "Without exception all of the investigations show rural delinquency to be less than urban delinquency per unit of population."³ However, there are wide variations in the incidence of delinquency in particular urban neighborhoods. We find the highest rates of delinquency in sections of our American cities marked by low incomes, congestion of population, poor housing, and lack of adequate recreational facilities. (2) Variations in the cultural backgrounds of families and neighborhoods have a bearing on the problem of delinquency. City children of immigrant parents or from our own rural sections are caught between two worlds—the older primary-group type, and the diffuse secondary sort—and misconduct often arises out of the all too obvious conflict between the norms of their families and those of the urban world. (3) It is often contended that poverty induces delinquency and crime. Yet there is slight evidence that crime is affected during periods of economic depression. It has been pretty well accepted that as an external factor poverty, as such, is but a backdrop to subtler matters, such as cultural conflict, family disharmony, sense of frustration and attendant anxiety and hostility. (4) A number of studies have shown that retardation in school is another external factor of considerable importance in relation to delinquency, especially when poor school performance is associated with low mental ability and with inadequate provision for vocational training. (5) The misuse of leisure time as a concomitant of misconduct has long been noted. Play affords a natural setting for socialization and especially for moral training. Unsupervised and inadequate recreation in our urban centers is often associated with the rise of delinquent gangs which furnish the growing boy with patterns of conduct that may greatly influence his subsequent life organization. The importance of companionship in delinquent behavior is well established. (6) No doubt there are class differentials in the incidence of delinquency. Although upper- and middle-class parents make many demands on their children to obey and to conform, they likewise provide wholesome recreation, travel, and opportunities for self-expression in socially rewarding ways. Such advantages children in the lower social brackets do not have. As Reiss remarks, "It ap-

³ Walter Dinkness and Muriel Smith, *Juvenile Delinquency*. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1932, p. 47.

pears that families in sub-cultures of high socio-economic status are more effective in controlling the behavior of members with respect to delinquency than families low in the socio-economic status structure. Particularly they appear to be more effective in controlling repeated delinquency of family members." "Then, too, if the children of upper and middle classes violate juvenile codes, their parents may be in a position "to fix it up" so that the child does not have to go to the juvenile court or its officials. (7) Culture patterns of crime and delinquency which often surround youngsters in certain sections of our cities doubtless greatly influence the direction of their interests and behavior. The continuity from adolescent to adult gangs is well known.⁷ It is not only the direct training or the neighborhood "copies" of adult crime which stimulate youthful misconduct; the whole exploitive, speculative, money-making pattern of our business ethos doubtless has some indirect effects. In a society where illegal enterprises such as stock-market rigging, embezzlement, and the sale of worthless securities are winked at, there is evidently a certain tolerance for crime not to be found elsewhere. (8) As we have emphasized throughout, the family is the matrix of fundamental training, and its place in the stimulation of misconduct has often been noted. Among items frequently noted are the broken home, the practices of criminal or other deviant conduct on the part of parents or siblings, and, more important but less easy to quantify, such factors as family harmony or conflict.

For years reformers and others eager to find some tangible "cause" for delinquency considered the broken home as one of the key factors. It is true the bulk of studies in the matter do show that the incidence of broken homes is higher among delinquents than non-delinquents, "even when such factors as age and ethnic background are taken into account."⁸ Yet, the place of the broken home, as such, in inciting deviant conduct is given far less credence today than formerly. Much more important are the nature and quality of the social-emotional elements which enter into the inter-personal contacts within the family.

These matters are very difficult to measure, however. The differential effect on children of discipline as contrasted with indulgence, the importance of a certain consistency of authority as against playing fast and

⁷ Albert J. Reiss, Jr., "The Accuracy, Efficiency, and Validity of a Prediction Instrument," Ph.D. thesis (University of Chicago Libraries, 1944), p. 55. By permission.

⁸ An early descriptive study of the influence of companionship, of inadequate recreational guidance, and of the adult culture of crime on delinquency was F. M. Thrasher's, *The Gang: A Study of 1,313 Gangs in Chicago* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1926, rev. ed., 1966). See also C. R. Shaw and H. D. McKay, *Seven Factors in Juvenile Delinquency*, Vol. II of *Report on the Causes of Crime* (Washington, National Commission of Law Observation and Enforcement, 1931). For an intimate picture of gang life, see W. F. White, *Street Corner Society* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1943).

⁹ H. M. Shubman, "The family and juvenile delinquency," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 1949, 261-26.

loose with the child's affections, the open or hidden conflicts of spouses, or of parents and children—these and many other factors enter into the etiology of delinquency as they do into neurotic and psychotic breakdowns. But it is difficult to disentangle them, or to tell which should be given the greater and which the lesser weight in "causation."

The suggestive patterns of a family are hard to measure but they too must play a definite part in the child's life. Where there is alcoholism, vice, or delinquency on the part of the parents or siblings, the growing child often tends to fall into like conduct. Even when parents take the view that a child shall act better and differently than themselves or the child's siblings, the examples of overt conduct usually outweigh verbal admonitions or pious hopes. The belief that one may secure wealth and luxury without working or by devious ways is often present, and the child who tries to run counter to this suggestion from either his family or his neighborhood has to overcome great handicaps. Lack of insight on the part of the parents, as well as on the part of the delinquent boy or girl, is an important feature in these family relations. Healy and Bronner comment on the amazing lack of understanding by parents of the factors in the situation which contribute to the misconduct of their children.⁹

The emotional tone of the family interactions is perhaps the most crucial factor of all. A child may be reared in poverty, in deteriorated neighborhoods, and with severe educational and vocational handicaps, but, if there are harmony, love, and affection between the parents, between parents and children, and among the children themselves, he may escape many of the difficulties which we have been discussing. Such a home provides a sense of security and of companionship which is indispensable. In contrast, quarreling, bickering, and overt violence between father and mother or among other members puts a premium on aggressive and sadistic attitudes and habits that can hardly fail to influence the growing boy or girl. From these patterns the child constructs his own rôle and status. That is, his own life organization tends to take on the ways of those around him. But these features are, so far, rather difficult to evaluate in a statistical way.

Personality Factors: Intelligence. Against the background of social-cultural conditions of the sort just noted, we ask: Why do some children become delinquent when others do not? That is, we want to know something of the motivations and self-images of delinquents. How do they value their experiences which others designate as against the moral and legal codes? In short, what particular configuration of intellectual and social-emotional traits does the delinquent reveal?

In the early days of intelligence testing (ca. 1910-1930) many ambi-

⁹ William Healy and Augusta F. Bronner, *New Light on Delinquency and Its Treatment: Results of a research conducted for the Institute of Human Relations* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1936).

tious mental testers believed that they had at last found the key which would unlock the mystery of the causes of delinquency. In study after study it was shown that delinquents had, on the average, lower I.Q.'s than non-delinquents of comparable chronological ages. In 1931, Sutherland critically reviewed 145 such studies of delinquents in correctional institutions for the years 1910-1928. He found wide discrepancies in the reported I.Q.'s. As a typical instance he cites the findings at the Indiana Boys' School: for the years 1914-1917 the proportion of delinquents diagnosed as feeble-minded was 59 per cent; for 1922-1927 it was but 10 per cent. This does not mean that by some magic the percentage of intellectually low-grade children in these institutions changed so sharply. It merely means that mental testers had changed their minds as to what constitutes "normal" intelligence.¹⁰

In recent decades psychologists have devised more reliable tests, have been more careful in their sampling, have equated their groups as to age, sex, and socio-economic status, and have been more cautious in interpreting their results. One well designed and executed study is that of Merrill. She compared the performance on the revised Stanford-Binet test of 500 consecutive juvenile court referrals in a certain rural county in California with that of 2,904 unselected American-born white school children. The average I.Q. of the former was 92.5, of the latter, 101.8. The results are shown in Figure 12. While the difference is statistically significant, it must be noted that the average of the delinquent group still falls within the range of normal intelligence: 90 to 110 I.Q. The overlapping of the two distributions is striking. While a very small fraction of the un-




FIG. 12. Distribution of I.Q.'s of 500 consecutive juvenile court referrals compared with that of 2,904 unselected white children. (Maud A. Merrill, *Problems of Child Delinquency*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1947, p. 167. By permission.)

¹⁰ E. H. Sutherland, "Mental Deficiency and Crime," in Kimball Young, ed., *Social Attitudes* (New York: Henry Holt & Company, Inc., 1931).

a wealth of helpful material. They also tried to work out a predictive scale based on their results but this will need considerable additional work before it is likely to be generally applicable.¹⁵

Personality Factors: Motivation. Intelligence, attitudes, and interests all have their part in delinquent as they do in non-delinquent conduct. So, too, in matter of motivation the range is wide for both groups. Certainly in many juvenile-court cases there is little or no evidence of emotional disturbance or of more serious pathological conditions. The boy or girl may grow up in an environment where certain acts are considered to be in the more or less tolerated or permissible folkways of a particular group. Some of these young persons, either because of the frequency of their conduct not approved outside or because of its manifestations beyond the boundaries of their particular area, may in time run afoul of the law and the mores imposed by the dominant groups in the larger community—city, country, or state. These youngsters become labeled delinquent. Some of them may react readily to sensible treatment or correction of one sort or another. Others may react negatively to such handling and so be set upon a life career of delinquency and crime at least partially as a result of such attempted reformation. There is much evidence that a great deal of illegal and immoral behavior in these neighborhoods does not result in arrests. This does not mean that all the young people brought up in these areas are potential or unapprehended delinquents. There are combinations of family circumstances, gang membership, adult patterns of crime, and other differentiating features which would play a part in particular cases. Even within the very families from which delinquents come, in the face of similar if not identical exposure to criminal patterns outside the home, there are many children who evidence no serious misconduct. But again the unique organization of each person's life is no different in these than in other life situations. In order to understand and "explain" divergence in conduct under such circumstances here, there is often no need to appeal to the concepts of mental conflict, emotional distress, or severe pathological conditions among the delinquent siblings as contrasted to the normality of the non-delinquent ones.

One cannot examine the literature on delinquency or deal with actual cases in clinics without the recognition that many of these young persons, at least in their initial legally defined misconduct, are to all intents and purposes as normal as the usual run of youngsters of their own age. If a psychologist were to consider some of these cases merely in terms of integration or sound balance of personality, without reference to public morality, he would readily admit that many of them are as well balanced or inte-

¹⁵ For a pertinent criticism of their material on the possible predictive use of such findings, see J. E. Anderson's review in *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology*, 1951, 41: 745-748. There is here "A symposium of reviews" of *Unraveling Juvenile Delinquency*. See, in particular, the ones by Sellin and by Alexander.

grated as any individual he gets to know in the family, in his school, business, or church, or in civic or recreational contacts. At least at the outset of their misbehavior, there is no evidence of mental conflict or emotional disturbance of a deep-seated sort in a large fraction of the cases who come from such backgrounds.

On the other hand, many delinquents are obviously the victims of mental conflict or some other sort of emotional frustration and distress. This internal disturbance, this sense of insecurity or of inferiority, may find its overt manifestations in such escape patterns as running away from home, truancy, or compensatory reactions of a wide variety, including efforts to secure a satisfactory status. In other instances it may find its outlet in aggressive, rebellious, or revengeful and sadistic responses, such as hostility to various forms of authority and discipline, or strong emotionalized reactions to wrongs felt by others. Or the thwarting of normal demands for affection and what W. I. Thomas called the desire for intimate response, which is not necessarily directly sexual, may prove to be the motivating element. Moreover, there is evidence that occasionally delinquents, like some adult criminals, are driven to misconduct by an impulse toward punishment. Such individuals get a certain satisfaction from suffering at the hands of those in authority—a masochistic counterpart, perhaps, to their aggression.

The case of Mary Huber well illustrates a combination of factors: thwarted affectional life, resentment of parental authority, compensation for felt inferiority, and rebellious outbursts into delinquencies. This girl, whose first serious misconduct grew out of an intolerable home situation involving a sharp conflict of cultural norms, quickly went on to a series of other delinquencies, ending in tragedy.

Case of Mary Huber. Mary, aged 14, was turned over to the juvenile court officers after having been arrested on the charges of stealing something like \$250 from her own father. When the latter first reported the felony to the police, he had no idea that his own daughter had taken the money. Mary readily admitted having picked her father's pocket as the two of them were riding from the Huber farm into a near-by town. She said she needed money to buy some clothes and intended to return the remainder when she had got what she wanted. It was evident that she had no idea of the amount she had taken from her father. Before being apprehended, she had purchased a pair of slippers and a pair of rubbers. When Mr. Scott, the county detective, took her into custody, she told him that she had no suitable clothes and had been obliged to wear the dresses handed down to her by her older sisters.

Pending clinical examination and disposition of the case, Mary was placed in a resident "Girls' Club" maintained by the Juvenile Protective Association. The members of the Club ranged in age from 12 to 20 years. Some were homeless girls, some were delinquents awaiting court action, still others were "behavior" cases from home and school detained there until foster homes or other provision could be made for them.

On the order of the juvenile court judge Mary was sent to a clinic. The ex-

amination there showed her to be in good health, though somewhat overweight. Her I.Q. was 89.

At her first interview with the psychologist, Mary spoke frankly of her difficulties and told of her conflict with her father. While her usual reactions were rather slow, she became easily aroused to anger. "I am just like my father in that," she shouted. She resented her father's ridicule and criticism. "He insults me; he makes a fool of me. I often have to bite my tongue nearly off to keep from talking back to him." Her family, teachers, and playmates had all made her conscious of her violent temper.

Mary had developed a distinct sense of inferiority. She daydreamed a great deal about her appearance. She thought herself homely. (She was a stocky, heavy blonde.) She suffered occasionally from nightmares. She also worried about her schoolwork, both because of low grades and having to recite in the presence of others. She blushed easily, causing the students to laugh at her. She was afraid of being teased and reacted hostilely to anyone who did so. She remarked, "I am clumsy and always get hurt when playing; but when I get mad I am not so very clumsy." She greatly resented having been told both at school and at home that she was "childish." Yet asked about her play contacts, she said she always liked taking the rôle of the daredevil. She got a thrill out of appearing "tough."

Her attitudes toward her teachers were almost entirely qualified by their disciplinary measures toward her. She had "no use" for the parish priest "because he hollers at me," and she heartily disliked the sisters at the parochial school—which she once attended—because they tried to restrain her. She declared that she had no intention of remaining a Catholic when she grew up.

Ambivalent to her temper tantrums was her tendency to melancholy and self-pity. From time to time she contemplated suicide. At about the age of 12 she had on one occasion deliberately walked into a small pond near her home and, standing in water just above her knees, had called out loudly that she would drown herself then and there. When nobody paid any attention to her, she went into the house.

As to a vocation she expressed little or no interest, except to say that she wanted to be a beauty-parlor operator. This was clearly a wish related to her anxiety about her physical appearance.

Her whole reaction to her family was either one of open antagonism or of complete indifference. She was fond of her mother at times, especially when the latter attempted to pacify the father about her. But Mary's greatest bitterness and resentment were directed toward her father. "I could get along without him very well," she declared feelingly. She had no affection for any of her sisters.

In subsequent interviews, in addition to further evidence of her strong reactions to deprivation and frustration, it became clear that Mary was characterized by distinct suggestibility. She was restless and constantly seeking some outlet for her emotionally disturbed inner life (As will be noted below, this high suggestibility was evidently a factor in leading her into more serious delinquencies later.)

Instead of acquiring any moral rôle or superego through home training and in church and school, she had built up strong resistances to moral obligations chiefly because they were identified in her mind with her father's restrictive authority. At times Mary had taken odd change from her father's clothes with which to buy lunches or candy. She also confessed to having stolen fifty cents from the school on one occasion. It was evident that certain habits of petty stealing were already at hand. While she expressed some sense of

shame about her temper tantrums, she had little or no guilt for having stolen money from her father.

Mary was the youngest child of a German-American farm family. The father, aged 66 years, and the mother, aged 55, had immigrated to the United States shortly after their marriage. They had purchased a dairy farm, where the family had resided for 25 years. The father had always made a good living, though he frequently complained about his debts and taxes. There were nine children in all, seven daughters and two sons.

The family situation had been one of almost constant conflict. Mr. Huber ruled his wife and children with an iron hand. He was an unbending authoritarian who worked hard and expected all his family to do the same. In fact, he was so overbearing and even cruel, so given to outbursts of temper and physical punishment, that all the other children except Mary had left home as soon as they could manage to do so. The wife was a fair housekeeper but showed signs of severe treatment and looked 20 years older than her actual age. On two occasions, at the entreaties of her older daughters, she had left home, but had returned when her husband had promised to be more kind.

Upon investigation it was found that three of the daughters had previously been involved in criminal conduct. Two of them had served short terms in the state reformatory for women on sex charges; and another daughter was known to the police to have been involved in like misconduct but had escaped conviction. At the time of Mary's difficulties these sisters had all settled down to apparently normal living.

Since Mary was the only child left at home, the father insisted on her helping him on the farm. She had to rise before five o'clock every morning in order to do some of the milking and to aid in making deliveries of milk. She then had to hurry a mile to school, and was frequently scolded by the teacher for being tardy. She was given no allowance for lunches, but her mother usually gave her unbuttered slices of bread. She often threw this would-be lunch away rather than face the ridicule of the other children, who taunted her about her fare. About the only clothes she had were the cast-off garments of her sisters. She was forbidden any recreation because both her father and her mother expressed their fears that she might become "wild like her sisters had been." Mary later told the psychologist of attending school and neighborhood parties by pretending to be going to confession.

At the Girls' Club Mary met several older and sophisticated girls who filled her with stories of adventure and of thrills at drinking and sexual parties. Much of this was pure fiction, but it greatly impressed the country girl, who had long dreamed of romance and excitement as a way of escaping an unpleasant life of hard work and family conflict. But Mary herself proved to be a trouble-maker at the club. She became a bearer of tales; she lied with ease; she was quarrelsome and quick-tempered and often accused others of abusing her.

The court put Mary on probation on the understanding that she would be placed in a boarding home for a few months. During the informal hearing in the judge's chambers, when the plan for Mary was discussed and the decision announced about the boarding home and about the requirement for the father to pay, in part, for Mary's keep, the father flew into a rage. He had been furious at the discovery that his own daughter had stolen his money in the first place, and now he felt that to be required to aid in keeping her away from home was adding insult to injury. He tore off his coat, stormed in peasant German dialect at the judge, and declared he would go home and hang himself in his barn before he would pay one cent to keep his "evil" daughter anywhere.

Mary remained in her first boarding home less than a week, and was then returned to the probation department as being uncontrollable and entirely unwilling to cooperate with members of the household. She was then placed in another boarding home, with a Mrs. Johnson, who had had excellent success with other girls. In less than six weeks the Johnsons asked to be relieved of their responsibility. Mrs. Johnson reported that Mary quarreled constantly, had an ungovernable temper, used profane language, refused to go to school, and slipped out of the house on every opportunity "to gad" about with strange boys. On various occasions she had "even brought boys of questionable reputations" into the house.

The clinic advisory group then recommended that Mary be sent to a Catholic social agency's home for wayward girls, but, while arrangements were being made for this transfer, Mary ran away from the Johnson home. A week later she turned up at the office of the clinical psychologist. It was later discovered that she, in company with girls she had met earlier at the Girls' Club and elsewhere, had been going about with a group of older boys and men who frequented the town's speakeasies. One of her married sisters then tried to keep her for a fortnight but with no success. Finally Mary was allowed to return home on her own promise to help her father and mother. She asked only that her father not make her deliver milk and that he refrain from abusing her. She gravely declared, "I won't be sworn at on Main Street."

After a week at home, Mary was taken to the state hospital for an appendectomy. Following her release from the hospital, she remained a week or so with one of her sisters. She then returned home. She later confessed that it was while living at home again that she had her initial sexual relations, with a boy she had known in school. But after a week at home she departed for the county seat. She did not report to the probation office, however, but got a room in a cheap hotel and took a job as a waitress in a near-by restaurant.

The next few weeks were filled with a series of escapades with boys and men, some of whom it was discovered were involved in bootlegging, automobile thefts, and other serious crimes. She had made up her mind, she boasted, to "paint the town red." Finally she was apprehended along with some other girls, and placed in the county jail until arrangements could be made to send her to the state industrial school for girls. It was during this interim that she was seen for the last time by the clinical psychologist. She confessed some fear of being pregnant, but declared that, if she was, she would kill herself. She begged the psychologist to intervene with the judge to give her "another chance." When the whole story of her six months' experience—with her constantly broken promises to do better—and the meaning of her violent temper tantrums were again discussed with her in a friendly way, and when she was faced with her own failure to cooperate, she pleaded all the more for a chance "to go straight."

She did not know that the psychologist and the probation officer had in their possession letters which she had tried to smuggle out of the jail to her men friends outside how she planned to fool the judge by getting the help of the psychologist and the social workers, or, that failing to shoot herself in the foot or get slightly injured by an automobile, so that she could get to the hospital, from which she could then escape and make off to Chicago, where she thought she would be safe from apprehension. She felt bitter about being sent to the state school and again threatened suicide.

Before the clinic could prepare its report on this latest interview, the girl was taken to the state school. Three days later she hanged herself in her room. This tragic end aroused considerable newspaper and public dis-

cussion of the case, but the clinic staff was convinced that this was intended to be but another gesture of defiance and self-pity which would bring her sympathy and an opportunity to escape, not a deliberate act of self-destruction.

In terms of differences in culture this case illustrates a conflict between certain Old World patterns of severe paternal authority and the more democratic family norms in the United States. At the level of psychological analysis the most striking features are:

(1) Mary's strong identification with her father as shown by her imitation of his aggressive outbursts when thwarted in even little things and in her adopting his suicidal gestures on other occasions. (2) In contrast to this, Mary sensed a loss of affection from her parents, but apparently felt this rejection more intensely as regards her father. (3) Her inner confusion between wanting to be loved and being strongly identified with the father and her feeling of being rejected and of being abused led to strong hostility toward her father in particular. Her mother was usually regarded with indifference or disdain at being a sentimental weakling. In this, too, Mary reflected a rather common view of the wife and mother in the patriarchal authoritarian German family. (4) The girl's fantasy life was largely motivated by her feeling of rejection and from her frustration at having to stay home and work. It was also stimulated by her sense of loneliness and isolation from her schoolmates. (5) Her inner conflict, feeling of not belonging, and her fantasies of escape were finally externalized by her thrill-seeking adventures involving buying clothes, running away, and sexual misconduct. There is considerable evidence that she was regarded by her male companions as a silly adolescent who could be easily exploited. Also the stories she had heard about her older sisters and their "wild life" gave her "copies" of what she might do, despite her parents' having held the sisters up as "bad" examples of misbehavior.

This case gives clear evidence of deprivation of affection, feeling of rejection, and of consequent sense of insecurity, and inferiority. Mary had an intense craving for attention. She faced deprivation and frustrations by marked hostility. Moreover she was constantly on the alert for some means to bolster her ego, to restore her sense of security, and to remove her fear of not being wanted. And, when Mary did not get this emotional support through love and affection, she began to strive for it through socially deviant conduct. Her responses to any frustration were immediate, intense, and impulsive. She violently reacted against every evidence of discipline at home, in the school, and later from the social workers and foster-home adults who tried to be of assistance to her.

There are still other motivations in delinquent conduct. There has been considerable talk about the place of sexuality, especially in relation to adolescent girls in delinquency, but direct frustration of sexual expression is seldom a basic factor. Frequently young girls become sexually delinquent not because they are intensely erotic but because giving sexual favors to

young men secures for them a wanted sense of intimacy and affection, even though the relations implied are temporary and often clearly deceptive and exploitative in nature. Often, in these cases, there is a certain deprivation of affectional relations at home, a felt rejection by father, mother, or siblings. In such instances, rather than go into stealing or other aggressive offenses against property and persons, the individual indulges in substitutive reactions which stimulate love and affection. Practically all investigations indicate that in our society it is girls rather than boys who fall into this type of misconduct, at least in significantly higher proportion. There is no doubt that cultural patterns play a distinctive part in directing the behavior of young women into these channels of sensuality. Sexual love is the key to marriage and family life; it is the symbol of affection and security between the parents in the home; and, although a young girl may witness conflicts between her parents, the basic stability of the family remains rooted chiefly in the love life of the parents. Hence, when a girl is deprived of affection and its attendant security, sex becomes for her—at least under the suggestion of her male companions—the obvious means of repossessing the very affection which she has missed at home or elsewhere.¹⁶

There are some instances of delinquents, and of criminals, too, whose misconduct seems to be motivated by an inner desire or compulsion to be punished. With intense drives to activity arising from rebellion and resistance to authority, the individual in these cases seems to be ambivalently impelled to commit acts which he realizes more or less consciously will sooner or later get him into difficulty with the police and the courts and lead to punishment. Among these delinquents and criminals it is not uncommon for them to express a definite sense of relief at their arrest. Such an act from others seems itself to produce a resolution of the inner tensions which have been associated with their misdeeds. In these the superego or conscience operates as a self-punishing mechanism.

Life Organization of the Delinquent. Social-emotional motivation and attendant attitudes are probably more significant in most delinquent careers than are the intellectual qualities. We have noted the importance of frustration, deprivation, and rejection, and the attendant sense of inferiority with all its compensatory manifestations. The rebelliousness, the aggressiveness, and the resentment of many delinquents are traceable to thwarted love life and to loss of the sense of security, in the home and school in particular. Failing to develop the expected attitudes and traits, the individual faced with emotional distress comes to be dominated by more rudimentary impulses. It is easy to understand how, like water, the impulses seek their own level and these boys and girls soon gravitate to

¹⁶ For a good statement on the place of women in crime, with some attention to the factor of sex see O. L. Pollak, *The Criminality of Women* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1950).

companions and localities where there are thrill, adventure, excitement, and other outlets for these deep-seated emotional interests.

Finally it may be said that we do not have any clear idea just what psychological factors predispose certain children to delinquent behavior while their siblings do not become so divergent. Certainly in many instances there early arises considerable contrast in thought and action between siblings—one of whom became delinquent, the other not. On the whole the former tends either to be more easily emotionally distressed, or to be over-docile and over-attached to adults, with no effort at emancipation until it takes an aberrant form partly because it is delayed.

PERSONALITY OF THE ADULT CRIMINAL

Narrowly delimited, crime has to do with acts which are forbidden by statute or other legal instrument. In these matters the political state operates to enforce the criminal law by means of punishment. But obviously the law touches only some, not all, of the conduct norms. Infractions of the mores and of the demands of public sentiment likewise represent deviant behavior for which disapproval is expressed in some form or other. What is criminal therefore depends upon how a society defines acts as antilegal and antimoral, and how it punishes those who commit such acts.¹⁷

There are, in fact, a variety of individuals who deviate from the legal and moral norms of a particular community or society. First, there are those who do not accept the codes of the group which acts to enforce a certain norm. Second, there are those who do more or less accept this norm in principle but who nevertheless run counter to it in actual conduct. Third, from the viewpoint of the political state there are those who are known to the police as criminals but who cannot be charged with or arrested for crimes because of various technical or other reasons. Fourth, there are those who get arrested for alleged infractions. Fifth, there are the individuals who are convicted and punished by the legal authorities. The criminal persons who have been studied by lawyers, criminologists, psychiatrists, psychologists, sociologists, social workers, and others are chiefly a sample of this last classification.

We are concerned principally with those individuals who, having come into conflict with the legal authorities, are punished for their illegal acts. The broader problem of misconduct—that is, infractions of the cultural norms generally—as important as it is, falls outside the scope of our present discussion.

When we turn to examine the personalities of those who run afoul of the

¹⁷ As an introduction to the wide field of criminology, the reader may consult: H. E. Barnes and N. K. Teeters, *New Horizons in Criminology* (New York, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1943), W. C. Reckless, *The Crime Problem* (New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1950), E. R. Sutherland, *Principles of Criminology*, 4th ed. (Philadelphia, J. B. Lippincott Company, 1947), Donald R. Taft, *Criminology*, rev. ed. (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1950).

conduct norms, especially those who fall into the hands of the police and the courts, we are impressed by the difficulties of trying to describe and analyze the elements which distinguish the criminal from the non-criminal. In the first place, the situation in our complex society is vastly different from the situation under primary-group organization. In the latter type of society, with a more homogeneous culture, the conduct code is as a rule relatively simple and direct, and the norms of behavior are usually pretty well integrated into the personal lives of most of the members of the society. In these situations, violations of the norms are usually easy to detect, and the punishment may be relatively direct. Today we have a wide variety of competing interest groups with conflicting standards, and the matter of describing and interpreting the infractions of the codes of the community and the state is not so simple.

Effects of Changing and Conflicting Norms. The seriousness of the problem of crime in our country depends in large part upon the conflict of norms. This, in turn, is but a phase of the larger process of cultural growth involving a shift from primary to secondary group dominance. In this process such matters as mass migration of rural immigrants to our cities (either from Europe or Asia, or from our own countryside), the great mobility of people, the decline of the family as the basic social group, the disappearance of the neighborhood, the high division of labor, the increase of impersonality in human contacts, and the loss of moral religious faith all play a part in producing social and personal disorientation and disorganization. Delinquency and crime are really, in part, but phases of the reorganization of cultural norms and the reshaping of personality organization which accompanies this larger process.

In dealing with crime we must take into account the motivation and meaning of the act to the individual in relation to the conduct norms which he accepts and considers correct as well as with reference to the norms of the larger society within which he operates. We must never forget that *meaning* is socially and culturally determined, largely by how one's fellows define a particular item or series of items of behavior. A racketeer may consider his alleged criminal activity as perfectly right and proper. So, too, a member of an isolated minority group like the gypsy may see no wrong in his depredations against the property of persons outside his own group. Revolutionary agitators seldom consider their acts against the dominant state as anything but praiseworthy. If there is a genuine conflict of cultural standards as to what is right and lawful, the handling of the criminal in terms of a group norm which he does not accept may be useless so far as prevention or reformation is concerned. Only when the individual internalizes the norm of the punishing group will he make, ordinarily, any serious effort to change his ideas, attitudes, and habits as they concern his alleged criminal activity. (See below.)

There have been various classifications of criminal personalities, but

we need not go into the ramifications of this matter. For our purposes simple descriptive categories will do. We shall take up, first, those individuals whose criminal activities are associated with organized crime. Next we shall discuss those who might be expected to accept the conduct norms of our society but whose socialization in this was incomplete, or who under unusual circumstances go contra the codes. Then there are the neurotic individuals who become enmeshed in crime. Finally brief mention must be made of the psychotic criminals who, while not large in number, always arouse a lot of public attention to their infractions of law and order.

Organized Crime and the Individual Malefactor. Mention has already been made of those crimes which represent a kind of corporate organization of misconduct and may be considered as representing really a subculture at war with the norms of the larger society. Under strong leadership with a kind of feudal social structure of personal loyalty and division of labor, racketeers and gangsters apply many of the techniques of the capitalist entrepreneur. Men like Capone and Costello try to organize and control traffic in illicit liquor and narcotics, gambling, prostitution, and other forms of vice and crime with an eye to making money. We know that the institutions of prostitution, gambling, and narcotic trade are old in urban societies. The racketeer merely moves in and tries to "corner the market," as it were. While these activities run counter to the mores of our American life, they nevertheless represent a persistent and convenient provision for certain fundamental desires in many individuals: for sexual outlet, for new adventure, and for indulgence of anxiety-removing and pleasure-giving sensations.

In recent decades, moreover, the racketeer has entered the labor market and the wholesale and retail merchandising fields. He has often worked out deals with labor-union leaders to intimidate employers and to bring possible recalcitrant union members or other workers into line with the union leaders' policies.¹⁸ So, too, and under the guise of "protection" he has exploited many business enterprises.

Naturally one asks, what of the personality manifestations of the individuals who operate such a system of extralegal and illegal control? Are these men subnormal? Are they feeble-minded or neurotic or psychotic? And again, how different is this sort of exploitation from that found where the members of a firm manipulate the stock market so as to cheat thousands of individuals out of their money? The history of the making of large fortunes in this country is replete with instances of success brought in what were essentially criminal ways. In such matters we are dealing with a whole institutional structure, and the individuals concerned therein differ in their personality manifestations as do people everywhere. They are varied as to rôle and status. They doubtless represent different degrees of

¹⁸ For a popular account see Malcolm Johnson, *Crime on the Labor Front* (New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1950)

integration of attitudes, traits, and habits. Moreover, they produce, each in his own way, rationalizations which reflect the norms of the sub-groups whose conduct norms they take for granted. It is extremely difficult to make out a case that racketeers represent an aberrant type of personality in contrast to those who rig a stock market or sell fake stocks.

Yet, from the larger view of a dominant although ideal conduct norm of our society regarding the sacredness of life and property and the right to keep the results of one's own toil, the individuals engaged in such forms of depredation and exploitation must be classed as criminal. From the standpoint of full socialization—that is, internalization of the moral and legal codes of their society—all these men represent deviates. The reason we do not ordinarily consider the great financial exploiters to be of the same cloth as the gangster or racketeer is because the "resistance potential" (Sellin) toward the gangster is much higher than it is toward the exploiters of natural resources or of the stock market. Put in other words, most of us brought up on the paradoxical combination of Christian morality and the customary business ethics of capitalistic money-making have psychologically much more in common with the great captains of finance than we have with the "big shots" of vice, gambling, and organized crime. For this reason we condone the crimes of the financiers more readily.

Family Patterns of Crime. Not unrelated to the place of conflicting norms of divergent groups within a larger community or society in inducing criminal conduct are those instances which reveal what might be called a family pattern of crime. In these cases we may find that criminal behavior has become more or less standardized—that is, become a culture pattern—for a family over a number of generations. This is frequently seen in milder misconduct such as petty thievery, begging, and more or less institutionalized beggary or vagrancy. Many communities find themselves constantly exploited by whole families that live by preying on their neighbors.

Falling in this general category is Shaw's account of the criminal careers of the five Martin brothers. This is an interesting story of family neglect and stimulation to begging, followed by more serious misconduct, and in four of them by reformation. Each of these brothers was studied rather intensively through an examination of their criminal records, from the collection of data on the family background, from their autobiographies, from various psychiatric interviews, and from a series of tests and ratings. The following summary, which presents some of the differences and likenesses in traits and attitudes of the Martin brothers, is based on Burgess's analysis of their careers for the Shaw volume:¹⁰

(1) John's life history is largely an apology filled with attempts to justify his criminal career, chiefly to himself, not to others. Of all the five documents his is most indifferent to the possible effects on his readers. He never places the

¹⁰ C. R. Shaw *et al.*, *Brothers in Crime* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1938).

blame for his criminal conduct upon himself, but elsewhere, first upon his oldest brother, who died, and then in this order upon his father, upon the neighborhood, upon his partner in his last offense, and finally upon women. His life history, which is filled with moralizing and philosophizing, shows him to be the most egocentric of the brothers.

Yet his egocentricity seems to have had no "causal relation" to his entry upon a life of crime, upon his continuance therein, or upon his reform. During the years he spent in the army he was evidently well adjusted, but later, without much resistance, fell back into his old habits. His criminal attitudes and habits do not seem to have been deep-seated, however, but they do persist relatively unaltered although he has had no record of criminality during the last ten years. In sharp contrast with the optimistic plans for the future which characterize the autobiographies of the older brothers, John, in the closing sections of his life story, expresses "feelings of depression and defeatism" which seem to indicate that of the five he is the least well adjusted.

(2) In contrast to John's, Edward's autobiography is that of a normal individual who describes his delinquency, crime, and prison experiences objectively and impartially. Evidently as a child he was as responsive to socially approved as he was to delinquent patterns of conduct. On at least two occasions, he relates, he was especially "susceptible of sympathetic approaches for his reformation." Of the five, he seems the most conscious of the alternatives between approved and criminal conduct. At the time of writing his story he was well adjusted and oriented toward a legitimate career. He writes, "I am a determined sort of fellow and I am going to succeed somehow."

(3) James is the only one of the brothers who possesses a marked degree of self-consciousness. His awareness of his reader-audience is indicated in the opening sentence of his narrative: "This story of my life is written so that folks may see the inside of my past and not only the crust as I think they see it now." He is interested in revealing his inner thoughts and feelings, especially those related to his years in correctional institutions. He remarks, "I wasn't born tough. The treatment in the institutions made me that way. My heart grew bitter and hard . . . [from] the manhandling I received." Also, he was more concerned than the others with analyzing his own mental conflicts as to whether to continue in misconduct or take up a legitimate job. He reports that he often tried to keep at work but that "friends lured me back to the racket," that he disliked stealing but went along in order to avoid ridicule. He candidly states his full intention to go straight, if not for his own then for his mother's sake, but includes a reservation, "If given any kind of a chance." At present he seems well adjusted to normal society.

(4) Michael presents a rather matter-of-fact, unimaginative, fairly objective, but somewhat defensive account of his life. He does not expose his inner world of emotions, feelings, and attitudes. But the document does show him to be characterized by self-pity, hypercriticism of law-enforcing officials and agencies, and an inclination to blame society and others for his criminality and for his present predicament. (He was still in prison when he wrote his history.) In fact, he admits that he may continue his criminal career, though he concludes his document with the following implicit bargain to society: "All I need is a good job with a good salary and then the state of Illinois can check another boy off their hands as reformed."

(5) While Carl's autobiography reveals less than any of the others, it does provide some insight into its author. He diverges rather sharply from his brothers in his traits and attitudes. He is the most objective, the least communicative, and, possibly excepting Edward, the least susceptible to the in-

fluence of the criminal culture which surrounded him. He writes chiefly about the environment and less about himself.

Much of this difference from the other brothers may be due to Carl's youth. (He was the youngest.) He appears to be still in a common adolescent state of ambivalent trends, one toward dependence, the other toward independence. He did not run about nights as did his brothers; and he seems more conscious of the disapproval of delinquency by society than they were. He resolved early not to fall into the life of delinquency, and his misconduct arose later when he began going along with his older brothers or companions in their exploits.

A series of six scales were devised to reveal emotionality, independence, social adjustment, and the like. Regarding the results of these tests, Burgess writes:

"John is markedly below the average in social adjustment, average in independence; somewhat below average in emotional stability and extroversion; below average in self-sufficiency and dominance.

"Edward is average in social adjustment; markedly above the average in independence, self-sufficiency, and dominance; and unusually high in emotional stability and extroversion.

"James is average in social adjustment and independence; above average in emotional stability and extroversion; somewhat above the average in self-sufficiency; and average in dominance.

"Michael is below average in social adjustment; somewhat below average in independence; average in extroversion; below average in emotional stability and dominance; and markedly below average in self-sufficiency.

"Carl is markedly above average in social adjustment, somewhat below average in independence; markedly above average in emotional stability, extroversion, and dominance; and somewhat below the average in self-sufficiency."²⁰

It is worth noting that four of these five brothers have made fairly good adjustments as normal members of society since their release. Burgess attributes this to their own favorable attitudes and resolution to reform and to the favorable and sympathetic treatment which they received while under state control and direction.

Deficient Intelligence as a Factor in Criminality. When we turn to the second broad classification, that of persons within a given community who are more or less adapted to its conduct norms but who nevertheless fall into trouble with the police and the law, we find that criminologists frequently center their attention on the importance of mental defectiveness as a factor. There has been not only a wide variation in the reported findings and in their interpretation as to the frequency of low intelligence among criminals but also considerable divergence in the interpretation as to the significance of this factor in the incidence of criminal activities. As already noted when the intelligence test was first invented it was hailed as a scientific and therapeutic godsend. Scholars and reformers imagined, as they did with regard to juvenile delinquents, that here was an instrument which would enable them to get at the "causes" of crime. But this

²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 332-333. By permission.

enthusiasm was misplaced. As Sutherland has shown, the incidence of criminality in the feeble-minded population is no greater than it is in the normal. He has also pointed out—on the basis of a wide series of investigations—that dull-witted prisoners are no more difficult to discipline while incarcerated than are normal; they are about as successful on parole as the latter; they have about the same rate of recidivism. There is, however, some slight support for the popular belief that the weak-minded are more given to sex crimes than those of normal intellect.²¹

This is not to say, of course, that we may completely ignore the possible importance of mental deficiency as a factor in some criminal conduct. For one thing the individual poorly endowed with intelligence may not be capable of the essential learning which lies behind adequate socialization. He may fail to develop a moral self or the superego; he may lack comprehension of the world of his fellows and of his proper rôle therein. But, if the social-cultural environment is favorable in the sense of providing him with economic, marital, and recreational outlets of a normal sort, the person of low mentality may make a satisfactory adjustment. On the other hand, in the face of crisis, or through the anti-moral suggestions of others, or under the impress of strong emotionality, which sometimes, though by no means always, accompanies feeble-mindedness, the mentally defective may fall into difficulties with the law.

The Socially and Emotionally Maladjusted Criminal. In this wide category a variety of specific constellations of habits, traits, and attitudes may be found. Much depends on how one defines social-emotional stability, and so far we lack adequate objective standards. In the end, the matter rests upon the rather broad and somewhat amorphous, but none the less important, cultural norm, even though the norm varies with social class, occupation, and other groupings. For our purposes we shall simply select certain illustrative cases for comment. In this way we may reveal the many facets which enter into the development of patterns of life which lead an individual into certain acts that the dominant groups in our society consider criminal.

We must repeat that only a small fraction of the total acts of any criminal, even those labeled degenerate and vicious, are to be defined as deviant. That is, these persons have a set of basic personal habits not unlike those of the rest of us. They are often capable of great love, bravery, and endurance—all high values in our society. Not infrequently they are pious, and most of them have some sense of guilt and shame for their acts. It usually takes time to make them thoroughly immoral and contra-legal in their conduct. And, despite frequent vocational maladaptation, a large number of criminals are not lazy and have pretty well accepted our cultural definition of the importance of a job. In short, in dealing with such a deviant person we place a *general* all-inclusive label or brand on him

²¹ E. H. Sutherland, *Principles of Criminology*, 4th ed., pp. 104-105

because more or less specific and segmental acts have brought him into conflict with the law and mores. Yet in time many criminals, in part because of our treatment of them, do develop a more or less persistent *criminal rôle* and may in some cases make this the central focus of their life organization.

Such matters as the sense of injustice or of inferiority, the thwarting of self or ego demands, and the frustration of love, with its not infrequent ambivalent turning to hatred—these and many other configurations of emotional and ideational factors in the individual may be important in inducing acts that are considered criminal. In fact, the isolation of the person from active participation in the normal life around him may be an important factor in inducing misconduct. The continuation of strong mother fixation, persistence of childish emotions, and inability to assume economic responsibilities are other stimulating factors in such deviant behavior.

The effects of a persistence of undue childish attachment of the son to his mother, with all that this implies as to failure to develop normal heterosexual attitudes and habits, is strikingly demonstrated in our society by those criminals who get into difficulties because of their homosexuality. Various studies show that among homosexuals, infantile and childish fixations upon the mother are evidently important items in the life organization. Terman and Miles, in their study of femininity and masculinity, present some interesting data on this whole matter. Included in their total sample were 19 men in a state prison who had been convicted of homosexuality. In summarizing their findings on these men, they say:

"If the case-history data supplied by these individuals can be accepted as anywhere near the truth, the psycho-social formula for developing homosexuality in boys would seem to run somewhat as follows: too demonstrative affection from an excessively emotional mother, especially in the case of a first, last, or only child, a father who is unsympathetic, autocratic, brutal, much away from home, or deceased, treatment of the child as a girl, coupled with lack of encouragement or opportunity to associate with boys and to take part in the rougher masculine activities, over-emphasis on neatness, niceness, and spirituality; lack of vigilance against the danger of seduction by older homosexual males. The formula, of course, does not always work. Doubtless many children who grow up in an environment of the kind just described become nevertheless heterosexual; possibly a majority do."²²

It would take us too far afield to examine the many types of crime in which neurotic individuals indulge. However, the personality dynamics of certain neurotic criminals have been exposed by psychoanalytically oriented criminologists.²³ From the many suggestive analyses at hand we will mention only three: swindling, theft, and aggressive assault.

²² From *Sex and Personality*, p. 329, by L. M. Terman and Catherine C. Miles. Copyright, 1916, McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc. By permission.

²³ An important contribution is Ernst Alexander and William Healy, *Roots of Crime: Psychoanalytic Studies* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1935).

According to Bromberg, there are two kinds of swindlers.²⁴ One seeks self-aggrandizement by pretending he is someone above his own status. The other is represented in the confidence man whose conscious motive is to secure money by deceit. The former may pretend to be banker, high military officer, or important governmental administrator. But confidence men also put up an impressive front to their would-be victims. The bearing of the swindler is often unctuous and his speech facile and fluent. He has many of the marks of the pathological liar. He is self-elevating and usually assumes attitudes of invincibility and infallibility.

As we have noted above the rôle and status of the delinquent and the criminal alike are defined, in part, in terms of projections of others of their own unconscious wishes to get something for nothing, to indulge freely in sexual expression, and otherwise to live out their fantasies. The unconscious but subtle interplay of criminal and victim is evident in swindling. Bromberg states the matter in these words:

"The feeling of infallibility, which grows out of the swindler's inner emotional needs and has become an integral part of his personality, is accepted by his victim. At the same time, the study of the swindler's victims reveals the presence of similar unconscious tendencies within themselves, namely, the wish for unlimited bounty and, secondly, the feeling of personal infallibility. The swindler is aware of these deeper psychologic currents in his victim and utilizes them in his approach. The technique of swindling features elements of secrecy, mystery, or intricacy which befuddle the victim by blinding his judgment and allowing his unconscious wishes to emerge. . . .

"The victim of a confidence game is indulging his own desire to get something for nothing. So, too, those who are taken in by the first type of swindler, the pretender to high and different status get satisfaction by identifying themselves with a rôle they would like to play but dare not."²⁵

In a similar manner Bromberg points out that the various forms of stealing show a variety of unconscious motives. He says burglary which is theft by entering a building when the occupants are assumed to be absent reflects "an underlying trait of passivity. The basic character of burglary is that of stealth. Stealth is aggression under cover, the aggression of a passive individual with a feeling of inferiority."²⁶ So, too, Bromberg reports that among men convicted of robbery whom he examined, many of them, but by no means all, showed "deep feelings of inferiority and passivity."²⁷

Criminals who commit aggressive crimes such as assault and murder often display neurotic complexes. A frequent basis for such actions is a strong sense of inferiority which may be overlaid with compensatory swaggering and courage. Deep anxiety regarding sexual inadequacy accom-

²⁴ Walter Bromberg, *Crime and the Mind: An Outline of Psychiatric Criminology* (Philadelphia, J. B. Lippincott Company, 1948) Quotations by permission.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 75, 141.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 141.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 148.

panied by the constant strain of defending one's virility has been found to be the motivation behind rape as well as behind cases in which a jealous husband kills his adulterous wife and/or her paramour.

It has been shown repeatedly that some neurotic criminals have a strong wish to be caught and punished. Many times, as Bromberg remarks, "the forbidden act or crime is set in motion because of the need for punishment . . ." Moreover, "this mental mechanism is completely unknown to the individual."²⁸ In fact, there is evidence that this need plays a part in recidivism. Many so-called "hardened" criminals who are repeatedly arrested and convicted yet seem incapable of social therapy and reformation are probably just such neurotic personalities.

Many other kinds of misbehavior are linked to neuroticism. Background factors such as spoiling, deprivation of love, early intimidation, and others, doubtless have a place in inducing neurotic traits. But, unlike so many neurotics who take flight into symbolic fantasy, the criminal neurotics work off their anxieties in overt activities that get them into difficulty with the law.

Psychosis and Crime. A certain percentage of our criminal population falls more or less definitely into the category of the psychotic or "insane" in the legal and popular sense. While their number is not large in the total of offenders who are arrested and convicted, they often furnish some of the most difficult and persistent problems for the police, the clinical psychologist, and the psychiatrist.

It is difficult to classify psychotic criminals because the categories of psychoses themselves are none too clear. Certainly some of those which Bromberg, for example, calls "aggressive psychopaths" are found among racketeers, strong-arm operators, and professional killers. Some psychiatrists would classify them under the omnibus but poorly defined category of "constitutional psychopathic inferiors." Persons in this class are often regarded as constitutionally and psychologically atypical—something akin to those who in a pre-scientific day were called "born criminals." (See Chapter 23.)

Sometimes individuals with the manic-depressive syndrome commit acts of violence during periods of high excitement or mania. Individuals in this category often have a fair probability of recovery, but the law, following public sentiment, may not take a tolerant view and such persons may be given long terms. Then criminalistic attitudes and values may develop which were not present when the crime of violence was committed.

Some criminals definitely fall into the schizophrenic class: those individuals marked by loss of normal concern with the external world, given over to elaboration of their fantasy world, who develop a distinct split between their emotional-feeling values and the intellectual and habitual

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 148.

demands of the environment. There is no doubt that a good many vagrants, tramps, petty thieves, and others represent a type of schizoid adaptation.

More serious are those criminals who are recruited from the paranoiacs. Some of the most dangerous and socially shocking murderers fall into this category. Such criminals usually have a long history of mental disorder. Often psychotic trends begin in difficulties in getting along with others. In time, these individuals develop extreme self-pity and gradually an increasing tendency to be suspicious of those around them. Such suspicion increases and develops into delusions of persecution. This is but an exterior manifestation of intense inner conflict and emotional distress. As a rule, the delusion becomes centered on one or two or a few persons, frequently close relatives, or on some given group. It may take the form of intense conviction that these others are plotting to undo the individual. This delusion may become so powerful that in a moment of irritation, or from cool deliberation, the paranoiac resolves his fears by a homicidal attack. Such individuals often possess high intelligence and great cunning, and, if their homicidal pattern becomes established, they may repeat such a crime in order to gain a given end. Because paranoiacs are so plausible, often so shrewd in their appeals to others, so clever in rationalizations, and so well oriented in their usual social contacts, their paranoid motivations are frequently well disguised. For these reasons they not infrequently win their freedom from prison only to become serious problems later.

SOME COMMENTS ON TREATMENT

The traditional treatment of both delinquents and criminals has been characterized by the doctrine of punitive justice. Only in recent years have new views arisen and new techniques been attempted in the rehabilitation of those who fall afoul the law and the mores.

We have already noted that the emotional reactions of most people in a community to the delinquent and criminal are often direct and severe. As the Freudian psychologists might put it, our own superego or conscience is constantly pushing upon our strong and elemental id, our animal impulses to damage others personally, or to deprive them of their possessions in order to secure power, or to indulge freely in our sex urges. As a matter of fact the punishment applied in our correctional and penal institutions is evident of our strong unconscious reactions to tendencies to misconduct in ourselves as well as in others.

Programs of Treatment of the Delinquent. The juvenile court and similar social agencies reflect the fact already noted that the home and the school are unable to handle certain problems of child misconduct under their traditional modes of operation. Such legal and social service agencies indicate that the wider community **must take steps to protect the child himself as well as the community from certain kinds of deviant be-**

havior. As the theory of juvenile courts states, the judge and his co-workers must act *in loco parentis* when the family care and control break down. It is not our purpose, however, to examine the functioning of the agencies for child care and protection²⁹ but rather to indicate some possible contributions of psychology and psychiatry to more adequate programs of treatment.

The follow-up of delinquents after release from various correctional or educational programs reports success ranging from 50 per cent to results which show no significant differences between delinquents under careful and sympathetic supervision and those who had no such care. A striking illustration of the latter kind of investigation is the Cambridge-Somerville Youth Study. This study, carried on for over 10 years at a cost of thousands of dollars, reports at its close that there was little difference in the incidence of delinquency between those boys who were given much and extended friendly advice and help and a matched control group who got no such care.³⁰

If we are to deal more effectively with juvenile delinquents in the hope of returning them to normal society, the following factors, among others, must be taken into account: (1) Aid must be given the boy or girl to find self-expression in socially acceptable ways. (2) The delinquent's confidence in himself and in others must be restored. (3) He must acquire insight into his motivations and behavior so that self-control and a sense of moral responsibility may be built up. (4) There must be provision of adequate and satisfying vocational outlets, which will enable him later to assume his own rôle as a sensible head of his own family and as a sound citizen in the community. (5) In dealing with delinquents, it must not be forgotten that their interactions with police officers, juvenile-court judges, probation-staff members, social-service workers, psychologists, psychiatrists, teachers, the personnel of correctional institutions, foster parents, and all others will profoundly influence the success or failure of any program of treatment.

²⁹ See Thorsten Sellin, ed., "Juvenile delinquency," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 1949, 261. Also the annual yearbooks issued by the National Probation and Parole Association provide much current data and discussion on treatment. For a discussion of correctional programs for both juvenile delinquents and adult criminals, see P. W. Tappan, ed., *Contemporary Correction* (New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1951).

³⁰ For a summary of this investigation see Edwin Powers, "An experiment in prevention of delinquency," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 1949, 261:77-88. From a methodological standpoint this study is a curious mixture of the use of a series of good tests of personality and uncontrolled, unstructured, and sentimental contact of various workers with the boys in the so-called "treatment" or "experimental" group. It is not to be wondered at that the results turned out to be so equivocal. The full report will be found in Edwin Powers and Helen L. Witmer, *Experiment in the Prevention of Delinquency: The Cambridge-Somerville Youth Study* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1951). See also Edward Glover, "The Diagnosis and Treatment of Delinquency," Chap. 12 in *Mental Abnormality and Crime* (London, Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1944).

The difficulty with the usual educational or correctional program for delinquents is that they are manned by poorly trained superintendents, supervisors, and workers and that the methods continue to be punitive rather than rehabilitative. All too often these institutions but serve to satisfy the public that the offenders are put out of sight and out of the way, at least for the nonce.

Moreover, the punitive treatment frequently enhances rather than cures the delinquent trend. If through treatment of the individual charged with misconduct we stimulate him in such a way as to cause a spread of his deviant behavior and attitudes to ever wider segments of his personality, we may in the end produce an integrated but a socially mal-adjusted person where at the outset we had only a mild case. Thus if attendants mete out physical punishment, it will, in most instances, be met with further resistance on the part of the delinquent. Sadism is matched with sadism, and in time it is discovered that the would-be reformation has produced in the delinquent or criminal only a hard-boiled attitude of revenge supported by a deep sense of self-pity and injustice.

Various methods of handling delinquents are in use. Probation has been widely used. Under this plan the delinquent may be placed under the guardianship of a probation officer, or put in a foster home, or returned, in some instances, to his own family. Sometimes the boy or girl is sent to a special school with an eye to rehabilitation especially through vocational training. And even within the better correctional institutions many improvements have been made. Reckless, for example, notes the following as important: (1) "The creation and maintenance of a relaxed atmosphere . . ." (2) "The curtailment of useless disciplinary rules and the placing of disciplinary action in the hands of a professional staff who consider with the infracting inmate the reasons for his getting into difficulty and the need for disciplinary action." (3) "Inmate participation on committees" which deal with problems of inter-personal relations in the institution. (4) Development of "small operational units" each developed around the particular needs of the inmates. (5) The use of the cottage plan of housing. And (6) "the recognition of security classes" and the need to differentiate inmates in terms of probabilities of successful rehabilitation.³¹

Some Wider Implications. The high importance of the home in forming the personality of the child is well recognized, and in the matter of delinquency, as in other areas of deviant conduct, it is more than evident that the disorganizing features of contemporary family life will be reflected in misconduct. Marital conflict and inharmonious atmosphere, overindulgence or overdiscipline, and, especially, marked inconsistency of child-

³¹ Walter C. Reckless, "Significant trends in the treatment of crime and delinquency," in Marjorie Bell, ed., *Bulwarks Against Crime* (New York Yearbook, National Probation and Parole Association, 1948), pp. 1-2. By permission.

training, are doubtless much more deleterious than the inadequate incomes which happen to characterize a large proportion of the families from which our delinquents are recruited. The importance of affection, harmony, and tranquillity are obvious. To secure these qualities requires sound childhood training of potential parents and effective adult education for parents whose children are likely to prove delinquent, neurotic, or otherwise divergent. So, too, parents must recognize the need for sane and healthy recreation outside the home—a failure very common among the parents of delinquents.

Second, the school has a significant part to play in the prevention of delinquency. As the traditional functions of the home and church are being dissipated, the school is assuming more and more responsibility, not only for mental and vocational training, but for the whole development of the person from early childhood to late adolescence or beyond. The detection of incipient behavior difficulties among schoolchildren is fundamental, and teachers are beginning to be trained to give attention to these matters as well as to formal drill in school subjects. (See Chapter 15.)

The development of mental-hygiene and guidance clinics within many school systems is further evidence of the growing realization of this problem. So, too, the high importance of extracurricular activities in preventing delinquency is everywhere being recognized.

Finally, there must be a growing recognition in this area of human conduct, as in many others, that the motivations and meanings of life are colored at nearly every point by the larger cultural expectancies and norms. Not only is the economic and political order of our country responsible in a broad way for the production of conditions which stimulate delinquency, but more specifically our whole scheme of dominant values—individualized competition for wealth, prestige, and status; our emphasis upon aggression; our doctrines of independence, freedom, and liberty for the person; our lack of theories and practices of cooperation; and the curious ambivalence of all this to the Christian moral principles of the Golden Rule, of sympathy and love—these together produce a configuration of stimuli which induce much of our delinquency just as it does much of our neurotic and psychotic behavior. Not that misconduct might not occur under other forms of societal organization. It does. But there is no doubt that the extreme emphasis upon individual prowess, upon the prestige and wealth accruing to individual effort, sets a certain ideal that affects misconduct as well as behavior which we call normal.

The Treatment of the Adult Criminal. There is no doubt that the usual methods of handling criminals in our jails and prisons do little to reform them and prepare them for more adequate adjustments to life outside when they are released. There is much evidence that the sense of injustice, mistreatment, and the like experienced while "doing time" tends

to promote motives to seek revenge through misconduct later, when released. The sadism of the "third degree" is self-evident. Severe prison discipline and the "hard-boiled" attitudes and practices of prison guards are not conducive to the recovery from criminality of those who suffer at their hands. Many ex-convicts are motivated to further crimes because of their overwhelming desire for revenge, itself stimulated in part by the punitive, sadistic treatment accorded them in prison. The literature of penology is full of evidence not only that our traditional penal methods do little or nothing to remove desires and attitudes of revenge or to redirect other deviant motivations but that, instead, incarceration actually enhances impulses already established.

While considerable advance has been made in the rehabilitation of criminals, we are far from a scientifically oriented treatment. Much of so-called modern methods are, as Lindner remarks, still "based upon expediency, untested hypotheses, unwarranted conclusions from a pseudo-scientific empiricism."²²

If failure to grow up socially and emotionally is the central aspect of the criminal's personality—as it seems to be—then the treatment should not be beatings, cruelty, and solitary confinement. This may satisfy the sadistic impulses of the guards and the ever-latent sadism of the "outraged" public outside, but it will hardly induce satisfactory changes in the prisoner. As we have indicated in discussing the child in the home, in the school, and elsewhere, love, sympathy, patience, and, above all, provision of a sense of security, of self-importance, and of scope for activity, are highly important. Further deprivation, physical punishment, and the like only accentuate previously conditioned emotional states, which, though unconsciously motivated, serve to disturb the prisoner.

Bromberg has made the wise observation that the treatment of many criminals might be more successful if the psychiatrist or other worker would begin therapy by evoking in the prisoner feelings of dependency. This would provide a basis for the development on the part of the psychiatrist or other person of a parental rôle which would combine certain authority and punitive functions along with those of an indulgent and loving figure. This dual rôle encourages transference and "the possibility of new ego ideals then comes into existence."²³

All that we have said about the matter of rational treatment for juvenile delinquents applies equally well for adult criminals. But, unfortunately

²² R. M. Lindner, *Rebel Without a Cause* (New York, Grune & Stratton, Inc., 1944), p. 258. See also, K. J. Scudder, "Progress in handling the adult offender," in Marjorie Bell, ed., *Redirecting the Delinquent* (New York, Yearbook, National Probation and Parole Association, 1947), pp. 13-20.

²³ Bromberg, *op. cit.*, p. 198. See also, Walter Bromberg and T. C. Rodgers, "Authority in the treatment of delinquents," *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry*, 1946, 16:672-685.

for the prisoners and for society, by the time the individual reaches adulthood, he is often so fixed in habit, trait, and attitude that little can be done to alter him. If a certain personal inflexibility in the child is the despair of the mother or teacher, it is the even greater despair of those who would reform the criminal.

CHAPTER 23

Neurotic and Psychotic Manifestations of Personality

As he grows up the individual is provided with a host of "copies" of thought and conduct which are defined for him as "normal," "proper" and "good" by parents, playmates, teachers, preachers, employers, and others. But, as we noted in Chapter 22, norms are always relative, so far as the individual is concerned, first, with reference to those of the larger community or society, and, second, to those of various sub-groups in which he participates. Norms always imply expectation and acceptance or consensus of the basic values of a given group.

This acceptance, however, does not mean absolute conformity. All societies take cognizance of individual variations. Moreover, deviations in thought and words are often permitted so long as overt conduct conforms fairly well to the accepted and proper patterns. Usually it is only when the number of divergent features in behavior is believed to be excessive or when some unaccepted activity is so intense or violent as to be considered detrimental to others that it is dealt with as abnormal.

The present chapter will consider those forms of divergent thought and conduct which are defined as neurotic or psychotic. The former constitute milder forms of personality maladaptation, the latter those which are put into the general category of mental disease. We have already given considerable attention to some of the milder forms of maladjustment, but so far we have said little about their more extreme forms. But, as we shall see, both mild and severe mental disorders may all be dealt with in terms of adaptive interaction between an individual and his environment. We do not intend to review the usual topics covered in abnormal or clinical psychology or psychiatry.¹ But by judicious use of tabular material we

¹ The student interested in these special fields may find the following helpful: Norman Cameron, *The Psychology of Behavior Disorders* (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1947); James C. Coleman, *Abnormal Psychology and Modern Life* (Chicago, Scott, Foresman and Company, 1950); John Dollard and N. E. Miller, *Personality and Psychotherapy* (New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1950); Carney Landis and M. Marjorie Bolles, *Textbook of Abnormal Psychology* (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1946); A. H. Maslow and Bela Mittelmann, *Principles of Abnormal Psychology* (New York, Harper and Brothers, 1941); J. J. B. Morgan and

will give the more or less conventional classification of mild and more severe disorders and note the chief symptoms of each group. This will give us a basis upon which we may discuss various mental difficulties from the standpoint of this volume. Before taking up the personality adjustment of neurotics and psychotics, some general definitions and distinctions must be presented.

Most of the study of mild and severe mental breakdowns has been made in the fields of psychiatry and of abnormal psychology. *Psychiatry* is that branch of medicine which deals with the diagnosis and treatment of mental diseases. *Abnormal psychology*, while it considers treatment, puts its principal attention upon the description and analysis of the mental and behavior mechanisms to be found in the mentally disturbed. Its work is usually projected against the background of normal thought and conduct. Obviously, these two fields overlap, but psychiatry, though interested in theory, has been, on the whole, more concerned with therapy than with systematic scientific investigation.

Most present-day psychiatry conventionally divides mental disorders into two large classes: the psychoneuroses or neuroses and the psychoses. A *psychoneurosis* or *neurosis* is a form of mental and behavioral divergence from the accepted or normal which tends to make the individual less efficient socially and personally, but which does not completely incapacitate him for social participation in everyday group life. Such persons may express undue worries, obsessive fears, or extreme fatigue, or show hysteric responses which keep them from effective and emotionally and intellectually satisfying lives. With the neurotics there is usually no need for institutionalization. They represent, in fact, a borderline type of behavior which stands between the normal and the psychotic. Moreover, the distinction between the neurotic and the so-called normal person is largely one of degree. Most normal people possess some characteristics which might be termed neurotic. The matter is essentially one of the extent and constellation of certain traits and attitudes in the total personality.

A *psychosis* is a more severe mental and behavioral disorder, involving such divergence from normal conduct as to require medical and perhaps institutional care. The psychotic is often marked by disorders of mind and conduct so far-reaching as to involve the entire make-up of the personality. His acts become dangerous to others and so divergent as to demand severe control by his fellows. He frequently has no objective understanding of his conduct. In short, he becomes so unlike those around him that he loses practically all the socially accepted forms of interaction.

The word *insane*, however, is applied properly to those psychotics who

G. D. Lovell, *The Psychology of Abnormal People* (New York, Longmans, Green & Company, 1948); J. D. Page, *Abnormal Psychology* (New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1947); E. A. Strecker, F. G. Ebaugh, and J. R. Ewalt, *Practical Clinical Psychiatry* (Philadelphia, Blakiston Company, 1947); L. P. Thorpe and Barney Katz, *The Psychology of Abnormal Behavior* (New York, The Ronald Press Company, 1944).

are considered by legal definition to need institutional care. The term "insane" should not be used except in the legal sense. It is not a synonym for "psychotic." Strictly speaking, it is not a medical or psychological concept at all.

In Western and Christian history the psychotics were for centuries looked upon as individuals possessed of evil spirits. Sometimes, by magic or miracle, these malignant spirits or demons might be "cast out" of the sufferers. More often the individuals were locked up in dungeons or driven out of the communities as unworthy of any human care whatsoever.

With the rise of scientific medicine, the mentally diseased came to be viewed as individuals suffering from disorders of normal structure and function. It was gradually recognized that they should be treated as sick persons rather than as possessing evil demons. In the history of medicine, however, three factors have retarded a broader and, from our point of view, more satisfactory consideration of mental disorders. The first was the growth of the scientific stereotype of disease as a morbid entity. This notion itself may well be a certain psychological "hang-over" from the older belief that disease was due to some foreign element lodging within the person. This notion of disease as an entity continues even in our present-day medical thinking and practice. But, as Campbell well puts it, "A patient is said to have a psychosis but he does not have a psychosis in the same sense that he has a bullet in his leg. A psychosis cannot be extracted from the patient for study . . ." ² Today objective-minded physicians consider disease as a manifestation of the total organism.

The second handicap to a sounder view of the neurotic and especially of the psychotic arises from the conception that all mental disorders must develop from some material "cause." The ordinary physician still believes that the mentally deranged must have, of necessity, some infection, some toxin in the body, some injury to the brain or other nervous tissue. Otherwise, he argues, the individual could not show such curious and divergent mentality and behavior.

The third handicap to a more scientific understanding of the neuroses and psychoses is the persistence of the mind-body dichotomy. Neither modern biology nor psychology accepts such a distinction. The human individual, like any other animal specimen, is viewed as a physical and biochemical totality in a dynamic adaptive relationship to other organisms and to the physical environment. One part is not mind stuff or *psyche* and another part body or *soma*. Yet there is a carry-over in terminology which suggests this, as in the phrase "psychosomatic" medicine. Careful students of human behavior are not misled by this semantic tradition.

Somewhat similar difficulties are implied in differentiating between

² C. Macfie Campbell, "Personality and the psychosis," in *The Biology of the Individual*, Association for Research in Nervous and Mental Disease, 14 (Baltimore, The Williams & Wilkins Company, 1934), p. 170.

functional and organic disorders in psychiatry and abnormal psychology. It is not that tissue changes may not occur in the psychoneurotic, schizophrenic, manic-depressive, or other functional disorders. They may. But any direct and obvious correlation of tissue pathology and personality pathology is not evident. In the functional cases the principal conditioning factors seem to be social-cultural rather than constitutional. In contrast, in the organic psychoses the physical factors are considered as dominant and precipitating causes, although, as we shall see, social-cultural factors should not be entirely overlooked.³

The traditional classifications of psychoneuroses and psychoses have been a topic of much debate. The earlier sharp separation of categories is no longer regarded as entirely sound. That there are behavioral differences among the various sub-categories of both neurotics and psychotics, however, is clear to anyone with direct experience with particular cases.

In diagnosing and classifying mental disturbances—mild or severe—psychiatrists have found the concepts of symptom and of syndrome useful. A *symptom* is a single element or feature of mentality or behavior. A *syndrome* represents a combination or pattern of symptoms which occur together and form a larger unity. Syndromes thus furnish the distinguishing features of the particular disorder.

Against these general background considerations, we turn now to an examination of the psychoneuroses in our particular cultural setting.⁴

PSYCHONEUROSES IN OUR SOCIAL-CULTURAL SETTING

That social and cultural factors play a large part in the development of the psychoneuroses is evident to most students of mental disorganization. Doubtless many of these psychoneurotic individuals possess inadequate constitutional capacities. Yet the genesis of neurotic behavior itself must be studied as an attempt at adjustment to the social and cultural world. Many of the instances of maladjusted personalities already cited in other chapters really fall into the category of neurotics. Anxieties over sexual expression, over status, over success in school and in business amply indicate the wide range of what are often mildly neurotic responses to frustration and stress.

³ This is not the place to enter into the continuing controversy between those psychiatrists and neurologists who lean strongly toward the constitutional approach to personality disorders and those who continue to consider social psychological and cultural factors as the most probable conditioners of most of the psychoneurotic and functional disturbances. For a vigorous statement from the former see Stanley Cobb, "Personality as affected by lesions of the brain," Chap. 18 in J. M. V. Hunt, ed., *Personality and the Behavior Disorders*, Vol. 1 (New York, The Ronald Press Company, 1944).

⁴ Unfortunately it is not possible to explore the whole topic of neuroses and psychoses from a cross-cultural standpoint. This was attempted in Chapter 25 of the first edition of this book, but the field of cross-cultural analysis of personality has grown so large that it deserves more extended treatment than we could give it here.

The main purpose of this section is to examine some of the personality manifestations of neurotic individuals in our own social-cultural system. But to provide the student certain necessary background facts, we have prepared in tabular form a summary of the chief symptoms and adjustive functions of the psychoneuroses.

Classification of Psychoneuroses. As noted above there is no completely satisfactory system of classifying the neurotics. But for our purposes a modification of the categories and nomenclature adopted by the United States Army during the Second World War will do.⁵

Table 7 presents the chief forms, symptoms, and adjustive functions of the psychoneuroses.

Neurasthenic Patterns or Fatigue Syndromes. The physical symptoms of neurasthenia, chiefly of unlocalized and nonspecific kind, nevertheless illustrate a *social* orientation on the part of the patient. In other words, excessive self-reference with its talk of symptoms—illustrated in the person who continually tells his acquaintances about his sleeplessness, his lassitude, his aches, pains, and operations—reveals a strong craving for attention from others. This attention serves as a means of holstering up a weakened sense of self, of supporting a feeble self-esteem. These persons frequently have a distinctive sense of inferiority. The symptoms are external evidences of a lowered form of adaptation—lowered, in part, because others do not readily accept the patient's definition of his position. He tries, in other words, to secure some measure of security in his social world by arousing sympathy and care from others. There are numberless instances of whole families who have had to build their lives around the neurotic whims of a parent or child who has come to exploit others in order to remain secure.

This is obviously not a normal adaptation; yet it is not sufficiently divergent, in most cases, to demand special hospital care. Such individuals, when possessed of sufficient wealth, crowd our sanatoria and health resorts, where they continue to seek the return of their vigor, without, of course, really wanting to get well. The cultural setting of neurasthenia is witnessed by the fact that it is apparently closely correlated with the good economic status and availability of leisure found in our middle and upper bourgeois classes. In fact, in the last quarter of the nineteenth century neurasthenia became something of a fad among the wealthiest classes, which led Europeans to refer to it as "the American disease." Neurasthenia well illustrates the interplay of psychological and constitutional features. Idleness rather than overwork often produces fatigability and other neurasthenic symptoms. Over-attention to oneself, excessive care in preserving one's strength, or anxiety about any sort of strain may easily lead to fixed ideas about health, and in the end bring about a

⁵ A convenient reprinting of this is "Revised psychiatric nomenclature adopted by the army," *Mental Hygiene*, 1946, 30: 456-476.

Table 7

FORMS, SYMPTOMS, AND ADJUSTIVE FUNCTIONS OF THE PSYCHONEUROSES

Form	Chief Symptoms	Adjustive Functions
Neurasthenic disorders or fatigue syndrome (also called: asthenic reaction, effort syndrome, soldier's heart)	Exaggerated sense of fatigue with no organic basis; diminished capacity for work, but not necessarily for recreational effort. Sometimes headaches and other pains; insomnia; nightmares, sense of depression; pessimism. Sometimes attention distractable and loss of memory for particular events.	Self-protective device in face of anxiety stimulated by feeling of unsatisfactory life situation. Often an attention-getting or compensatory mechanism; also rationalization for failure or inadequacy. Childhood often marked by over-attention to illnesses, and to possible over-exertion.
Hypochondriacal disorders	Persistent, obsessive concern with disease or defect or health for which there is no bodily foundation. Wide variety of somatic complaints, such as digestion, heart, lungs, muscles, bones, and so on. (Where there is an organic basis for disease or defect, person with excessive attention to it may show hypochondriacal symptoms.)	Protection against anxiety by exaggeration of need for bodily care; struggle for goals. Often develops "reaction sensitivity" to bodily organs. (Cameron) Oversolicitude of mother <i>et al.</i> regarding child's illness may lay groundwork for use of this means to get attention, express hostility, identify with loved one, compensate for loss of love, and rationalize failure.
Psychasthenic disorders (phobic and compulsive)	Basic syndromes: phobias or morbid fears, such as acrophobia, claustrophobia, astraphobia; obsessions or compelling irrational ideas; compulsions, such as irrational impulses and acts often of a ritualistic kind. No known organic basis for any of these.	Self-protection against stress and anxiety by displacement to some symbolic object or thought. Magic rituals of compulsive nature as a means of counteracting dangerous impulses and ideas. Used to express hostility, gain attention, compensate for loss; and regression to former state. Source in early learning, involving fear of disease, of crossing streets, and so on, or too much responsibility, or too heavy guilt feelings.
Hysteric disorders	Two classes: (1) Conversion or inactivation or "reaction insensitivity" (Cameron); (2) disso-	Reaction to need or anxiety by escape or rejection of expected action or rôle by change to

ciation or autonomy, both without evidence of organic pathology. Both marked by certain stigmata: for example, in (1) mutism and aphonia, loss of appetite (anorexia), varied visceral pains, paralysis of motor organs, loss of sensory functions (anesthesia), such as loss or reduction of vision, hearing, and so on; in (2) tics, tremors, clamps, and seizures, and loss of memory (amnesia), somnambulism, fugue, and alternating or multiple personality.

other responses or absence of same as in simulation of illness or injury, or by dissociation. Incomplete repression and high suggestibility prominent features. Hysterical responses used for attention-getting, identification, and rationalization.

Anxiety neuroses

Vague, chronic, "free-floating" and unexplained fears, with no organic pathological basis. Usually classified into two kinds: chronic and acute. Former shows persistent skeletal and visceral tensions marked by habitual "reaction sensitivity." Latter results from shock or trauma, such as acute fear in battle or under other physical crisis. (Many symptoms not unlike those in psychasthenia.)

Self-protection by escape or avoidance of external or internal dangers. Repression an important mechanism. Learned reactions from childhood related to chronic insecurity, fear of punishment and development of undue sense of guilt. Used aggressively to control others, to gain attention, to rationalize failure.

Psychosomatic disorders (somatization reactions)

Various visceral and other bodily maladjustments of psychogenic rather than organic origin. Symptoms appear in difficulties with the digestive apparatus, heart and blood vessels, reproductive and urinary systems, lungs, skin, and so on. (Closely related to hypochondria, anxiety neuroses, hysteria, and possibly other psychoneurotic syndromes.)

Reaction to frustration and anxiety, related to chronic and excessive mobilization of physiological processes involving the emotions and autonomic nervous system. Hostility, fear, sexual interests, and other social-emotional factors play a part. Origin probably in childhood training involving bodily functions. Serves adult as outlet for anxiety, aggression, and to provide attention.

diminution of that physical-activity which is necessary to keep the constitution in normal condition.

Freud had the theory that neurasthenia resulted chiefly from sexual repression which, in turn, might be associated with rich sexual fantasies and/or with guilt feelings. To offset these the individual puts up defenses in the form of physical symptoms. While the taboo on overt sexuality is strong in our society, there is no reason to assume that the fatigue syndrome arises only as a result of the repression of the sex drive. In a society which puts such emphasis on work and hard play as well as on sound health generally as we do, even a child may acquire reaction-sensitivity to fatigue that may easily become exaggerated as a compensation for unsatisfactory life or as an attention-getting device.

Hypochondriacal Disorders. Unlike the situation in neurasthenia, wherein fatigue reactions are nonspecific, in hypochondria the person focuses his exaggerated attention on some particular organ, ailment, or function. While there is no necessary organic foundation for anxiety over one's health, in time such over-concern may influence the body. For example, the years of pill-taking or other medication may well induce some physiological changes. Then, too, where there is some constitutional foundation for worry over a given defect or disease, excessive concern may become cumulative and the person's hypochondriacal symptoms may long outlast the original precipitating condition.

The social aspects of hypochondria are clear. It is an adjustive technique to avoid, offset, or get around frustrations or to secure some reward, such as care of others. It is, in short, a tension-reducing device. In some instances, both in children and adults, the symptoms appear as an aggressive means of securing care and affection. Parents who unduly fear for their child's health may find that their youngster soon learns to control the family situation by use of body complaints. There are many instances where an entire family takes on over-concern with health and fills its medicine chest with a wide array of nostrums. Sometimes, too, a hypochondriacal invalid or semi-invalid may for years tyrannize an entire household by demanding special service and attention at all times.

Psychasthenic Disorders. Originally psychasthenia meant "weak psyche" just as neurasthenia meant "weak nerves." Today these earlier meanings have completely disappeared. In fact, just as the concept neurasthenia is gradually being replaced by such concepts as fatigue syndrome, so psychasthenia is now often divided into two groupings: phobic and obsessive-compulsive. But so long as we continue to recognize them as among the varied kinds of adaptive devices used by individuals we should have no difficulty in defining or recognizing their chief features.

The excessive fears and the varied compulsions found among psychasthenic individuals cover a wide range. In the case of phobias the person centers his attention on some reaction, substitutive or otherwise. For

example, fear of high places (acrophobia) or fear of crowds (ocholophobia) may well be symbols for something quite different. But in any case the focus is on a response. In the case of compulsions the individual centers his attention on various substitute reactions, on his own particular rituals.

While Freud, in keeping with his early theory, held that excessive fears, doubts, and obsessions were frequently traceable to repression and inner conflicts regarding sexual matters, our present view by no means overlooks the possible source of psychasthenia in other basic motivations as well. Early training in fear reactions is by no means confined to sexuality.

Phobic reactions may have their source in some actual dangerous situation, but more often they are substitutive responses which symbolize something usually repressed and unconscious to the individual. As adjustive devices they may be regarded as distinctly limited because the flight response which is the common denominator of all phobias is usually a transient solution. Sometimes certain phobias may become so all-important that they distinctly limit the person's social and spatial world.⁶

In similar vein the adjustive functions of compulsions are limited. Their ritualistic, driving nature may be a defense against unconscious anxieties and frustrations, but their circular and repetitive character restricts their effectiveness. One cannot give them up. One is impelled to attend to obsessive ideas, doubts, or impulses. They seem to intrude from the outside but cannot be voluntarily stopped or controlled. Compulsive acts may reveal attempts to overcome anxiety and sense of insecurity but actually they represent a lowered social adaptability.

Adjustment through Hysteria. The conversion and the dissociative processes of hysteria represent still another form of adaptation which we do not consider adequate in our society. This neurosis is characterized by *la belle indifférence*, shallow emotions, and lack of basic integration of impulses, habits, and rôles toward socially acceptable goals. In addition it is often marked by indolence and a tendency to follow the morality of expediency, that is, it becomes merely external adjustment to the moral demands of his society. Hysteric reactions serve to insulate the individual from his fellows.

The dissociative processes represent unconscious attempts on the part of the individual to escape rôles which involve unpleasant memories or present obligations. These may take the form of physical stigmata or they may involve extensive amnesia or loss of memory for episodes which have been unpleasant. Sometimes these forgotten experiences reappear in periods of somnambulism or in hysteric trances. Sometimes during these dissociated states the individual dramatically re-enacts the previous ex-

⁶ See, for example, William Ellery Leonard, *The Locomotive God* (New York, D. Appleton & Company, 1927).

perience. The classical case of Irène, given by Janet, is known to every student of abnormal psychology.

Case of Irène. This young girl, who had gone through a harrowing experience at the deathbed of her mother, later became to all appearances completely indifferent to the episode. She denied that her mother was dead, but did say that her relatives had often told her about it. She could not recall anything whatsoever about the event and naively asked why she had not been called upon to care for her mother. In short, the accounts by others of her mother's decease seemed completely foreign to her emotionally.

Yet during her hysteric attacks or "spells" Irène relived minutely all the details of her mother's demise: sometimes she talked extensively of the experience, at other times she seemed to see her mother before her (hallucination), and she would make pantomimic movements of grief, taking care of her, and the like. On still other occasions, she combined hallucination, speech, and action in a dramatic rehearsal of the whole episode, including going through again her own plans to commit suicide so as to join her mother in death. After an attack the girl would return to her more or less normal behavior but remain again completely amnesic regarding this experience.⁷

In some instances multiple personalities may develop. Sometimes these alternate in occupying the same body, as it were. In other cases as that of Sally Beauchamp, there may be several battling for dominance. As we noted in Chapter 7 where we described Sally, we all have a variety of selves. The extreme cases of hysteric dissociation known as multiple personalities represent the severing, permanently or temporarily, of those threads which keep most persons in some kind of integrated condition although their varying rôles may at times stretch this common bond to the breaking point.

The extent to which these separate selves are integrated into a common focus or central self depends upon a number of factors, including, as we have shown, the coördination of impulses, habits, and attitudes—a generalized other—oriented toward some central goal or aim in life. But few of us completely attain this state. In truth normal dissociation is as important as integration. The whole series of rôles which we play in various social situations should convince us without argument that we do have various selves. And in many persons these are held together only in a loose organization, depending upon constancies of recognition and demands or expectancies of us by others and by the attendant introjection of this constant factor back into one's inner life.

The resort to hysteric symptoms as a tension-reducing device is associated with a high degree of suggestibility, credulity, and lack of education. There has been a noticeable decline in the number of serious hysterical disorders in medical clinics in the past half-century. This has been ascribed to urbanization and improvement in medical knowledge among

⁷ Pierre Janet, *The Major Symptoms of Hysteria* (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1907), pp. 29-31.

laymen." Whatever the specific reasons for the reduction, certainly cultural factors play a part in this as in other neurotic manifestations. Historically there are many instances of the culturalization of hysteric patterns. The dancing manias of the Middle Ages and the emotional revivals of certain periods of Protestantism are but two examples in our own social-cultural system. What is called "arctic hysteria" is found among certain Siberian tribes. It is marked by mimicry, irrational conduct, and in some cases by spasms, falling into trances, howling, dancing, and certain epileptoid fits. In Malaya, another hysterical form is called *latah*. Under some kind of unusual situation the individuals completely lose their poise and self-control. There is a state of hyperimitativeness, often an outpouring of obscene, tabooed words, vocal expressions of repressed erotic wishes, and great suggestibility. These outbursts are said to be confined to women. Of more violent sort is the *amok*—the source of our expression "running amuck." For no apparent reason a man may be seized by a sudden and violent frenzy and attack and frequently kill anyone who stands in his way. This rage usually lasts until the victim is himself killed by the police or neighbors.

It is clear that hysteria will occur and be accepted in terms of the cultural practices and values of a given society. In our own case, the gradual decline of this form of neurotic conduct does not mean a reduction in the total incidence of psychoneuroses. It means that better educated individuals may express their neuroses in other ways, probably in the anxiety neuroses.

Anxiety Disorders. We have already had many occasions to discuss the function of anxiety as a phase of personality adjustment. Its place in behavior pathology is widespread. In fact some writers contend that anxiety is the common core to all neurotic and psychotic conduct. Without accepting this fully, it certainly, along with aggression, is an important component in the life organization of both normal and abnormal personalities. Here we are concerned with those extreme forms of anxiety which become more or less chronic and which operate to disturb the individual's work and play and usual routine of living. These excessive anxieties mean a predisposition to make exaggerated and inappropriate reactions on slight excuse.

Anxiety responses reflect a person's insecurity, inferiority, and sense of inadequacy to reach goals or rewards which he and his society regard as worthwhile. Under our highly competitive system with the stress on upward social mobility, the individual is often exposed to great pressure to make good. In fact, with us, this is probably one of the important sources of morbid anxieties. Another inciting cause of such disturbances lies in the heavy taboo which lies over our sexual life. In the adolescent it is seen in his undue worry about masturbation or about indulgence in

^a Cameron, *op. cit.*, p. 321.

premarital intercourse. In married adults it appears as part of interspouse misunderstandings and conflict. It rises to harass many unmarried adults who are unable to make satisfactory sexual adjustments—heterosexual or otherwise—outside the conventional framework of marriage. (See Chapter 18.)

Sometimes anxiety may reach such intensity as to break out in acute attacks, often characterized by agitation, restlessness, dilation of pupils, dizziness, faintness, numbness, sweating, respiratory changes, and acceleration of heart beat. Unless carefully diagnosed and treated these episodes may be mistaken for genuine heart attacks. The maximal anxiety attack is called "panic reaction" which may be marked by temporary disorientation, emotional breakdown, and flight or suicide. Sometimes such extreme reactions occur among an entire group as in military panics, or panics of crowds trapped or believed to be trapped in burning buildings.

Anxiety disorders often emerge with aging. Persons nearing retirement may develop disturbances not previously evident. As we noted in Chapter 20 sound mental hygiene for later maturity and old age may do much to prevent and alleviate such troubles.

Psychosomatic Disorders. Somatization reactions provide a means of relieving anxiety by "channeling the originating impulses through the autonomic nervous system into visceral-organ symptoms and complaints."⁹ We discuss these disorders at this point because they are so closely bound up with neurotic manifestations.

The close interplay between fear, anger, and other emotions and certain bodily disturbances has long been recognized. But it is only in recent decades that specific psychogenic factors, such as frustration, anxiety, hostility, dependency, and so on, have been positively correlated with various visceral and other bodily disorders. Obviously not all visceral and other bodily ailments are psychosomatically induced, but it is becoming increasingly clear that a great many such disorders have a distinctly psychological foundation. The chief studies of psychosomatic medicine have centered around the following difficulties: gastrointestinal, cardiovascular, respiratory, genitourinary, headaches, and a variety of skin afflictions.¹⁰

⁹ "Revised psychiatric nomenclature," *Mental Hygiene*, *op. cit.* Some writers follow the army terminology rather than use the term *psychosomatic* on the grounds that the latter refers to a point of view involving the whole field of medicine. There seems, however, no good reason for not following current practice in using the adjective "psychosomatic." It is no more cumbersome than "somatization reactions," as used by Coleman, *op. cit.*, pp. 205-211.

¹⁰ There is a vast literature on these and related topics. The following will provide a good introduction to the field. Franz Alexander and T. M. French, *Studies in Psychosomatic Medicine* (New York, The Ronald Press Company, 1944); H. Flanders Dunbar, *Emotions and Bodily Changes*, 3rd ed. (New York, Columbia University Press, 1946); also her *Synopsis of Psychosomatic Diagnosis and Treatment* (St. Louis, C. V. Mosby, 1948); S. S. Tompkins, ed., *Contemporary Psychopathology* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1943), Chaps. 8-13; E. Weiss and O. S. English, *Psychosomatic Medicine*

We cannot review, even briefly, the chief symptoms of each of these groups of disorders. We shall, however, cite a few studies which throw into focus the psychogenics of some of them.

There are probably no organic disturbances in which the psychological effects are more apparent than in those involving the stomach, the intestines, and associated eliminative functions. The effects of frustration and hostility are neatly shown in a report by Harris. He found that of 200 ex-soldiers admitted to a hospital for minor psychiatric condition, the chief symptom of 25 of them were complaints "referable to the upper gastro-intestinal tract, which symptoms had had their onset during some period of military service." To these men "the gastric symptoms seemed to represent a visceral protest against the pressure and regimentation they sensed in the military service. They appeared to be saying through their symptoms . . . 'I can't stomach the army.'" ¹¹

Mittelman and Wolff investigated the personality reactions of 30 unselected patients with peptic ulcer and three with gastritis and duodenitis. While there were obvious individual differences in many features of personality, "the reactions of intense anxiety, insecurity, resentment, guilt, and frustration [were] obtained in all." ¹²

Many other studies have found essentially the same components. Zane even writes of "a character structure which readily thrusts the patient into the peptic-ulcer conflict situation, [which] is the 'I must but I can't' type . . ." Such persons tend to be "overconscientious, meticulous, careful, and hard-working . . . They . . . rely heavily on plans to achieve their goals—all the while fearing and anticipating failure." ¹³

The childhood source of such reactions probably lies, in part, in the close linkage of hunger and fear of not being fed, which induces emotional insecurity. There is a strong craving for food as well as for love at the hands of mother or other person. When these are withheld conflict between hostility and need for the other may easily develop. ¹⁴

There is much evidence to confirm these hypotheses. The removal of emotional conflict leads to improvement and even disappearance of the serious symptoms. There is both common sense and medical testimony on this point. Zane wisely remarks, "The emotional reaction of the pa-

(Philadelphia, W. B. Saunders Company, 1943). The periodical, *Psychosomatic Medicine, Experimental and Clinical Studies*, will provide a source of current research and clinical work in this field.

¹¹ I. D. Harris, "Relation of resentment and anger to functional gastric complaints," *Psychosomatic Medicine*, 1946, 8, 211-213. Quotation from page 213. By permission.

¹² Bela Mittelman and H. G. Wolff, "Emotions and gastroduodenal functions," *Psychosomatic Medicine*, 1942, 4, 5-61. Quotation from pp. 58-59.

¹³ M. D. Zane, "Psychosomatic considerations in peptic ulcer," *Psychosomatic Medicine*, 1947, 9, 372-380. Quotation from pp. 375-376. By permission.

¹⁴ Thomas Szasz et al., "The rôle of hostility in the pathogenesis of peptic ulcer," *Psychosomatic Medicine*, 1947, 9, 331-336.

tient is held to be of greater significance than the particular diet or drugs utilized in treatment."¹⁶

Many dysfunctions of the colon likewise have their roots in social-emotional experiences. In fact, Wittkower, on the basis of a study of a sample of patients with ulcerative colitis, remarks, "If we assess the relative significance of emotional psychological factors in the ætiology of ulcerative colitis, very little can be said in favour of a primary bacteriological or dietetic origin."¹⁶ Studies made of constipation and diarrhea likewise reveal a psychogenic origin.

Alexander and his colleagues attempted to uncover the dominant psychoanalytic factors in a group of cases suffering from three kinds of gastrointestinal disturbances: gastric ulcers, colitis, and constipation. The patients were analyzed and the results interpreted as forms of conversion neuroses, each type with its own peculiar personality manifestations.

(1) The cases with gastric ulcers were marked, at the conscious level, by independence, activity, and efficiency. These traits were interpreted as arising from repressed and denied fulfillment of impulses to be fed and to eat. Unconsciously the patients were motivated by inclinations to secure food, and by transference to get help from others. Yet this impulse was repressed and ambivalently replaced by a conscious sense of independence of others. Nevertheless, they could not escape their insistent desire for symbolic sustenance, which served as a chronic stimulus to the stomach "independent of the process of nutrition" itself. (2) The patients with colitis were featured by a strong sense of having fulfilled their obligations to others; hence they gave freely through the eliminative functions. They did not sense any feelings of guilt or of inferiority toward others. According to Freudian analysis, their excessive elimination was an aggressive symbol of their strong desire to demonstrate their independence. Their giving was a kind of token restitution for what they had received. (3) In contrast, the instances of chronic constipation had consciously the attitude that they did not take or receive; therefore they did not need to give. But unconsciously these individuals feared giving anything away lest they suffer a loss of power (the castration complex). Their failure to defecate symbolized a retention of their potency.¹⁷

Essential hypertension or high blood pressure induced by emotional disturbances is also well-known to students of psychosomatic medicine.

Attempts have been made by psychoanalysts to discover the probable unconscious elements in the etiology of high blood pressure—at least in certain cases. Saul reports for seven individuals with essential hypertension a background of four factors: (1) marked dominance by the

¹⁶ *Zeebop et al.*, p. 375.

¹⁷ E. Wittkower, "Ulcerative colitis: personality studies," *British Medical Journal*, 1955, 2:156-157; *Quoted in this paper*, page 137.

A. Alexander and L. E. Saul, "The Seven," I. Green, "Psychogenesis and psychosomatics of functional colitis," *Psychosomatic Medicine*, 1947, 9:131-144.

mother during the early years of the patient, with submissiveness and oral dependence transferred to others later; (2) a masked inhibition of heterosexuality; (3) strong hostility patterns; and (4) an unresolved conflict between passive dependence and hostile impulses, resulting in severe emotional blocking or conflict.¹⁸

Studies of other cardiovascular disturbances tend to confirm Saul's view. Inner tension associated with guilt, rage, fear, anxiety, and frustration is widely reported for patients with various heart ailments.¹⁹

Psychogenic genitourinary difficulties include among others menstrual disturbance, frigidity in women, impotence in men, dysuria, and enuresis. A large number of allergies have been shown to have psychogenic sources as have such respiratory troubles as asthma. Such allergies are said to be linked up with repressed longing for affection and sense of frustration. Miller and Baruch compared the hostility feelings of a group of allergic children with another group which was non-allergic. The latter showed much more direct and indirect hostility to others and less to themselves and less in respect to "blocking" or restraint of overt hostility than did the allergic children. On the contrary, the allergic group revealed less hostility of the direct or indirect kind toward others and showed much more directed to themselves (self-punitive) as well as much more resentment or blocking of overt hostility. The non-allergies showed a little more inclination, but not a great deal more, than did the allergies in hostility toward more remote social objects or situations.²⁰ Harris, Rapoport, and Rynerson, from their observations of asthmatic children, state that the children were marked by fear of separation from their mothers and yet had greater difficulty in crying and in confiding in their mothers than a non-asthmatic group.²¹

Many common skin afflictions, such as hives, edema, and acne have been shown to have their sources in undue worry, emotional conflict, and dependency feelings. Sontag cites a case, covering a period of 17 years, in which a woman had periodic severe outbreaks of acne. "The original

¹⁸ L. J. Saul, "Hostility in cases of essential hypertension," *Psychosomatic Medicine*, 1949, 1: 153-161. See also George Saslow et al., "Possible etiologic relevance of personality functions in arterial hypertension," *Psychosomatic Medicine*, 1950, 12: 292-302. These authors found a positive correlation of their hypertensive subjects and "obsessive-compulsive" and "subliminal assertiveness." But they are very cautious as to causal connection with this condition.

¹⁹ G. A. Wolf and H. G. Wolf, "Studies on the nature of certain symptoms associated with cardiovascular disorders," *Psychosomatic Medicine*, 1946, 8: 293-319.

²⁰ Hyman Miller and Dorothy W. Baruch, "A study of hostility to allergic children," *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry*, 1950, 20: 506-519.

²¹ L. D. Harris, Lydia Rapoport, and Mary A. Rynerson, "Observations on asthmatic children," *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry*, 1950, 20: 490-505. Another suggestive paper on psychosomatic disorders in children is L. W. Sontag's "The genetics of differences in psychosomatic patterns in children," *ibid.*, 1950, 20: 479-489. See also E. F. Gilboa, "Special features of personality which are common to certain psychosomatic disorders," *Psychosomatic Medicine*, 1949, 11: 273-281, and Melitta Sperling, "The rôle of the mother in psychosomatic disorders in children," *ibid.*, 377-385.

appearance of the condition and its recurrence coincided with periods of severe emotional stress associated with sexual problems." The evidence seems to support his thesis that the acne represented a "punishment and a safeguard, accompanied through autonomic control of the cutaneous vascular bed."²² We do not want to extend the list too far, but there is also evidence to show that some sufferers of migraine headaches show personality features of intolerance, strong drive toward status and success, difficulty in sex adjustment, striving for perfectionism, and certain obsessive-compulsive traits.²³

In concluding our discussion of this intriguing topic, mention must be made of certain larger social-cultural correlates. From data collected in Great Britain, Halliday has reported some interesting facts about age, sex, and class differentials and of changes in the incidence of certain psychosomatic disorders. For example, during the latter part of the nineteenth century peptic ulcers and essential hypertension were predominantly female disorders. At the midpoint of the twentieth century these have become increasingly more evident in males. It is interesting also to note that exophthalmic goiter and hysteria, both of which have emotional components, have shifted in their higher incidence among men. In contrast, diabetes, once regarded as confined largely to men, has become increasingly common among women. Moreover the age incidence of gastritis, peptic ulcers, cardiovascular disorders, and anxiety states has dropped.

Halliday has further shown that gastrointestinal disorders, essential hypertension, exophthalmic goiter, and rheumatism occur more frequently in urban than in rural areas. The death rate for peptic ulcers is higher for both sexes in the lower occupational groups than in the professional and well-to-do classes. In both diabetes and "hypertensive cardiovascular disorders," the death rate for males is highest in well-to-do classes but is highest for females in the poorest classes.²⁴

Halliday believes that these changes indicate a neutralization of former and culturally determined sex differences but more particularly that they typify an increased complexity of modern urban living. That there is some basis for these inferences is seen in Donnison's work in which he points out that psychosomatic disorders of this kind, at least, are rare in nonliterate and non-industrialized peoples.²⁵

Psychopathic Personality. Before closing this section a few comments about the concept of psychopathic personality are in order. As briefly in-

²² L. W. Sontag, "The purpose and fate of a skin disorder," *Psychosomatic Medicine*, 1945, 7, 306-310. Quotations from page 310. By permission.

²³ W. D. Ross and F. L. M. Naughton, "Objective personality studies in migraine by means of the Rorschach method," *Psychosomatic Medicine*, 1945, 7, 73-79.

²⁴ J. L. Halliday, *Psychosomatic Medicine, A Study of a Sick Society* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1948).

²⁵ C. P. Donnison, *Civilization and Disease* (Baltimore: The Williams & Wilkins Company, 1937).

licated in Chapter 22, there has been considerable dispute as to the validity of such a concept. The concept of the psychopathic personality has been used by psychiatrists to designate mentally deviant delinquents and criminals who do not seem to fit any of the conventional psychoneurotic or psychotic categories. Sometimes, of course, persons so designated might by others be called cases of schizophrenic simplex. (See below). Certainly we find a considerable number of ne'er-do-wells, vagrants, and criminals who seem to lack anything like adequate socialization or who have lost what they had,—what Cameron calls "desocialization." At one time such individuals were classed under the term "moral imbecility" or "moral insanity." Later such cases were put in a category called "constitutional psychopathic inferiority." They were defined as individuals who have difficulty in social adjustments, but who are not mentally defective nor suffering from obvious organic disorder nor whose symptoms fall under the syndromes usually assigned to the psychoneuroses or psychoses.²⁶ Several writers have suggested that this personality is marked by lack of superego,²⁷ defects of emotional control, and retention of somewhat infantile types of response. Gough has summarized several of these features in the following words:

"Overevaluation of immediate goals as opposed to remote or deferred ones; unconcern over the rights and privileges of others when recognizing them would interfere with personal satisfaction in any way; impulsive behavior, or apparent incongruity between the strength of the stimulus and the magnitude of the behavioral response; inability to form deep or persistent attachments to other persons or to identify in inter-personal relationships; poor judgment and planning in attaining goals; apparent lack of anxiety and distress over social maladjustment and unwillingness or inability to consider maladjustment qua maladjustment; a tendency to project blame onto others and to take no responsibility for failures; meaningless prevarication, often about trivial matters in situations where detection is inevitable, almost complete lack of dependability on and willingness to assume responsibility; and, finally, emotional poverty."²⁸

In short, these signify a paucity of social rôle-taking. The psychopathic personality represents a poverty of social-emotional identification with others and hence little or no moral sensitivity. Unlike the neurotic he has little or no sense of guilt or intrapsychic conflict. He "has no sense of neurotic doubt or perplexity . . . is not at odds with himself" but "he is at odds with the group because he is deficient in the capacity to evaluate objectively his own behavior against the group's standards."²⁹

²⁶ See P. W. Preu, "The concept of psychopathic personality," Chap. 30, in Hunt, ed., *Personality and the Behavior Disorders*, Vol. 2 (New York, The Ronald Press Company, 1944).

²⁷ Phyllis Greenacre, "Conscience in the psychopath," *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry*, 1945, 15:495-509.

²⁸ H. C. Gough, "A sociological theory of psychopathy," *American Journal of Sociology*, 1948, 53: 359-366. Quotation from page 362. Quotations by permission.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 365.

THE FUNCTIONAL PSYCHOSES IN OUR SOCIETY

The psychoses are traditionally divided into two large classes, the functional and the organic. The *functional psychoses* are those for which no obvious and easily detectable constitutional condition can be held responsible. The inception and development are considered to be largely psychological, that is, due to some inability to meet the adaptive demands of the environment. The *organic psychoses*, in contrast, refer to those which have a detectable organic lesion or other physical foundation for the aberrant thought and action. The former have been subdivided into schizophrenia, paranoia, and circular or manic-depressive. In the latter we find epilepsy, paresis, senile dementia, and some others to be discussed in the next section.

The functional psychoses reveal a more extensive distortion of the normal personality than is true of the psychoneurotics. However, it is wise to remember that the psychotic manifestations are not something apart but are adjustive efforts to solve personal problems. As Campbell remarks:

"... The *personality* and the *psychosis* are not independent concepts: the psychosis is the personality; it is the individual in action. This may seem to conflict with the familiar fact that the behavior of the individual in a psychosis is often the very opposite of the behavior of the individual before the psychosis. The crude, infantile, erotic, egoistic, aggressive behavior of the patient may contrast with the official personality, self-effacing, modest, submissive. This official personality, however, represented merely those expressions which were allowed to be manifest and which were tolerable to the official consciousness of the individual; beneath the surface were repressed trends. The personality if adequately conceived represents the total system of forces, including both those conscious and expressed and those subconscious and repressed. The formulation of the personality must do justice to the behavior and utterances of the individual on week-day and on Sunday, in church and in seclusion, at play and at work, and at home and abroad, sober and intoxicated, sane and insane."²⁰

Before we examine some of the social-cultural foundations of the functional psychoses, we shall summarize the symptoms and adjustive functions of the major forms of the same.

Classification of Functional Psychoses. As with the psychoneuroses, the categories of the functional psychoses are open to some question. However, we shall follow the traditional categories of psychiatry in Table 8.

In using the facts presented in the table or from more extended descriptions, it must not be forgotten that the clinical symptoms do not always yield neat and clean-cut distinctions between one form and another. This is evident in the two major classes of functional psychosis: the schizophrenics and the circulars. Thus catatonic excitement has much in common with the manic phase of the affective or manic depressive psychosis. And often the depressive episode in affective psychoses re-

²⁰ Campbell *op. cit.* p. 174. By permission.

sembles at least superficially the quiescence of some of the schizophrenic cases. It is easy to assume, too, that schizophrenia represents the "shut-in" type of personality, while the manic-depressives do not. But the schizophrenics do not always appear so. (See below.)

Psychoses as Forms of Adjustment. In keeping with our general standpoint we may briefly indicate what seem to us some basic factors to be taken into account in dealing with the functional psychoses as well as the neuroses: (1) The effect of hereditary, bodily maturation, and constitutional factors must be recognized. Individual differences in neurological make-up, in endocrine functioning, in drives, and in sensory-perceptual-motor capacities are important. On these the earliest learning must rest. (2) But no matter what particular predisposition to activity the organism possesses, the patient is to be understood always with reference to his material and social-cultural environment. (3) As to the form of adaptation which he makes, this involves the way an individual correlates his inner life with his overt conduct. As we have shown previously there is always a dual orientation in behavior, one toward the inner (subjective) world, the other to the outer. The inner is a combination or synthesis of physiological processes, needs, motives, emotions, and ideas which set off responses to cues which, in turn, lead on to some goal or reward. Moreover, the relation of the inner to the outer life rests on social-cultural learning. Hence in considering adaptation, either normal or abnormal, we must take into account (a) the early personal-social adaptation in the pleasant intimacies or antagonisms of the child-mother, child-father, and child-sibling relations; (b) the early cultural conditioning, especially to disciplinary demands—the rise of the superego—held essential for continuity of both familial and other groups; (c) the manner in which the individual meets especially difficult situations or crises. For instance, does he tend to retain infantile patterns or develop the culturally accepted forms of adjustment? And (d) What are the more particular precipitating situations in which the breakdown itself occurs?

Obviously one might adopt a variety of approaches to the topic of personal maladjustment. This might be stated in terms of behavior at the physiological level. Although we do not overlook the physiological factors, we approach abnormal behavior from a social-psychological standpoint. The following case, summarized from Dollard, provides a suggestive analysis from this latter standpoint. It shows how the psychotic continues to react to his social-cultural world, at least in part, in terms of prior conditioning, even though he rejects the socially expected and substitutes his own, and to others bizarre, forms of adjustment.

Case of A. The patient A., a male 24 years old, is the eldest of four living children (the second a girl, the last two boys). The father is engaged in business, and the financial circumstances are good. The parents had indulged in premarital intercourse, and the forced marriage a few months before A.'s

Table 8

FORMS, SYMPTOMS, AND ADJUSTIVE DYNAMICS OF THE FUNCTIONAL PSYCHOSES

<i>Form</i>	<i>Chief Symptoms</i>	<i>Adjustive Functions</i>
Schizophrenic disorders	Usually gradual, insidious development of inattention to social-physical environment, emotional indifference, negativism, and retreat to inner world of fantasy with no known organic basis. Delusions and hallucinations common, impairment of normal intellectual and emotional functions; desocialization. (Cameron) No evident organic basis.	Self-protective devices to meet frustration and anxiety; replacement of world requiring social-emotional and intellectual adjustment by one of wishful, egocentric sort.
Schizophrenia simplex	Apathetic, shiftless attitudes toward others, toward work obligations, and general loss of interest in and withdrawal from external world. Loss of personal pride; may have mild delusions. Seldom any emotional outbursts or extremely peculiar actions. Seldom needs institutionalization.	Means of escape and avoidance of social contacts and responsibility, often arising from sense of loss of love and rejection.
Hebephrenia	Shallow, inappropriate affect; dilapidation of thought; silly and incoherent speech; neologisms, "word salad," meaningless phrases; fantasy, vague delusions, bizarre, incoherent hallucinations. Sometimes hostile if fantasies are interrupted, but usually indifferent to social contacts. Untidy in personal matters. Behavior incoherent, silly, and at times obscene.	Retreat from external world, also perhaps from inner tensions through use of incoherent speech, fantasy and bizarre and childish activities.
Catatonia	Conspicuous motor disorder marked by generalized inhibition, resulting in stupor, negativism, and mutism, or perhaps in "waxy" flexibility. May alternate suddenly with excitement and excessive motor responses, compulsive acts.	While onset is usually sudden, case histories show gradual retreat from reality, passivity, and negativism, in face of disappointment, illness, and demands of external world.
Paranoid schizophrenia	Delusions, often grandiose and/or persecutory, with varying degrees of organization; suspiciousness and negativism. Hallucinations, often of auditory kind, are common. Elaborate autistic thinking; usually gradual mental deterioration.	Hostility and anxiety developed from sense of frustration. Projection and identification evident as self-defensive mechanisms.

Elaborate delusions, usually of persecutory sort. Marked by egocentricity and suspiciousness. Combination of fantasy and projection build up picture of a "pseudo-community" which replaces normal social contacts, insofar as they concern the delusional system. (Cameron) No other mental deterioration. Some cases also show grandiose delusions, often assuming talents and personal powers far in excess of real facts.

Method of dealing with inferiority feelings, insecurity, anxiety, and inner conflicts largely by systematic delusions. Projection serves to preserve sense of self-importance in face of felt deficiencies. Background often one of prolonged frustrations, over-attachment to parents, especially mother. Defective socialization evident in arrogance, suspiciousness, and compensatory attributing to others the individual's own shortcomings.

Manic and depressive disorders

Essentially disturbances of affect system, but with no known organic pathology, usually showing sharp fluctuations from excitement to depression. Bizarre but poorly organized delusions and hallucinations. No other mental deterioration. Recovery rate high, but recurrences common. In manic phase: great elation, flight of ideas, distractibility, and much energy. Depressive phase may be *agitated*, expressing self-recrimination, feelings of guilt and despair, and restlessness; or *retarded*, marked by slow reactions, feelings of sadness, dejection, and often suicidal impulses.

Onset usually from stress situation. In manic phase, overt hostility and compensatory responses in evidence. In agitated depression also aggressive intention often clear. Retarded depression, withdrawal from others, and some regressive responses in evidence. Unlike schizophrenia, manic-depressive disorders usually interpreted as "flight into reality," in which individual indulges in self-punishiveness as means of balancing his sense of failure and guilt. Childhood source probably in excessive development of conscience, in over-training of "reaction-sensitivity" to threats to sense of security of rejection, and of punishment.

Involucional melancholia

Depression of middle life and old age where there has been no previous history of manic-depressive disorders. Two main types: strong depression with self-condemnation, mood of hopelessness and defeatism; or agitated depression, accompanied with paranoid ideas and delusions of guilt and unworthiness.

Often clearly related to loss of status, sense of rejection by family and friends, loss of physical attractiveness. Source in early years probably much the same as in manic and depressive disturbances, but becoming more evident in later maturity in face of feelings of inferiority and decline in status.

birth was not desired by the father, who looked down on his wife's social status. The family lived in almost continuous conflict from the start, and there was a divorce six years before A. was committed to the mental hospital.

Without doubt the patient's breakdown was predicated upon a long series of thwartings and disappointments, arising chiefly from his milieu. The effects of these experiences may be detected, in part, by noting some of his remarks during his psychosis—remarks which did not make sense to the uninformed observer, but which, considered against the background of his previous life, did. One of his repeated comments was: "It makes me feel terrible that I have not had a nickname." From interviews a number of facts developed which make this statement intelligible. In school he did have a nickname, "Molasses," but it was most unpleasant to him, having been given him as a reaction to his intellectual retardation. What he really wanted was a nickname which would indicate group approval. Another determinant was his jealousy and envy of the brother who had been named after the father. He had a strong identification with his father and greatly resented his brother's advantage over him in having his father's name and using the father's nickname. In fact, when he first learned to write, A. often used that nickname as his own signature.

Another frequent remark of the patient was: "I have a great feeling that I am the cause of storms." Such a comment might be easily put down as a nonsensical delusion; but it was discovered that at eleven years of age A. had suffered a great shock during an electric storm and for months had dreamed about the experience in terror. Moreover, there was some evidence that "being to blame for storms" had become entangled with the worry over his rôle in the family conflict situation. The experience with the storm had taken place about the time that A. had first discovered that his mother and father had been obliged to marry and that his true birthday was other than he had been told. This proved a great emotional shock and was clearly a factor in the development of his psychosis.

Other comments of the patient are interesting. He often said, "Two mistakes count as one," and "I am alive to be punished for what I have done." When these remarks are linked to another, "The sin was masturbation and stealing from my mother's purse," the meaning of these otherwise trivial statements begins to be clear. One of A.'s most persistent problems was his autoerotic compulsion. He recalled the warnings of his mother about the dangers of autoeroticism, an item confirmed by the mother herself. Also, he seemed full of guilt for having engaged in petty thefts of money from his mother. He had evidently linked these two experiences together, and was still reacting to anticipations of punishment.

During the collection of additional material on the case, it was found that just previous to the outbreak of his psychosis A. had spent four or five hours a day learning the poetry of Edgar Allan Poe. This did not seem to have any bearing on the case until it was discovered that Poe was also a favorite of his father's. When A. was four years of age, the father had begun teaching the boy to recite many of Poe's poems, and the father took great pride in A.'s ability to perform well. Perhaps his return to Poe was a device for again trying to please his father. In his disturbed periods A. constantly had hallucinations of the appearance of his father. Also, in the two years preceding the acute outbreak of the disorder, the patient had taken up a correspondence course in engineering at the father's suggestion. In fact, A. became so compulsive and anxious about his studies that he often refused to eat.

Related to this situation is another remark often repeated. "I thought I was standing higher up than I was." At the time his parents were divorced, his father

had quarreled with him. A. had taken this to mean an almost complete rejection. The boy had been obliged to give up his plans to go to college—a plan which his father had earlier promised him—and to take up manual labor in order to support himself. The patient's tone of bitter frustration revealed the emotional importance to him of this enforced change in his life goal. (At the time of the break with his father, however, there had been little or no emotional outburst.)

In the course of psychiatric examination the patient also explained that he believed the whole difficulty arose from the family situation, though he blamed himself for his breakdown. When asked, "What are you in this world for?" he replied, "It is an old sad story of the person that would like to have been a better boy. Given such a high step he couldn't jump to reach it. I believe that what I have gone through was rather painful." Again at first sight this all sounds irrelevant, but, when it is realized that what he was really explaining was how he got into his present state, the answer does make sense. The world had been too much for him; he had failed; and now he blamed himself. That he had considerable insight into himself and into his previous difficult environment is shown in the following statement: "I feel I ought to start over growing up again and see if I can grow up right the next time."

There are many other apparently senseless remarks which take on sound meaning when analyzed against the background of his experience. Thus his constant query to the nurses and attendants, "Can't you trust me?"—repeated without any regard to the immediate situation—takes on some significance when it is found that this is the very remark he made to his father on an emotionalized occasion when the father had accused him of seeing his mother on the sly after the divorce. The family members had been definitely split into two opposing camps, and his father had expected A. to stand by him. As a matter of fact, the father had used, among other things, this argument of his disloyalty for disowning him. To quote Dollard, "The phrase may, therefore, carry a considerable part of the affect of this past tormenting situation and be evoked again in trifling circumstances that suggest the old situation." Another item—ironical in character—appeared when he was asked what the date was. He replied that the newspapers said that particular day was June 10, 1929, but that to him it was April 1, "and it's been that way for a long time." By this symbolic use of April Fool's Day he conveyed the idea that fate had played him a grim joke.³¹

The details of this case clearly indicate the necessity of taking into account the social and cultural background of the individual if we are to understand him as one who is making, through the psychosis, an attempt to strike a balance between his inner life and the demands of society. Thus trivial and apparently meaningless remarks become significant when their sources are uncovered. In like manner also, the more autistic gestures, drawings, and verbalisms of the schizophrenic may be used as a means of comprehending his motivations and mechanisms of thought.

Background Factors in Functional Psychoses. Students have been concerned with two sets of background factors to functional psychoses: the sociological and the psychological, including in the latter a great deal of attention to family influences. As to the sociological factors, we need but make the briefest mention of them.

³¹ John Dollard, "The psychotic person seen culturally," *American Journal of Sociology*, 44, 1936, pp. 648-650.

First and of general significance is the fact of complexity of life in our urban, industrialized communities. Associated with this is the heavy stress on inter-personal competition in the struggle for economic goods and social prestige. In our society the emphasis on upward striving for status induces anxiety and aggressiveness, on the one hand, and sense of frustration and inferiority, on the other. The latter is particularly true of those who fail, or believe they fail, to attain their anticipated goals.

Another situation making for mental disturbance lies in our marital and family patterns. The curious effort to integrate romantic love with the demands of our highly competitive status-striving world and with the requirements of child-bearing and child-rearing often result in personality difficulties for parents as well as children. The modern family is often riven with frustration, anxiety, and hidden rebellion which do not make for calm companionship and affection.

Then, too, the failure, in our society, to find an adequate place for religious and esthetic interests and outlets probably plays a part. These offer emotionally satisfying and balancing elements in personal adjustment. But religious faith is disappearing in many quarters and the level of esthetic interest and of artistic creativity for the majority of people is far below what it might be not only for personal pleasure but as an aid in mental health as well.

Cultural conflict, especially as it is associated with severe economic struggle, makes not only for delinquency and crime but for mental breakdowns as well. It is well known that the rate of first admissions to mental hospitals is much higher for native-born of foreign or mixed parentage and for foreign-born than it is for native-born individuals of native parentage. This fact doubtless reflects difficulties in personal adaptation to a new cultural system.²²

The ecology, that is spatial distribution, of mental disorders in our larger cities is informative. Various studies, but especially in Chicago, show that the first admissions to mental hospitals are highest for persons in the central business district, next highest in the rooming and hobo areas which surround the center of the city, and lowest in the residential areas on the periphery of the community. In Chicago, for example, for the segment extending south from the Loop, the zone rates (computed in terms of certain standard distances) ranged from 362 per 100,000 population to 71 at the outskirts. For the area from the center to the outlying northwestern section the range was from 362 to 55.²³

²² These and other pertinent sociological facts are conveniently reviewed in W. M. Lemert, *Social Pathology* (New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1951), Chap. 11.

²³ R. E. L. Faris and H. W. Dunham, *Mental Disorders in Urban Areas* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1934). This study and some subsequent ones are conveniently summarized and discussed in R. E. L. Faris, *Social Disorganization* (New York, The Ronald Press Company, 1948), Chap. 9.

If we turn to data on specific psychoses we find certain variations. Schizophrenia, which accounted for 22 per cent of the first admissions in the Faris and Dunham study, follows a definite pattern from very high incidence at the center to a low incidence at the edge of the community. In general this pattern holds for senile dementia and arteriosclerosis as well. But it does not hold at all for the manic and depressive disorders. There are, however, some class differentials. Paresis is high in the hobo, rooming house, and Negro areas. Catatonia is low in the hobo and rooming house sections, but high among the Negroes and foreign-born. Alcoholic psychosis has high incidence in the hobo, rooming house, and foreign-born sections, but with some sub-cultural variation. It is, for instance, very much higher among those of Irish extraction than among the Jews.

The interpretation of these differentials is not easy. The causative factors are undoubtedly multiple and intertwined. It seems reasonably clear that urban isolation, poverty, and occupational instability play important parts in accounting for the differences in the rates between the center and the periphery. We know that similar variations are found in the rates for delinquency. But just why there should be a rather regular pattern for schizophrenic disorders and not for the manic-depressive types is not clear. There is supporting evidence that the schizophrenics, while a rather diverse group, do represent a personality deviation particularly related to isolation, low economic status, transiency as to residence and job, and low education. The proportion of individuals with these social characteristics is much higher in the central than in the outlying sections of our larger cities.

Within these larger ecological divisions, of course, live people of varying cultural backgrounds. This fact, in turn, will have implications for personal adjustment. Sherman's study throws some light on sex, age, and cultural variations. He secured background material on 500 white patients and 300 Negro patients from selected mental hospitals. These data were checked by interviews with relatives and close friends of the patients. Among suggestive findings are the following:

Younger patients more frequently had delusions regarding money, education, and literary attainment. White women were more prone to paranoid delusions than white men; the reverse was true for the Negroes. Paranoid ideas were more common among foreign-born than natives. Persecutory and grandiose delusions were more common among Northern than Southern Negroes. Lack of education and low economic status are positively correlated with paranoid ideas. On the other hand, grandiose delusions are positively associated with education. Delusions of the white persons centered chiefly around money, those of the Negroes around religion. Among whites religious delusions were more common with Protestants than with Catholics. The Jews in this sample showed no religious

delusions. Hallucinations are more common among Negroes than whites, but the women in both groups exceed the men of their respective races in this symptom.³⁴

We need other and more carefully controlled studies of such matters. These studies would become particularly important if linked up to the dynamics of individual adaptation. Adequate studies of such correlations, aside from qualitative case investigations, are not at hand.

Social-Psychological Factors. A possible hereditary basis for the functional psychoses has been a topic of much heated debate. There is a considerable body of evidence that the average expectancy of an individual's having a schizophrenic breakdown is directly correlated with his blood kinship to schizophrenic patients. Some pertinent aspects of this topic were presented in Chapter 2, pp. 30-31. No one, but the extremist, seems to believe that the disorder is inherited directly. Rather it is a matter of biological predisposition toward this kind of breakdown under certain stresses.³⁵

On the other hand, there seems to be much less evidence of the presence of any important hereditary factor in the average case of manic-depressive disorder. Slater, however, reports that 15 per cent of parents and siblings of known manic-depressives were also affected as compared to the expectancy of one in 200 in the unrelated population.³⁶ But again this does not mean direct inheritance of the disease, but probably some constitutional predisposition to the same. But the whole topic of the relation of biological heredity to personality make-up is far from being clearly understood, either for the normals or abnormals.

When we turn to the data on the possible influence of the family as a group of interacting members on the later incidence of psychoses we find that the alleged relations are not always clear cut. However, a few suggestive findings will be noted. Bowman's study of the backgrounds of 125 schizophrenics and of 73 manic-depressives reports certain likenesses and certain differences in the two groups:

"The schizophrenic tends to be a model child, to have few friends, to indulge in solitary amusements, to be a follower, to feel superior, to be close-mouthed and uncommunicative. As a child, he is not oversensitive and daydreams less than normal. He smokes and drinks less. He is less contingent sexually but his sex life is less harmonious. As he grows up he becomes more seclusive, has fewer friends, becomes more uncommunicative, utilizes humor less, becomes much more sensitive as compared with the normal adult, since he does

³⁴ Mandel Sherman, "Some social backgrounds of the insane," *Bulletin, Society for Social Research*, 1935, 14th year, pp. 1, 3.

³⁵ For a full review of this whole topic, see Franz Kallmann, "Modern concepts of genetics in relation to mental health and abnormal personality development," *Psychiatric Quarterly*, 1947, 21:535-553.

³⁶ E. T. O. Slater, "Genetics in psychiatry," *Journal of Mental Science*, 1944, 90:17-35.

not lose his childish sensitivity. There is an increase in his tendency to daydream so that it equals that of the normal. He shows less sportsmanship.

"The affective individual [manic-depressive] as compared with the normal tends to be a model child; he has sometimes more, sometimes fewer friends, he tends to be a leader, considers himself superior, is less frank and communicative, is extremely sympathetic, daydreams less and is less absentminded. He shows less sportsmanship. He tends to show more initiative, to be more ambitious and a more valuable worker. He smokes and drinks less. He usually is less continent sexually and has a less harmonious sex life. As he grows up, he indulges more in recreations with others, becomes less self-assertive, a little more jealous, has a greater energy output. Although no more sensitive as a child, he preserves his childish sensitivity and hence becomes more sensitive than the normal.

"As compared with the schizophrenic instead of the normal, the affective group shows the same percentage of model children; the child of the affective group has more friends, indulges more in recreation with others, tends to be a leader, shows no difference in self-estimate or in ability to bear pain well. He is very much more sympathetic. There is no difference in sensitivity during childhood, in adult life there is possibly a little less sensitivity. He daydreams less and is less absentminded. There is a greater energy output, a little more initiative, a little more ambition and a slightly higher work ability. Habits of smoking and drinking are similar and the sex life shows nothing of significance.

"Since it has been pointed out that certain changes do occur in the pre-psychotic personality during the change from childhood to adult life, the question may well be asked if such a change is not the actual beginning of mental disease. Kraepelin has raised this same question without attempting to answer it. It does not seem that we can answer it but it does appear to us important and worth further study. Since we have found that certain traits such as sensitivity are about the same in the pre-psychotic personality and in the normal during childhood but have a marked change occurring in adult life, it may well be that functional psychoses start with a slow, insidious personality change which continues for years and which is an integral part of the psychosis. It is also possible that many descriptions of pre-psychotic personality are based on the individuals' reactions at this period and are really a description of the early symptoms of the psychosis rather than of the pre-psychotic personality."²⁷

Witmer and her students tried to discover if there were any particular configurations of family relations which might be predictive of later functional breakdowns. No control group was used, but they did compare the schizophrenics with the manic-depressives. For both groups two-thirds of the patients "were considered to have been unusually sensitive and close-mouthed both as children and as adolescents." But "important differences between the two groups were found in the traits: output of energy, reaction in the social group, number of friends, and type of recreation, a larger proportion of manic-depressives being outgoing in these respects, and in absentmindedness, which characterized a larger proportion of the dementia praecox patients." On other traits there were no differences, but on the

²⁷ K. M. Bowman "A study of the pre-psychotic personality in certain disorders," in *The Role of the Individual*, Publication of the Association for Research in Nervous and Mental Disease, 1941, 14, 208-239. By permission.

whole the schizophrenics were "markedly introverted" and the manic-depressives more out-going.

About a quarter of the homes were marked by friction, but from one-third to two-thirds were rated as harmonious. It is suggested that children from the latter may actually be "over-protected" and thus in some ways not conditioned to distress when faced with a rough-and-tumble world outside.³⁹

In another study of the after-careers of individuals who were diagnosed as schizophrenic or potentially so during adolescence, Gladstern found that of 26 patients, after an interval of from 5 to 10 years, only one fourth were rated as doing very well, less than another third as only moderately adjusted. The balance were "substantially unimproved" or "confirmed schizophrenics."⁴⁰

Yerbury and Newell compared a group of 56 psychotics with a group of normal children in an effort to discover important differentials in the incidence of mental disorder. Among the most striking findings are these: Nearly 70 per cent of the former came from parents with "hereditary tendencies," compared to about 3 per cent of the normals. Ninety per cent of the psychotics had "abnormal siblings," while about 3 per cent of the normal had. The psychotics, far more than the normals, came from "turbulent" homes, with "conflicting discipline." Also there were many more of the psychotics who showed over-attachment to parents, who experienced brutal discipline, or who hated the parent. The authors remark: "The most striking revelation was the total lack of security in the human relationships to which the psychotic children were subjected." Nearly one-half of the psychotics came from foster homes, 60 per cent from "unwholesome neighborhoods," and a very high fraction of their families had had some kind of social service. As to difficulty with childbirth and incidence of severe illness in childhood, the two groups showed little difference.⁴¹ Friedlander's study tends to confirm a common-sense observation as well as findings of other studies that either over-indulgence or extreme severity in treatment of the child, severe friction, strong anxiety and extensive day-dreaming all rank disproportionately high as features of early experience among those who later become psychotic.⁴¹

The manner in which family members play a part in the inception of

³⁹ Helen L. Witmer, *et. al.*, "The childhood personality and parent-child relationships in dementia-praecox and manic-depressive patients," *Smith College Studies in Social Work*, 1934, 4:259-377. By permission.

⁴⁰ Hedda Gladstern, "The later adjustment of twenty-six adolescents diagnosed as schizophrenic or potentially schizophrenic," *Smith College Studies in Social Work*, 1941, 12:106-136.

⁴¹ E. C. Yerbury and Nancy Newell, "Genetic and environmental factors in psychoses of children," *American Journal of Psychiatry*, 1943, 100:599-605. Quotation from page 605.

⁴¹ Dorothee Friedlander, "Personality development of twenty-seven children who later became psychotic," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1945, 45:330-335.

personality patterns which in the end led to schizophrenia is shown in the following case.⁴²

Case of Doris. Doris came to the attention of the psychiatrist attached to a well-known college, because of failure in all work except along certain literary lines, difficulty in getting on with other students, and her growing practice of taking property from other girls in the dormitory.

"Doris is the daughter of a prominent fiction writer, who, according to his publishers, is an outstanding American author. Her mother's educational background is not certain, other than that she did attend a private girls' school. The financial and social rating of the family, on the Warner scale, would be lower-upper class."

This girl has given indications of being a misfit since early childhood. There is evidence of parental rejection and of strong sibling rivalry. ". . . Her problems originate in the personal deviation of her father. The latter has an Oedipus attachment to his mother which has resulted in strained relationship with his wife. Since Doris was an unattractive, dull, and unwanted child, she was not 'welcome' at home. It was made very clear to her that she must not be seen when outsiders were present even though her two talented younger sisters were on display. Her father's rejection of her was so great that she was placed in a private boarding school.

"Unfortunately she was a misfit there. At the termination of one semester the principal suggested that she be placed under psychiatric observation because of her slowness or inability to grasp the material presented. Rather than comply with this request, the parents transferred Doris to another school. There was a recurrence of the same difficulties and again on advice she was sent to a psychiatrist.

"Custodial care plus private tutors were outlined as a plan of treatment. In this manner it was hoped that her literary talents could be shunted into productive channels. However, the outlook was a dismal one, because of the parents' unwillingness to co-operate. Within a short time, this program was concluded by mutual consent of parents and physician.

"From then on, Doris was the butt of the family jokes. She was a genius, her mother rationalized. For this reason she lived in an aura of inner beauty. And according to close associates of Doris' father, the latter was actually envious of her ability to compose simple, ethereal poems with ease. The family's attitude toward her was crystallized in an article published in a 'high class' magazine by her youngest sister. 'If you see a big blob of fat sprawled out on a couch munching on candy and not paying attention to anyone, that is my sister Doris.'

". . . It is obvious why she chose to remain in a world of unreality. Other than for her mother, who made feeble attempts to understand her, she was isolated from her family. In time she developed such a sense of not belonging that she, in turn, totally rejected them. Mentioning any of her father's works precipitated moods of irritability. The latter were accompanied by outward evidences of anger . . . By the time she arrived at the college, she was not only well-established in an introverted world of unreality, but she also possessed many phobias. She exhibited somnambulism, photomania, and claustrophobia."

During her first year at the college she became a real problem to teachers, administrators, and fellow-students alike. She failed to attend classes regularly. She was dropped and then reinstated. She began petty thievery which she rationalized as "borrowing" things. This was not regarded by her fellows as too

⁴² This account is quoted and paraphrased from a case record kindly furnished by Dr. E. C. Chiasson from an unpublished manuscript and is used by her permission.

serious, and anyway they seldom cared about regaining their property since "it was usually ruined." Some students made a real effort to understand her and to be sympathetic.

"Several unsuccessful attempts were made to socialize her by having someone room with her. However, despite the motivations of living with a 'genius,' her roommates were unable to do so for any length of time because of her unbelievable filth. Rather than doing her laundry or sending it out to be done, Doris would dig out the 'cleanest' of her soiled garments and wear them. This would continue until someone would send them to be washed . . .

"In addition she developed a morbid appetite . . . It was not unusual to see her lumber through a tearoom juggling two ice cream sodas plus several sandwiches for an in-between-meal snack. She would gorge herself until at times she became physically ill."

The school psychiatrist reports the following from her records: "Psychometric data are erratic in nature. The Rorschach indicates signs of early schizophrenia with confused manner of approach, slight confabulation and contamination, low color response and variability in quality of responses. Intelligence rating varies from 70 to 95, depending on degree of co-operation. In the field of literary interests and abilities, she shows an unusually high score. This would parallel the findings in her scholastic work."

"Her ideation content was filled with oral hallucinations. Observers report her frequently carrying on active conversations with trees and flowers. The final diagnosis in this case was simple schizophrenia with deterioration."

While this case-study lacks many details as to background and symptoms, it does show the way in which schizophrenic dissociation begins and develops. There may well have been some family predisposition to mental disorganization which, in turn, was stimulated by rejection and sense of isolation coupled with certain childish indulgences, especially in eating. The case shows clear evidence of oral fixation.

In concluding this section let us indicate briefly some of the general features which represent some forms of adaptation though they may not be of such a kind as to provide normal social participation with one's fellows.

In schizophrenia, delusions are considered an important feature. In some instances they tend to be highly systematized. A delusion is frankly a cultural definition of someone else's belief. We so label the beliefs of the psychotic because they do not correspond to those generally accepted by others around him. If a patient in our society believes in devils, we call him insane, but other societies have had similar beliefs and certainly did not consider themselves pathological for doing so. It is largely a matter of consensus. So long as forms of conduct associated with given beliefs do not completely undo a given group or society, it is amazing what variations may be found in the culturalization of ideas that to the Occidental mind seem completely fantastic.

In the affective (circular) psychoses delusions seldom have such elaboration as we find in paranoia or schizophrenia. The delusions of the manic-depressives may take the form of a sense of guilt, or may serve as

the foundation for revenge upon someone for an imagined or real wrong, as in the following example.

Case of Albert O., 60 years of age. In a manic phase at the onset of his second breakdown as a manic-depressive, Albert broke up a picture of his father and a group of professional associates. His father had long been an object of a certain jealousy and envy and was the basis of the son's sense of inferiority. To Albert, in fact, the house in which he lived, filled as it was with furniture, pictures, and valuable household objects of his prominent father, was a sort of prison; and in his maniacal attack he set out to destroy the objects which symbolized to him his enthrallment to his father as a superior—a man for whom consciously he had great love and admiration.

In this episode a strong but suppressed antagonism to his wife was also apparent. She was his wife by a second marriage, the first marriage having been broken by the wife's unfaithfulness. But through all the years he had remained really in love with his former wife. He had always believed that his second wife had married him largely to gain the wealth and social prestige accruing to the son of a prominent father, so that in his violence he was not only attacking his father, but also taking revenge on his present wife, who valued the family antiques as material evidence of her status.

The emotional responses of the psychotics, then, are to be defined as aberrant because they are not understood by others. These persons often reveal forms of impulsive reactions to crises which we consider infantile and ineffective. The inner foundations of these—what they are trying to express—escape us. Yet the violence of the manic doubtless has a meaning for him, and in one sense any normal person in a state of great anger is reacting not unlike those whom we see in states of mania and excitement. On the contrary, the apparent apathy or lack of emotional expression in the schizophrenic is considered to be evidence of the lack of the normal inter-relation of the emotional and the intellectual processes. But the lack of such an emotion is often itself a form of adaptation, perhaps a dissociation developed to prevent painful memories or painful acts.

Some writers consider the "shut-in" personality as the central feature of schizophrenia and this introverted pattern as a long and gradual development. However, there is some evidence that cases which certainly are diagnosed as schizophrenic have neither the long history of social insulation nor the gradual appearance of the more serious symptoms. Sometimes the onset is rather sudden and there may be a certain percentage of recoveries. It may be that, as we get more understanding of the dynamics involved in the source of such breakdowns, we shall have further proof that the older, rather static classifications are distinctly limited."

There is finally the problem of mental conflict and the psychoses. The importance of mental conflicts among neurotics, especially the psychasthenics and neurasthenics, is evident. In the schizophrenics there is often a long struggle to make some sort of adequate adjustment to a situation

⁴² See a suggestive paper on this matter, S. K. Weinberg, "A sociological analysis of a schizophrenic type," *American Sociological Review*, 1950, 15: 600-610.

which is defined by the individual or by others as difficult. The appearance of schizoid cases among primitive peoples who have been exposed to white culture is another instance of conflict. In the manic-depressive conflicting emotions play an important part. The self-pity, the sense of guilt which troubles the patient, the feeling that blame should rest upon one's own shoulders—these symptoms often reflect long periods of worry and conflict over rôle and status, and over capacity to gain ends or goals which seem important.

THE ORGANIC PSYCHOSES

At the opening of the previous section the distinction between the functional and organic psychoses was indicated. The latter are those mental disorders for which there is a more or less detectable constitutional foundation. We shall first summarize the symptoms of some of the more important of the organic psychoses and then offer a brief comment on some of the essential differences in the personal adjustment of such cases in contrast to those in the functional group.

Classification of Organic Psychoses. There are many organic disorders and some of these have been discussed in Chapter 21. Following the plan used above we shall note briefly in Table 9 the form, symptoms, and certain adaptive features of selected psychoses which rest on constitutional deficiencies or abnormalities.

The Organic Disorders and Personality Adjustment. It would carry us too far afield to undertake a discussion of the ramifications of the problems of personal adaptation which are found among the organic cases. The individual differences are great because the nature of organic diseases is so varied. The most important point is that the constitutional disturbances put definite limits upon the social-cultural factors which are our chief interest.

When we consider those who suffer from organic breakdowns, we are obliged to reckon with the effects of profound internal physiological and neurological changes upon the personality. These are of such a character as not only to influence the reception of new stimuli, but also to affect the depositions of past experience and finally to influence motor or overt activity. In the neuroses and functional psychoses the effects of social-cultural learning still operate largely within the constitutional limits of fixity and flexibility, whereas in the organic psychoses the matter is more or less reversed. That is, in the latter, the effects of disease on the organism are such as to reduce, greatly distort, or even destroy the influence of previous learning. Thus the life organization is temporarily or permanently altered, many rôles disappear, and in many cases the "generalized other" concerned with moral conduct (the superego) tends to break down or disappear altogether. In most cases, certainly, there is little that can be

done to restore the individual to full participation in society and its culture.

THERAPY AND PREVENTION

A variety of methods have been developed with a view to helping neurotics and psychotics improve their lot. For the neurotics most of the therapy is provided by the private practitioner in medicine and by counselors in school, industry, the church, and in other community institutions and agencies. The psychotics have, for the most part, to be treated in publicly supported hospitals or in private sanatoria. In public institutions the therapy is likely to be distinctly limited for want of competent staff. In the private institutions there is often good provision for effective help. In this section we shall comment briefly on various kinds of therapy and then close with a paragraph or two regarding the prevention of mental disturbances.

Various Kinds of Therapy. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss in any detail the many kinds of treatment which have been applied to the mentally disordered.⁴⁴ But we shall comment briefly on certain of the physical, psychological, and sociological methods which have been used.

There are a number of striking methods of physical therapy in use. Some of these such as the "shock" treatment have had a lot of public attention. The theory behind the giving of insulin, metrazol, and other drugs, or the use of strong electric current to produce shock is that the patient, if physiologically highly disturbed thereby, may come out of the shock period much improved. Insulin treatments have been administered to paranoid schizophrenics with some success; there is less effect, apparently, in cases of catatonia. Metrazol has been used on schizophrenics with considerable success but the convulsions are often so great that the patients injure themselves seriously during the seizure. Because of this there has been considerable professional and lay reaction against this method. Electric shock therapy has been used a great deal with good success in manic-depressive psychoses and with some success in cases of schizophrenia.

Another much publicized type of physical therapy is called psychosurgery. This is a method of treating functional disorders by sectioning parts of the cerebral cortex. It is a highly delicate operation and the details need not concern us. The method has been applied to a wide range of functional cases, including so-called psychopathic personalities and even some psychoneurotics. The reports on post-operative effects vary widely, partly because of the inadequate criteria of success or failure.

⁴⁴ For a good review of some of the more important forms of therapy, see Coleman, *op. cit.*, Chap. 19.

Table 9

FORMS, SYMPTOMS, AND ADJUSTIVE FUNCTIONS OF CERTAIN ORGANIC PSYCHOSES

Form	Chief Symptoms	Adjustive Functions
General paraesis	Progressive mental deterioration due primarily to tissue injury of brain by spirochetes of syphilis. Wide range of organic and psychological symptoms: sight, walking, speech being often affected. Three common types: <i>expansive</i> , showing euphoria, fantasy of important projects, such as making money, and so on, <i>depressed</i> , marked by discouragement, bizarre hypochondriacal delusions, for example, thinking one has no brain, no bowels; <i>demented</i> or <i>simple</i> , revealing neither marked expansive nor depressed symptoms, but a gradual personality deterioration.	Gradual decline in normal personality reactions sometimes accompanied by some insight into condition. In the depressed type guilt feelings and self-condemnation appear. Often there are rationalizations and various compensatory devices.
Epilepsy	Periodic seizures of two kinds: <i>Grand mal</i> , marked by sudden onset, violent tonic (rigid) contractions of muscles, followed by clonic (jerky) ones; later, rhythmic relaxation, contraction of muscles and, usually, passing into deep coma or sleep. Sometimes there is temporary cyanosis, foaming at the mouth, biting of the tongue. <i>Petit mal</i> is a mild attack, marked by giddiness, momentary loss of consciousness, and mild muscular disturbance. Person rarely falls down. All levels of intelligence and all kinds of personality represented in epileptics. Many of them, however, are irritable, suspicious, highly egocentric, rigid, and lacking in sympathy.	While epilepsy is often thought to have an hereditary basis, emotional stress may well be a factor in inducing seizures. They may be regarded as tension-reducing devices. (It is interesting to note that hysterics sometimes simulate epileptic seizures, probably as attention-getting methods.)
Toxic psychoses	A wide variety of disturbances arise from toxins. Among others are those associated with fever, nutritional deficiencies, lead poisoning, carbon-monoxide poisoning, and overdosage of alcohol. Deliria develop from fever, with	The presence of toxins leads to modifications in behavior and represents efforts of the organism to adapt itself to chemical changes of the internal environment. Most of these effects are rela-

Chief Symptoms

which may be associated nightmares, restlessness, excitement. Lack of B-vitamin, as a nutritional deficiency, may result in depression, increased sense of tension, and increased emotionality. Lead poisoning, though rare today, results in great fatigue, irritability, convulsions, and hallucinations. Carbon-monoxide poisoning produces bewilderment, apathy, amnesia, muscular rigidity or tremors, and general lowering of mental functions. Alcoholism is marked by delirium tremens, extreme memory defect, Korsakoff's psychosis, and in prolonged cases by general deterioration of all mental functions.

Senile dementia

Loss of memory, of ability to concentrate; egocentricity, insomnia, often hostility with some paranoid features, **decline in habits of personal care.**

Adjustive Functions

tively temporary. In the case of alcoholism, there may be a gradual and extended modification of conduct and personality traits, marked by hostility; projection of paranoid delusions, and hallucinations. Childhood background of alcoholics is often a home of conflict, strong sense of insecurity and inferiority, and in some cases over-protection and pampering by parents, especially the mother.

While fundamental basis is probably some organic deterioration of brain tissue, sense of social rejection and loss of status in old age may be precipitating causes. Rational anticipation of changes in later maturity and old age may help prevent incidence of serious senile disorders.

So far no one knows just what takes place in shock therapy or in psychosurgery. Clearly the intense physiological effects of shock treatments or the rendering ineffective of parts of the brain by surgery induce certain behavioral changes. These include, among others, lessening of emotional outbursts, appearance of calmness in place of former agitation, and loss of intense personal ambition. But just what this means in terms of neurology is unknown. Certainly we need more data on the possible long-term effectiveness of these methods which, on the whole, reflect the continuing biological orientation in psychiatry.

The psychological methods of dealing with neurotics and psychotics vary considerably. Although personality tests may be used as part of the treatment, most of the methods center around the interview. For milder cases psychotherapy ranges all the way from extended psychoanalysis to short-range treatment which may involve only a single interview or at most a few sessions. Psychotherapy for psychotics has been applied only in limited situations and very little real scientific work has been done in this field. All too often it is assumed that the psychotic, especially the schizophrenics, are hopelessly incurable. We are just beginning to develop promising techniques for helping at least a fraction of these people back to normality.

In treating both neurotics and psychotics the points indicated in our discussion of the interview apply. (See Chapter 11.) Congenial social atmosphere, good rapport, and emotional re-education are basic. Whether the form of the interview be directed or non-directed will depend on the patient and on the skill of the clinician. Certainly the principles regarding interaction and self-involvement which have been presented in this book must be recognized and put into practice if a modicum of success is to be expected.

The use of hypnosis in treating mental disorders has been variously successful. During the nineteenth century hypnosis was much used, but today it seems most applicable where short-range and quick results are wanted. For instance, it has been successfully used on soldiers emotionally undone by combat conditions.⁴⁵ Most workers in this field regard hypnotherapy as rather limited. For one thing it operates outside normal consciousness and normal social interaction. It is generally assumed, and I think properly so, that better results are to be expected if the patient is a participant with the clinician in the process of trying to improve his personal and social adjustment.

By sociological therapy we refer to the manipulation of the group life and institutions in which the patient finds himself with a view to altering and/or improving his attitudes, values, and habits. Such treatment might,

⁴⁵ See, for example, R. R. Grinker and J. P. Spiegel, *War Neuroses* (Philadelphia, The Blakiston Company, 1945). Also, J. G. Watkins, *Hypnotherapy of War Neuroses* (New York, The Ronald Press Company, 1949).

among other things, undertake to modify the group membership, the companionship relations, and the forms of recreation. Much occupational therapy has both psychological and sociological features. The theory behind such treatment is that a modification or manipulation of the social contacts and institutional adjustments of the mentally ill will help them. For the most part such techniques are supplementary to those which reach more effectively into the deeper motivations and anxieties of the individual.

The Prevention of Mental Disorders. The mental hygiene movement began in the United States about 1908.⁴⁰ Its fundamental aim is to educate the public in such a way as to prevent mental disorders, mild or severe. Today many of its concepts, principles, and programs have been integrated into our schools, social service agencies, and industry. From these places it has also spread into the home. While it is difficult to know just what positive benefits this movement has had, there is much support for the view that it has helped to give individuals a more sensible view of themselves as well as of others. True, sometimes the principles of sound mental health, when first presented to people, serve to upset them more than to help them. But such self-reference is perhaps a first step in the growth of self-understanding.

In Part II of this book, especially, we have drawn heavily on materials which, viewed broadly, fall within the scope of mental hygiene. These will not be summarized here, but it should be said in closing that as these principles become more fully understood and applied, the pressure of our highly complex and industrialized living may take less toll of all of us. Certainly life today furnishes a steady stream of neurotics and psychotics to private doctors, clinics, and hospitals. We are far from meeting this challenge through psychiatry and psychology with anything like the success with which medical man solved the problems of infectious and contagious diseases some decades ago. But the growing public awareness of the need for mental as well as physical health programs is promising. Finally, those interested in preventive mental health programs should realize that its principles derive in considerable measure from the study of neurotic and psychotic behavior which has gone steadily forward in recent years.

⁴⁰ See David Klein, *Mental Hygiene* (New York, Henry Holt & Company, Inc., 1944).

Glossary

- Adjustment.** The efforts of a person to meet his needs and adapt to his internal and external environment.
- Affect.** The general term to cover emotions and feelings as distinct from intellectual activities.
- Ambivalence.** The coexistence in the individual of opposite and conflicting impulses, attitudes, feelings, ideas, or responses toward a physical object or person. These may be either conscious or unconscious.
- Ambivert.** A person whose activities lie between the extremes of extroversion and introversion.
- Amnesia.** Loss of memory for a given event or period which may be due to either physical or psychological causes.
- Anal eroticism.** A psychoanalytic concept referring to fixation of libido at the anal stage of development. It is marked by substitutive responses associated with pleasures arising in the anal region which are called "anal character traits," expressed in obsessive orderliness, cleanliness, miserliness, stubbornness, and related compulsive patterns.
- Anomie.** A condition of the individual marked by lack of norms; a sense of isolation and want of values and goals; a result of the high degree of specialization in mass society and that loss of intimacy found in closely knit primary groups.
- Anorexia.** Loss or marked decrease of appetite, due to either organic or functional causes.
- Anticipatory behavior.** Behavior which is preparatory or incipient to the final, overt response.
- Anxiety.** A condition of emotional tension marked by worry and apprehension. May be specific or free-floating and general. In severe form is characteristic of neurosis.
- Aphasia.** A partial or complete loss of language capacity and expression in any of its forms: reading, writing, speaking, and the comprehension of the written, printed, or spoken word. May be due to either organic or psychological pathology.
- Asthenic type of physique.** Body type, marked by lean, narrow build, angular face, long, thin arms and legs, thin chest, flat stomach, poor circulation, and poor skin secretion. According to Kretschmer associated with the schizoid personality type.
- Athletic type of physique.** Body type, marked by strong muscular and skeletal development, broad shoulders, thick chest, tapering trunk, strong arms and legs, firm face, prominent jaw, and tendency to short nose form. According to Kretschmer associated with the cycloid personality type.
- Attitude.** The predisposition or tendency to react in a way typical to oneself in regard to a given physical object, person, or value; usually accompanied by feelings and emotions.

Autistic thinking. Gratification through fantasy which is highly self-centered and non-reality oriented. Synonym for *dereistic thinking*.

Autoeroticism. Any form of sexual self-stimulation and response.

Autonomic nervous system. Nervous system complementary to the central nervous system made up of a chain of connected ganglia, the nerve fibers of which have efferent endings in the visceral organs, blood vessels, glands, heart, and smooth muscles; divided into the sympathetic and parasympathetic sections.

Case history. A record which may be derived from various sources, such as interviews, autobiography, legal documents, and so on, which may be informally or formally ordered so as to present an historical account of an individual's life.

Catatonia. One of the sub-groups of schizophrenia characterized by withdrawal and alternation of immobility and stupor, and excitement.

Catharsis. Release of emotional tension associated with disturbing and usually repressed traumatic events through verbal or general overt reaction. May be achieved through interview or by use of drugs or by any other suitable stimulus.

Cathexis. In Freudian theory the investment or concentration of psychic energy in some object or mental process, in analogy to an electric charge.

Central nervous system. Cerebrospinal nervous system located in the spinal vertebrae and brain case, which mediates the relation between external stimulation and motor-glandular responses. Connected with the autonomic nervous system.

Compensation. Substitutive behavior where responses are built up around some alternate object or situation to offset failure to obtain an original goal because of feeling of inadequacy, actual or imagined. A form of ego defense.

Competition. Act of striving for something which is also sought for by others at the same time; is always object-oriented and may or may not involve close personal interaction.

Complex. Emotionally toned wishes, attitudes, ideas, and memories which are linked together and which are partially or totally repressed.

Compulsion. Irresistible impulse to carry out some action or response although the person may realize it is irrational and even unpleasant.

Conditioned response. A learned response built up by association or connection of native or learned stimulus and response with a new stimulus or response.

Congenital. Existing at birth or before birth but not hereditary.

Conflict. Act of striving for something which is also sought for by another or others at the same time; it is at first rival-oriented since the end can only be secured by neutralizing the efforts of the rival.

Constitution. The organic make up of the individual, relatively constant, but dependent on interplay of heredity, maturation, and environment.

Conversion hysteria. Neurosis in which anxiety is shown by or "converted" into some specific symptoms; often involves loss of some sensory or motor function, or dissociation of mental and action processes.

Coöperation. Joint action of two or more persons to secure a reward or goal which may or may not be shared, mutual aid.

Covert behavior. Activity not observable by another, such as inner life which must be inferred from observed responses—either of gross muscular kind or by communication which reports the individual's inner life.

Cyclic psychosis. See *manic-depressive psychosis*, also called *circular psychosis*.

Cycloid personality. Type of personality characterized by tendencies to periodic or cyclic fluctuations of mood, or extremes of emotions and feelings, essen-

tially the pattern of behavior found in accentuated form in the manic-depressive psychosis. Kretschmer's *cyclothymes*.

Defense mechanism. Any behavior pattern which permits the individual to avoid anxiety or any threat to the ego.

Dementia praecox. See *schizophrenia*.

Dereistic thinking. See *autistic thinking*.

Displacement. A form of transference or substitute response, usually of an emotional attitude or symbolic meaning from one person to another. It is an ego-defense mechanism permitting redirection of strong affect on to another.

Dissociation. Opposite of association and integration.

Dysfunction. Disturbance or impairment in the functioning of mental or organic processes.

Ego. The more or less conscious self that is aware of personal experiences and in touch with reality. In Freudian theory that mechanism which serves to adjust the individual to the demands of the physical and social environment.

Ego-ideal. The model of an individual—usually formed in pre-adolescence or adolescence—that becomes a standard toward which one strives.

Emotion. Aroused psychological and physiological state of the organism marked by increased bodily activity and strong feelings.

Endocrine glands. Organs of internal secretion which produce *hormones*. These are released directly into the lymph or blood streams.

Etiology. The specific set of factors contributing to a given disorder.

Extrovert. A person whose activities are determined chiefly by external social stimulation rather than by inner experiences. He is sociable and tends to extensive activity.

Fantasy. Daydream, often elaborated more or less consciously in terms of some personal desire or wish. Often a form of ego defense by escape from reality into a world of wishful thinking, yet frequently the basis of creative art and invention.

Fugue. A breakdown of the continuity of consciousness characterized by amnesia and flight from a subjectively intolerable situation. The person tends to create a new setting for himself in which he may lead a normal life.

Gerontology. The science which deals with the study of old age in all its phases. *Geriatrics* is a synonym.

Homeostasis. The tendency of an organism to maintain its physiological equilibrium or steady state, the disturbance of which sets up activity to restore the balance.

Hysteria. A form of psychoneurosis, marked by a high degree of suggestibility, frequently expressed in conversion and dissociative reactions. An hysteria may solve a conflict by using symptoms of organic illness in the absence of demonstrable organic pathology.

Id. From Freud, meaning the instincts or original drives. In his theory it is the fundamental impulse system of the individual.

Identification. Method of putting oneself in the place of another in imagination or activity often going so far as to result in sense of oneness with the other person.

Imitation. Executing an act which is identical or similar to the act of another, basic human mechanism is that of identification.

Inhibition. Blocking or arrest of function; may be either conscious or unconscious.

Integration. Building up by coördination of a series of units of response into a larger pattern or totality.

Intelligence quotient. A numerical index to denote intellectual capacity; determined by dividing the mental age (as fixed by a score on an intelligence test) by the individual's chronological age.

Interaction. Relationship set up between two or more people in regard to each other or in regard to some common object or situation; the basis of society.

Introjection. Incorporation of attitudes, values, and overt behavior of another person or of a group into one's own inner pattern.

Introvert. A person whose activities are determined chiefly by inner feelings, thoughts, and fantasies rather than by external experiences. He tends to seclusiveness and avoids social activities.

Involutional melancholia. A functional psychosis characterized by depression, agitation, and apprehension, characteristically occurs in middle age or later.

Libido. Freud's term for any sexual or love desire, urge, or drive in the very broadest sense.

Life organization. The more or less coördinated pattern of habits, ideas, and emotions of the individual related to his rôle, status, and his self-regard. See *personality*.

Manic-depressive psychosis. Psychotic reactions marked by prolonged periods of excitement and overactivity (manic), or by periods of depression and lessened activity; sometimes by alternation of the two. Has no demonstrable organic foundation.

Myxedema. Disorder caused by thyroid deficiency in adult life, characterized by mental dullness. In children it is known as *cretinism*.

Neurasthenia. A neurotic reaction marked by chronic mental and physical fatigue and listlessness, presently called "asthenic reaction" in some quarters.

Neurosis. Mild functional nervous disease, without clearly evident organic basis, characterized by presence of physical or mental symptoms and a certain impairment of effective adjustment but without serious disturbance in the perception of reality. Ordinarily hospitalization is not necessary. Synonymous with *psychoneurosis*.

Objective thinking. Thinking directed by logically verifiable associations, as contrasted with fantasy or dereistic thinking.

Oedipus complex. In psychoanalytic theory, excessive sexual fixation of child on the parent of the opposite sex and a dislike or hatred of the parent of the same sex; usually operates at unconscious level.

Organic psychosis. A psychosis associated with actual and demonstrable brain pathology.

Overt behavior. Behavior marked by responses observable by another person.

Paranoia. Functional mental disease characterized by more or less systematized delusions of persecution or grandeur, no evident organic basis.

Paranoid personality. Type of personality characterized by suspiciousness, envy, extreme jealousy, and rigidity, essentially the pattern of behavior found in accentuated form in true paranoia.

Paresis. An organic psychosis caused by syphilitic infection of the brain.

Particularism. The tendency to explain complex events or situations by some single, particular cause.

- Perception.** The interpretation of a sensation in terms of associations based on past experience such as memories and meanings.
- Personal-social conditioning.** Learning from social interaction which is not predetermined by culturalized habits and attitudes but which grows out of more highly personalized relations of individuals.
- Personality.** Totality of characteristics and habits of an individual which makes it possible for him to take part in social life. These are derived from constitutional factors as well as from personal-social and cultural learning.
- Personality type.** A general term used to indicate certain basic traits and mental and behavior patterns which characterize a group or sample of the population. The personality type is believed to be determined by hereditary factors and the effects of social-cultural learning in the first years of life.
- Phobia.** Exaggerated or morbid fear, characteristically directed to a specific object or situation.
- Projection.** Thrusting qualities upon others which arise from one's own experience; avoidance of guilt and anxiety by attributing to another one's own repressed attitudes and complexes. An ego-defense mechanism which places blame for one's troubles on others.
- Projective techniques.** Diagnostic devices designed to elicit predominantly unconscious material by means of forcing the subject to interpret an unstructured or ambiguous stimulus. The test situation itself is frequently of therapeutic value.
- Psyche.** From Greek word meaning mind or mental processes. Adjective *psychic* refers to conditions and processes relating to the mental or functional in contrast to bodily factors.
- Psychoanalysis.** A method of psychotherapy based largely on the assumption of an *unconscious* and utilizing techniques of free association and recall developed by Freud.
- Psychodrama.** A therapeutic method, developed by Moreno, in which the person acts out predetermined rôles. For the observer these provide diagnostic aids, for the "actor" they provide therapeutic outlets.
- Psychogenic.** Originating in the psychological system, rather than from organic factors.
- Psychoneurosis.** See *neurosis*.
- Psychosis.** Severe personality disorder marked by loss of contact with reality, usually characterized by disorganization of intellectual and affective processes leading to delusions and hallucinations. Hospitalization is ordinarily required.
- Psychosomatic.** Pertains to illnesses which exhibit inter-related psychological and physiological components.
- Psychosurgery.** General term for various techniques of brain surgery used in the treatment of certain mental disorders.
- Psychotherapy.** Treatment of personality maladjustments by various psychological techniques.
- Pyknic type of physique.** Body type characterized by rounded figure, fat about trunk deep chest, round, soft arms, shoulders usually rounded and pushed slightly forward.
- Rationalization.** Process of giving a socially acceptable justification or reason for an act really performed from some other motive. Often rationalizations are unconscious justifications in terms of what is considered right and proper by one's group. A form of ego defense.
- Reaction-formation.** Conscious or unconscious behavior which is the reverse

of certain repressed emotions, impulses, or attitudes that are for some reason considered unacceptable.

Regression. A mechanism by means of which an individual retreats to less mature responses that marked an earlier stage of development, in order to avoid conflict and anxiety. May become a habitual response to specific frustrations.

Repression. An unconscious mechanism by which a thought or idea is removed from consciousness. Repressed experiences, usually painful and unpleasant, are assumed to continue to influence behavior.

Rôle. The function or behavior of a person in a specific social context based on the expectations of others and his own definition of the situation.

Schizoid personality. Type of personality characterized by tendencies toward dissociation, withdrawal, and autistic thinking, essentially the pattern of behavior found in accentuated form in schizophrenia. Kretschmer's *schizothyme*.

Schizophrenia. A severe psychosis marked by withdrawal and the dissociation of emotional from ideational processes, and often both from overt responses. Has no evident organic basis. Also called *dementia praecox*.

Shock therapy. Treatment of personality disorders by administration of insulin, metrazol or severe electric current.

Sign. Broadly a term for any learned cue which sets off a response; a directly perceptible indicator of an event; for example, smoke means fire, crying of a baby means he is in distress. See *symbol*.

Social expectancy. The expectation or belief that another or others will perform a certain act or take a particular attitude; developed from anticipatory responses built up in social interaction.

Social type. A general term used to characterize the habits and attitudes, or better, the major rôle of persons in a given group or sample of the population.

Socialization. An interactional learning process which equips the individual to become a participating and acceptable member of the group.

Soma. From Greek word meaning body. Adjective *somatic* refers to conditions and processes relating to the organic or bodily factors. Originally implied a sharp contrast to *psychic* factors. Today used only to refer to obvious constitutional factors but with no necessary implication of former mind body dichotomy.

Somatotype. A classification of an individual according to his body-build.

Status. Relative position, rank, or standing of a person in a group, or of a group in reference to some other group or groups.

Sublimation. Form of substitute behavior which is socially accepted as praiseworthy and ethically desirable.

Superego. Conscience or moral part of self. Term used by Freud.

Suppression. The conscious pushing of desires or thoughts out of consciousness; a form of deliberate inhibition of impulses and ideas.

Symbol. Any object, picture, gesture, sign, mark, printed or written matter, or sound, which stands for, represents, or serves to recall a meaningful experience, and which directs mental and actional associations.

Symptom. Any apparent departure from a normal function or structure either physical or psychological which gives evidence of pathology.

Syndrome. An aggregate or group of symptoms associated with a given disease or disorder. Does not necessarily indicate a disease entity.

Transference. Displacement of emotions and feelings from one person to another. A form of identification, particularly evident in relation of therapist to patient.

Unconscious. Term used to describe that area of mind which influences idea, attitudes, and behavior without mediation through consciousness. The unconscious may be built up by associations or conditioned responses never in the focus of attention. It may also be built up by conscious associations which are later repressed. By definition "unconscious" content is inaccessible to conscious awareness except by special methods of psychotherapy.

APPENDIX A

An Outline for Writing a Life History

Before preparing a life history, it would be wise to reread the discussion of the life history method in Chapter II, especially pages 305-311 and 320-322.

This outline may be employed as a basis for a case record or life history prepared from interviews and from data obtained from various institutional records, such as those of the school, the hospital, the social-work agency, the clinic, the business or industrial firm and the correctional or other public or semi-public institution designed to care for delinquent, neglected, or dependent children or adults. Or it may be used as a guide in the preparation of an autobiography.

If it is used to guide the writing of one's own life story, the writer should consider the outline as an aid in reviewing the significant features of his life. While attention should be given to an accurate recording of the major objective facts about age, occupation, places of residence, schooling, and the like, the chief aim of the autobiography is to secure a more or less free narrative of the personality development and function. A convenient procedure is to become familiar with the major divisions of the outline before beginning to write, perhaps making notes as memories or ideas occur to one during the reading of the various topics listed. But the outline should not be regarded as a formal set of questions and instructions. For example, many matters in your experience may **not fit into the scheme suggested here.**

By all means feel free to follow your own conception of writing and presentation. You should write under conditions favorable to quiet concentration on the task. Be specific; present concrete events and actual incidents rather than abstract comments. Frequently items that by themselves seem trivial may, in the total context, have considerable meaning. For instance, little injuries to self-esteem, happy experiences on particular occasions, or frustrations in childhood or adolescence that would not affect one as an adult may have meant much at the time and may have left some residue of trait, attitude, or habit that has a place in one's present life. Trifles, in fact, are often important clues to underlying significances.

I. DATA ON FAMILY

A. INDIVIDUAL'S OWN FAMILY

1. Age, sex, and names of all family members—parents and children—in chronological order.
2. Residential history of family: rural, small-town, urban; if pertinent, give ethnic history of family members.
3. Health history of each member (brief).

4. Occupation of chief wage-earner, and prior vocation, if pertinent.
5. Occupation of mother, before and after marriage.
6. Religious affiliation of family, and degree of participation in church activities.
7. Political affiliations of family members, and participation.
8. Educational attainment of family members.
9. Status of family in community—reputation, rôle, and leadership.
10. Other persons in household than own immediate family: sex, age, number, function, relationship to own family.

B. HISTORY OF FATHER'S FAMILY

Record essential data listed above under A, 1-10, if available.

C. HISTORY OF MOTHER'S FAMILY

Record essential data listed above under A, 1-10, if available.

D. DESCRIPTION OF THE FAMILY CULTURE PATTERNS

A narrative of the history of the family as a unit, its traditions, aims, ideals. The place of old memories, of family legends of events long past. Family "get-togethers"; what is talked about at these times. Intimate intrafamily secrets; sense and degree of solidarity. What family members and relatives do for one another. The story of the rise or decline of the family in social-economic status.

Father-mother interactions: division of labor, of responsibility, dominant and/or submissive rôles with regard to other spouse, conflict and/or coöperation regarding children. Relations of each parent to children; relations among siblings, rivalry, cooperation. Ego-models or ambitions set before children by parents and others. Relations of mother to her own family members, and of father to his own family.

II. DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE INDIVIDUAL

Since the basic matter in the life history is the interplay between the person and his social-material environment (the situation: group, individuals, material things), it is wise to combine, if possible, the description of the social interactions and external situations with the individual's own overt responses and inner thoughts with regard to these matters. (If this outline is used as a guide to writing an autobiography, a good warm-up is to begin this section by writing down your earliest memories of yourself and family.)

A. CHILDHOOD AND PRE-ADOLESCENCE

Situations

1. **Mother-child contacts.** Nature and extent of basic habit training: feeding, weaning, sphincter controls, sleep, play, and so on. Nature and degree of interplay of indulgence and discipline; consistency or inconsistency in training. Dependency patterns and stimulation of child's independence and self-control by others. Favoritism; rejection. Any projection of aims on child. Mother as ideal or ego-model.
2. **Father-child relations.** Nature and extent of father-child contacts in early

years. Imposition of demands for obedience, loyalty, and compliance. Nature of any conflicts. Play relations with father. Projections of father on child respecting aims. Erection, favoritism. Father as ideal or ego-model.

3. **Inter-sibling contacts.** Affection, rivalry, envy, jealousy, indifference; situations giving rise to these. Imitation, dependency relations.

4. **Other household members.** Nature and extent of contact with relatives living in home, with servants, reactions to visitors—children and adults.

5. **Playmates, friends, rivals.** Nature and extent of early play contacts, interference from parents or other adults; types of status relations developed: dominance or submission. Place of comradeship, congeniality groupings, gang experiences in early years. Oppositional patterns, place of rivals and enemies.

6. **Relations to neighbors and community.** Nature and extent of contacts: friendly or avoidant; rise of notion of we-group—of own family and neighborhood as against members of out-groups. Reaction to policemen and other community authorities.

7. **Early school contacts.** Initial adjustments at school: fellow-pupils, teachers. Nature and extent of any difficulties in adaptation to the educational regimen.

Individual's Responses

1. **Reactions to fundamental training.** Frustrations and other reactions, aggression or avoidance, resistant behavior; fears and anxieties; compulsions and demands for attention.

2. **Dependency functions.** Role of mother, father, siblings, playmates, teachers, and others, their meaning to the child. Overdependency or rejection.

3. **Sense of emotional security.** Sources and meanings.

4. **Inferiority feelings.** How set up, with reference to what situations; means of handling them—avoidance, compensation, overcompensation, daydreaming.

5. **Fantasy life.** Nature and extent: objectification in play; accommodation to culturally accepted outlets—reading, motion pictures, radio, and television.

6. **Growth of self-confidence.** Self-assurance and self-reliance; willingness and readiness to assume more and more responsibility for own acts.

7. **Development of appropriate social rôles with references to others.** Emergence of "generalized other" or central rôle; identification with ego-models of others, sources: parents, relatives, teachers, and others.

8. **Rise of conscience (moral self; superego).** Sense of guilt and shame; situations causing guilt and shame. Growth of tendency to blame others; rise of projection as ego-defense.

9. **Fundamental interests and aims (aspirations).** Externalized or internalized play; hobbies; rise of vocational aspirations.

10. **Emerging status in relation to groups and individuals.**

11. **Religious training.** Kind, reaction to.

12. **Degree of satisfaction or happiness in the early years.**

B. ADOLESCENCE

Situations

1. **Parent-child.** Parent's preparation of child for pubertal changes; new relations with coming of puberty and adolescence: conflicts, aids from mother and father in meeting difficulties; stimulation to become freed from home ties or insistence on continuation of earlier dependency rôles. Degree of understanding by parents of adolescent's attempts at emancipation from home, of the

rise of heterosexual interests, of the growth of a sense of responsibility and self-control. Rejection; favoritism. Projection of parents' aims on children. Parent and ego-model.

2. **Inter-sibling contacts.** New conflicts with approach to maturity. Spread of affection from family members to others.

3. **Contacts with peer group and its culture.** New social configurations; dancing, recreation; parental objections to friends. Adolescent romances. Stimulation of new ideals and aims of youth. Stimulation of sense of age differences and conflicts between peer group and parental group.

4. **Extension of relations to adults in community.** New contacts with secondary groups: vocational, recreational, religious, political. Favorable or unfavorable reactions of parents to these new relations. Interest in "causes" and new and radical ideas. Emergence of conflict between primary and secondary group ideals and values.

Individual's Responses

1. **Meaning of pubertal changes.** New frustrations, anxieties, and mental conflicts; physical growth, attitudes, and habits associated with sexual functions, and so on.

2. **Alterations in dependency.** Struggle to emancipate oneself.

3. **New problems of emotional security.** Being misunderstood, or seeking new sources of strength and self-reliance.

4. **Inferiority feelings.** Enhanced or reduced by adolescent problems.

5. **Fantasies.** Related to sexual adjustments, to desires to escape home ties, to growing demands to assume responsibility and self-control. Aims and hopes in fantasy life and degree of making them work out.

6. **Coming of the romantic love pattern and fantasies of ideal mate.**

7. **Preparation for occupation or career; for civic responsibility.**

8. **Self-confidence and self-control.** Degree of retention of dependencies.

9. **Extension of moral self.** With respect to sex, to future marriage, to vocational and civic obligations.

10. **Modification and extension of goals and interests.** Vocational, marital, recreational, and so on.

11. **Degree of happiness and gratification.**

12. **Habitual adjustments to difficulties, problems, frustration.**

III. ADULT LIFE

Situations

1. **Occupation.** Nature of work, conditions, relations to fellow workmen. Income and socioeconomic status resulting from vocation.

2. **Premarital sexual adjustments.** Their nature and degree of satisfaction. Sense of guilt, or integration to other life aims.

3. **Family adjustments.** Conflicts over and satisfaction in sex life. Extramarital relations and their meaning. Adaptation to spouse, to children, to household routines: cooperation, conflict, indifference with respect to home and family members.

4. **Civic participation.** Nature and extent of community and political activity. What groups, rôle in groups. Leader, or more or less passive follower of others?

5. **Participation in religious life.** Nature and extent of participation in church activities; rôle and status, and leadership, if any.

6. **Recreational life.** Nature and extent of leisure-time activities; hobbies; active or passive games; solitary or gregarious patterns in leisure-time interests and conduct.

7. **Esthetic interests.** Nature and extent of interest in, and activity related to, esthetic matters. Forms of art enjoyed; degree of creative activity with reference to art.

Individual's Responses

1. **Degree of intellectual and social-emotional maturity.** With reference to each of these major areas of adult action: vocation, marriage, community life, religion, recreation, and esthetic interests. These may be measured or estimated against the norm (or cultural expectancy) of one's society, community, and social class.

2. **Integration or emotional conflicts.** With respect to these areas of life activity, how well has the individual coördinated his major rôle or "generalized other"?

3. **Degree of personal satisfaction.** How much does the individual feel forced or obliged to participate in these major activities, and how much is it willed and desired participation? Any sense of frustration with respect to these activities? What substitutive activities tend to offset frustrations or inferiority feelings which may accompany any of these areas of behavior? In particular, what place have esthetic and religious activities in offering balance to one's life course? Evaluation of one's place in the world; sense of achievement in relation to others.

4. **Planning.** Nature and extent of plans for future, aspirations regarding vocation, marriage, civic life, and so on.

IV. THE NATURE AND MEANING OF THE INNER (SUBJECTIVE) LIFE

The purpose of this section is to present the fundamentals of the inner or subjective life of the person and to get a picture of the basic value systems and frames of reference. Since it is here that the uniqueness of personality is most apparent, those writing an autobiography will each have his own scheme of values and his own manner of arranging and discussing. (If this section is used in preparing a case history of another the material will necessarily be largely inferential.)

1. **Emotional stabilities.** Nature of basic emotional-feeling (disposition): calm, fluctuating, tendency to dissociate intellectual from emotional values and aims. Extent of integration of impulses. Expansive or narrow contractive personality: extent of preference of one's own inner life to active participation? Nature and extent of deep-lying anxieties, fears, and sense of frustration. Nature and extent of hostility patterns and manner of expressing aggression. Dominance patterns—overt or only covert.

2. **Sense of self-confidence.** Assurance, and capacity to meet crises; what are the person's limits of facing difficulties, how does he react to severe situations? What use of devices to avoid meeting tests of self-assurance? How much, if any, self-deception? Nature of, and extent of, deceiving others about interests, abilities, attitudes, and habits.

3. **Power devices.** Nature of the means used to influence or control others.

flattery, overt aggression, negativism, appeals for sympathy and attention, kindly and coöperative habits, and so on. Degree of satisfaction at successful use of these power devices.

4. **Sense of self-pity.** Does the individual feel sorry for himself often, seldom, or never? What emotional-social support does he crave, especially when feeling abused, injured by circumstances, misunderstood?

5. **Basic inferiorities.** What are these, if any, and how are they met, and how disguised from others?

6. **Self-insight.** Ability to view oneself as others do (objectively). Ability to criticize oneself. Sense of humor, especially about oneself. Tendency to blame others or circumstances for failures (projection). How well does the individual take criticism from others?

7. **Fundamental ideals and aspirations.** What does he really want most in life? Manner of integrating conflicting aims in overt conduct as well as in imagination. What are basic vocational, marital, civic, and religious aims? What sacrifices will he make to achieve these aims?

8. **Work as a value.** Meaning of work, enforced obligation or voluntary and well-integrated habit system which provides positive gratification. Does the individual have to drive himself to work, or need urging or forcing from external circumstances? Any sense of being thwarted because the work does not bring the anticipated results?

9. **Recreation and avocation.** Meaning of play: for relaxation, balance; how integrated to work habits? What types of recreation are liked best? What hobbies and what significance or satisfaction do they have?

10. **Conception of maturity.** What is it and what are the individual's standards for determining it: sexual potency, money-making, sound civic participation, good health, leadership, moral responsibility to others—is it near or remote from personal relations?

11. **Self-control.** How does the individual meet difficulties: deny them, escape into fantasy, blame others, carry through plans for changing habits and attitudes which he realizes are inefficient and conducive to inadequate social adaptation?

12. **Basic satisfactions or happiness in life.** Fluctuations in sense of satisfaction; what real meaning does life have? Tendency to retreat inwardly for greatest satisfactions, or to find them in contact with world of other persons or things? What is the basic outlook on life: optimistic, pessimistic? How does the individual conceive his place in the world today? In the future?

APPENDIX B

Some Suggestions on the Use of Films

The use of the motion picture as a teaching aid in courses in personality is growing rapidly. As the demand increases, so too, the supply of good films is steadily becoming better. No attempt will be made here to do more than to provide a suggestive list of presently available films, classified under some of the larger rubrics of our analysis of personality. These are (1) biological foundations of behavior, (2) motivation, emotions, and learning, (3) child development, (4) pre-adolescence and adolescence, (5) general problems of adjustment, (6) special problems such as those associated with school, marriage, occupation, and mental disturbances, and (7) diagnosis and therapy. The abbreviations AFI, NFBC, PCR, and so on, refer to the film distributors listed on pp. 695-696.

1. *Biological Foundations of Behavior*

Heredity. H. H. Strandkov. Explains schematically the transmission of hereditary factors responsible for inherited characteristics in animals. Sound; 11 minutes. EBF1; IFB.

Nervous system. R. W. Gerard. Explains, through animated drawings, how sense organs receive stimuli, and how nerves carry impulses to the central nervous system and thence to muscles to execute responses. Sound; 11 minutes. EBF1, IFB.

2. *Motivation, Emotion, and Learning*

Motivation and reward in learning. N. E. Miller and Gardner Hart. Shows rats driven by hunger trying to secure food by trial and error learning. Demonstrates how learning is controlled by motivation and reward (reinforcement). Sound; 15 minutes. PCR.

Social behavior in animals. O. H. Mowrer. Part I shows a competitive situation involving food, in which rats develop a form of sharing; Part II shows another situation in which behavior instead of sharing becomes increasingly competitive. Silent; 12 minutes. PCR.

Unconscious motivation. L. F. Beck. Shows how everyday thoughts, feelings, and actions may be influenced by unconscious motives. Two subjects, a young man and a young woman, are given post-hypnotic suggestions as a basis for their motivation. Sound, 38 minutes. AFI; PCR.

3. *Child Development*

Preface to life. The critical years of a child's life and how his developing personality is influenced by the attitudes and actions of his family. Sound, 28 minutes. AFI; PCR.

- Learning and growth.** Arnold Gesell. Shows possibilities and limitations in training infants from 24 to 48 weeks of age. Sound; 11 minutes. EBFI.
- Early social behavior.** Arnold Gesell. Analyzes various social situations which children face as they grow up; age ranges are from eight weeks to seven years. Sound; 11 minutes. EBFI; IFB. (There is an entire series on learning and maturation, prepared under Gesell.)
- Growth: a study of Johnny and Jimmy.** Based on a well-known study of twins; shows the interdependence of training and maturation. Silent; 43 minutes. IFB.
- This is Robert.** Mary S. Fisher, *et al.* Traces the personality growth in a pre-school child, from two years of age when he entered nursery school to end of his first year in public school when he was seven years old. Sound; 75 minutes. PCR.

4. Pre-adolescence and Adolescence

- Children growing up with other people.** Traces development of personality from childhood through adolescence; good for general orientation. Sound; 23 minutes. PCR.
- You and your family.** Typical problems are presented showing conflicts over dating, home chores, and so on. Sound; 7 minutes. AFL.
- You and your friends.** Shows a teen-age party, contrasting friendly with self-centered behavior. Sound; 7 minutes. AFL.
- Problem children.** Story of two junior high-school boys; one of whom is an aggressive "show-off," the other, a shy, introverted lad. Film brings out importance of family training, impact of school, and so on, on development of behavior patterns. Sound; 20 minutes. PCR.
- Learning to understand children.** Parts I and II. A case study of an emotionally and socially maladjusted girl of 15 years. Diagnostic techniques and therapeutic plan presented. Sound; each part 22 minutes. OSU.

5. General Problems of Adjustment

- Feelings of depression; the feeling of rejection; the feeling of hostility; and overdependency.** A series of four case histories each centering around the topic of the film, presenting both diagnosis and therapy. All sound. Time 30, 21, 31, and 32 minutes respectively. NFBC; PCR.
- Act your age.** Presentation of infantile and childish emotional reactions in order to bring out need to overcome such social handicaps as one grows up. Sound, 15 minutes. CF; PCR.

6. Some Special Problems. Education, Marriage, Deviants

- Problem of pupil adjustment.** Parts I and II. Problems of motivation in school showing the need to link up teaching with pupils' interests. Sound; 20 minutes each. M-HBC; PCR.
- Are you ready for marriage?** Reuben Hill. Checklist for couples contemplating engagement and marriage. Sound, 15 minutes. CF, PCR.
- Marriage for moderns series.** Five films developed around Henry Bowman's *Marriage for Moderns* (New York, McGraw Hill Book Company, Inc., 2nd ed., 1945). Sound. Time ranges from 14 to 22 minutes. M-HBC, PCR.
- The feeble minded.** Causes of feeble mindedness explored, types of tests used, occupational training, and social problems associated with the feeble minded are shown. Sound; 41 minutes. PCR.

Pay attention: problems of hard-of-hearing children. Discusses some of the educational and personality problems faced by the child who has defective hearing. Sound; 30 minutes. NYU.

The quiet one. Story of a child from a disrupted home who develops a strong sense of isolation and rejection; later becomes a delinquent and is sent to a special correctional school where he shows considerable improvement under sound therapy. Sound; 67 minutes. AF.

Introduction to combat fatigue. Shows development of symptoms of combat fatigue, beginning with fear, and moving on to tensions, insomnia, and so on. Sound; 31 minutes. ND.

Psychosomatic disorders. Discussion and demonstration of hysterical pains and other disorders which have no discernable organic causes. Sound; 22 minutes. ND.

Symptoms of schizophrenia. Summarizes the major symptoms of schizophrenia, such as social apathy, delusions, hallucinations, and so on. Silent; 18 minutes. PCR.

7. *Diagnosis and Therapy*

The unity of personality. Study of expressive movements of five individuals who show various differences in gestures, handwriting, manual activities, and so on, from person to person but who show consistency for a given person. Silent; 18 minutes. PCR.

Understanding children's play. Introduction to use of play as diagnosis and therapy: use of toys, painting, etc. Sound; 12 minutes. PCR.

Frustration play techniques: Parts I and II. Shows use of toys and dolls in projective play. Sound; each about 20 minutes. PCR.

Finger painting. Shows personality diagnosis obtained from evaluation of paintings made by use of fingers. Silent; 17 minutes. OSU.

An introduction to clinical neurology: Parts I-IV. A series dealing with general neurological and clinical symptoms related to cerebral, cerebellar, and other pathologies. Silent; times range from 17 to 20 minutes. PCR.

DISTRIBUTORS OF MOTION PICTURES

Instructors who wish to use films should make their own collection of possible sources and should check prices for purchases and rentals. Films should be ordered well in advance of intended showing date. Some films are restricted as to use. The abbreviations used above precede the name of firm and address.

AF	Athena Films, Inc., 165 West 46 Street, New York 19, N.Y.
AFI	Association Films, 35 West 45 Street, New York 19, N.Y.
CF	Coronet Films, Coronet Building, Chicago 1, Ill.
EBFI	Encyclopedia Britannica Films, Inc., 20 North Wacker Drive, Chicago, Ill.
IFB	International Film Bureau, 6 North Michigan Avenue, Chicago, Ill.
M-HBC	McGraw-Hill Book Company, Textbook Film Department, 330 West 42 Street, New York 18, N.Y.
ND	Navy Department, Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, Audio-visual Training Section, Potomac Annex, Building 2, Room 304, Washington 25, D.C.

- NFBC National Film Board of Canada, 620 Fifth Avenue, New York 20, N.Y.
NYU New York University Film Library, Washington Square, New York 12, N.Y.
OSU Ohio State University, Department of Photography, Columbus 10, Ohio.
PCR Psychological Cinema Register, Pennsylvania State College, State College, Pa.

The United States Department of the Army also distributes some useful films. To obtain them instructors should write the commanding general in their particular corps area and specify, "Attention, Surgeon." To give coverage of government-made films, see *Guide to United States Government Motion Pictures*, Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.

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